Disproportional ownership structure and pay–performance relationship: Evidence from China's listed firms

This paper examines the impact of ownership structure on executive compensation in China's listed firms. We find that the cash flow rights of ultimate controlling shareholders have a positive effect on the pay–performance relationship, while a divergence between control rights and cash flow rights has a significantly negative effect on the pay–performance relationship. We divide our sample based on ultimate controlling shareholders' type into state owned enterprises (SOE), state assets management bureaus (SAMB), and privately controlled firms. We find that in SOE controlled firms cash flow rights have a significant impact on accounting based pay–performance relationship. In privately controlled firms, cash flow rights affect the market based pay–performance relationship. In SAMB controlled firms, CEO pay bears no relationship with either accounting or market based performance. The evidence suggests that CEO pay is inefficient in firms where the state is the controlling shareholder because it is insensitive to market based performance but consistent with the efforts of controlling shareholders to maximize their private benefit.     

CEO compensation,director compensation,and firm performance: Evidence of cronyism?

We model CEO and director compensation using firm characteristics, CEO characteristics, and governance variables. After controlling for monitoring proxies, we find a significant positive relationship between CEO and director compensation. We hypothesize that this relationship could be due to unobserved firm complexity (omitted variables), and/or to excess compensation of directors and managers. We also find evidence that excess compensation (both director and CEO) is associated with firm underperformance. We therefore conclude that the evidence is consistent with excessive compensation due to mutual back scratching or cronyism. The evidence suggests that excessive compensation has an effect on firm performance that is independent of the poor governance variables discussed by previous studies.     

Leading the herd: evidence from mutual funds’ buy and sell decisions

This article investigates whether a mutual fund’s performance is related to its herding behavior. Using the methodology of Sias (Rev Finance Stud 17:165–206, 2004), we develop a measure to capture the magnitude that a fund’s buy (sell) decisions are leading other funds’ buys (sells), and find that a fund’s performance is positively (negatively) related to its “buy leading” (“sell leading”). We interpret these findings as evidence that “buy leaders” (“sell leaders”)’ performance benefits (suffers) from the positive (negative) price effect associated with buy (sell) herds. Additionally, we find a positive relationship between fund performance and valuation-motivated “buy leading”, while we find weak evidence on the relationship between performance and valuation-motivated “sell leading”. We interpret these results as evidence that leading funds’ outperformance is due, in part, to their ability to value stocks.     

Fund ESG performance and downside risk: Evidence from China

Whether responsible investing reduces portfolio risk remains open to discussion. We study the relationship between ESG performance and downside risk at fund level in the Chinese equity mutual fund market. We find that fund ESG performance is positively associated with fund downside risk during the period between July 2018 and March 2021, and that the positive relationship weakens during the COVID-19 pandemic. We propose three channels through which fund ESG performance could affect fund downside risk: (i) the firm channel in which the risk-mitigation effect of portfolio firms’ good ESG practices could be manifested at fund level, (ii) the diversification channel in which the portfolio concentration of high ESG-rated funds could amplify fund downside risk, and (iii) the flow channel in which funds’ better ESG performance may attract greater investor flows that could reduce fund downside risk. We show evidence that the observed time-varying relationship between fund ESG performance and downside risk is driven by the relative force of the three channels.     

Mutual funds' exits,financial crisis and Darwin

It is recognized in the literature that there is a negative relationship between fund performance and fund exit. This paper analyses the performance of 6600 U.S. mutual funds that exited the market in the 2000–2014 period and nearly twice as many U.S. mutual funds that remained operational, to provide evidence on whether the negative exit – performance relationship existed during the 2008 financial crisis. We confirm the general relationship but show that, in contrast to all the other periods, there was no statistically significant exit – performance relationship during the financial crisis. We also show that the impact of expenses and loads on fund exit increased during the crisis. This is consistent with our argument that when some active investors leave the market, the passive ones become important to fund–families, albeit the investors may lose out as a result. We also show that the mergers that occurred in the years following the financial crisis resulted in statistically significantly worse post–merger performance of both the acquirers and of the targets in comparison with their pre–merger performance.     

