The Risk-Adjusted Cost of Financial Distress

Financial distress is more likely to happen in bad times. The present value of distress costs therefore depends on risk premia. We estimate this value using risk‐adjusted default probabilities derived from corporate bond spreads. For a BBB‐rated firm, our benchmark calculations show that the NPV of distress is 4.5% of predistress value. In contrast, a valuation that ignores risk premia generates an NPV of 1.4%. We show that marginal distress costs can be as large as the marginal tax benefits of debt derived by Graham (2000) . Thus, distress risk premia can help explain why firms appear to use debt conservatively.     

Preemption,leverage, and financing constraints

This paper investigates the interactions between preemptive competition and leverage in a duopoly market. We investigate both a case in which the firms have optimal financial structures, and a case in which financing constraints require firms to finance their investments by debt. Our findings are that the second mover always leaves the duopoly market before the leader, although the leader may exit before the follower's entry. The leverage effects of debt financing can increase the value of a firm and accelerate investment, even in the presence of preemptive competition. Notably, financing constraints can delay preemptive investment and improve firm values in preemptive equilibrium. Indeed, the leader's high leverage due to financing constraints can lower the first-mover advantage and weaken preemptive competition. Especially with strong first-mover advantage, the financing constraint effects can dominate the leverage effects. These findings are almost consistent with the empirical evidence, which shows that high leverage leads to competitive disadvantage and mitigates product market competition.     

Quantitative Asset Pricing Implications of Endogenous Solvency Constraints

We study the asset pricing implications of an economy wheresolvency constraints are endogenously determined to deter agentsfrom defaulting while allowing as much risk sharing as possible.We solve analytically for efficient allocations and for thecorresponding asset prices, portfolio holdings, and solvencyconstraints for a simple example. Then we calibrate a more generalmodel to U.S. aggregate as well as idiosyncratic income processes.We find equity premia, risk premia for long-term bonds, andSharpe ratios of magnitudes similar to the U.S. data for lowriskaversion and a lowtime-discount factor.     

自由现金流量创造力与违约风险——来自A股公司的经验证据

本文基于我国A股上市公司数据,研究了企业自由现金流量创造力与违约风险之间的关系。研究发现:(1)企业自由现金流量创造力越强,其违约风险越低。经过一系列稳健性检验后,该结论依旧成立。(2)自由现金流量创造力越强的企业往往有更低的债务规模、更高的资产收益率和更低的股票波动,因而其违约风险更低。(3)自由现金流量创造力与违约风险的负相关关系,主要存在于货币政策紧缩时期以及外部信息环境较差的企业。本文发现意味着,监管部门和投资者应重视上市公司自由现金流量创造力不足所带来的潜在债务违约风险,通过不断提高公司自由现金流量创造力,助力我国宏观经济与微观企业高质量发展。     

Distressed debt prices and recovery rate estimation

This paper has two purposes. First, it uses distressed debt prices to estimate recovery rates at default. In this regard, estimates are obtained for three recovery rate models: recovery of face value, recovery of Treasury, and recovery of market value. We show that identifying the “economic” default date, as distinct from the recorded default date, is crucial to obtaining unbiased estimates. The economic default date is defined to be the first date when the market prices the firm’s debt as if it has defaulted. An implication is that the standard industry practice of using 30-day post default prices to compute recovery rate yields biased estimates. Second, we construct and estimate a distressed debt pricing model. We use this model to implicitly estimate the parameters of the embedded recovery rate process and to price distressed debt. Our distressed debt pricing model fits market prices well, with an average pricing error of less than one basis point.      

Financial Synergies and the Optimal Scope of the Firm: Implications for Mergers, Spinoffs, and Structured Finance

Multiple activities may be separated financially, allowing each to optimize its financial structure, or combined in a firm with a single optimal financial structure. We consider activities with nonsynergistic operational cash flows, and examine the purely financial benefits of separation versus merger. The magnitude of financial synergies depends upon tax rates, default costs, relative size, and the riskiness and correlation of cash flows. Contrary to accepted wisdom, financial synergies from mergers can be negative if firms have quite different risks or default costs. The results provide a rationale for structured finance techniques such as asset securitization and project finance.     

Secured and unsecured debt in creditor-friendly bankruptcy

This article develops a continuous-time asset pricing model for valuing corporate securities in the presence of both secured and unsecured debt. We consider a framework where creditors dominate the negotiation process. This is consistent with the increasing influence of creditors in bankruptcy. We show that the unsecured creditors are incentivized to liquidate the firm prematurely relative to the first-best threshold. However, if the firm’s liquidation value is very low, it should complement its secured debt with unsecured debt as a form of insurance to avoid early liquidations. Our results have important implications for the debt structure and the resolution of financial distress of modern firms with substantial intangible assets.     

