企业财权与企业财务几个基本问题的研究

企业是利益相关者之间相互缔约形成的利益共同体。企业利益相关者因为对企业契约结构的不同理解和缔约要求所形成的利益冲突,要求对企业财权进行合理安排。通过企业核心利益相关者即企业财权主体之间财权契约的动态运行与优化,将剩余财务控制权和与之对应的剩余索取权在各主体之间进行分散对称安排,将可能达到各主体之间的利益动态均衡状态并提高企业效率。本文在企业财权概念研究的基础上对企业财务的几个基本理论问题作了进一步的探讨,以期能够有助于企业财务理论从技术性向制度性的转化。     

财务治理效率论纲

效率是经济学和管理学研究的核心与主线。在将公司本质界定为利益相关者产权契约联结体的基础上,推演出财务治理效率论说,其核心思想包括:公司产权契约的核心是公司财权契约;财权契约不完备与代理问题的存在导致财务治理问题的产生;财务治理的本质是剩余财权配置,根本目标是实现财务治理效率最大化;财务治理效率最大化的核心是剩余财务索取权与剩余财务控制权对应,基本衡量标准是财务治理收益与财务治理成本对比。     

财务动态治理论纲

传统财务治理理论侧重于财务治理结构和权利分布状态等静态范畴的研究,而忽略了财务动态治理的专门研究.财务治理可分解为基于企业公平的财务静态治理和基于企业效率的财务动态治理,它在本质上是一个二元价值体系,在实践上表现为企业公平和效率的并行与平衡.财务动态治理是对传统财务治理的继承和超越,它是剩余公司治理的集中领域和公司动态治理的核心,其理论基础溯源于企业产权契约理论、公司治理理论、公允价值会计计量理论和财务治理理论.以不完全合同中的完备部分和不完备部分为标准,财权可划分为通用财权和剩余财权.剩余财权配置是财务动态治理的核心,财务动态治理的基本内容包括动态治理结构、治理机制和治理行为规范.     

资产专用性、声誉与企业财务契约自我履行:一项实验研究

财务契约的不完备性使其更接近所谓的纯粹自我履行契约。本文在理论上论证了资产专用性沦落沉没成本和声誉资本的贬值是对财务契约违约者的私人惩罚机制,同时也构成了缔约者的私人履约资本。因此财务交易包含的资产专用性和交易主体的声誉是构成财务契约自我履行的基础,也是决定财务契约自我履约范围的关键因素。随后,本文以由MBA和MPAcc学员为被试对象进行一项实验,检验了资产专用性、交易主体的声誉以及二者交互作用对财务契约自我履行促进作用的理论假说,同时也检验了在相同条件下良好的法律环境有助于促进财务契约自我履行。本文研究结果可为财务契约自我履行的机制提供进一步的检验证据的同时,也为促进我国企业财务契约履行效率、治理财务契约冲突提供有益的启示。     

财务动态治理结构论纲

以不完全契约中之完备部分与不完备部分为标准,财权可以划分为基于企业公平的"通用财权"范畴和基于企业效率的"剩余财权"范畴;在此基础上,财务治理可分解为基于企业公平的财务静态治理和基于企业效率的财务动态治理.财务动态治理结构强调财权配置的效率性,侧重关注剩余财权占主导的财权配置.财务动态治理结构主要体现为财务资本结构的调整、改善及其动态优化,具体包括资本结构动态优化、股权结构动态优化和债权结构动态优化.     

风险资本市场财务治理机制的新制度经济学分析

风险资本市场财务治理是借助财务契约在风险资本投资者、风险资本家和风险企业家之间配王刺余财务索取权和剩余财务控制权,是为了降低三者之间产权交易成本而设计的一种制度装置.在上述财务治理主体中,兼有物质资本所有者与人力资本所有者二重身份的风险资本家是最重要的财务治理主体.从总体上讲,风险企业的财务控制权呈现出明显的状态依存性.我国风险企业财务治理模式创新的基本思路是:在主要的财务治理主体之间建立剩余财务收益权和剩余财务控制权对称性的制度安排.进而健全风险企业的财务激励与约束机制.     