The dynamics of CEO equity vs. inside debt and firm performance

This paper provides new evidence on the comparative dynamic effects of CEO inside debt and equity compensation on firm performance as measured by Tobin’s Q. In contrast to the extant literature, we find significant empirical evidence supporting the classic Jensen and Meckling (1976) premise that managers should receive debt vs. equity compensation in proportion to the capital structure of the firm. We also provide new evidence showing that the effects of the CEO compensation structure on firm performance are dependent on the CEO’s time horizon, as measured by the expected period of employment to retirement. We show that the incremental benefits of equity compensation to performance increase with the CEO’s projected time to retirement. A similar, but insignificant relationship is observed for CEO inside debt compensation. Cash compensation is more beneficial to the firm when concentrated near the end of the CEO’s tenure.     

Corporate culture and CEO turnover

We study the effect of corporate culture on the relationship between firm performance and CEO turnover. Utilising a measure of cultural dimension developed in organisation behaviour research, we quantify corporate culture by assessing official documents using a text analysis approach. We employ this quantification to examine the impact of culture on CEO turnover, especially in the case of poor firm-specific performance. First, we find strong evidence of a negative relationship between firm-specific performance and CEO turnover. Second, we demonstrate that the probability of a CEO change, on average, is positively influenced by the competition- and creation-oriented cultures. The negative relationship between firm-specific performance and CEO turnover is reinforced by the control-oriented culture and reduced by the creation-oriented culture. Finally, we study the CEO insider or outsider succession and observe that the creation-oriented culture has a negative relationship with the probability of hiring an outsider. Moreover, the creation-oriented culture weakens the negative relationship existing between the firm-specific performance under the incumbent CEO and the probability of hiring an outsider.     

Salesperson empowerment in Spanish banks: A performance-driven view

Our research has a dual purpose. The first is to deepen our understanding of the dimension of power transference within the concept of empowerment. We consider power transference to be a driver of the individual feeling of empowerment, and identify two kinds of power to be transferred and, as a consequence, two different drivers of empowerment: process-driven empowerment (PDE) and decision-making-driven empowerment (DDE). The second is to study the relationship between both of them in relation to performance. We use multiple sources of evidence to build validity. We show that empowerment has its limits. Top management decisions regarding the transference of power to salespeople are performance-driven. A positive relationship between PDE and performance is confirmed. Nevertheless, the existence of a positive relationship between DDE and performance might be questioned.     

Product differentiation,market dynamics and the value relevance of trade payables: Evidence from UK listed firms

This paper provides a comprehensive evidence on how product and market dynamics affect the value relevance of trade payables. Using a sample of 2559 UK listed firms over the period 2005–2014, we find a positive relationship between trade payables and firm performance. Our evidence suggests that trade payables increase (decrease) performance in firms with differentiated products and demand uncertainty (larger market share). We demonstrate that the relative value relevance of bank credit versus suppliers’ credit is dependent on the nature of the product, the level of sales volatility, and market share. We use an innovative approach to assess the robustness of our results to omitted variable bias.     

CEO turnover in China: the role of market-based and accounting performance measures

We investigate the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) turnover and firm performance in China's publicly traded firms. We provide evidence on the use of accounting and market-based performance measures in CEO turnover decision. We also investigate the moderating roles of noise in performance measures, firm growth opportunities, state-owned enterprises, and corporate governance reform on the weights attached to these performance measures. We observe that Chinese listed firms rely more on accounting performance than on stock market performance when determining CEO turnover. Firms with noisier performance measures and larger growth opportunities rely less on both accounting performance and stock market performance in CEO replacement decision. State-controlled firms are more likely to use accounting performance to determine CEO turnover. Finally, we observe that the weight attached to the accounting performance measure is significantly reduced and the weight attached to the stock market performance measure is significantly increased after the governance reform. We also observe that the reform has different impact on state-owned firms and private firms in terms of the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance.