从我国上市公司看西方“股利迎合论”的适用性

美国学者Baker和Wurgler早在2004年一篇文章里提出了股利迎合理论,本文通过对该理论的简单介绍并结合我国上市公司的具体情况进行了分析。结果表明,西方股利迎合理论并不适合我国的上市公司。在我国这样一个有着特殊的股权结构及非流通股股权高度集中的市场环境下,管理者制定股利政策时主要是考虑非流通股东的需求,而广大中小投资者的需要往往会被忽视。     

从我国上市公司看西方“股利迎合论”的适用性

美国学者Baker和Wurgler早在2004年一篇文章里提出了股利迎合理论,本文通过对该理论的简单介绍并结合我国上市公司的具体情况进行了分析.结果表明,西方股利迎合理论并不适合我国的上市公司.在我国这样一个有着特殊的股权结构及非流通股股权高度集中的市场环境下,管理者制定股利政策时主要是考虑非流通股东的需求,而广大中小投资者的需要往往会被忽视.     

上市公司现金股利政策是否迎合了投资者的需求——基于上证180的短期效应研究

目前国内存在许多关于股利政策的研究,但是基于行为股利政策的研究却一直不见起色,直到近年美国学者Baker和Wurgler提出了股利迎合理论,才从行为公司角度对股利政策有了进一步的探索。股利迎合理论已经在美国得到了证实,但是究其在国内的适用性,学者大多持保留态度。本文在前人研究的基础上,使用事件研究方法重新检验这一理论的适用情况,并最终通过研究表明股利迎合理论并不适用于我国实情。     

上市公司现金股利政策是否迎合了投资者的需求——基于上证180的短期效应研究

目前国内存在许多关于股利政策的研究,但是基于行为股利政策的研究却一直不见起色,直到近年美国学者Baker和Wurgler提出了股利迎合理论,才从行为公司角度对股利政策有了进一步的探索.股利迎合理论已经在美国得到了证实,但是究其在国内的适用性,学者大多持保留态度.本文在前人研究的基础上,使用事件研究方法重新检验这一理论的适用情况,并最终通过研究表明股利迎合理论并不适用于我国实情.     

基于股利迎合理论的我国上市公司送转股行为研究

本文运用股利迎合理论,在对股利溢价进行改造的基础上,即将其定义为送转股公司与纯派现公司的平均市值账面比(M/B)的差值,利用Logistic 模型以及多元回归模型来探讨我国上市公司管理者是否存在理性迎合投资者热衷送转股的股利偏好的行为.研究结果发现:投资者股利需求不仅对公司送转股概率的高低有着重要的影响,而且对其送转股比例的高低也有着重要的影响.也因此表明,我国上市公司管理者确实存在理性迎合投资者热衷送转股的股利偏好的行为,而迎合的目的,则是追求公司短期股价最大化,以获取股利溢价.     

双重迎合与现金股利平稳性——基于中国A股上市公司的实证研究

市场机制与监管机制的共同作用为中国上市公司的现金股利决策带来了特殊的双重迎合动机。本文以1998-2017年中国A股上市公司为样本,以资本市场自发的投资者迎合和外部监管压力下的政策迎合对上市公司现金股利决策跨期动态调整的叠加作用为视角,实证检验了双重迎合对现金股利平稳性的影响。研究发现,半强制分红政策实施前,投资者偏好和预期的迎合对我国上市公司股利平稳性的作用明显,而监管政策作为新的强迎合对象,不同程度的削弱了原有市场机制的作用。其中,国有企业的政策迎合动机远高于非国有企业,达标型分红作为国有上市公司逐渐"理性"的策略性迎合手段帮助股利监管政策在实施后期实现了预期效果。     

基于公司治理的我国上市公司股利政策研究

股利政策是公司在股利支付和内部留存收益两者间的分配选择,是我国上市公司主要的分配政策,也是投资者获得回报的重要途径.传统上,对公司的股利政策研究町以从股利信号理论和公司治理结构两个角度人手,而考虑到资本市场上信息不对称等非效率因素的存在,本文在股利相关理论的基础上对我国上市公司治理结构和股利政策进行分析研究,并具体研究公司董事会特征和股权集中度对股利政策选择的影响,试图找到合理的途径较好地解释我国现行股票市场上的股利政策.     

机构投资者持股与中国上市公司现金股利政策

本文基于上市公司现金股利政策的视角,深入考察机构投资者的监督治理效应、投资行为偏好,以及不同类型的机构投资者之间是否存在异质性。以中国A股上市公司为样本,实证发现:(1)机构投资者持股比例较高的上市公司具有显著更高的现金股利支付意愿和支付水平,表明机构投资者对上市公司现金股利政策发挥了积极的监督效应;(2)高派现上市公司吸引了更高的机构投资者持股比例,显示机构投资者将现金股利视为其构建投资组合的关键要素,遵循了"谨慎人规则";(3)不同类型的机构投资者在现金股利的监督效应、股利偏好方面并没有呈现出明显的异质性,揭示着我国各类机构投资者可能存在趋同的投资风格;(4)我国机构投资者倾向于将现金股利政策视为上市公司传递的一种"信号"而非解决传统代理冲突的治理机制。     

信息不对称、管理者内生偏好与上市公司股权融资偏好

一般以为,上市公司的股权融资偏好是由于不合理的成本因素、有缺陷的监管制度和政策与低效的资本市场等原因造成的.本文分析认为,上市公司股权融资偏好产生的基本原因是管理者的内生融资偏好.如果公司绩效影响管理者的财富(或职位、声誉等),管理者的偏好将支配公司的融资决策;对称信息下,管理者将有充分的股权融资偏好.不对称信息下,如果管理者对公司项目(或资产)拥有私人信息,且厌恶风险,管理者将最大限度地使用股权融资,直至达到均衡.最后,本文提出,管理者对股权融资的偏好是内生的,治理目前上市公司股权融资偏好所产生危害的基本思路是"疏",而不是"堵".     

基于企业生命周期理论的上市公司现金股利研究

本文选取我国沪市2009-2011年的上市公司作为样本,根据企业经营活动、投资活动和筹资活动现金流量组合特征划分企业生命周期阶段,对现金股利支付意愿和水平进行实证研究。研究结果表明,我国上市公司的现金股利支付具有显著的生命周期特征,从萌芽期、成长期到成熟期,现金股利支付倾向显著上升;从成熟期到衰退期,现金股利支付倾向显著下降。现金股利支付水平同样遵循了这一规律。这说明企业生命周期理论很好地解释了我国上市公司现金股利支付现象,我国上市公司现金股利政策呈现出更加理性和科学的特点。     

Dividend payouts and catering to demands: Evidence from a dividend tax reform

Utilizing the 2012 dividend tax reform in China, this paper examines how firms make dividend payout decisions that cater to the controlling shareholders' demand, especially when controlling shareholders and outside minority shareholders have different dividend preferences. We find that firms increase dividend payouts when controlling shareholders demand higher dividends after the dividend tax reform. In particular, firms pay higher dividends when facing increased demand from controlling shareholders than when the demand is from minority investors. In addition, we find that firms that increase dividend payments due to the controlling shareholders' demand subsequently have more debt financing and poorer firm performance, suggesting that catering to the demands from controlling shareholders is subject to the Type II agency problem.     

Dividend Payouts and Corporate Governance Quality: An Empirical Investigation

Motivated by agency theory, we investigate how a firm's overall quality of corporate governance affects its dividend policy. Using a large sample of firms with governance data from The Institutional Shareholder Services, we find that firms with stronger governance exhibit a higher propensity to pay dividends, and, similarly, dividend payers tend to pay larger dividends. The results are consistent with the notion that shareholders of firms with better governance quality are able to force managers to disgorge more cash through dividends, thereby reducing what is left for expropriation by opportunistic managers. We employ the two‐stage least squares approach to cope with possible endogeneity and still obtain consistent results. Our results are important as they show that corporate governance quality does have a palpable impact on critical corporate decisions such as dividend policy.     

中美资本市场财富效应比较研究

本文从股利支付和资本利得的角度对比分析了中美资本市场财富效应水平,并对其影响因素展开分析。研究发现,我国资本市场财富效应不够显著,A股上市公司虽然具有较高的股利支付倾向,但股利支付率和资本利得属性较弱;股利支付行为迎合监管动机较强,融资分红特征明显,股票股利支付行为具有高送转特征;资本市场估值中枢下移,指数波动性较高,资本利得属性较差。美股上市公司虽然股利支付意愿不及A股,但股利支付率和资本利得属性较强,且上市公司不存在明显的融资分红倾向。基于此,本文从控股股东属性、企业生命周期、管理层侵占行为、宏观经济和资本市场环境四个维度对A股市场财富效应水平展开深入探讨,并从提升公司质量、改善盈利能力、调整投资者结构、加强市场建设、优化股利监管制度五方面提出了改善我国资本市场财富效应的政策建议。     

A Catering Theory of Dividends

We propose that the decision to pay dividends is driven by prevailing investor demand for dividend payers. Managers cater to investors by paying dividends when investors put a stock price premium on payers, and by not paying when investors prefer nonpayers. To test this prediction, we construct four stock price-based measures of investor demand for dividend payers. By each measure, nonpayers tend to initiate dividends when demand is high. By some measures, payers tend to omit dividends when demand is low. Further analysis confirms that these results are better explained by catering than other theories of dividends.     

