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1.
翟杰平 《会计师》2011,(12):51-52
<正>一、EVA指标的概念及计算公式EVA,即经济增加值,是企业税后营业净利润减去对投资在该企业所有资本的机会成本的合理估算。它能够表明一定时期为股东增加了多少价值,用于衡量企业财富的增加量,实际上反映的是企业在一定时期内的经济利润,是专门从股东的投入资本角度定义的利润。计算公式如下:EVA=税后净营业利润一资本成本=税后净营业利润一调整后资本×平均资本成本率计算结果表明,当EVA的值为正时,表示企业获得的收  相似文献   

2.
芦岩 《时代金融》2013,(24):51-52
经济增加值指标(EVA)认为企业盈利只有在高于其全部资本成本时才为股东创造出更多的价值,因此有别于传统会计利润的计算,需要在传统会计利润基础之上进行必要的调整。  相似文献   

3.
随着社会经济条件的变化.传统的财务业绩评价指标的缺陷日益显露.人们开始寻求能更全面地反映企业绩效的新方法。EVA就是其中一种,最早于20世纪80年代提出.瓜股东价值的角度对目标企业运用的所有资本成本进行综合考评,考虑了利润与股东资本的机会成本之间的配比.更能反映企业运行的有效性,受到管理层的欢迎.我国应用EVA的时间比较短.对众多企业来说还是比较新鲜的事物.本文首先将EVA与传统考核指标体系进行比较,以对EVA有更明确的认识,然后总结我国企业在运用EVA中遇到的困难.最后提出一些解决思路.  相似文献   

4.
《会计师》2014,(19)
利润并非价值,这一点已经被越来越多的企业所认识到。因此,很多有利润的企业并非就一定有价值。传统的盈利能力指标仅考虑了企业的债务资本成本,而并未考虑来自股东方的权益资本成本。本文以混合所有制钢铁企业为研究视角,以EVA业绩评价体系为研究内容,通过分析混合所有制钢铁企业实行以EVA为导向的企业业绩评价体系的现实意义和优越性,指出混合所有制钢铁企业在当前形势下应如何建立EVA业绩评价体系。  相似文献   

5.
薛红玉 《会计师》2014,(10):51-52
利润并非价值,这一点已经被越来越多的企业所认识到.因此,很多有利润的企业并非就一定有价值.传统的盈利能力指标仅考虑了企业的债务资本成本,而并未考虑来自股东方的权益资本成本.本文以混合所有制钢铁企业为研究视角,以EVA业绩评价体系为研究内容,通过分析混合所有制钢铁企业实行以EVA为导向的企业业绩评价体系的现实意义和优越性,指出混合所有制钢铁企业在当前形势下应如何建立EVA业绩评价体系.  相似文献   

6.
张月姮 《中国外资》2008,(9):133-134
公司的财务管理目标在于用尽可能少的资本投入为股东创造尽可能多的价值。经济增加值(EVA)是公司经营利润与资本成本的差值,它是衡量企业在某个特定年份中赢利抵偿资本机会成本的指标,EVA真正地将经营者的利益和股东的利益最大限度地结合起来,用EVA作为衡量一个企业的财务管理目标是否得以实现的指标,是能将所有者理财目标与管理者理财目标紧密衔接的一条纽带。  相似文献   

7.
利润并非价值,这一点已经被越来越多的企业所认识到.因此,很多有利润的企业并非就一定有价值.传统的盈利能力指标仅考虑了企业的债务资本成本,而并未考虑来自股东方的权益资本成本.本文以混合所有制钢铁企业为研究视角,以EVA业绩评价体系为研究内容,通过分析混合所有制钢铁企业实行以EVA为导向的企业业绩评价体系的现实意义和优越性,指出混合所有制钢铁企业在当前形势下应如何建立EVA业绩评价体系.  相似文献   

