首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
相似文献
 共查询到19条相似文献,搜索用时 109 毫秒
1.
中国银行流动性过剩的成因辨析:一个新的视角   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
本文将银行的流动性资产分为自愿性(预防性)流动资产和非自愿性流动资产两部分.通过建立银行预防性流动资产需求模型,运用向量误差修正模型(VEC)和方差分解方法实证分析我国银行流动性过剩的原因.实证结果表明:银行间同业拆借利率、汇率波动率、存款波动率和银行存款增加是银行流动性过剩的主要原因,银行的自愿性流动资产过剩和非自愿性流动性过剩并存,银行大量的流动性资产部分是为了规避融资成本、汇率风险和存款波动等风险而持有的.  相似文献   

2.
本文将银行的流动性资产分为自愿性(预防性)流动资产和非自愿性流动资产两部分。通过建立银行预防性流动资产需求模型,运用向量误差修正模型(VEC)和方差分解方法实证分析我国银行流动性过剩的原因。实证结果表明:银行间同业拆借利率、汇率波动率、存款波动率和银行存款增加是银行流动性过剩的主要原因,银行的自愿性流动资产过剩和非自愿性流动性过剩并存,银行大量的流动性资产部分是为了规避融资成本、汇率风险和存款波动等风险而持有的。  相似文献   

3.
本文选取2008~2013年14家上市银行的数据,分析存款竞争与银行风险的互动关系。结果表明,存款利率上限管制没有限制存款竞争,价格和非价格引起的存款竞争有可能会提高银行的信用风险,但有助于刺激银行改善流动性。存款市场约束通过数量渠道约束银行的信用风险承担行为,通过价格渠道约束银行的流动性风险,存款利率上限放开会提高银行的流动性风险。流动性风险和信用风险的变化会对存款市场竞争产生显著的影响,银行提高流动性的行为及银行不良贷款率上升会加剧存款市场竞争,中国银行业的存款竞争存在显著的顺周期性特点。  相似文献   

4.
刘青 《济南金融》2004,(3):58-59
流动性风险是指银行无力为负债的减少或资产的增加提供融资,即当银行流动性不足时,它无力以合理的成本迅速地增加负债或变现资产获得足够的资金,从而影响其支付能力和盈利水平。在严重情况下,流动性不足会造成银行的清偿问题,若得不到外援,便会陷入关门的境地。由此可见.银行特别是商业银行,资产的流动性好坏是一  相似文献   

5.
本文构建理论模型分析流动性监管影响银行风险承担的传导机制,发现流动性监管对银行风险承担的影响取决于资产端和负债端中介效应的净影响。在此基础上,本文以2007—2019年中国51家商业银行为样本,运用断点回归模型检验流动性监管对银行风险承担的影响。结果发现,提高流动性监管要求,短期内会显著降低银行单位资产盈利能力,进而加剧银行风险承担行为,但长期会提高银行单位资产盈利能力,进而降低银行风险承担水平。进一步的中介效应分析发现,流动性监管要求与银行单位资产盈利能力呈U型关系,即提高流动性监管要求在长期会提高资产回报率,进而降低银行风险承担水平,但流动性监管对银行负债融资成本的影响不显著,说明流动性监管主要通过资产端影响商业银行的风险承担水平。  相似文献   

6.
流动性风险是指银行无力为负债的减少或资产的增加提供融资,即当银行流动性不足时,它无力以合理的成本迅速地增加负债或变现资产获得足够的资金,从而影响其支付能力和盈利水平.在严重情况下,流动性不足会造成银行的清偿问题,若得不到外援,便会陷入关门的境地.由此可见,银行特别是商业银行,资产的流动性好坏是一项致命的管理要素.  相似文献   