从“股东财富最大化”到“利益相关者财富最大化”

美国著名的经济学家科斯于1937年提出了著名的“企业契约理论”，将企业的性质概括为“是生产要素的交易，确切地说是劳动与资本的长期的权威性的契约关系”。这一观点不仅为企业理论的主流派，也为会计界所接受。如美国实证会计理论家瓦茨和齐默尔曼就认为“企业不过是一种若干契约的结合”。具体而言，企业实质上是股东（或出资者）、债权人、经理人员、雇员等利益相关者之间缔结的一系列契约的结合体，契约各方向企业投入了一定的要素，或是财务资源，或是知识资源，或其他资源。按照谁贡献谁收益的原则，契约签订前，原则上说，契约各方都是独立、平等的产权主体，都有权参与剩余分配。因此“契约当事人就是权利从未来的交易活动中获取自己的产权权益，片面地强调其中一方的产权权益并不符合内生于市场经济的公平原则”。但契约签订前各契约当事人理论上的独立平等地位，只能说明他们日后有平等参与企业剩余索取权和控制权博弈的机会，要把这种平等由可能性转化为现实性，则要取决于各利益当事人依据自身实力、一在企业中的地位等因素进行博弈的结果。博弈一旦是某一方成为赢家，取得了企业的剩余索取权和控制权，那才能企业的各项重大决策和活动都将从该方的角度出发，体现其利益。企业的财务管理目标也必将从该产权主体的角度去确定。倘若博弈的结果是没有哪一方占绝对优势，那么产权各方只能共同分享企业的剩余索取权和控制权，的各项重大决策和活动也只能从产权各方的共同利益出发，为各方的共同利益服务，财务管理目标亦要相应转变。因此，企业的财务管理目标可看作是企业各产权主体的最终博弈结果的一个体现。     

融资契约的代理成本与融资政策建议

代理理论重点研究的问题是代理成本,包括契约签订的缔约成本、代理人的担保成本和“剩余损失”以及委托人的监控成本等。本文着重研究企业融资契约根据股权融资契约和债务融资契约的不同委托代理关系,分析其代理成本产生的根本原因,并且分别提出相应的融资政策选择建议。     

从契约的不完备性谈国有企业产生和存在的理论依据

制度经济学将企业的产生归结为契约的组合,并同时指出契约是不完备的。西方经济学的主流观点认为契约的不完备性决定了企业的"剩余控制权"和"剩余索取权"应当归属于物质资本要素的提供者。但是传统的"企业契约理论"和"交易费用企业论"无法解释国有企业的产生和存在的理论依据问题,社会学的实证分析表明,企业和政府两种异质组织是历史地交织在一起的。国有企业存在的实质应当是企业契约和社会契约不完备性共同作用的结果,其制度安排在很大程度上取决于社会法治环境和政府权力运作方式。政府对国有企业"剩余控制权"和"剩余索取权"的行使不是基于人民对其所有权的委托,而是基于行政权力,并遵循社会契约的逻辑。     

企业集团财务控制:一个理论分析框架

从契约理论角度看,财务控制是对初始契约的不完备性所进行的修正,这恰是企业集团财务控制的逻辑起点.在企业集团复杂的代理关系中.母公司处于核心主导地位,是企业集团财务控制的主体.通过均衡代理成本争财务协同效应使财务控制的制度安排净收益最大化不仅是企业集团财务控制的目标,同时也蕴涵财务控制的机理.因此反映上述特征的企业集团财务控制完整架构应由目标层、治理层和管理层所组成.     

财务治理效率之理论基础探究

财务治理效率是财务治理的根本目标和财务核心竞争力。对财务治理效率及其理论基础进行研究已成为非常重要和亟待解决的课题。推进财务治理效率问题的研究，必然离不开对其理论基础进行系统研究，但既有文献非常匮乏。有鉴于此，本文较为系统地梳理和创造性地研究了财务治理效率的企业契约理论、企业能力理论、财权理论、公司治理理论以及博弈论等理论基础，部分弥补了财务治理效率理论基础研究非常薄弱的缺憾，也必将对该领域的后续研究起到抛砖引玉的作用。     

The certification value of private debt renegotiation and the design of financial contracts: Empirical evidence from Europe

By using a sample of bank loan renegotiations by European firms, I show that the renegotiation of financial contracts bears a certification value, while deeply changing the contractual features of the loan over time, to the benefit of shareholders. I find that amendments to financial covenants and to loan amounts increase the cumulative abnormal returns of a borrowing firm by 10–15%. Early and less frequent renegotiations of bilateral loans with short maturities also imply a positive stock market reaction. Amendments signaling the early accrual of new and positive information allow increasing firm value.     

Firms' Off-Balance Sheet and Hybrid Debt Financing: Evidence from Their Book-Tax Reporting Differences

We match large U.S. corporations' tax returns during 1989–2001 to their financial statements to construct a firm‐level proxy of firms' use of off‐balance sheet and hybrid debt financing. We find that firms with less favorable prior‐period Standard & Poor's (S&P) bond ratings or higher leverage ratios in comparison to their industry report greater amounts of interest expense on their tax returns than to investors and creditors on their financial statements. These between‐firm results are consistent with credit‐constrained firms using more structured financing arrangements. Our within‐firm tests also suggest that firms use more structured financing arrangements when they enter into contractual loan agreements that provide incentives to manage debt ratings. Specifically, we find that after controlling for S&P bond rating and industry‐adjusted leverage, our sample firms report greater amounts of interest expenses for tax than for financial statement purposes when they enter into performance pricing contracts that use senior debt rating covenants to set interest rates. Furthermore, we find that the greatest book‐tax reporting changes occur when firms become closer to violating these debt rating covenants. These latter findings are consistent with firms' contractual debt covenants influencing their use of off‐balance sheet and hybrid debt financing.     

