CEO turnover in China: the role of market-based and accounting performance measures

We investigate the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) turnover and firm performance in China's publicly traded firms. We provide evidence on the use of accounting and market-based performance measures in CEO turnover decision. We also investigate the moderating roles of noise in performance measures, firm growth opportunities, state-owned enterprises, and corporate governance reform on the weights attached to these performance measures. We observe that Chinese listed firms rely more on accounting performance than on stock market performance when determining CEO turnover. Firms with noisier performance measures and larger growth opportunities rely less on both accounting performance and stock market performance in CEO replacement decision. State-controlled firms are more likely to use accounting performance to determine CEO turnover. Finally, we observe that the weight attached to the accounting performance measure is significantly reduced and the weight attached to the stock market performance measure is significantly increased after the governance reform. We also observe that the reform has different impact on state-owned firms and private firms in terms of the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance.     

Top management turnover,firm performance and government control: Evidence from China's listed state-owned enterprises

Using a sample of 916 Chinese listed state-owned enterprises (SOEs) from 2001 to 2005, we find that the likelihood of top management turnover is negatively associated with firm performance, suggesting the existence of an effective corporate governance mechanism in an emerging economy that is highly controlled by government. We also find that the negative turnover–performance relationship is stronger when the SOE is directly held by the central or local government, holding a monopolistic position in a local economy or in a strategic/regulated industry. The results indicate that the market-based corporate governance mechanism that disciplines top executives as a result of poor performance is not only used in Chinese SOEs, but is used more frequently when the governance control of SOEs is more intense. Our findings support the notion that government control strengthens rather than weakens the turnover–performance governance mechanism. Our additional analysis shows that this complementary effect is stronger in regions that lack pro-market institutions, such as investor protections and a functioning capital market.     

The Complementarity Between Signal Informativeness and Monitoring

A firm that must decide whether to retain or terminate a manager can rely on several sources of information to assess managerial ability. When it relies on a performance signal and monitoring, we show that a more informative signal can surprisingly increase the value of monitoring. Then, signal precision and monitoring are complements. This happens if a more precise information system makes some signals more negative indicators of managerial ability that still do not trigger termination. When the turnover cost is high enough and the manager is more entrenched after a positive performance, an increase in signal precision increases expected monitoring. In firms with a high turnover cost, a less informative signal is compounded by worse monitoring after a disappointing performance. This “bad corporate governance trap” makes it hard for these firms to eventually improve performance.     

浅析东北国有企业重组"轮回"现象及治理机制

东北国企重组出现"轮回"现象,其根源在于大型国有企业行政隶属关系仍然很强,企业改制重组工作很大程度上是通过传统的行政模式和手段推进的。政府积极介入经济和社会发展过程,有其客观原因,但不能凭短期的经济效益来评价国企改制重组的效果。解决之道在于建立和完善治理结构,在所有权和经营权分离基础上进行体制创新,提高委托—代理关系的可靠性和有效性。     

Public governance and executive perks under a weak corporate governance environment

We reveal state-led anti-corruption campaigns in China can mitigate excess executive perk consumption facilitated by firms' weak internal control environment. Our findings suggest that public governance can substitute for firm-level governance mechanisms. Since these campaigns enhance the central government's disciplinary power over local state-owned enterprises (SOEs), the above effects are heightened among SOEs controlled by provincial/municipal governments rather than the central government. Irrespective of political connections, non-SOEs are also affected, indicating policy effect spillover to China's private sectors. We explore several underlining mechanisms for these effects, including Communist Party Committee governance, chief executive officer/chairperson dismissal, industry competition, and firm productivity.     

国有上市保险公司股权结构对经营绩效的影响研究

伴随着国有企业股份制改革浪潮的推进,对我国保险业来说影响深远的重大事件莫过于中国人寿和中国太保2007年先后回归境内上市.股权结构作为目前上市公司热门话题之一--公司治理的关键基础,探析它对我国国有上市保险公司经营绩效的影响是迫切的、符合实际国情的.本文采用个体时点双固定效应回归模型考察了从2008年第一季度到2010...     

Easy cleanups or forbearing improvements: The effect of CEO tenure on successor’s performance

Long CEO tenure can harm firm performance even after the CEO is replaced. We analyze this issue by conditioning post-turnover firm performance on the length of the preceding CEO’s tenure. Identification comes from instrumenting sudden CEO deaths as an exogenous shock to tenure length. We find that when a successor takes over after a long-tenured CEO, operating performance and stock returns are significantly lower, restructuring costs are higher, “big baths” are larger, and firm recovery is slower. Weaker corporate governance and a long-tenured CEO with lower skills amplify these post-turnover effects.     