Share repurchases,catering, and dividend substitution

We first extend Baker and Wurgler's (2004a) catering theory of dividends to share repurchases. Consistent with the notion that firms cater to investor demand for share repurchases, we report evidence that the market's time-varying repurchase premium positively affects firms' choice to repurchase shares. Next, we use the catering behavior as a novel framework for testing the dividend substitution hypothesis. Consistent with the notion that managers consider dividends and share repurchases to be substitute payout mechanisms, we find that the dividend premium negatively affects the repurchase choice, whereas the repurchase premium negatively affects the choice to pay dividends.     

Flexibility and dividends

We develop a model of corporate dividend policy based on the idea that management values operating flexibility. By reducing dividends and conserving cash, management increases its flexibility. This improves its ability to invest in projects that it believes are good for the shareholders in the long run but which shareholders would not provide the capital for because they think the projects are value reducing. However, the cost of not paying dividends is a reduction in the current stock price. Management trades off these two aspects of dividends. Flexibility considerations help us understand various dimensions of dividend policy that existing theories do not explain. Our theory generates numerous testable predictions that we confront with the data. The evidence is supportive of the model.     

Retail minority shareholders and corporate reputation as determinant of dividend policy in Australia

This paper investigates the influence of retail minority shareholders in the determination of corporate dividend policies of Australian companies. While retail investors are typically also minority shareholders and therefore perceived in academic literature to have limited influence on corporate dividend decisions, casual empiricism suggests the contrary. We hypothesise that corporate reputation serves as a device aligning managers' incentives with retail minority shareholder interests, and that the propensity to manage for corporate reputation is positively related to the degree of retail shareholder base. We find empirical evidence of managers of Australian companies catering to the retail investors' preference for dividends when setting dividend policy, even when they are minority shareholders, so long as the proportion of these retail shareholders relative to the total shareholder base is high. Our results are robust when controlled for the factors of size, profitability, financial leverage, signalling, agency costs and franking credits.     

Managerial entrenchment and payout policy: A catering effect

Agency theory suggests that entrenched managers are less likely to pay dividends. However, according to the catering theory, external pressures from investors can force managers to increase dividend payments. Hence, we test whether entrenched managers respond to investor demand for dividends and share repurchases. Using a large sample of 9677 US firms over the period 1990–2016 (i.e. a total of 80,478 firm-year observations), we test and find evidence that managerial entrenchment negatively impacts dividend payments. Our findings suggest that catering effects weaken the negative impact of managerial entrenchment on payout policy and that in firms with entrenched managers an increase in the propensity to pay dividends is conspicuous only when there is external investor demand for dividends. Our results indicate that while insiders and institutional owners might not necessarily favour dividend payments, firms respond to catering incentives when dominated by insiders but not institutional owners. Overall, our findings are consistent with the view that dividend payments are a result of external pressures to reduce agency problems associated with firms run by entrenched managers.     

CEO mobility and corporate payouts

We examine how chief executive officer (CEO) mobility affects corporate payouts. We exploit US state courts’ staggered adoption of the inevitable disclosure doctrine (IDD) to obtain exogenous variation in mobility. We report several findings. First, we find that firms in IDD-adopting states increase dividend payouts, whereas the effect of IDD on share repurchases is insignificant relative to firms not in IDD-adopting states. Second, the increase in dividends is concentrated on firms run by CEOs having high ability. Third, CEOs increasing dividends are less likely to be forced to leave their jobs. Fourth, the increase in dividends is concentrated on firms run by early-career CEOs rather than retiring CEOs. Last, CEOs increasing dividends receive more favorable shareholders’ say on pay votes for higher pay. Our evidence supports the notion that restricted mobility induces CEOs to choose a dividend policy that enhances their positions with their shareholders.     

Agency Problems and Dividend Policies around the World

This paper outlines and tests two agency models of dividends. According to the "outcome model," dividends are paid because minority shareholders pressure corporate insiders to disgorge cash. According to the "substitute model," insiders interested in issuing equity in the future pay dividends to establish a reputation for decent treatment of minority shareholders. The first model predicts that stronger minority shareholder rights should be associated with higher dividend payouts; the second model predicts the opposite. Tests on a cross section of 4,000 companies from 33 countries with different levels of minority shareholder rights support the outcome agency model of dividends.