How skilful are US fixed-income fund managers?

We develop a performance evaluation model that incorporates the factors proposed by Huij and Derwall (2008) and a fund-specific benchmark to analyse the performance of US fixed income funds. Using the full sample, and accounting for the possibility of false discoveries, we find that fund management companies extract most of any abnormal performance produced by their fund managers. Our sub-sample analysis indicates that after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) there was a substantial increase in the number of bond funds with: both positive gross-of-fee alpha and positive net-of-fee alpha performance; and also a reduction in funds with negative-alpha performance. However, because the GFC was such a unique event, it would still be difficult to conclude that these managers offer value for money for investors compared to passive alternatives.     

Winners and losers: German equity mutual funds

We investigate the performance of winners and losers for German equity mutual funds (1990–2009), using empirical order statistics. When using gross returns and the Fama–French three-factor model, the number of statistically significant positive alpha funds is zero but increases markedly when market timing variables are added. However, when using a ‘total performance’ measure (which incorporates both alpha and the contribution of market timing), the number of statistically significant winner funds falls to zero. The latter is consistent with the bias in estimated alphas in the presence of market timing. We also find that many poorly performing funds are unskilled rather than unlucky.     

Performance and performance persistence of UK closed-end equity funds

Using a comprehensive data set of almost 300 UK closed-end equity funds over the period 1990 to 2013, we use the false discovery rate to assess the alpha-performance of individual funds with both domestic and other mandates, using self-declared benchmarks and additional risk factors. We find evidence to indicate that up to 16% of the funds have truly positive alphas while around 3% have truly negative alphas. Positive post-formation alphas using fund-price returns depend on the factor model used: there is some positive-alpha performance when post-formation returns are evaluated using a one-factor global model but substantial positive-alpha performance when using a four-factor global model.     

Informed trading around earnings and mutual fund alphas

We examine whether informed trading around earnings announcements drives mutual fund performance. The measure is motivated by prior studies arguing that a mutual fund is skilled if it buys stocks with subsequent high earnings announcement returns. We find that this measure predicts future mutual fund returns. On average, after adjusting for Carhart’s four risk factors, the top decile of mutual funds outperforms the bottom decile by 44 basis points per quarter. By decomposing fund alphas into two components in their relations to earnings, we find that this measure is only associated with earnings-related fund alphas. This measure can also be used to predict stock returns at future earnings announcements.     

Performance attribution of mutual funds in India: outperformance or mis‐representation?

We conduct a novel holdings‐based performance attribution, particularly suited to emerging markets, for equity‐oriented active mutual funds in India. Although, we find significantly positive alphas for an average fund, the stated benchmarks are grossly mis‐specified. A style‐adjusted benchmark could beat the stated benchmarks by greater margins than the funds themselves. While funds’ trading activity consistently adds value, cash drag and market timing usually diminish value. Although, the best‐performing funds exhibit superior security selection abilities, their outperformance does not persist. However, despite the lack of persistence winner funds continue to generate significantly higher alphas than loser funds for quite some time.     

UK equity mutual fund alphas make a comeback

In this study, we re-visit the performance of 887 active UK equity mutual funds using a new approach proposed by Angelidis, Giamouridis, and Tessaromatis. The authors argue that mutual funds stock selection is driven by the benchmark index, so if the benchmark generates alpha, there will be a bias in interpretation of manager's stock-picking ability. In their model, the alpha of a fund is adjusted by the benchmark's alpha. By applying this method, we eliminate bias inflicted by the persistently negative alphas of FTSE 100 Index in the period 1992–2013. We find that adjusted Fama–French and Carhat alphas of UK equity mutual funds are higher than those implied by the standard three- and four-factor models and are overall positive, contrary to most of the existing literature on UK fund performance. This result is consistent across funds' investment styles and robust to the use of FTSE Small Cap as benchmark for a sub-sample of small cap funds.     

Reassessing False Discoveries in Mutual Fund Performance: Skill,Luck, or Lack of Power?

Barras, Scaillet, and Wermers propose the false discovery rate (FDR) to separate skill (alpha) from luck in fund performance. Using simulations with parameters informed by the data, we find that this methodology is conservative and underestimates the proportion of nonzero‐alpha funds. For example, 65% of funds with economically large alphas of $\pm 2\%$ are misclassified as zero alpha. This bias arises from the low signal‐to‐noise ratio in fund returns and the resulting low statistical power. Our results question FDR's applicability in performance evaluation and other domains with low power, and can materially change the conclusion that most funds have zero alpha.     

Alpha or beta in the eye of the beholder: What drives hedge fund flows?

Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) alpha explains hedge fund flows better than alphas from more sophisticated models. This suggests that investors pool together sophisticated model alpha with returns from exposures to traditional (except for the market) and exotic risks. We decompose performance into traditional and exotic risk components and find that while investors chase both components, they place greater relative emphasis on returns associated with exotic risk exposures that can only be obtained through hedge funds. However, we find little evidence of persistence in performance from traditional or exotic risks, which cautions against investors’ practice of seeking out risk exposures following periods of recent success.     

Asset management and investment banking

We find evidence that conflicts of interest are pervasive in the asset management business owned by investment banks. Using data from 1990 to 2008, we compare the alphas of mutual funds, hedge funds, and institutional funds operated by investment banks and non-bank conglomerates. We find that, while no difference exists in performance by fund type, being owned by an investment bank reduces alphas by 46 basis points per year in our baseline model. Making lead loans increases alphas, but the dispersion of fees across portfolios decreases alphas. The economic loss is $4.9 billion per year.     

Model uncertainty,performance persistence and flows

Model uncertainty makes it difficult to draw clear inference about mutual fund performance persistence. I propose a new performance measure, Bayesian model averaged (BMA) alpha, which explicitly accounts for model uncertainty. Using BMA alphas, I find evidence of performance persistence in a large sample of US funds. There is a positive and asymmetric relation between flows and past BMA alphas, suggesting that fund investors respond to the information in BMA alphas. My findings are robust to various sensitivity analyses, including alternative measures of post-ranking performance, flows and total net assets, and alternative econometric model specifications.     

Should investors invest in hedge fund-like mutual funds? Evidence from the 2007 financial crisis

This study empirically examines the value added for investors during the 2007–2009 financial crisis from hedge fund-like equity mutual funds, including 130/30, market neutral, and long/short equity funds. We find that based on the information ratio, all market neutral funds, top 90% of long/short funds, and top 25% of 130/30 funds outperform a long-only passive index fund over the crisis period. However, we find little evidence of abnormal performance by the average and median funds in our sample, based on either unconditional or conditional four-factor alphas. The reason for the overall under-performance in the crisis period is that while short positions taken by these funds do generate alpha, the gain from their short positions is not sufficiently large to offset the loss from their long positions. Finally, the abnormal performance of short positions is found to be attributable to managers’ characteristic-adjusted and industry-adjusted stock selection skills. One implication of this study is that even though market neutral and long/short funds on average may not generate alpha, investors can benefit from holding these funds, especially the former, that can provide a hedge against down markets due to their low betas and that can be useful for asset allocation.     

Can Mutual Fund “Stars” Really Pick Stocks? New Evidence from a Bootstrap Analysis

We apply a new bootstrap statistical technique to examine the performance of the U.S. open‐end, domestic equity mutual fund industry over the 1975 to 2002 period. A bootstrap approach is necessary because the cross section of mutual fund alphas has a complex nonnormal distribution due to heterogeneous risk‐taking by funds as well as nonnormalities in individual fund alpha distributions. Our bootstrap approach uncovers findings that differ from many past studies. Specifically, we find that a sizable minority of managers pick stocks well enough to more than cover their costs. Moreover, the superior alphas of these managers persist.     

基金业绩归因与投资者行为

本文以2006年1月至2016年12月中国64家股票型主动管理基金为样本,从基金净资金流变化的角度,检验了投资者决策与基金业绩结构的关系,以期更好地理解投资者行为。本文结论有:(1)整体上,投资者在衡量基金经理能力时,更关注原始超额收益率或只基于市场风险调整风险敞口,这可能与中国市场投资工具仍然不够充分、风险难以有效对冲有关;(2)机构投资者相比个人投资者对风险敞口的识别更严格;(3)简单模型的优势集中在市场波动低、投资者情绪高的时期;(4)除基金经理能力外,净资金流变化对市场风险报酬也很敏感;(5)从alpha的角度,我国基金市场仍存在“赎回异象”,可能与“处置效应”有关,仍需提升投资者对风险的认知,引导市场形成更加科学的投资观念。     

Mutual fund performance with learning across funds

The average level and cross-sectional variability of fund alphas are estimated from a large sample of mutual funds. This information is incorporated, along with the usual regression estimate of alpha, in a (roughly) precision-weighted average measure of individual fund performance. Substantial “learning across funds” is documented, with significant effects on investment decisions. In a Bayesian framework, this form of learning is inconsistent with the assumption, made in the past literature, of prior independence across funds. Independence can be viewed as an extreme scenario in which the true cross-sectional distribution of alphas is presumed to be known a priori.     