Discretionary write-downs,write-offs,and other restructuring provisions: a signaling approach

This paper introduces a model seeking to explain the discretionary write-downs, write-offs, and other restructuring provisions reported by managers. The model comprises a firm, a manager, and a financial market. The firm is about to be restructured. The manager has some private information about the likelihood of success of his restructuring action. The manager may recognise all or part of the expenditure associated with his future restructuring action by reporting a discretionary restructuring provision. The manager chooses whether or not to report a provision, recognising the impact of the provision on his compensation. The paper shows how, under certain conditions, the manager may credibly communicate his private information to investors through his provision policy. Testable implications are consistent with the empirical evidence reported by Strong and Meyer (1987), Elliott and Shaw (1988), and Zucca and Campbell (1992).     

国企混改实践中的认识误区和未来突破的关键问题

通过梳理和逻辑分析已经完成和正在进行的国企混改案例背后所揭示的事实,本文指出实践中存在的对国企混改的认识误区和国企混改未来突破需要解决的关键问题。以国企之间的“混”或通过基金的“混”来代替民资背景战投的引入,并不能真正实现国企经营机制转换和公司治理制度完善的最终混改目的。未来国企混改突破的关键在于,其一如何通过公司治理制度设计,使民资背景的战投激励相容,愿意参与国企的混改;其二如何实现产业集团向国有资本投资公司的转型,真正实现国有资本监管体系从“管企业”向“管资本”转化。在转型路径选择上,存在委派董事参与公司治理、与民资背景战投组成有限合伙构架以及国资转化为优先股三种可能的实现路径。     

How Does Government Ownership Affect Firm Performance? Evidence from China's Privatization Experience

The effect of government ownership on firm performance remains a controversial issue, especially in a transitional economy like China. Government ownership is typically viewed as adversely affecting firm performance. This study of that of Mainland China's privatization experience indicates the opposite. No matter whether it is in the form of state ownership or legal person ownership, government ownership has a positive impact on partially privatized state-owned enterprises. However, this relationship is nonlinear and shows an inverted U-shape. Given the situation of highly indebted, non-performing state-owned enterprises, we argue that too much government control is indeed bad for enterprises. But too little government ownership may not be good either. It might mean a lack of the government's political support and business connections, which are valuable and necessary to vitalize performance.     

党组织参与治理与国有企业金融化

本文基于中国特色国有企业公司治理视角分析党组织参与治理在解决国有企业金融化中的作用,并以2006—2018年A股国有上市公司为样本进行实证检验。理论分析方面,通过整合金融化“预防性动机”“投机动机”和“盈余管理动机”构建综合的机制分析框架。实证研究发现,党组织通过“双向进入”“交叉任职”参与治理,有效抑制了企业金融化的“投机动机”和“盈余管理动机”,显著降低了国有企业金融化程度。党组织参与治理的效果在“讨论前置”实施前后、不同层级国有企业间以及不同方式的“双向进入”安排中存在显著差异。进一步研究发现,党组织参与治理对金融资产收益率没有影响,但显著提高了风险金融资产的市场价值。本文有助于丰富和发展中国情境下公司治理理论,为抑制国有资本“脱实向虚”、促进实体经济健康发展提供了政策启示。     

国企“混改”与企业金融资产配置

本文利用2010～2017年中国沪深A股非金融类上市公司面板数据,考察了国企“混改”对企业金融资产配置的影响,并重点分析了国企“混改”过程中企业金融资产配置的动机。结果显示,非国有股东参股促进了国有企业的金融资产投资。机制检验发现,非国有股东参股通过治理效应路径和融资约束路径共同影响了国有企业的金融资产配置行为,具体表现为非国有股东参股带来的监督治理效应和融资约束强化效应均增强了国有企业配置金融资产的预防性储蓄动机,进而促使国有企业增加金融资产投资。上述研究结果表明,非国有股东参股推动的国有企业金融资产投资并非出于短期利益追逐,而是为了平滑企业投资进行的预防性储蓄。本文研究对于如何通过深化混合所有制改革引导企业“脱虚向实”有一定的借鉴意义。     

