Costly external finance,corporate investment,and the subprime mortgage credit crisis

We study the effect of the recent financial crisis on corporate investment. The crisis represents an unexplored negative shock to the supply of external finance for non-financial firms. Corporate investment declines significantly following the onset of the crisis, controlling for firm fixed effects and time-varying measures of investment opportunities. Consistent with a causal effect of a supply shock, the decline is greatest for firms that have low cash reserves or high net short-term debt, are financially constrained, or operate in industries dependent on external finance. To address endogeneity concerns, we measure firms’ financial positions as much as four years prior to the crisis, and confirm that similar results do not follow placebo crises in the summers of 2003–2006. Nor do similar results follow the negative demand shock caused by September 11, 2001. The effects weaken considerably beginning in the third quarter of 2008, when the demand-side effects of the crisis became apparent. Additional analysis suggests an important precautionary savings motive for seemingly excess cash that is generally overlooked in the literature.     

Economic shock,owner-manager incentives,and corporate restructuring: Evidence from the financial crisis in Korea

We examine how owner-managers incentives and firm-specific measures of corporate governance affect restructuring decisions during an economy-wide shock. Using a large sample of Korean firms that had experienced a severe financial crisis during 1997–1998, we find that the likelihood of restructuring is negatively related to the divergence of cash flow rights and control rights of controlling shareholders, and that the announcements of restructuring by chaebol firms with such divergence are greeted more negatively by investors. However, firm-specific measures of corporate governance such as total debt, bank loans, and equity ownership by unaffiliated financial institutions mitigate these negative effects, thereby influencing firms to choose value-maximizing restructuring policies. Our results suggest that the controlling shareholders' incentives to expropriate other investors are high during an economic shock. Our results also highlight the importance of corporate governance in mitigating such expropriation incentives, and provide important implications for the role of corporate governance during an economic shock, such as the 2007–2008 global financial crisis.     

Firms as liquidity providers: Evidence from the 2007–2008 financial crisis

Using a supplier–client matched sample, we study the effect of the 2007–2008 financial crisis on between-firm liquidity provision. Consistent with a causal effect of a negative shock to bank credit, we find that firms with high precrisis liquidity levels increased the trade credit extended to other corporations and subsequently experienced better performance as compared with ex ante cash-poor firms. Trade credit taken by constrained firms increased during this period. These findings are consistent with firms providing liquidity insurance to their clients when bank credit is scarce and offer an important precautionary savings motive for accumulating cash reserves.     

The impact of labor unions on investment-cash flow sensitivity

This paper empirically examines how labor unions affect investment-cash flow sensitivity using samples from the US covering the period of 1984–2009. We find a significant positive union effect using a q model of investment. The capital expenditures of firms are 1.71 times more sensitive to internal cash flows when unionization rates increase one standard deviation from the mean. This effect holds when we control for other proxies of financial constraints. In addition, unionized firms are associated with lower cash–cash flow sensitivity, which suggests that the higher investment-cash flow sensitivity in unionized firms is primarily driven by the incentive of these firms to reduce liquidity and enhance bargaining power against the union. We also show that the above union effects become more pronounced during labor contract negotiation years.     

Investment-cash flow sensitivity cannot be a good measure of financial constraints: Evidence from the time series

Investment-cash flow sensitivity has declined and disappeared, even during the 2007-2009 credit crunch. If one believes that financial constraints have not disappeared, then investment-cash flow sensitivity cannot be a good measure of financial constraints. The decline and disappearance are robust to considerations of R&D and cash reserves, and across groups of firms. The information content in cash flow regarding investment opportunities has declined, but measurement error in Tobin's q does not completely explain the patterns in investment-cash flow sensitivity. The decline and disappearance cannot be explained by changes in sample composition, corporate governance, or market power—and remain a puzzle.     

WHAT HAPPENED TO THE WILLINGNESS OF COMPANIES TO INVEST AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS? EVIDENCE FROM LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES

In this article we investigate the changes in corporate investment dynamics in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. Using firm-level data from six Latin American countries from 2002 to 2015, we show that firms are less constrained and have greater ability to invest after the crisis. However, the willingness of firms to invest optimally is reduced. This is supported by strong evidence that during the postcrisis period investment–cash flow sensitivity disappears, investment-q sensitivity increases, and the estimated speeds of adjustment for target investment decrease. Moreover, after the crisis, firms notably increase their efforts to attain optimal cash and leverage levels. Our analysis implies that firms may not always be willing to invest optimally. The willingness to invest optimally appears to be time variant and moves together with the dynamics of cash and leverage policies, albeit in opposite directions.     

