监管政策、审计师变更与后任审计师谨慎性

本文以我国2001～2002年出台的相关审计监管政策为例,讨论审计监管对审计师变更和后任审计师谨慎性的影响。由于证监会2001年发布的《公开发行证券的公司信息披露编报规则第14号—非标准无保留审计意见及其涉及事项的处理》(以下简称14号文)增强了非标审计意见之于上市公司的不利后果,因此可能推动了机会主义审计师变更的增加。我们发现,在14号文出台后,前期非标审计意见同审计师变更的正相关关系变得更为紧密,且大所向小所的审计师变更频率显著上升。但是,没有证据表明,相比于未变更公司而言,变更公司的后续审计意见改善程度更高。并且,在2000～2002年,后任审计师针对变更公司的谨慎性有逐渐增强的趋势,这意味着2002年中注协关于审计师变更的监管政策可能发挥了一定的积极作用。     

审计意见购买行为特征及监管研究述评

审计意见购买行为是审计功能异化的集中体现,也是审计监管的重要议题.国内外学者主要研究了意见购买的行为动机、行为路径、行为后果和监管等内容.研究表明,意见购买行为是客观存在的,其实现的主要途径是通过审计师变更向继任审计师购买意见,或者以审计费用或提供非审计服务的方式收买现任审计师.部分研究还表明,意见购买行为具有一定的经济后果.同时,意见购买行为的监管效应则取决于监管成本和监管收益的均衡.以往研究的不足在于尚未进一步揭示意见购买行为的动因,从国内来看,非审计服务是否损害审计独立性以及意见购买行为是否产生不利的经济后果,仍然缺乏必要的经验证据.     

审计师变更的原因和结果研究综述——来自海外的研究

审计师的变更是一个动态的过程,它变更的原因可能是来自审计师也可能是来自客户,更有外部因素诸如监管带来的影响所致.而审计师变更的结果研究也没有统一的观点,审计意见购买还是审计质量的提高?本文试图将这个过程相关的国外学者的研究进行整理,以期待能找到进一步研究的着手点和方向.     

审计师变更之管理层与审计师博弈：模型与抉策

审计师的变更具有经济后果。管理当局通过变更审计师，购买有利的审计意见或是通过提出变更审计师威胁审计师的独立性，都将有损审计质量。本文通过构建管理层与审计师的博弈模型，分析可能影响其行为决策的因素，以期对我国审计师变更监管政策的制定存所帮助。     

审计师变更与盈余管理关系的实证研究--来自中国A股市场的经验证据

通过对2001～2003年A股上市公司的实证研究发现:审计师变更与公司可操纵应计利润的增长具有显著正相关关系,且两者关系在不同年度、不同前期审计意见的情况下有所不同.这表明,一方面审计师变更影响到后任审计师的独立性,即公司能够通过更换审计师实现盈余管理的目标;另一方面,对前期非标审计意见的公司,审计师采取了较为谨慎的做法,且伴随着监管政策的逐渐强化,后任审计师的独立性逐年提高.     

盈余管理 审计师变更与审计师独立性

盈余管理与审计师变更存在一定的相关性。本文检验了审计师变更公司在新任审计师的第一年、前任审计师最后一年、倒数第二年的可操控性应计利润及其在不同年份之间的变化。检验结果表明 ,虽然前任审计师在其最后一年聘期内采取了比其他审计师更为稳健的会计处理方法 ,以致被公司变更 ;但新任审计师在第一年并未完全配合公司。这在一定程度上表明 ,公司变更审计师并未达到预期的目的 ;前任审计师、后任审计师的独立性均很强。这可能要归功于事务所脱钩改制 ,以及有关部门有效的监管措施     

审计师变更的原因和结果研究综述——来自海外的研究

审计师的变更是一个动态的过程，它变更的原因可能是来一审计师也可能是来自客户，更有外部因素诸如监管带来的影响所致。而审计师变更的结果研究也没有统一的观点，审计意见购买还是审计质量的提高？本文试图将这个过程相关的国外学者的研究进行整理，以期待能找到进一步研究的着手点和方向。     

审计师变更的经济后果研究——来自中国证券市场的经验证据

本文运用2002—2008年我国上市公司数据研究了审计师变更的经济后果。以公司市场价值与其财务盈利的相关系数(简称为盈利可信度)作为审计师变更的经济后果的替代变量,通过研究我们发现:审计师变更总体上降低了上市公司的盈利可信度;变更前一年度财务报告被出具非标准审计意见或者处于财务困境的公司,发生审计师变更使其盈利可信度下降的程度更大;出于对审计服务级差需求的审计师变更,无论是升级变更还是降级变更公司的盈利可信度均显著高于同级变更的公司,而升级变更为声誉较好的国际四大会计师事务所带来的盈利可信度的提高程度最大;审计委员会的设立与否以及上市公司的盈余管理程度对于审计师变更的经济后果没有显著影响,这可能是由于我国上市公司审计委员会的独立性不强以及投资者对上市公司的盈余管理行为识别不足造成的。研究结论同时还说明审计意见分歧、上市公司财务困境以及对审计服务的级差需求是我国上市公司变更审计师的主要原因。本文的研究发现有助于包括上市公司、会计师事务所、投资者以及证券市场监管部门在内的信息使用者更好地理解和评价我国证券市场中的审计师变更现象,并为相关领域的研究提供了新的经验证据。     

