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1.
本文从市场相关和银行相关角度,运用面板数据模型,对我国14家上市银行特许权价值的决定因素进行了实证检验.结果发现,决定我国上市银行特许权价值的主要因素包括以银行为导向的金融结构,银行业垄断性和宏观经济因素;但并没有发现银行控股股东性质对银行特许权价值的显著影响.  相似文献   

2.
银行业的风险程度关系到整个经济体的稳定与发展,控制风险是银行经营的重要目标之一。目前对银行风险承担的研究主要从特许权价值和市场竞争的角度分别展开分析。本文以156家中国商业银行为研究对象,同时分析了银行特许权价值、市场竞争程度对银行风险的影响。通过实证分析,我们发现目前影响我国商业银行特许权价值的因素主要来自银行因素而非市场因素;在没有控制内生性的前提下,发现银行特许权价值有效地约束了银行风险,而市场竞争的加剧增加了银行风险行为;在控制银行风险和特许权价值内生性后,发现特许权价值对中国商业银行风险的约束效应基本不存在。因此,要维持银行业的稳定,需要规范银行的竞争行为,提高特许权价值的风险约束效应。  相似文献   

3.
特许权价值是商业银行具有的从受保护市场获取未来租金的牌照价值,通常情况下,具有相对较高特许权价值的银行为了避免破产,更有动力倾向于采取谨慎策略,因而其发挥着银行风险自律器的作用。通过银行风险行为的静态选择和动态选择视角,考证特许权价值的自律效应,对于后过渡时期的银行监管政策具有启发意义。  相似文献   

4.
中国上市银行特许权价值的自律效应   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
银行特许权价值是银行风险自我约束的重要机制。本文使用托宾Q值衡量了中国14家上市银行的特许权价值,借助面板数据回归分析对银行特许权价值的自律效应进行了实证检验。结果表明:上市银行特许权价值对反映外部评价的市场风险确实存在着自律效应,但还未对表现为内部风险控制的资本充足率产生显著作用。因国家对银行业提供了全面担保,银行所有制性质对银行风险无显著影响。随着银行业竞争日趋激烈,通过引导商业银行提升特许权价值来激励银行审慎经营并加强内部风险控制,对后金融危机时期中国银行业的健康稳定发展具有积极意义。  相似文献   

5.
将银行破产风险分解为经营不确定性与风险覆盖能力、杠杆风险与资产组合风险,建立动态面板模型并采用2003~2013年中国上市银行的数据和系统广义矩估计方法,分析特许权价值激励银行降低风险承担的途径和方式。研究发现:我国银行特许权价值具有抑制银行风险的自律效应,银行为避免过高风险而遭受监管惩罚或丧失市场资源,保持特许经营条件和优势,将进行积极的风险管理;特许权价值的风险自律效应主要通过促使银行提升风险覆盖能力、降低资产组合风险和杠杆风险来实现。  相似文献   

6.
随着金融自由化的逐步推进,商业银行特许权价值下降趋势明显,而在数字技术的赋能下,银行数字化转型为缓解特许权价值下滑提供了全新路径。本文基于2007-2021年中国商业银行的年度数据,实证考察数字化转型对银行特许权价值的影响效果及作用路径。研究发现,数字化转型可以显著促进银行特许权价值提升,降低风险承担是数字化影响银行价值的渠道机制。进一步分析表明,数字化转型对银行特许权价值的影响效应会由于银行管理水平、行业竞争程度及银行股权性质的不同产生差异化表现。  相似文献   

7.
从银行特许权价值的定义入手,利用样本银行1998~2007年的年度数据,阐述和分析了银行特许权价值的风险约束效应。研究结果表明,银行特许权价值对银行的风险行为有很强的约束效应,即拥有较高特许权价值的银行不会倾向于采取过度冒险的经营行为,而那些特许权价值较低的银行会增加冒险经营的动机。  相似文献   

8.
李冲 《金卡工程》2010,14(11):256-257
本文采用托宾Q方法度量了2003~2009年中国上市商业银行的特许权价值,并用panel模型实证分析了外资银行进入对银行特许权价值的影响。结果发现,在华外资银行的资产占比与银行特许权价值负相关,这说明外资银行进入削弱了中国银行业的稳定性,因此需要加强对在华外资银行的审慎监管。  相似文献   