The response of the external finance premium in Asian corporate bond markets to financial characteristics,financial constraints and two financial crises

Empirical investigation of the external finance premium has been conducted on the margin between internal finance and bank borrowing or equities but little attention has been given to corporate bonds, especially for the emerging Asian market. In this paper, we hypothesize that balance sheet indicators of creditworthiness could affect the external finance premium for bonds as they do for premia in other markets. Using bond-specific and firm-specific data for China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand during 1995–2009 we find that firms with better financial health face lower external finance premia in all countries. When we introduce firm-level heterogeneity, we show that financial variables appear to be both statistically and quantitatively more important for financially constrained firms. Finally, when we examine the effects of the 1997–1998 Asian crisis and the 2007–2009 global financial crisis, we find that the sensitivity of the premium is greater for constrained firms during the Asian crisis compared to other times.     

Internal financial constraints,external financial constraints,and investment choice: Evidence from a panel of UK firms

This paper uses a panel of 24,184 UK firms over the period 1993–2003 to study the extent to which the sensitivity of investment to cash flow differs at firms facing different degrees of internal and external financial constraints. Our results suggest that when the sample is split on the basis of the level of internal funds available to the firms, the relationship between investment and cash flow is U-shaped. On the other hand, the sensitivity of investment to cash flow tends to increase monotonically with the degree of external financial constraints faced by firms. Combining the internal with the external financial constraints, we find that the dependence of investment on cash flow is strongest for those externally financially constrained firms that have a relatively high level of internal funds.     

A flight to Q? Firm investment and financing in Korea before and after the 1997 financial crisis

We examine investment behavior among exchange-listed Korean manufacturing firms before and after the 1997 financial crisis using firm-level panel data. Starting with the standard Q-theory of investment, we augment it by allowing for a sales accelerator and the possibility of cash constraints, categorizing firms based on their age, size and affiliation to an industrial conglomerate (i.e., chaebol). We find that Tobin’s Q is a robust determinant of investment in a pooled sample for 1992–2001, but that it became more important for small firms and less important for chaebol-affiliated firms after the crisis. Investment by chaebol firms also became more sensitive to the availability of internal cash balances after the crisis. We interpret this as reflecting a shift in the Korean economy to a stronger market orientation after the crisis and to a business climate in which the quality of potential projects became more important relative to capital market imperfections in determining the destination of investment funds.     

Access to capital,investment, and the financial crisis

During the recent financial crisis, corporate borrowing and capital expenditures fall sharply. Most existing research links the two phenomena by arguing that a shock to bank lending (or, more generally, to the corporate credit supply) caused a reduction in capital expenditures. The economic significance of this causal link is tenuous, as we find that (1) bank-dependent firms do not decrease capital expenditures more than matching firms in the first year of the crisis or in the two quarters after Lehman Brother's bankruptcy; (2) firms that are unlevered before the crisis decrease capital expenditures during the crisis as much as matching firms and, proportionately, more than highly levered firms; (3) the decrease in net debt issuance for bank-dependent firms is not greater than for matching firms; (4) the average cumulative decrease in net equity issuance is more than twice the average decrease in net debt issuance from the start of the crisis through March 2009; and (5) bank-dependent firms hoard cash during the crisis compared with unlevered firms.     

Real effects of stock underpricing

This paper provides evidence for a causal effect of equity prices on corporate investment and employment. We use fire sales by distressed equity funds during the 2007–2009 financial crisis to identify substantial exogenous underpricing. Firms whose stocks are most underpriced have considerably lower investment and employment than industry peers not subject to any fire sale discount. The causal effect of underpricing on investment is found to be largely concentrated on the most financially constrained firms.     

Why has the investment-cash flow sensitivity declined so sharply? Rising R&D and equity market developments

The study of the investment-cash flow (ICF) sensitivity constitutes one of the largest literatures in corporate finance, yet little is known about changes in the ICF relationship over time, and the literature has largely ignored how rising R&D investment and developments in equity markets have impacted ICF sensitivity estimates. We show that for the time period 1970–2006, the ICF sensitivity: (i) largely disappears for physical investment, (ii) remains comparatively strong for R&D, and (iii) declines, but does not disappear, for total investment. We argue that these findings can largely be explained by the changing composition of investment and the rising importance of public equity as a source of funds, particularly for firms with persistent negative cash flows.     

Family control and investment–cash flow sensitivity: Empirical evidence from the Euro zone

This paper considers the ownership structure of family firms to determine whether family control alleviates or exacerbates investment–cash flow sensitivity in the Euro zone. We find that family-controlled corporations have lower investment–cash flow sensitivities. Further, our results show that this reduced sensitivity is mainly attributable to family firms with no deviations between cash flow and voting rights and to family firms in which family members hold managerial positions. We also find that second largest shareholders affect family firms' sensitivity and are associated with either monitoring (non-family second blockholders) or collusion (family second blockholders). Overall, family control seems to mitigate investment inefficiencies that derive from capital market imperfections.     

Cash Flow Sensitivity of Investment

Investment cash flow sensitivity is associated with both underinvestment when cash flows are low and overinvestment when cash flows are high. The accessibility of external capital is positively correlated with cash flows, intensifying investment cash flow sensitivity. Managers actively counteract the variations in internal and external liquidity by accumulating working capital when liquidity is high and draining it when liquidity is low. These results imply that cash flow sensitive firms face financial constraints, which are binding in low cash flow years. Traditional indicators of financial constraints, such as size and dividend payout, successfully distinguish firms that may potentially face constraints, but are less successful in distinguishing between periods of tight and relaxed constraints. These periods are much more clearly separated by the KZ index, which, on the other hand, is less successful in identifying firms that are likely to face liquidity constraints.     