媒体负面报道、审计师变更与审计质量

本文基于新闻传播学的"议程设置"理论,并融合心理学的"铺垫效果"及"框架"理论为分析构架,以2008—2012年中国A股上市公司为样本,采用可操控性应计利润和会计稳健性作为审计质量衡量指标,研究媒体负面报道对审计质量的作用机制以及媒体负面报道对审计师变更的审计质量影响。研究表明:媒体负面报道与审计质量呈正相关。进一步地,审计师变更对审计质量的作用并不显著,但媒体负面报道的铺垫效应及框架设置对审计师变更的审计质量具有明显改善效果,且这种作用在审计师升级变更的审计质量方面更强。这一结论为加强新闻媒体在资本市场中的审计监管提供了建设性的指导意义。     

审计师变更与审计质量:一个理论分析

本文通过建立股东、管理层和审计师三方参与的两委托人-单代理人博弈模型,研究了固定审计费用下不同审计师变更方式对审计质量的影响。研究结果表明,审计师强制性单期变更与审计师强制性定期变更下,审计师与管理层之间的合谋将导致严重的财务舞弊;而在审计师自愿性变更下,股东可以利用解聘现任审计师这一威胁来阻止审计师和管理层之间的合谋,使得审计师和管理层的最优策略均为真实披露公司的盈余信息,并发表标准无保留审计意见。     

Corporate director liability and monitoring preferences

An important issue in the regulation of corporate behavior is its impact on the monitoring configuration selected by top management. In this article, we provide evidence consistent with the notion that the recent trend toward audit committee formation, and the movement toward Big-Eight auditors, are responses to increased legal exposure of the board of directors, notably stemming from the passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977. The costs associated with changes in monitoring configurations are also considered. In particular, it is argued that auditor assistance can substantially reduce the cost of audit committee formation. Because external auditors may have differential incentives to support audit committee formation, a hypothesis linking auditor identity and audit committee formation is offered. Recent auditor changes and audit committee formations of American Stock Exchange companies are examined to provide positive evidence for the theory. The data reveal a clear trend to form audit committees, and a movement to Big-Eight auditors. Underscoring the importance of auditor involvement, it is shown that audit committees were more likely to be formed given recent selection of a new Big-Eight auditor.     

New Auditors’ Decisions for Released Firms from the Mandatory Auditor Designation Rule: Evidence From South Korea

This study examines the effect of the mandatory designation rule on audit fees charged and audit hours rendered by auditors for firms released from the mandatory auditor designation rule in the Korean audit market. Under the mandatory auditor designation rule, which took effect in 1991, problematic firms are assigned new auditors by the Financial Supervisory Service. Previous studies suggest that this regulation positively affects the quality of audits by promoting auditor independence. Thus, this study hypothesises that firms that have been subjected to mandatory auditor designation improve the quality of their financial reporting, and that auditors hired after the mandatory designation period account for reduced audit risks when determining audit fees and audit hours. This study shows that audit fees and audit hours of firms released from the mandatory auditor designation rule are lower than those of other initial audit engagements. Taken together, this study's findings reinforce the notion that auditors’ perceptions of changes in audit risk yield corresponding changes in the audit fees they charge and audit hours they render.     

Auditor independence, ‘low balling’, and disclosure regulation

This paper investigates the allegations of the Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities and the Securities and Exchange Commission that ‘low balling’ on initial audit engagements impairs auditor independence. We demonstrate that, contrary to these claims, ‘low balling’ does not impair independence; rather it is a competitive response to the expectation of future quasi-rents to incumbent auditors (due, e.g., to technological advantages of incumbency). ‘Low balling’ in the initial period is the process by which auditors compete for these advantages. Critically, initial fee reductions are sunk in future periods and therefore do not impair auditor independence. The implications for current regulation governing changes of auditor (Accounting Series Release No. 165 et al.) and audit fees (Accounting Series Release No. 250) are also discussed.     

Controller changes and auditor changes

Using listed companies in China’s A-share market from 1997 to 2009, this paper investigates the relationship between controller changes (including changes in controlling shareholders, directors and CEOs) and auditor changes. The empirical evidence indicates that controller changes are positively related to auditor changes and that auditor changes are more likely if there are extensive controller changes. For companies in which both the controlling shareholder and the auditor change, if the successor controlling shareholder is controlled by an other-province government, the auditor is more likely to be replaced and the successor auditor is more likely to be a smaller auditor from the same province as the new controlling shareholder.     

