Broker recommendations and Australian small‐cap equity fund management

This study examines whether the abnormal performance of active Australian small‐cap equity fund managers is associated with broker recommendations. Our evidence supports the investment value of broker recommendations, showing significant abnormal returns (ARs) both pre‐ and post‐broker recommendations. We find that when a factor‐mimicking portfolio based on broker recommendations is added to a Carhart (1997) model, annual alphas are reduced by 48 basis points. Using transaction‐level data, buy trades following broker recommendations earn significant cumulative ARs of 1.56 per cent after 60 days. Overall, we find that broker recommendations account for an economically significant component of alphas.     

Small-cap equity mutual fund managers as liquidity providers

This paper examines the relation between the performance of small-cap equity mutual funds and the liquidity characteristics of their asset holdings. We study the trading behavior of fund managers and show that on average, they tend to buy less liquid stocks and sell more liquid stocks. We introduce the notion of net “liquidity creation” by fund managers and examine its role in explaining the cross section of small-cap equity mutual fund returns. Our empirical results show that on average, small-cap mutual fund managers are able to earn an additional 1.5% return per year as compensation for providing such liquidity services to the market.     

Interaction of investor trades and market volatility: Evidence from the Tokyo Stock Exchange

This paper examines the relation between market volatility and investor trades by identifying who supplies and demands market liquidity on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. Because the different trading patterns of various investor types such as individual investors, institutional investors, and foreign investors affect market liquidity differently, we find that market volatility fluctuates significantly depending on which investor types participate in trade. We show that market volatility increases by more than 50% from the average level when there are greater buy trades by momentum investors that demand liquidity and there are less sell trades by contrarian (or profit-taking) investors that supply liquidity. On the other hand, volatility dampens by more than 57% when there are greater sell trades by profit-taking investors, mostly by domestic investors, while there are less momentum buy trades.     

Do Domestic Investors Have an Edge? The Trading Experience of Foreign Investors in Korea

We investigate whether domestic investors have an edge overforeign investors in trading domestic stocks. Using Korean data,we show that foreign money managers pay more than domestic moneymanagers when they buy and receive less when they sell for mediumand large trades. The sample average daily trade-weighted disadvantageof foreign money managers is 21 basis points for purchases and16 basis points for sales. There is also some evidence thatdomestic individual investors have an edge over foreign investors.The explanation for these results is that prices move more againstforeign investors than against domestic investors before trades.     

Liquidity shocks,size and the relative performance of hedge fund strategies

We examine whether the increase in the flow of capital to hedge funds over the period 1994–2005 had a negative impact on performance. More specifically, we study the relative performance of small versus large funds for each of the hedge fund strategies. Our results indicate that on an absolute return basis, small funds outperform large funds. On a risk-adjusted return basis, however, we find that large funds outperform small funds, and that large funds are also shown to hold less liquid assets and take on less systematic and idiosyncratic risk than small funds. Further, funds that experience positive liquidity shocks generally outperform those that experience negative liquidity shocks. We also find evidence that hedge fund managers that are aggressive in dealing with liquidity shocks perform better than hedge fund managers that are conservative in dealing with liquidity shocks.     

Are active fund managers collectors of private information or fast interpreters of public information?

Recent studies of fund manager performance find evidence of outperformance. However limited research exists as to whether such outperformance is because of privately collected information, or merely expedient interpretation of publicly released information. In this study, we examine the trade sequences of active Australian equity fund managers around earnings announcements to provide insights into the source of fund managers’ superior information. We document an increased occurrence of buy‐sell trade sequences around good‐news earnings announcements. The evidence is consistent with fund managers having both private information about forthcoming good‐news earnings announcements and being ‘short‐term profiteers’. We find no evidence that fund managers have private information about forthcoming bad‐news earnings announcements. However, we do find an increase in the frequency of fund managers not trading before bad‐news earnings announcements only to subsequently sell during announcements.     

Strategic trading in the wrong direction by a large institutional insider

Many theoretical papers suggest that large informed traders should make misleading or random trades to disguise their trading. Alternatively, informed traders may trade purely on their estimate of stock value. This paper examines the trading behavior of a large institutional insider that periodically trades in the wrong direction, i.e., makes occasional sell (buy) trades within packages of buy (sell) trades. Using a hand-collected data set, we find that three quarters of the trade packages include wrong-direction trades. Wrong trades appear to be used mostly to disguise right-direction trades. We find that the wrong-trade stocks are larger and have less noisy returns, hence, they lack natural disguise. Wrong trades are relatively small, used to accentuate return volatility, distributed evenly during a package of trades, and are not consistently profitable.     

Are the Insider Trades of a Large Institutional Investor Informed?