9.
缪晓斌 《时代金融》2013,(27):133-134
特许权价值是商业银行风险行为的重要影响因素。本文以2008—2011年14家上市银行为样本,实证表明:特许权价值与商业银行风险行为显著负相关,说明商业银行为了保障特许权价值的长期持续性,会降低自身的风险承担。  相似文献   

10.
随着银行业竞争的日益激烈,深入探讨金融自由化、特许权价值以及银行风险行为之间的关系显得愈来愈有必要.较多的国外文献已经证明三者之间存在着密切相关的联系.在面临全球化竞争时,通过研究三者的具体联系,更加清晰地认识特许权价值对于银行自身的风险约束作用,有效控制自身风险将会是我国银行业最基本的要求,更是非常关键的一步.  相似文献   

11.
A common assumption in the academic literature and in the supervision of banking systems is that franchise value plays a key role in limiting bank risk-taking. As market power is the primary source of franchise value, reduced competition in banking markets has been seen as promoting banking stability. A recent paper by Martínez-Miera and Repullo (MMR, 2010) shows that a nonlinear relationship theoretically exists between bank competition and risk-taking in the loan market. We test this hypothesis using data from the Spanish banking system. After controlling for macroeconomic conditions and bank characteristics, we find support for this nonlinear relationship using standard measures of market concentration in both the loan and deposit markets. When direct measures of market power, such as Lerner indices, are used, the empirical results are more supportive of the original franchise value hypothesis, but only in the loan market. Overall, the results highlight the empirical relevance of the MMR model, even though further analysis across other banking markets is needed.  相似文献   

12.
We show that a competitive banking system is inconsistent with an optimum quantity of private money. Because bankers cannot commit to their promises and the composition of their assets is not publicly observable, a positive franchise value is required to induce the full convertibility of bank liabilities. Under perfect competition, a positive franchise value can be obtained only if the return on bank liabilities is sufficiently low, which imposes a cost on those who hold these liabilities for transaction purposes. If the banking system is monopolistic, then an efficient allocation is incentive feasible. In this case, the members of the banking system obtain a higher return on assets, making it feasible to pay a sufficiently high return on bank liabilities. Finally, we argue that the regulation of the banking system is required to obtain efficiency.  相似文献   

13.
This paper investigates whether or not functionally diversified banks have a comparative advantage in terms of long-term performance/risk profile compared to their specialized competitors. To that end, this study uses market-based measures of return potential and bank risk. We calculate the franchise value over time of European banks as a measure of their long-run performance potential. In addition, we measure risk as both the systematic and the idiosyncratic risk components derived from a bank stock return model. Finally, we analyze the return/risk trade-off implied in different functional diversification strategies using a panel data analysis over the period 1989–2004. A higher share of non-interest income in total income affects banks’ franchise values positively. Diversification of revenue streams from distinct financial activities increases the systematic risk of banks while the effect on the idiosyncratic risk component is non-linear and predominantly downward-sloping. These findings have conflicting implications for different stakeholders, such as investors, bank shareholders, bank managers and bank supervisors.  相似文献   

14.
Bank Capital Requirements, Capital Structure and Regulation   总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0  
This paper studies the impact of capital requirements, deposit insurance and franchise value on a bank’s capital structure. We find that properly regulated banks voluntarily choose to maintain capital in excess of the minimum required. Central to this decision is both firm franchise value and the ability of regulators to place banks in receivership stripping equity holders of firm value. These features of our model help explain both the capital structure of the large mortgage Government Sponsored Enterprises and the recent increase in risk taking through leverage by financial institutions. The insights gained from the model are useful in guiding the discussion of financial regulatory reforms.  相似文献   

15.
Traditional theory suggests that higher bank profitability (or franchise value) dissuades bank risk-taking. We highlight an opposite effect: higher profitability loosens bank borrowing constraints. This enables profitable banks to take risk on a larger scale, inducing risk-taking. This effect is more pronounced when bank leverage constraints are looser, or when new investments can be financed with senior funding (such as repos). The model’s predictions are consistent with some notable cross-sectional patterns of bank risk-taking in the run-up to the 2008 crisis.  相似文献   

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