7.
存款保险制度的实施可能会提升银行风险承担,并导致资产流动性结构恶化,而这些因素构成了银行发展资产证券化的潜在动因。本文以2012年信贷资产证券化重启后的银行数据为样本,研究存款保险制度对银行资产证券化发展的影响。研究发现:存款保险制度的实施显著促进了银行资产证券化发展。机制检验表明,主动风险承担的提升、资产流动性结构的恶化及资本充足水平的降低,是存款保险制度促进银行资产证券化发展的重要作用渠道。进一步检验异质性特征,发现存款保险制度的实施主要促进了银行抵押贷款证券化的发展,并对全国性和城市商业银行的资产证券化发展具有显著促进作用。本文不仅基于银行微观行为深化了对存款保险制度影响效应的认知,而且拓展了银行资产证券化的研究视域,对进一步优化存款保险制度和资产证券化发展路径提供了新的思路。  相似文献   

8.
虽然目前银行流动性增多,但利率从货币市场向实体经济的传导还不顺畅。究其原因,三季度受存款偏离度指标考核压力以及利率市场化推进等因素影响,各银行存款增长普遍承压,存款余额环比下降,负债结构的变化带来了银行资金成本压力,进而影响到企业贷款成本;重要原因还在于经济下行压力下,债务率较高和风险溢价上升。  相似文献   

9.
河南地方银行规模较小且差距大,传统存贷款业务占比下降、同业业务快速增长造成对实体经济的金融支持力度下降并导致融资难和融资贵;同业业务、批发融资的快速增长致使利率敏感性资产和负债增加,更易遭受利率波动影响;地方银行在与大银行以及以“担保公司”为代表的非正规金融等传统金融之间竞争的同时还要面对互联网金融等非传统金融的竞争;短期内地方银行仍然会依靠规模来保持盈利水平,因而融资难现象会缓解,但由于贷款市场的竞争不充分贷款利率并不会大幅下降,融资贵现象短期内会持续;风险管理能力、风险定价能力较弱;需要关注利率风险、流动性风险以及系统性风险。  相似文献   

10.
金融当局的审慎监管、中央银行的最后贷款人功能和存款保险,被公认为金融安全网的三大要素。目前,已有72个国家和地区建立了存款保险制度。支持存款保险制度的观点为,银行业与其他行业相比有其独特性,主要表现在它的流动性转化功能,即银行用流动性强的负债为流动性差的资产融资。恰恰是这种流动性转换,使得银行很容易遭受破坏性的存款挤兑。由于银行实行的是部分准备制度,因此注定了它天生就具有不稳定性。  相似文献   

11.
Our investigation of the association between bank market power and liquidity in 101 countries reveals that a bank's initial gains of market power lead to increases in bank liquidity, but does so at a diminishing rate. Beyond an empirically determined threshold, further increases in market power are inversely associated with bank liquidity. From a cross-sectional viewpoint, banks that lack market power hold more liquid assets and are net lenders in the interbank market. In contrast, dominant banks hold less liquid assets and are net interbank borrowers. For a given level of market power, ceteris paribus, developed nation banks hold less asset liquidity and obtain more interbank funding liquidity than their developing country peers. These results remain equally relevant during the 2007–2009 global financial crisis (GFC).  相似文献   

12.
This study examines the relationship between funding liquidity and bank risk taking. Using quarterly data for U.S. bank holding companies from 1986 to 2014, we find evidence that banks having lower funding liquidity risk as proxied by higher deposit ratios, take more risk. A reduction in banks’ funding liquidity risk increases bank risk as evidenced by higher risk-weighted assets, greater liquidity creation and lower Z-scores. However, our results show that bank size and capital buffers usually limit banks from taking more risk when they have lower funding liquidity risk. Moreover, during the Global Financial Crisis banks with lower funding liquidity risk took less risk. The findings of this study have implications for bank regulators advocating greater liquidity and capital requirements for banks under Basel III.  相似文献   

13.
Banks can deal with their liquidity risk by holding liquid assets (self‐insurance), by participating in interbank markets (coinsurance), or by using flexible financing instruments, such as bank capital (risk sharing). We use a simple model to show that undiversifiable liquidity risk, that is, the liquidity risk that banks are unable to coinsure on interbank markets, represents an important risk factor affecting their capital structures. Banks facing higher undiversifiable liquidity risk hold more capital. We posit that, empirically, banks that are more exposed to undiversifiable liquidity risk are less active on interbank markets. Therefore, we test for the existence of a negative relationship between bank capital and interbank market activity and find support in a large sample of U.S. commercial banks.  相似文献   