Incomplete contracts,renegotiation, and the choice between bank loans and public debt issues

In a two-period model where an investment project is funded with standard debt, the probability distribution of final cash flow is determined, at the interim date, by an unverifiable state of nature together with a choice by the controlling party (entrepreneur or creditor). With a control allocation contingent on a noisy default signal, renegotiation may improve efficiency in two ways: (i) reduce excessive risk-taking – due to the entrepreneur's moral hazard – through debt forgiveness; (ii) avoid the costs of financial distress associated with excessive liquidation or underinvestment by debt-holders, by letting them receive an equity stake in the firm. Such efficiency gain is an advantage of bank loans over publicly traded debt, given that the former are more easily renegotiated than the latter. The difference between the two types of debt is increasing in the degree of contractual incompleteness (noise present in the default signal) and in the portion of project value accounted for by future discretionary investment options.     

Corporate strategy financialized: Conjuncture,arbitrage and earnings capacity in the S&P500

The conjuncture that ushered in the era of shareholder value served to embed capital market expectations into corporate governance aligning management and shareholder interests. Market arbitrage focussed on modifying contractual relations with stakeholders to extract a (higher) return on invested capital. In this article we focus on cash earnings on capital employed generated by the S&P 500 survivor group of firms covering the period 1990–2008. We use this financial data to construct three complementary perspectives on corporate financial performance: firm, firm-relative and macro. Within this framework the financial numbers and perspectives are analogous to a ‘hall of mirrors’ where ambiguity and contradiction are in play frustrating straightforward performative narratives that connect purpose with financial transformation an era of shareholder value.     

Corporate Equity Ownership and the Governance of Product Market Relationships

We assemble a sample of over 10,000 customer–supplier relationships and determine whether the customer owns equity in the supplier. We find that factors related to both contractual incompleteness and financial market frictions are important in the decision of a customer firm to take an equity stake in their supplier. Evidence on the variation in the size of observed equity positions suggests that there are limits to the size of optimal ownership stakes in many relationships. Finally, we find that relationships accompanied by equity ownership last significantly longer than other relationships, suggesting that ownership aids in bonding trading parties together.     

The role of time value in convertible bond call policy

Since the seminal work of Ingersoll (1977b) the optimal time in which a firm should redeem its outstanding convertible bonds has received large attention by the financial literature. Several studies have put forward a number of possible costs and benefits for a firm if it interrupts the life of its convertible bonds prior to their contractual maturity. However, in this paper we argue that the managerial decision to call back a convertible bond is mainly driven by a fundamental variable almost neglected up until now: the time value extraction from bondholders’ conversion option. Accordingly, we propose a measure for the effective convenience of calling—which we define as net time value advantage—and we show, using a survival analysis, that it is more effective than previously proposed measures in explaining the firms’ observed call policy.     

Lending relationships when creditors are in control

Violations of financial covenants shift control rights to lenders. When borrowers have lending relationships with these lenders in control, they experience not only smaller declines in investment, but also lesser deteriorations in both firm survival probabilities and in sales. These effects are largely driven by opaque borrowers without any credit ratings. They are present where lending relationships existed already before loan issuance (ex-ante), but also where a contractual relationship without pre-issuance interaction is more mature (ex-post). Surprisingly, there is no evidence of any “dark side” of lending relationships when creditors are in control, such as an increase in interest expenses or a lesser degree of financial discipline.     

Creditor control rights and firm investment policy

We present novel empirical evidence that conflicts of interest between creditors and their borrowers have a significant impact on firm investment policy. We examine a large sample of private credit agreements between banks and public firms and find that 32% of the agreements contain an explicit restriction on the firm's capital expenditures. Creditors are more likely to impose a capital expenditure restriction as a borrower's credit quality deteriorates, and the use of a restriction appears at least as sensitive to borrower credit quality as other contractual terms, such as interest rates, collateral requirements, or the use of financial covenants. We find that capital expenditure restrictions cause a reduction in firm investment and that firms obtaining contracts with a new restriction experience subsequent increases in their market value and operating performance.     

企业财务战略管理：一个企业能力理论视角

企业能力理论已成为研究企业理论与战略管理理论一个热门领域。企业的本质是知识与能力的集合体。财务战略管理作为企业战略管理的职能管理战略应该立足于企业能力现状,即从企业能力现状出发,进行具体的财务战略谋划;另一方面,财务战略管理应服务于企业能力尤其是竞争优势的培养这一企业能力目标。