False discoveries in volatility timing of mutual funds

This paper examines the volatility timing of US mutual funds by controlling the false discovery rate to find out how many funds are truly countercyclical (procyclical) timing funds. Empirical results show that, given the whole universe of our sample funds, the percentages of countercyclical and procyclical volatility timing funds are about equal. We also find that while the standard approach, which simply counts the number of significant positive (negative) timing coefficients, does not incorporate false discoveries in volatility timing, it provides quite accurate volatility timing results. Finally, we find that the performance measures for an equally weighted portfolio of procyclical timing funds are greater than for an equally weighted portfolio of countercyclical timing funds in the in-sample test, consistent with our expectation that procyclical timers earn higher returns because they take on more risk. However, the countercyclical timing portfolio outperforms the procyclical timing portfolio in the out-of-sample test.     

False Discoveries in UK Mutual Fund Performance

We use a multiple hypothesis testing framework to estimate the false discovery rate (FDR) amongst UK equity mutual funds. Using all funds, we find a relatively high FDR for the best funds of 32.8% (at a 5% significance level), which implies that only around 3.7% of all funds truly outperform their benchmarks. For the worst funds the FDR is relatively small at 7.6% which results in 22% of funds which truly underperform their benchmarks. For different investment styles, this pattern of very few genuine winner funds is repeated for all companies, small companies and equity income funds. Forming portfolios of funds recursively for which the FDR is controlled at a ‘acceptable’ value, produces no performance persistence for positive alpha funds and weak evidence of persistence for negative alpha funds.     

Mutual fund performance persistence: Factor models and portfolio size

We re-examine US mutual fund performance persistence. We investigate persistence (i) using both “academic” factor models and “practitioner” index models, (ii) using decile-size recursive portfolios and also portfolios formed from smaller numbers of funds, (iii) using nonparametric bootstrap p-values as well as conventional t-tests and (iv) using both net-of-fee fund returns (net alphas) and gross alphas. Our key result is that positive net alpha performance persistence can be found using small portfolios of funds together with a holding period of 6 months or less, for both practitioner index models and academic factor models.     

Do hedge funds deliver alpha? A Bayesian and bootstrap analysis

Using a robust bootstrap procedure, we find that top hedge fund performance cannot be explained by luck, and hedge fund performance persists at annual horizons. Moreover, we show that Bayesian measures, which help overcome the short-sample problem inherent in hedge fund returns, lead to superior performance predictability. Sorting on Bayesian alphas, relative to OLS alphas, yields a 5.5% per year increase in the alpha of the spread between the top and bottom hedge fund deciles. Our results are robust and relevant to investors as they are neither confined to small funds, nor driven by incubation bias, backfill bias, or serial correlation.     

European Mutual Fund Performance

This paper presents an overview of the European mutual fund industry and investigates mutual fund performance using a survivorship bias controlled sample of 506 funds from the five most important mutual fund countries. The latter is done using the Carhart (1997) 4-factor asset-pricing model. In addition we investigate whether European fund managers exhibit 'hot hands', persistence in performance. Finally the influence of fund characteristics on risk-adjusted performance is considered. Our overall results suggest that European mutual funds, and especially small cap funds are able to add value, as indicated by their positive after cost alphas. If we add back management fees, four out of five countries exhibit significant out-performance at an aggregate level. Finally, we detect strong persistence in mean returns for funds investing in the UK. Our results deviate from most US studies that argue mutual funds under-perform the market by the amount of expenses they charge.     

Managerial characteristics and performance of eurozone mutual funds

We investigate the relation between observable managerial characteristics (i.e., gender, age, tenure, professional qualifications, and advanced education) and performance in diversified equity mutual funds domiciled in the eurozone. We find that differences in the fund alphas are statistically significant only in groups based on age, tenure, and professional qualifications (i.e., chartered financial analyst [CFA]). We also find a significant positive relation for age and CFA certification with a fund's risk-adjusted performance and a significant negative relation for tenure. However, we find no significant effect for gender and advanced education (i.e., master of business administration [MBA]). The differences in risk taking are significantly related only with age and tenure; the former has a negative and the latter a positive relation with risk taking.