Voluntary disclosure of reasons for auditor changes and the capital market reaction to information disclosure

This study examines the association between firm attributes and management’s voluntary disclosure of the reason(s) for auditor changes and evaluates the capital market reaction to information disclosure of the auditor change events accompanied by preexisting red flag and non-red flag issues. We find that managers are more likely to disclose the reason(s) for auditor changes when those changes occurred because of benign business reasons or if the reasons do not indicate the presence of any underlying operating or financial reporting problem. On the other hand, managers are less likely to disclose the reason(s) for auditor changes when those changes are preceded by red-flag situations. Furthermore, auditor changes accompanied by preexisting red-flag situations are viewed negatively by the capital market, implying that the full disclosure of reasons for auditor changes is informative to investors. This observation is supported further by our market-based analyses, which consistently show that auditor changes accompanied by prevailing red flag issues are valued incrementally in the market above and beyond the reportable events (under FRR No. 31) and auditor-initiated changes. The study contributes to the recent policy debate related to mandating the disclosure of the reason(s) for auditor switches. Specifically, the results support the recent debates that the current voluntary disclosure regime results in selective disclosure practices that are likely to contribute to the general lack of transparency with respect to auditor changes.     

Hedge Fund Regulation and Fund Governance: Evidence on the Effects of Mandatory Disclosure Rules

This paper uses three alternating changes in hedge fund regulation to study whether regulation reduces hedge funds’ misreporting, and, if so, why regulation is effective. Relative to public companies, hedge fund regulation is relatively light. Much of the regime is a “comply‐or‐explain” framework that allows funds to forego compliance with governance rules, providing that they disclose their lack of compliance. The results show that regulation reduces misreporting at hedge funds. Further analysis suggests that the disclosure requirements led funds to make changes in their internal governance, such as hiring or switching the fund's auditor, and that these changes induced funds to report their financial performance more accurately.     

盈余管理、事务所客户资源控制权的归属与审计质量——来自中国证券市场的经验证据

与西方市场仅能观察到事务所变更不同的是,中国资本市场还同时提供了审计师变更的佐证。基于此,本文应用新制度经济学中的资产专有理论,从审计师和事务所两个角度,分析了中国证券市场特有的审计师/事务所变更行为,并结合盈余管理和审计意见进一步分析这种行为的原因和后果。文章通过对比签字审计师离开事务所并带走客户的公司与签字审计师离开事务所没有带走客户的公司后,发现在审计师跳槽之前,公司的盈余管理越强,越会跟随审计师到新的事务所,表明客户资源的控制权归审计师而非事务所所有。并且,我们还发现,这类公司在审计师变更前的审计质量更差。本文的研究丰富了审计理论的研究手段和现有成果,并对于规范审计师行为和提高审计独立性具有积极的理论价值和现实意义。     

Auditor objectivity as a function of auditor negotiation self-efficacy beliefs

This study empirically examines whether an auditor's perceived ability to negotiate discretionary accounting issues with clients (auditor negotiation self-efficacy) is related to auditor objectivity, and whether an auditor's negotiation self-efficacy has a greater impact on her objectivity when the auditor's accuracy motive (professional identity) is strong rather than weak. We tested the hypotheses using a cross-sectional survey design and obtained 146 responses from among 800 surveyed experienced Swedish auditors. The findings indicate that auditors with higher negotiation self-efficacy were more likely to make decisions on a material and discretionary accounting issue contrary to their clients' desires compared to auditors with lower self-efficacy. The relationship between negotiation self-efficacy and auditor objectivity was not moderated by professional-identity strength. These research findings suggest that recruiting and training auditors to increase their negotiation self-efficacy may be an effective method to enhance auditor objectivity without the problems inherent in other methods, such as auditor rotation. Our sample was obtained in Sweden, which allows long auditor tenures. We caution that, although our analysis controlled for auditor tenure, the effect of auditor negotiation self-efficacy may not be generalizable to countries that limit tenure through regulation.     

Review of Post‐CLERP 9 Australian Auditor Independence Research

The Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform & Corporate Disclosure) Act 2004 (CLERP 9) added substantial new provisions pertaining to auditor independence, and followed in the wake of financial reporting scandals during 2000 to 2003. Many of the regulatory changes were framed in the earlier Ramsay Report, which drew on independence concerns raised in the academic literature. This review paper reviews Australian academic research investigating auditor independence, framed by our conceptual understanding of auditor independence, to assess what we have learned about the impact of CLERP 9 on auditor independence. Our review of Australian auditor independence research published post‐CLERP 9 reveals little evidence of the impact of the regulatory changes on auditor behaviour (independence in fact) and perceptions (independence in appearance). We conclude there are substantial needs for further research on the impact of the CLERP 9 amendments on auditor independence and any enduring independence issues. We identify particular areas for future research that may better inform policy development and argue that the prospect of high‐quality relevant research will increase if regulatory agencies, the accounting profession and audit practitioners engage more with academics in the research process. We identify several ways in which this might occur.