混改背景下国有企业股权性质变化对企业创新效率的影响

党的十九大强调了“发展混合所有制经济”,国企混改将对企业创新效率产生一定的影响。为此,基于2009-2018年上市公司的财务数据和专利数据,运用双重差分模型和中介效应模型考察改制后国有企业的专利数量和质量的变化情况。结果表明：国有企业改制对企业的专利产出效率有积极作用,但是对企业的专利质量效率有消极作用,即国有企业改制会通过改变企业的融资约束和研发投入对企业的创新效率产生影响,融资约束和研发投入均对专利数量有遮掩作用,对专利质量有部分中介效用,改制后企业将更加重视企业经济目标,注重短期的专利数量成果,从而忽视创新专利的质量。     

Ultimate Government Control Structures and Firm Value: Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies

We show that 70% of Chinese listed companies are ultimately controlled by government agencies, thereby indicating that state ownership remains widespread in China's stock markets. Three questions are considered that are related to government control structures and their impact on firm value: (1) how do government agencies maintain their control of listed companies; (2) what are the impacts of different government control structures on firm value; and (3) are these impacts different in local government and central government-controlled firms? We find that the Chinese government controls listed companies directly or indirectly through solely state-owned enterprises (SSOEs). Taking into account the trade-off between political and agency costs, we show that firm value increases when some control rights are decentralized from the government to state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Moreover, decentralization improves significantly the performance of local government- controlled, but not central government-controlled firms.     

Top management turnover and firm default risk: Evidence from the Chinese securities market

China has moved rapidly from a socialist planned economy to a market economy. As a result, many enterprises in China are seeking talented top management to increase their performance and decrease their default risk. Studies abound regarding top management turnover and its relationship with firm performance, however, few studies have connected top management turnover with firm default risk. In China, a market with extensive financial fraud, firm default risk is an important factor and thus we explore this relationship in the Chinese securities market. Our results indicate that firms with higher default risk are more likely to change their top management in the next financial reporting period. In addition, following changes in top management, such firms default less than other companies.     

Does green governance affect financing constraints? Evidence from China’s heavily polluting enterprises

Given the increasing focus on global sustainable development, many enterprises in developing countries such as China participate in green governance and scale up their green investment; however, many enterprises still experience financing difficulties. Our study investigates whether green governance can mitigate corporate financing constraints. Using a sample of Chinese, A-share listed, high-pollution enterprises from 2013 to 2018, we find that corporate green governance practices, including environmental performance and information disclosure, ease corporate financing constraints. This effect is pronounced in areas with high levels of financial development and for state-owned enterprises. This paper not only proposes a channel for alleviating enterprises’ financing constraints but also reveals the importance of industrial transformation and emissions reduction for energy-intensive industries in emerging markets.     

The internationalization of Chinese companies: Firm characteristics, industry effects and corporate governance

A prominent issue in the internationalization of Chinese firms is that many are state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and that corporate governance in China is highly idiosyncratic. This paper identifies firm characteristics, industry effects and corporate governance mechanisms that foster internationalization. We find that Chinese cross-border mergers create shareholder value, but not more than domestic expansions. Corporate governance mechanisms matter, jointly and individually. While state-ownership predicts fewer cross-border mergers, a favourable board structure and corporate transparency explains higher M&A returns. As in more mature markets, firm- and industry-specific determinants also affect M&As in China.     

Board Independence and Mutual Fund Manager Turnover

This paper studies the relationship between board independence and manager turnover in the mutual fund industry. Using the Lipper 2003 mutual fund board data, we find that manager turnover is more likely to happen to funds with poor prior performance and more independent boards. Consistent with previous studies such as Tufano and Sevick (1997), our research provides new evidence in support of the Securities and Exchange Commission's approach of improving fund governance by promoting board independence.     

资产管理公司股权退出与国有企业重组

债转股是我国为化解金融风险、盘活国有银行不良资产和推动国有企业改革脱困而实施的一项重大举措。本在对目前债转股给国企带来的积极效应和存在的主要问题进行分析的基础上，提出了实现资产管理公司股权退出和国有企业重组的一些建议。     

Internal Monitoring Mechanisms and CEO Turnover: A Long-Term Perspective

We report evidence on chief executive officer (CEO) turnover during the 1971 to 1994 period. We find that the nature of CEO turnover activity has changed over time. The frequencies of forced CEO turnover and outside succession both increased. However, the relation between the likelihood of forced CEO turnover and firm performance did not change significantly from the beginning to the end of the period we examine, despite substantial changes in internal governance mechanisms. The evidence also indicates that changes in the intensity of the takeover market are not associated with changes in the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance.