审计师变更会影响关键审计事项披露模板化吗?

审计报告改革旨在降低传统审计报告的模板化问题，提高审计报告的沟通价值和审计工作的透明度。本文从审计师变更的视角考察了关键审计事项披露的模板化问题。研究发现，审计师变更可以减弱关键审计事项披露模板化；进一步机制检验发现，审计投入的提高、关键审计事项披露信息量的增加是审计师变更降低关键审计事项模板化披露的作用机制；当业务负责人、非“四大”背景的审计师发生变更以及企业外部分析师跟踪数较低时，审计师变更对关键审计事项披露模板化的降低效应更加明显；此外，审计师变更通过降低关键审计事项的模板化披露减少了企业的财务重述，同时带来了积极的市场反应。本文不仅丰富了审计师变更和关键审计事项披露的相关研究，也为监管部门进一步提升审计报告改革长期效果提供了可以借鉴的思路。     

新审计报告和股价同步性

财政部在2016年12月批准印发了《在审计报告中沟通关键审计事项》等注册会计师审计准则("新审计报告"),旨在提高审计报告的信息含量以及其决策相关性。本研究考察了新审计报告和资本市场股价同步性这一"反映公司特有信息"指标的关系。我们通过构建双重差分模型,检验并发现新审计报告的实施降低了股价同步性。进一步,披露的关键审计事项越多,其公司股价同步性越低;并且披露更多非行业共有型事项、披露内容更详尽时,两者负相关关系更明显。另外,新审计报告及关键审计事项对股价同步性的影响在信息不对称程度更高的公司中更明显。本文为研究新审计报告的经济后果提供了初步证据,并从公司特有信息定价角度对准则的执行效果给予了积极评价。     

新审计报告准则下关键审计事项披露分析与建议

2016年,我国颁布了新审计报告准则,准则中要求添加关键审计事项的披露。就目前来看,我国对关键审计事项的披露还处在初级阶段,对关键审计事项进行披露时还存在不足之处。本文对新审计报告准则下关键审计事项的披露进行了研究,并且分析了在关键审计事项披露中存在的主要问题,然后针对问题提出了相关的建议。     

审计报告中披露关键审计事项信息有助于提高审计质量吗?——报表盈余和市场感知双维度的经验证据

财政部批准发布的第1504号审计准则要求注册会计师在审计报告中沟通关键审计事项。本文基于我国新审计准则分步实施提供的准自然实验环境,采用PSM-DID方法研究了审计报告中披露关键审计事项对审计质量的影响,我们发现:关键审计事项的披露并未对财务报告层面的审计质量产生实质性影响,表现为公司操控性应计并未发生显著变化;但关键审计事项的披露对市场感知层面的审计质量产生了明显影响,表现为公司盈余反应系数显著上升。上述结果表明关键审计事项披露后,财务报告层面的审计质量与市场感知层面的审计质量发生了背离,不过进一步的检验发现,这种背离在更长时间窗口的观测中消失。本文结论对准则制定机构、市场监管者等多个市场主体的行为选择具有启示意义。     

关键审计事项对上市公司股价崩盘风险的影响研究

新审计报告准则的修订增加了披露关键审计事项的要求,能够为报告使用者提供更多信息,影响投资者决策,从而在一定程度上影响上市公司的股价崩盘风险.利用2016—2018年近三年A股上市公司的相关数据,实证分析了关键审计事项的披露对公司股价崩盘风险的影响效应.结果发现,关键审计事项的披露会扩大公司的股价崩盘风险.进一步分析发现,股价的下降是关键审计事项扩大股价崩盘风险的影响路径之一;调节效应显示公司价值越高,关键审计事项对股价崩盘风险的影响越小;公司内部控制能够削弱关键审计事项对股价崩盘风险的扩大效应.研究结论为关键审计事项的披露提供了政策建议,同时为企业防范股价崩盘风险提供了启示与思考.     

新审计报告与商业信用

本文以商业信用为切入点,考察供应商和客户如何解读和回应新审计报告中披露的关键审计事项。研究发现,关键审计事项披露会显著降低企业的商业信用融资,表明供应商和客户将关键审计事项解读为一项风险信息。截面机制检验发现,公司治理较好时,可以缓解供应商和客户对企业财务报告质量的担忧,关键审计事项披露对商业信用的负面影响得以缓解。此外,关键审计事项数量越多、关键审计事项与可抵押资产相关时,关键审计事项披露对商业信用的负面影响越明显,而关键审计事项应对强度越高、具有结论性评价时,负面影响得以缓解。本文从供应链关系视角为新审计报告改革效果提供进一步的经验证据,对企业和准则制定者具有一定的启示。     

新证券法背景下审计师选择性披露行为研究

新证券法的颁布和实施进一步夯实了审计师的法律责任，新审计准则要求审计师在审计报告中披露关键审计事项信息。在新的法律背景下，注册会计师是否会采取选择性披露以规避法律风险，从而抵消新准则实施效果，受到社会关注。本文通过实验研究方法，从审计师视角对不同关键审计事项披露情形下审计师法律责任判定进行了检测。研究表明：披露相关关键审计事项下审计师法律责任最小，因而披露相关关键审计事项可以起到诉讼保护的作用，新报告准则能够敦促审计师为减轻法律责任而勤勉尽责；针对不同报表项目的会计准则弹性差异，审计师感知的法律责任与会计准则弹性的关系并不显著，因而不支持外界对审计师为规避法律责任进行选择性信息披露的猜疑。     

关键审计事项披露同质化现象统计与分析

关键审计事项作为此次新审计报告改革最重要的内容,提高了审计报告的信息含量,缩小了财务报告使用者与审计师之间的信息差距,为投资者提供更多有用的信息。但是如果关键审计事项的披露出现同质化现象,那么将降低其决策有效性,尤其是普通股票投资者无法利用同质化信息进行投资决策,也严重背离审计报告改革的初衷。以中国房地产上市公司为研究样本,引入行业集中度、赫芬达尔指数和余弦相似度来衡量关键审计事项的披露同质化,本文以此考察新审计报告的同质化现象。研究发现,2017年度和2018年度的关键审计事项集中度CR5≥70%,赫芬达尔指数大约为2400,余弦相似度为0.84,表明中国房地产行业关键审计事项的披露信息存在较为严重的同质化现象。     

关键审计事项披露对利益相关者行为的影响研究

本文对关键审计事项在审计报告中的披露研究进行了文献综述。这些研究分析了关键审计事项的披露对利益相关者行为的影响,本文以此为基础分析了研究的局限性和对研究的有效建议。分析关键审计事项披露对利益相关者行为影响的五大实证研究主要包括:(1)股东(如投资者对审计师责任的看法和诉讼、价值相关性);(2)债权人(如贷款合同条款);(3)外部审计师(如审计流程和审计费用);(4)董事会董事(如盈余管理);(5)其他利益相关者(如信息对供应商和客户的价值)。本文主要选取其中三项:关键审计事项披露对股东和债权人、外部审计师行为的影响进行研究和综述。虽然国际审计报告准则的制定者假设关键审计事项披露对利益相关者的反应有积极影响,但大量的实证研究却显示出了不同的结果。此外,由于受关键审计事项披露的影响,公司的声誉可能是正面的,也可能是负面的,所以,这项研究对进行管理决策尤为重要。     

审计报告改革的中国经验:基于审计延迟的视角

以2018年全面开展的中国审计报告改革为背景，通过刻画改革窗口及风险导向审计行为特征等变量，检验了审计报告改革对审计延迟的影响。研究发现：审计报告改革之后，审计延迟总体上显著增加，这是改革的“威慑-增责”效应使然；审计报告披露的关键审计事项数量、应对数量越多及具有减值类关键审计事项，显示审计师执行了越勤勉的风险导向审计行为，会形成越长的审计延迟，这源自新审计报告的风险“视窗”和努力“视窗”效应。此外，审计报告改革对审计延迟的影响还显现出企业内部控制层面的差异。研究支持，在中国市场条件下的审计报告改革，有力地促进了审计师的风险导向审计转型，并具有审计延迟层面的政策效应。     

Does the mandatory disclosure of audit information affect analysts' information acquisition?

This paper explores the effect of public information on analysts' information acquisition. By introducing the implementation of the Key Audit Matters (KAM) Disclosure Standards for China's firms cross-listed in Hong Kong in 2017, we present evidence that KAM disclosure reduces analysts' firm visits, which is an important channel of information acquisition. The effect is particularly pronounced for firms with audit partner rotation and low institutional ownership. KAM disclosure by industrial leaders has a spillover effect on analyst visits for peer firms. Disclosure also improves the frequency and quality of analysts' forecasts and firms' information environments, indicating that KAMs are informative and audit information is an important determinant of analysts' information acquisition. Our study reveals the real effect of KAM disclosure on analyst decisions, which may be of interest to regulators concerned with the mandatory disclosure of audit information and capital market efficiency.     

Management earnings forecasts and the quality of analysts’ forecasts: The moderating effect of audit committees

This study investigates whether effective audit committees influence the association between management earnings forecasts and the properties of analysts’ forecasts. We posit that this influence on the part of an audit committee would likely result from increased responsibility for monitoring voluntary disclosure. Using the four attributes that the Blue Ribbon Committee (1999) and prior research suggest as being indicative of audit committee effectiveness, we find that analysts’ forecasts exhibit higher accuracy and lower dispersion with the issuance of management forecasts for those firms employing audit committees that are composed exclusively of independent directors, include an accounting expert, and act with due diligence. We also find that effective audit committees strengthen the association between management and analyst forecast accuracy. Our evidence, therefore, supports the notion that effective corporate governance influences the reliability of voluntary disclosure, and thereby benefits the users of financial information.     

IFRS adoption and analysts’ earnings forecasts: Australian evidence

We study 145 large listed Australian firms to explore the impact of international financial reporting standards (IFRS) adoption on the properties of analysts’ forecasts and the role of firm disclosure about IFRS impact. We find that analyst forecast accuracy improves, and there is no significant change in dispersion in the adoption year, suggesting that analysts coped effectively with transition to IFRS. However, we do not observe the expected relationship between firms’ IFRS impact disclosures in their financial statements issued at the end of the transition year with forecast error and dispersion in the adoption year. The results question the timeliness and usefulness of financial statement disclosure, even in a setting where disclosure was mandated by accounting standards (AASB 1047 and AASB 1) and firms had strong incentives to provide information to analysts.     

Audit committee financial expertise and properties of analyst earnings forecasts

An important role of financial accounting information is to aid financial statement users in forming expectations about the firm's future earnings. Prior research finds that accounting financial expertise of the audit committee is associated with higher financial reporting quality. We extend this literature by examining the association between audit committee financial expertise and analysts' ability to anticipate future earnings. We find a significant association between accounting financial expertise on the audit committee and analyst earnings forecasts that are more accurate and less dispersed. In contrast, we do not find a significant association between non-accounting financial expertise (i.e., supervisory expertise) and forecast accuracy or forecast dispersion. These findings contribute to our understanding of the benefits of accounting expertise in audit committees by demonstrating an association between accounting financial expertise and improvements in analyst earnings forecasts.     

CFOs and CEOs: Who have the most influence on earnings management?

This study examines the association between chief financial officer (CFO) equity incentives and earnings management. Chief executive officer (CEO) equity incentives have been shown to be associated with accruals management and the likelihood of beating analyst forecasts (Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; Cheng and Warfield, 2005). Because CFOs’ primary responsibility is financial reporting, CFO equity incentives should play a stronger role than those of the CEO in earnings management. We find that the magnitude of accruals and the likelihood of beating analyst forecasts are more sensitive to CFO equity incentives than to those of the CEO. Our evidence supports the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) new disclosure requirement on CFO compensation.     

How do auditors view managers’ voluntary disclosure strategy? The effect of earnings guidance on audit fees

The objective of this study is to examine the relation between attributes of earnings forecasts issued by managers and audit fees. Although there is an extensive literature on managers’ disclosure of earnings forecasts, there is a paucity of research on how auditors incorporate information from these voluntary disclosures. We find that the issuance of an annual or quarterly management earnings forecast in the prior period is positively associated with the current period audit fees. Our results indicate that on average, audit fees are higher by about 7% for firm-years associated with an annual forecast. Among the firms that issue earnings forecasts, we find no association between audit fees and likelihood of updating a previously issued earnings forecast, indicating that auditors do not view such behavior negatively. Further, we find audit fees to be positively associated with the error and the bias (or optimism) in the forecasts for annual forecasts but not for quarterly forecasts. Overall, these results suggest that management’s forecast behavior captures higher business risk for the auditor via greater risk of earnings management or litigation risk.     

公平信息披露与分析师预测精度——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

证券分析师是证券市场重要的信息加工者和传播者,他们的信息行为对中小投资者和市场效率有重要影响。本文基于2003~2009年分析师的年度盈利预测数据,运用面板计量模型实证检验了公平信息披露规则的实施对分析师预测精度的影响。研究结果表明:分析师预测精度在规则实施后显著下降了;而且,随着规则实施时间的推移,分析师预测精度进一步下降;另外,分析师对信息披露水平较差的上市公司的预测精度下降幅度更大。     

Disclosure Of Audit Committees by Public Companies in Australia 1988–1990

The existence of audit committees in public companies can improve the quality of the financial reporting process, aid the actual and perceived independence of both the internal and external auditors, and improve financial statement users' confidence in the quality of the information. These benefits will be enhanced by disclosure of audit committees in the financial statements. This study examined the incidence and form of the disclosure of audit committees in annual reports by major Australian public companies over the period 1988–1990. The results showed that disclosures by larger companies increased during this time. Rates of disclosure varied considerably depending on the auditor and was positively associated with the size of the organisation. Companies with audit committees are encouraged to consider enhanced methods of disclosure such as those outlined in AUP 31 Communication with an Audit Committee.     

Informative or distracting: CSR disclosure of peer firms and analyst forecast accuracy

We investigate the relationship between the CSR disclosure of peer firms and the analyst forecast accuracy of the focal firm. We find a negative association between peer CSR disclosure and analyst forecast error of the focal firm, indicating that peer CSR disclosure is informative. This negative association is more pronounced when the information environment of the focal firm is worse, when the correlation in fundamentals between the focal firm and its peers is higher, when the business of the focal firm is less complex, when the focal firm has more expert analyst coverage, when the focal firm's financial performance is more sensitive to CSR engagement, or when the quality of peer CSR disclosure is higher. Overall, we show that peer CSR disclosure conveys value-relevant information about the focal firm. Our study enriches the literature on both analyst forecasts and peer information, and we also provide important implications for practitioners in understanding the role of CSR disclosure in capital markets.     

U.S. Audit partner identification and auditor reporting

After a lengthy and protracted debate, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) adopted new rules requiring disclosure of the engagement partner’s name and information about other accounting firms on the new PCAOB Form AP, Auditor Reporting of Certain Audit Participants. We investigate the impact of this regulation on auditor behavior in the context of the auditor’s going concern report modification propensity. We document an increase in the propensity to issue a going concern report modification in the disclosure regime, accompanied by a corresponding increase in the Type I (‘false positives’) error rate. Thus, an unintended consequence of Rule 3211 is the potential reduction in the audit report's informativeness. Conceivably, a more significant repercussion is that going concern modifications can hasten bankruptcy for firms since financial institutions may be reluctant to lend money to firms with modified audit reports. An unjustified increase in the going concern modification rate as evinced in our paper may make U.S. capital markets potentially less attractive to young, upstart, albeit financially-distressed, companies.