We use a unique data set to consider whether a large institution's (Fidelity funds) insider trades are informed. Theoretical studies of large informed traders suggest that their information advantage could be greater for buy trades than sell trades, be short‐ or long‐lived, and be exploited by varying the pace of trade execution. Although there is evidence of each of these, Fidelity seems to be informed only for quickly executed buy trades. Other trades outperform a stock market index but not a four‐factor return model. This performance profile is consistent with Fidelity's fees, which depend on performance compared to an index.     

ADR holdings of US-based emerging market funds

What motivates investors to hold American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) rather than the underlying stock of US listed foreign firms? We analyze the investment allocation decision of actively-managed emerging market mutual fund managers. Although legal provisions are typically assumed to affect ADR and its underlying domestic shares equally, investors holding ADRs may have a higher level of legal protection as these securities are issued and traded in the US. We find that ADRs are the preferred mode of holdings if the local market of the issuer has weak investor protection, low liquidity and high transaction costs.     

Bid ask spread in a competitive market with institutions and order size

Large orders, particularly from institutions, are quite common these days and hence there is interest to know if institutional trading has any bearing on the price effect associated with large trades. Recent empirical studies contradict earlier evidence of negative price effect on selling large blocks and find no price effect associated with large trades. Existing theoretical framework suggests a monotonic and increasing adverse price effect for large trades, where the motivation for a large trade is private information. We model a trading system where pure information, information-liquidity, and pure liquidity traders trade small and large sizes. The pure information traders strategically choose an order size. Institutions trade only large sizes because of their low execution costs for large trades; they are information-liquidity traders whose ability to use an information signal to determine their trades is subject to a binding liquidity constraint. We show that in such a market a separating equilibrium where trade size is informative does not exist and hence there is no price effect for large trades. Trade size may be revealing only if there is a buy sell asymmetry (large buy size is not equal to large sell size) or the corresponding price effect is asymmetric (price effect due to a large buy is not equal to that of a large sell). Further for a pooling equilibrium to exist, where trade size is not informative, the width of the market denoted by the ratio of order size (large size/small size) needs to be small, while the shallowness (inverse depth) of the market denoted by the ratio between pure information and institutional trades and the information signal needs to be stronger (higher). Our results on bid and ask prices and spread confirm recent empirical evidence on price effect of large and institutional trades found in the literature.

Mutual Fund Herding and the Impact on Stock Prices

We analyze the trading activity of the mutual fund industry from 1975 through 1994 to determine whether funds "herd" when they trade stocks and to investigate the impact of herding on stock prices. Although we find little herding by mutual funds in the average stock, we find much higher levels in trades of small stocks and in trading by growth-oriented funds. Stocks that herds buy outperform stocks that they sell by 4 percent during the following six months; this return difference is much more pronounced among small stocks. Our results are consistent with mutual fund herding speeding the price-adjustment process.     

TRADING PATTERNS OF SMALL AND LARGE TRADERS AROUND STOCK SPLIT EX-DATES

We investigate the trading patterns of small and large traders around stock split ex-dates. Using the intraday transaction database for the Toronto Stock Exchange during 1983–89, we find that stock splits are associated with significant changes in trading patterns. Although stock splits appear to have little effect on the trading behavior of large traders (trade value of at least $100,000), they are associated with significant decreases in odd-lot trading and increases in small board-lot trading (trade value of less than $10,000). Although the liquidity premia decrease for all trade sizes, trade direction changes significantly from sell to buy after split ex-dates for all but the large trades, where the change is in the opposite direction. The significant increase in variances after split ex-dates is explained by various microstructure-related variables, and small (large) trades appear to be (de)stabilizing.     

Trading out of sight: An analysis of cross-trading in mutual fund families

This paper explores how mutual fund groups set the price of in-house transactions among affiliated funds. We collect a data set of four million equity transactions and compare the pricing of trades crossed internally (cross-trades) with that of twin trades executed with external counterparties. While cross-trades should reduce transaction costs for both trading parties, we find that the price of cross-trades is set strategically to reallocate performance among sibling funds. Furthermore, we provide evidence that a large number of cross-trades are backdated. We discuss the implications for the literature on fund performance and the current regulatory debate.     

What impact does a change of fund manager have on mutual fund performance?

Using a unique database of UK fund manager changes over the period from 1997 to 2011, we examine the impact of such changes on fund performance. We find clear evidence to suggest that a manager change does affect the benchmark-adjusted performance of UK mutual funds. In particular we find a significant deterioration in the benchmark-adjusted returns of funds that were top performers before the manager exit and, conversely, a significant improvement in the average benchmark-adjusted returns of funds that were poor performers before the manager exit. Our use of the Carhart's (1997) four-factor model reveals that the improvement in average post manager exit performance is accompanied by a reduction in market risk, a slight reduction in exposure to small cap stocks, and an increase in exposure to value and momentum stocks. Overall, our results suggest that UK fund management companies have been relatively successful in replacing bad managers with better managers, but relatively unsuccessful at finding equivalent replacements for their top performing managers. We believe that regulators should therefore try to ensure that all efforts are made by fund management companies to inform all of their investors about a change in management.     