Corporate debt maturity in the MENA region: Does institutional quality matter?

We investigate corporate debt maturity structure in the MENA region and its firm and institutional determinants using a sample of 444 listed firms over the 2003–2011 period, or 3717 firm-year observations. We find a very limited use of long-term debt by MENA firms; long-term debt represents only 3.41% of the typical MENA firm's total debt, which is much less than what is reported in prior literature on other parts of the world. Consistent with the predictions of debt maturity theories and prior empirical findings, we find that leverage, firm size, and asset tangibility are positively associated with the use of more long-term debt while firms facing a higher risk of default tend to use more short-term debt. In addition, we find that better quality institutions lead to the use of more long-term debt in MENA. Specifically, stronger rule of law, better regulatory effectiveness, better legal protection of creditors, and more developed financial intermediaries are associated with greater use of long-term borrowing by MENA firms. Our findings have important policy implications as they illuminate the path toward needed reforms that would enhance MENA firms' access to long-term debt, which may ultimately result in more private investment and jobs.     

Foreign currency borrowing surrounding the global financial crisis: Evidence from Korea

We present a complete profile of firms’ foreign currency borrowing surrounding the 2007 global financial crisis. Employing extensive data from Korean firms during 2002–2012, we find that foreign currency borrowing is significantly related to firm attributes of export revenues, firm size, tangible assets and asset growth, as well as to macro-level factors. These results offer two important implications. First, macroeconomic factors alone cannot fully explain firms’ foreign currency borrowing. Second and more importantly, these firm attributes are indicative of a lower default probability and larger collateral value, which would not only facilitate borrowers’ access to foreign currency debt markets but also offer lenders a better protective cushion from possible loan defaults in the face of exchange rate changes and information asymmetry on borrowers’ credits. Period wise, asset-related firm attributes have more pronounced effects in the post- than pre-crisis period. We further show that banking regulations following the crisis effectively limit the access to foreign currency borrowing by Korean firms, most significantly by those belonging to large business groups.     

Monetary Policy,Bank Lending,and the Risk‐Pricing Channel

This paper identifies a monetary policy channel through the risk pricing of bank debt in the market for jumbo certificates of deposit (jumbo CDs). Adverse policy shocks increase debt holder perceptions of bank default, increasing the risk premia for some banks, thereby decreasing their external funding of loans. The results show that contractionary policy increases the sensitivity of jumbo‐CD spreads to leverage and asset risk for small banks, and to leverage for large banks. The results also show a distributional and aggregate effect on banking system jumbo CDs and total loans, producing a risk‐pricing (or market discipline) channel. This channel has implications for monetary and regulatory policies, and financial stability.     

Asset redeployability and the choice between bank debt and public debt

A firm with less redeployable assets, which are assets that have fewer alternative uses outside the firm, is more likely to borrow from banks than issue public debt. These findings are consistent with firms with less redeployable assets valuing the ability to renegotiate bank debt contracts instead of selling assets in the event of default. Consistent with this mechanism, firms with lower asset redeployability sell fewer assets following covenant violations. Our results contribute to work on the determinants of which debt markets a firm chooses to borrow from and the role that banks play as intermediaries.     

土地财政抑制了企业创新吗?——基于信贷错配视角的分析

基于一般均衡框架,考量房价、土地财政与企业创新之间的关系。研究发现：金融市场存在摩擦时,土地作为重要的抵押资产,房价波动和土地财政会扭曲创新资源的配置,在短期和长期对创新产生不同的影响。短期房价上升通过土地财政推动政府支出增加和总产出扩张,同时带动了企业的研发投入。当面临新的投资机会时,企业可以通过出售房产,缓解流动性约束。但在长期,土地财政引致的政府债务挤出了企业信贷,部门间信贷错配抑制了企业研发投入,同时高房价会导致企业转移部分资源投资房产,部门内资源错配进一步抑制了企业创新,从而降低了长期经济增长率,政府增加土地供给,则会弱化政府债务对企业创新要素的挤出效应。     

破产重整对我国上市公司违约边界的影响

本文利用模型分析了债务重整对上市公司违约边界的影响。研究发现在一定条件下,公司有可能在资产价值大于债务面值的情况下选择违约以牟取重整收益,且重整成本和清偿率与违约边界呈反方向变化。因此为防范我国上市公司的违约风险,应该设定较高的违约边界。     

Financially Constrained Stock Returns

We study the effect of financial constraints on risk and expected returns by extending the investment-based asset pricing framework to incorporate retained earnings, debt, costly equity, and collateral constraints on debt capacity. Quantitative results show that more financially constrained firms are riskier and earn higher expected stock returns than less financially constrained firms. Intuitively, by preventing firms from financing all desired investments, collateral constraints restrict the flexibility of firms in smoothing dividend streams in the face of aggregate shocks. The inflexibility mechanism also gives rise to a convex relation between market leverage and expected stock returns.     

Entrepreneurial finance: Banks versus venture capital

We analyze how entrepreneurial firms choose between two funding institution: banks, which monitor less intensively and face liquidity demands from their own investors, and venture capitalists, who can monitor more intensively but face a higher cost of capital because of the liquidity constraints that they impose on their own investors. Because the firm's manager prefers continuing the firm over liquidating it and aggressive (risky) continuation strategies over conservative (safe) continuation strategies, the institution must monitor the firm and exercise some control over its decisions. Bank finance takes the form of debt, whereas venture capital finance often resembles convertible debt. Venture capital finance is optimal only when the aggressive continuation strategy is not too profitable, ex ante; the uncertainty associated with the risky continuation strategy (strategic uncertainty) is high; and the firm's cash flow distribution is highly risky and positively skewed, with low probability of success, low liquidation value, and high returns if successful. A decrease in venture capitalists’ cost of capital encourages firms to switch from safe strategies and bank finance to riskier strategies and venture capital finance, increasing the average risk of firms in the economy.     

The effects on investment incentives of an allowance for corporate equity tax system: the Belgian case as an example

The Modigliani–Miller theorem serves as the standard finance paradigm on corporate capital structure and managerial decision making. Implicitly, it is assumed that the market possesses full information about the firm. However, if firm managers have insider information, they may attempt to ‘signal’ changes in the firm’s financial structure and, in competitive equilibrium, shareholders will draw deductions from such signals. Empirical work shows that the value of underlying firms rises with leverage because investors expect such firms to implement positive NPV projects. We empirically examine this view using a sample of debt issue announcements by publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange. We argue that the timing of debt issues is fundamental in determining the relationship between leverage and risk-adjusted returns. We show that an announcing firm’s intrinsic value may not rise depending on when management publicly ‘signals’ changes in their firm’s capital structure. Specifically, we show that risk-adjusted returns rise positively for firms that make debt announcements during normal economic conditions while they tend to decline for firms making debt announcements during recessionary periods. During recessionary periods, market risk and loss aversion rise and investors focus less on the potential growth of debt announcing firms and focus more on potential losses instead. We conclude that the timing of new debt is of paramount importance and managers’ inability to prudently time such announcements can lead to exacerbated levels of systematic risk coupled with a significant erosion in shareholder wealth.     

Debt Financing,Corporate Financial Intermediaries and Firm Valuation

In this paper we consider the role of financial intermediaries in the valuation of firms and projects. We show that security prices should reflect both used and unused debt capacity if some corporations can act as financial intermediaries and can capture the tax benefits of debt capacity unused by the operating firm. We also provide some reasons why the value of the firm might be increased if the financing and operating risks of the firm are separated and financial intermediaries issue debt rather than the unit operating the asset.     

Firms as buyers of last resort

We develop a model to explore the asset pricing implications of firms being buyers of last resort for their own stocks. Those with more ability to repurchase shares when prices drop far below fundamental value (i.e., less financially constrained firms) should have lower short-horizon return variances (controlling for fundamental variance) than other firms. Using standard proxies for financing constraints such as past repurchases and firm age, we find strong support for this predicted relation. We also find that this relation is stronger in the U.S. after 1982 when regulatory reforms lowered the legal cost of conducting repurchases as well as in countries where share repurchases are legally easier to execute.     

Leverage change,debt overhang,and stock prices

We document a significant and negative effect of the change in a firm's leverage ratio on its stock prices. We find that the negative effect is stronger for firms that have higher leverage ratios, higher likelihood of default, and face more severe financial constraints. Moreover, firms with an increase in leverage ratio tend to have less future investment. These findings are consistent with Myers' (1977) debt overhang theory that an increase in leverage may lead to future underinvestment, thus reducing a firm's value.     

The Bankruptcy Decision and Debt Contract Renegotiations

We consider the bankruptcy law and workout practices in the United States and model bankruptcy as a strategic decision. We analyze a firm's choice between liquidation under Chapter 7, renegotiation of the debt contract in a workout, and reorganization under Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code. Our premise is that a financially distressed firm chooses its action in order to minimize the loss in value caused by the well-known over- and under-investment problems. We show that the firm initiates a workout when it faces under-investment, and commences Chapter 11 when it faces over-investment. Some of the results are: (i) in default, total firm value and equity value increase upon the announcement of a workout and decrease upon the announcement of Chapter 11; (ii) firms with shorter maturity of debt are more likely to reorganize in a workout; (iii) among the firms that renegotiate their debt contract, the proportion of firms entering Chapter 11 is higher for firms in mature industries than for firms in growth industries.