8.
杨亚 《财政监督》2002,(2):22-23
当前国际上许多大型企业集团公司普遍采用一种全新的企业业绩评估方法——经济增加值评估法,这种评估方法已在可口可乐、西门子等全球400多家大型跨国公司应用,成为一种全面反映和评价企业经营业绩的财务指标。一、什么是经济增加值(EVA)经济增加值(Economic Value Added,简称EVA),是美国经济学家Stewart博士1991年提出并由美国思腾思特公司(Stern Stewart Co.)所倡导。运用EVA指标衡量企业业绩和投资价值是否增加的基本理论是:企业必须从税后营业利润扣除实际所占用的资本的机会成本以后,才是股东从经营活动中获得的价值增量。与传统的利润指标相比,有以下特点:1.EVA指标是从企业所有者——股东的角度定义企业利润。2.EVA指标将所有者权益与企业经营目标联系在一起。  相似文献   

9.
传统的财务指标在评价企业业绩方面存在诸多缺陷。近年来,有许多国外公司开始以EVA(Economic Value Added)经济增加值这一新兴的财务指标作为财务管理的基础对企业业绩进行评估。简单地说,经济增加值就是指企业资本收益与企业资本成本之间的差额:如果这一差额是正数,说明企业的收益不仅弥补了股东资本的成本,而且还为股东创造了财富;反之则表明企业的收益不能弥补股东资本的成本,股东财富受到了侵害。用公式可以表述为:EVA=净利润-股权资本成本=净利润-全部资本的加权平均成本=净利润-(债权资本的比重债权资本成本 股权资本比重股权资本成本)。  相似文献   

10.
企业的盈利只有高于资本成本时,才会为股东创造价值.EVA在衡量企业的绩效时,从税后净利润中扣除了产生了这些利润所需资本投入总资本.由于房地产企业的资金需要量较大、股权资本占得比例较高,房地产项目的投资风险很高,销售收入确认的周期较长.对其进行价值评估时,EVA能够在充分考虑企业资本成本的基础上,真实地反映企业业绩,有助于不同规模企业之间对比,充分保护股东利益,避免房地产企业盲目扩张,对于房地产企业的长远发展具有重要意义.  相似文献   

11.
已有的分客户的盈利评价方法大多局限于计算分客户的会计利润,本文提出的商业银行分客户的EVA评价模型通过计量分客户的收入、分客户的成本以及分客户的经济资本成本,获得商业银行分客户盈利评价的EVA值.与以往的盈利评价方法相比,该模型考虑了对客户经营的风险因素以及资本成本,既可用于对客户的服务定价,也可用来确定各客户的EVA值,还可用来区分不同的客户类型,针对不同客户(群)实施差异化的经营策略,从而提高资源的配置效率,提升零售业务的市场竞争力.最后,文章指出该模型的实施需要商业银行具备较强的支撑平台.  相似文献   

12.
This article presents a case study illustrating some aspects of the new business model discussed in the roundtable above. Continuing a major theme in the roundtable, the authors begin by arguing that the long‐run failure of the E&P industry to create shareholder wealth stems to a large degree from weak or distorted incentives held out to the top executives and managers of most large, publicly traded companies. This article traces the incentive problem to the lack of an effective wealth creation metric to guide the financial management process. Although the industry employs a variety of accounting‐based performance measures, none is a reliable measure of wealth creation. In place of traditional financial metrics such as earnings, annual cash flow, and return on capital, this article recommends a performance evaluation and incentive compensation system that is tied to the use of a “reserve‐adjusted” EVA measure—one that exhibits a strong statistical correlation with changes in shareholder wealth in the E&P business. The greater explanatory power of this new measure reflects the reality that changes in the value of reserves in the ground can greatly outweigh changes in annual earnings or cash flows. As the focal point of a compensation plan, EVA has advantages over stock options in that it can be calculated at various levels in the organization, even at the level of a single well, whereas stock prices only exist for the company as a whole. For this reason, an EVA incentive system permits a clearer “line of sight” between pay packages and the performance of the part of the business for which managers are directly accountable. Perhaps even more important, EVA can be calculated (using an “internal hedging” mechanism) in a way that removes the impact of changes in oil prices on the incentive outcome. And, as demonstrated in the case study of Nuevo Energy, such internal hedging allows companies to give their employees a much greater share of wealth created with far less cost than by simply granting stock or stock options.  相似文献   