Leading the herd: evidence from mutual funds’ buy and sell decisions

This article investigates whether a mutual fund’s performance is related to its herding behavior. Using the methodology of Sias (Rev Finance Stud 17:165–206, 2004), we develop a measure to capture the magnitude that a fund’s buy (sell) decisions are leading other funds’ buys (sells), and find that a fund’s performance is positively (negatively) related to its “buy leading” (“sell leading”). We interpret these findings as evidence that “buy leaders” (“sell leaders”)’ performance benefits (suffers) from the positive (negative) price effect associated with buy (sell) herds. Additionally, we find a positive relationship between fund performance and valuation-motivated “buy leading”, while we find weak evidence on the relationship between performance and valuation-motivated “sell leading”. We interpret these results as evidence that leading funds’ outperformance is due, in part, to their ability to value stocks.     

What Style Liquidity Timing Skills Do Mutual Fund Managers Possess?

Recent studies claim that mutual fund managers demonstrate strong MARKET liquidity timing skills. We extend their liquidity timing tests to the four‐factor case and investigate liquidity timing skills with respect to the MARKET, SIZE, VALUE and MOMENTUM factors. Contrary to these claims, we find no evidence that fund managers adjust market exposure in anticipation of market liquidity changes. We find rather strong evidence that fund managers successfully overweight small stocks as market liquidity increases. Our study also demonstrates that it is easy to misidentify SIZE liquidity timing as MARKET liquidity timing in models that focus only on MARKET liquidity timing.     

Time-varying fund manager skills of socially responsible investing (SRI) funds in developed and emerging markets

We examine stock selectivity and timing abilities in the market-wide return, volatility and liquidity of SRI fund managers. We find that multi-dimensional fund manager skills are time-varying and persistent in the short run, with developed market funds exhibiting longer persistence in all dimensions. Fund manager skills tend to be affected by fund characteristics (i.e., expense ratio, fund size, turnover and management tenure) and market characteristics (i.e., ESG market capitalization, mandatory ESG regulation and 10–2 yield spread). Fund managers of developed (emerging) market funds outperform (underperform) the market indices. For both fund types, fund managers possess exceptional volatility and liquidity timing despite poor return timing. Moreover, fund managers focus more (less) on timing the market’s return and less (more) on picking stocks when the prospect of recession keeps increasing (decreasing). Interestingly, if fund managers attempt to time the market-wide return or liquidity, stock selectivity will be worsened by their timing behavior.     

Words versus Deeds: Evidence from Post‐Call Manager Trades

We examine the impact of conference call tones on the direction and magnitude of subsequent manager trades. Our univariate results show that corporate insiders buy company shares following negative‐tone conference calls and sell shares following positive‐tone conference calls. This inverse call tone–trading pattern holds for both managers’ introductory sessions and subsequent question‐and‐answer (Q&A) sessions. Our multivariate results confirm the univariate call tone–trading patterns and show that contrarian manager trades are mostly driven by managerial selling activity. In contrast to the consistent and strong evidence of managers trading in the opposite direction of their call tones, we find no evidence of managers trading in the same direction of their call tones. We also examine the impact of analyst Q&A challenges on post‐call manager trades. Our findings suggest that managers learn from analyst feedback and adjust their post‐call trades accordingly.     

Further analysis of the liquidity and information components of institutional orders: Active versus passive funds

Previous research examining the price impact of institutional trading concludes that index funds incur higher liquidity costs due to the higher demand for trading immediacy. However, this conclusion has only been inferred by comparing the total price impact of active and index funds. This study extends the literature by decomposing the price impact of both active and index funds' trades into liquidity (temporary) and information (permanent) components. Index fund trades incur higher liquidity costs and generate lower returns than active funds' trades. Indeed, the evidence presented in this study reveals the execution costs of index funds' trades are entirely liquidity-driven.     

A Glimpse Behind a Closed Door: The Long‐Term Investment Value of Buy‐Side Research and Its Effect on Fund Trades and Performance

We examine proprietary research produced by buy‐side analysts working for a large fund management company. We find that the buy‐side research has investment value for a one‐year horizon, and the analysts producing this research exhibit differential ability that tends to persist over time. The buy‐side research strongly influences trades made by the company's funds, especially when it coveys information that is independent of the fund managers' own information, when it is produced by buy‐side analysts with good track records, and when the underlying stocks have little sell‐side coverage. The influence of sell‐side research is concentrated primarily in stocks not followed by buy‐side analysts and in funds with low overall buy‐side coverage. The company's funds that rely more heavily on buy‐side research generate superior performance.