Subsidiary debt,capital structure and internal capital markets

I study external debt issued by operating subsidiaries of diversified firms. Consistent with Kahn and Winton's [2004. Moral hazard and optimal subsidiary structure for financial institutions. Journal of Finance 59, 2537–2575] model, where subsidiary debt mitigates asset substitution, I find firms are more likely to use subsidiary debt when their divisions vary more in risk. Consistent with subsidiary debt mitigating the free cash flow problem, I find that subsidiaries are more likely to have their own external debt when they have fewer growth options and higher cash flow than the rest of the firm. Finally, I find that subsidiary debt mitigates the “corporate socialism” and “poaching” problems modeled in theories of internal capital markets.     

Financial expertise of directors

We analyze how directors with financial expertise affect corporate decisions. Using a novel panel data set, we find that financial experts exert significant influence, though not necessarily in the interest of shareholders. When commercial bankers join boards, external funding increases and investment-cash flow sensitivity decreases. However, the increased financing flows to firms with good credit but poor investment opportunities. Similarly, investment bankers on boards are associated with larger bond issues but worse acquisitions. We find little evidence that financial experts affect compensation policy. The results suggest that increasing financial expertise on boards may not benefit shareholders if conflicting interests (e.g., bank profits) are neglected.     

Is Investment‐Cash Flow Sensitivity Caused by Agency Costs or Asymmetric Information? Evidence from the UK

We investigate the investment‐cash flow sensitivity of a large sample of the UK listed firms and confirm that investment is strongly cash flow‐sensitive. Is this sensitivity a result of agency problems when managers with high discretion overinvest, or of asymmetric information when managers owning equity are underinvesting if the market (erroneously) demands too high a risk premium? We find that investment‐cash flow sensitivity results mainly from the agency costs of free cash flow. The magnitude of the relationship depends on insider ownership in a non‐monotonic way. Furthermore, we obtain that outside blockholders, such as financial institutions, the government, and industrial firms (only at high control levels), reduce the cash flow sensitivity of investment via effective monitoring. Finally, financial institutions appear to play a role in mitigating informational asymmetries between firms and capital markets. We corroborate our findings by performing additional tests based on the stochastic efficient frontier approach and power indices.     

政治关联、融资渠道与民营企业非效率投资研究

从自由现金流和银行贷款两方面考量2007~2010年沪深A股民营上市企业政治关联对企业非效率投资的影响。结果表明,存在政治关联民营企业容易利用自由现金流和银行长期贷款进行过度投资;存在地方政治关联的民营企业,其自由现金流的过度投资更严重,中央政治关联企业则存在更多利用长期贷款进行过度投资的行为。同时,投资不足的民营企业政治关联降低了企业投资对于自由现金流和银行短期贷款的依赖;中央政治关联的民营企业投资对于银行长期贷款的敏感度更高,地方政治关联企业未发现类似的显著影响。     

Effects of financial constraints on corporate policies in Australia

We jointly study the impact of financial constraints on Australian companies’ investment decisions and demand for liquidity. By examining a large sample of Australian firms over the period 1990–2003, we find that financial constraints not only reduce the sensitivity of investment to the availability of internal funds, but also increase the responsiveness of cash holdings to internally generated cash flows. Further analysis shows that the impact of financial constraints varies across different cash flow states; that is, financial constraints have a small effect on corporate investment and cash policies when cash flows are positive. In contrast, the severity of constraints is high in negative cash flow years in which the cost disadvantage of external finance coincides with deteriorating operating performance.     

Subsidiary divestiture and acquisition in a financial crisis: Operational focus, financial constraints, and ownership

We exploit parent- and subsidiary-level data for publicly listed firms in Thailand before, during, and after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis to investigate the extent to which firms with different types of ownership restructure their business portfolios, in terms of divestitures and acquisitions. We compare restructuring choices made by firms mostly owned by (a) domestic individuals with block shares (family firms), (b) domestic firms and/or institutions (DI firms), and (c) foreign investors (foreign firms). We show that following the crisis (1) foreign firms' restructuring behavior is the least affected; (2) domestic firms owned by families and domestic institutions (DI) behave similarly to one another; (3) domestic firms do not increase divestiture in their peripheral segments to improve operational focus or to obtain cash in a credit crunch; they actually reduce divestiture in core segments; and (4) domestic firms also significantly reduce the acquisition of new subsidiaries. Our results challenge traditional explanations for divestiture such as corporate governance, operational refocus, and financial constraints. They indicate that in the great uncertainty of a crisis, domestic firms are able to hold onto their core assets to avoid fire-sale. In essence, they act more conservatively in churning their business portfolios.