13.
Private equity firms have boomed on the back of EBITDA. Most PE firms use it as their primary measure of value, and ask the managers of their portfolio companies to increase it. Many public companies have decided to emulate the PE firms by using EBITDA to review performance with investors, and even as a basis for determining incentive pay. But is the emphasis on EBITDA warranted? In this article, the co‐founder of Stern Stewart & Co. argues that EVA offers a better way. He discusses blind spots and distortions that make EBITDA highly unreliable and misleading as a measure of normalized, ongoing profitability. By comparing EBITDA with EVA, or Economic Value Added, a measure of economic profit net of a full cost‐of‐capital charge, Stewart demonstrates EVA's ability to provide managers and investors with much more clarity into the levers that are driving corporate performance and determining intrinsic market value. And in support of his demonstration, Stewart reports the finding of his analysis of Russell 3000 public companies that EVA explains almost 20% more than EBITDA of their changes in value, while at the same time providing far more insight into how to improve those values.  相似文献   

14.
王文胜 《金融论坛》2006,11(8):34-39
实施以经济增加值为核心的绩效考核,在金融资源匮乏的西部欠发达地区,基层行面临着经营核心目标与业务计划体系的统一、经营效益增长与市场份额增长的关系、产品定价机制问题、相对单一的信贷资产结构与降低经济资本占用、财务核算体系中业务风险体现不充分等两难选择。西部基层行必须从转变经营理念,完善组织结构,构建与完善管理信息系统、业绩评价系统、部门预算等方面创造条件为推行经济增加值奠定基础。在经济资本约束下,西部基层行在经营管理工作中要牢固树立价值最大化的经营理念,平衡好规模与效益的关系,加快经营结构的调整及强化风险管理等。  相似文献   

15.
Together with corporate governance expert Stuart Gillan, the managing partner of Stern Stewart discusses important issues of corporate financial management, including the fundamental objective of the public corporation and how boards of directors can achieve it. Whereas financial economists have long argued that the corporate goal is the maximization of firm value, Stern advocates a variation of the concept known as "Market Value Added"–one that is designed to discourage corporate growth and capital raising that does not end up adding value for shareholders. To accomplish this goal, he emphasizes the importance of incentive compensation systems tied not to accounting earnings, but to a measure of economic profit like EVA. And, as Stern argues in closing, EVA-based incentive systems are likely to be effective not only in the private sector, but in increasing the efficiency and value of state-owned enterprises. Indeed, such systems could bring about a new kind of employee capitalism that ESOPs promised, but have largely failed, to deliver.  相似文献   

16.
Despite the wide acceptance of DCF valuation and its corollary that value is created only by earning more than the cost of capital, very few companies use performance measures that focus on corporate efficiency in using capital—measures such as return on capital (ROC) or economic value added (EVA)—as the main basis for their top management incentive programs. In this article, the authors begin by documenting the surprisingly limited use of such measures in management incentive plans. Next they analyze three often cited problems—difficulty in retaining managers, discouragement of growth investment, and complexity—that could account for the limited use of such measures. Third and last, they suggest a number of adjustments to standard capital efficiency measures that are designed to address these problems and, in so doing, to give corporate directors more confidence in using measures like EVA to reward and hold managers accountable for value-adding performance.
In illustrating the problems encountered when using such performance measures, the article uses case studies of three long-time "EVA companies"—Briggs & Stratton, Herman Miller, and Manitowoc—to highlight the difficulty of using a "bonus bank" (or "clawback") system to hold managers fully accountable for earning a minimum return on capital. After presenting empirical data that shows "delayed productivity" of invested capital, the authors suggest that conventional capital efficiency measures can discourage value-increasing growth.
The article concludes by recommending that although measures like EVA used in combination with negative bonus banks provide the right incentives, EVA capital charges should be phased in gradually to reflect the delayed productivity of capital. At the same time, corporate boards should consider providing bonus bank "relief" when market and industry factors have excessively large negative effects on the performance measures and bonus awards.  相似文献   