14.
基于银行业在宏观风险来临时出现的流动性不足和系统性风险,通过建立 DSGE-VAR 模型,考量银行业在宏观经济运行框架下的系统流动性风险,结果发现:银行同业借贷、其他证券资产和交易性负债业务的综合作用会使得银行系统流动性风险总体增大,银行如果想要降低存款提取率对其流动性的影响,就要在银行间市场停止拆出资金、出售政府证券及其他流动资产,并出售潜在的流动性较低的资产.从监管层面来讲,应当通过监管的引导效应将交易性负债进行转化,引导同业借贷和其他证券资产业务向平衡区域集中,并在一定范围内减少银行其他证券资产业务的规模.  相似文献   

15.
We evaluate how the liquidity coverage rule affects US banks’ opacity and funding liquidity risk. Banks subject to the rule become significantly more opaque and funding liquidity risk increases by $245 million per quarter. Higher funding liquidity risk is more pronounced among banks that are subject to the rule’s more stringent liquidity buffers, and systemically riskier banks. Rising opacity reflects an increase in banks’ holdings of complex assets whose value is difficult to communicate to investors. The evidence highlights the unintended consequences of liquidity regulation and is consistent with theoretical models’ predictions of a trade-off between liquidity buffers and bank opacity that exacerbates funding liquidity risk.  相似文献   

16.
资产不透明的金融机构过度依赖批发性融资进行监管套利不利于系统性风险的防控。在此背景下,本文首先在经典银行道德风险模型的基础上引入关联性,从资产透明度和监管套利的视角分析银行系统性风险累积的内在机理。而后利用2007-2018年中国上市银行微观数据,构建资产透明度指标和系统性风险指标(SRISKMES),对理论推论进行实证检验。主要结论有:(1)资产不透明、监管套利会提高银行的系统性风险。(2)监管套利弱化了资产透明度和资本监管机制对银行系统性风险承担的约束作用,资产透明度与资本监管机制在约束系统性风险承担中的协调作用不明显。(3)以大银行为主的债权银行受监管套利的影响相较于受资产透明度的影响更明显。在此基础上,我们对完善金融风险防范体系以及监管机制提出了若干建议。  相似文献   

17.
The Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) is a new Basel III liquidity requirement designed to limit funding risk arising from maturity mismatches between bank assets and liabilities. This study explains the NSFR and estimates this ratio for banks in 15 countries. Banks below the ratio need to increase stable sources of funding and to reduce assets requiring funding. The most cost-effective strategies to meet the NSFR are to increase holdings of higher-rated securities and to extend the maturity of wholesale funding. These changes reduce net interest margins by 70–88 basis points on average, or around 40% of their year-end 2009 values. Universal banks with diversified funding sources and high trading assets are penalized most by the NSFR.  相似文献   

18.
After August 2007 the plumbing system that supplied banks with wholesale funding, the interbank market, failed because toxic assets obstructed the pipes. Banks were forced to squeeze liquidity in a “lemons market” or to ask for liquidity “on tap” from central banks. This paper disentangles the two components of the 3-month Euribor–Eonia swap spread, credit and liquidity risk and then evaluates the decomposition. The main finding is that credit risk increased before the key events of the crisis, while liquidity risk was mainly responsible for the subsequent increases in the Euribor spread and then reacted to the systemic responses of the central banks, especially in October 2008. Moreover, the level of the spread between May 2009 and February 2010 was influenced mainly by credit risk, suggesting that European banks were still in a “lemons market” and relied on liquidity “on tap” even before sovereign debt crisis unfolded in Europe.  相似文献   

19.
A model in which banks trade toxic assets to raise funds for investment is analyzed. Toxic assets generate an adverse selection problem and, consequently, the interbank asset market provides insufficient liquidity. Investment is inefficiently low because acquiring funding requires banks to sell high-quality assets for less than their “fair” value. Equity injections reduce liquidity and may be counterproductive as a policy for increasing investment. Paradoxically, if it is directed to firms with the greatest liquidity needs, an equity injection will reduce investment further. Asset purchase programs, like the Public–Private Investment Program, often have favorable impacts on liquidity, investment and welfare.  相似文献   

设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号