17.
实施以经济增加值为核心的绩效考核,在金融资源匮乏的西部欠发达地区,基层行面临着经营核心目标与业务计划体系的统一、经营效益增长与市场份额增长的关系、产品定价机制问题、相对单一的信贷资产结构与降低经济资本占用、财务核算体系中业务风险体现不充分等两难选择。西部基层行必须从转变经营理念,完善组织结构,构建与完善管理信息系统、业绩评价系统、部门预算等方面创造条件为推行经济增加值奠定基础。在经济资本约束下,西部基层行在经营管理工作中要牢固树立价值最大化的经营理念,平衡好规模与效益的关系,加快经营结构的调整及强化风险管理等。  相似文献   

18.
Most companies rely heavily on earnings to measure their financial performance, but earnings growth has at least two important weaknesses as a proxy for investor wealth. Current earnings growth may come at the expense of future earnings through, say, shortsighted cutbacks in corporate investment, including R&D or advertising. But growth in earnings per share can also be achieved by “overinvesting”—that is, committing ever more capital to projects with expected rates of return that, although well below the cost of capital, exceed the after‐tax cost of debt. Stock compensation has been the conventional solution to the first problem because it's a discounted cash flow value that is assumed to discourage actions that sacrifice future earnings. Economic profit—in its most popular manifestation, EVA—has been the conventional solution to the second problem because it includes a capital charge that penalizes low‐return investment. But neither of these conventional solutions appears to work very well in practice. Stock compensation isn't tied to business unit performance, and often fails to motivate corporate managers who believe that meeting consensus earnings is more important than investing to maintain future earnings. EVA often doesn't work well because increases in current EVA often come with reduced expectations of future EVA improvement—and reductions in current EVA are often accompanied by increases in future growth values. Since EVA bonus plans reward current EVA increases without taking account of changes in expected future growth values, they have the potential to encourage margin improvement that comes at the expense of business growth and discourage positive‐NPV investments that, because of longer‐run payoffs, reduce current EVA. In this article, the author demonstrates the possibility of overcoming such short‐termism by developing an operating model of changes in future growth value that can be used to calibrate “dynamic” EVA improvement targets that more closely align EVA bonus plan payouts with investors’ excess returns. With the use of “dynamic” targets, margin improvements that come at the expense of business growth can be discouraged by raising EVA performance targets, while growth investments can be encouraged by the use of lower EVA targets.  相似文献   

19.
This article builds a new model of capital structure and nonpension investment decisions to show that regulatory and investment incentives created by accrued pension obligations exacerbate traditional agency problems between stockholders and bondholders. The article identifies conditions under which firms with accrued pension liabilities have an incentive to choose an overly risky capital structure, invest in risky projects with negative net present value, and/or under-fund their pension accounts.  相似文献   

20.
商业银行股权激励的特殊意义与现实问题分析   总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3  
银行业普遍存在的管制,使银行面临着有限的控制权市场和接管威胁,从而大大降低了市场约束银行管理者的能力,因此对银行而言,通过股权激励机制协调股东和管理者的利益、降低代理成本显得尤为重要.我国商业银行实施股权激励不应盲目照搬西方国家的范例,应慎重选择股权激励的实施范围,目前最好只局限在高级管理人员,通过对股权激励机制的合理设计来充分发挥其长期激励效应,切不可盲目扩大激励范围,将股权激励演变成一种新的福利措施.应尽快建立起以经济资本为核心的业绩考核体系,在经济资本的约束下实现业务发展模式和盈利模式的转变.股权激励机制的有效实施离不开完善的银行治理结构.  相似文献   

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