探讨资产证券化项目融资的科学发展

资产证券化融资方式作为近年来世界项目融资领域的重大创新之一，利用成熟的项目融资改组技巧，将项目资产的未来现金流量包装成高质量的证券投资对象，显示了金融创新的优势。但由于其在我国的实践仍处于探索和试验阶段，还有很多方面需要完善。笔者这一问题从健全资产证券化法律制度、完善资产证券化市场环境两方面，探讨了我国资产证券化项目融资的科学发展策略以及资产证券化融资操作建议。     

谈我国信贷资产证券化问题

资产证券化是世界金融领域最重大的创新之一，在发达国家得到了发展和完善。我国信贷资产证券化受各种法规、制度、市场等条件约束，要发展信贷资产证券化，应根据市场的发展情况，分阶段、逐步地改善资产证券化的法律和制度环境，提高政策透明度，规范资本市场，降低资产证券化的不确定性和交易成本，推动资本市场的发展。     

言贷资产证券化投资者保护机制探讨

投资者的保护水平决定了信贷资产证券化的发展程度。作为一种金融创新，信贷资产证券化的投资者保护有其特殊性并开始成为证券化推广阶段的核心问题，试点时期的证券化制度已难以适应此时的投资者保护需要。应重新厘定监管者、金融中介和投资者的角色和功能，并在他们之间进行有效的证券化制度配置，以建立一个具有内在逻辑联系和价值传承的投资者保护机制，形成可持续自我发展的信贷资产证券化市场．     

资产证券化演进与金融市场效率

资产证券化的不断演进带来了金融市场效率的革命，使其成为最具创新性和最具活力的金融创新业务。资产证券化的引入将对优化我国金融体系结构和加强金融风险控制具有深远的影响。资产证券化演进需要宽松的制度支持，制度创新是我国推行资产证券化的首要任务。     

我国资产证券化市场方兴未艾——2007年的回顾与发展展望

2007年我国启动了第二批信贷资产证券化试点,同时加快了资产证券化的制度创新,资产证券化产品的市场规模在2006年的基础上快速增加,流动性显著改善,市场成长迅速。资产证券化对于商业银行尤其重要。正如中国工商银行行长杨凯生所说,“资产证券化业务的推出,既有利于我国商业银行的转型,也有利于我国资本市场的发展。”可以认为,随着监管部门对资产证券化业务的大力推动、资产证券化外部环境的改善以及资产证券化参与主体的多元化,商业银行对各种资产进行证券化将是一种常态。     

资产证券化：一种新型融资制度安排——访中国人民银行金融市场司副司长沈炳熙

2005年12月15日，国家开发银行和中国建设银行的两只资产支持证券在银行间市场成功发行，这标志着我国信贷资产证券化试点工作已取得阶段性成果。作为一种新型融资制度安排，资产证券化的推出具有深远背景和广泛影响。本刊记者为此采访了中国人民银行金融市场司副司长沈炳熙。     

我国商业银行资产证券化问题探析

资产证券化作为一种金融创新工具,是近30年来世界最重大的金融创新之一。在当今欧美等发达国家,资产证券化的使用非常普遍。资产证券化于20世纪90年代开始进入亚洲市场,并得到了迅速的发展。随着我国金融业的改革与开放,商业银行终将直面资产证券化。由于我国的监管制度尚未有效建立,立法又未明确证券化的法律地位,这些为规范运作埋下了隐患。因此,当前我国应该根据资产证券化的特点,事先进行相应的制度安排,有效地解决好各种客观条件的约束,使资产证券化业务从一开始就走向规范化发展的道路。     

探讨资产证券化项目融资的科学发展

资产证券化融资方式作为近年来世界项目融资领域的重大创新之一,利用成熟的项目融资改组技巧,将项目资产的未来现金流量包装成高质量的证券投资对象,显示了金融创新的优势。但由于其在我国的实践仍处于探索和试验阶段,还有很多方面需要完善。笔者这一问题从健全资产证券化法律制度、完善资产证券化市场环境两方面,探讨了我国资产证券化项目融资的科学发展策略以及资产证券化融资操作建议。     

全国人大代表马蔚华：建立和完善资产证券化立法体系

囿于我国现有法律制度的不完善和实施环境的不配套，商业银行数年来始终在各类所谓的“准资产证券化”方案的框架中徘徊，而未能真正开展起资产证券化业务。因此，建议在适当借鉴和参考国外有关资产证券化的成熟立法和运行模式的基础上，结合我国国情，尽快启动我国资产证券化专项立法，为实施资产证券化，有效缓解我国日渐突出的资产流动性问题提供制度支持和保障。     

资产证券化的制度建设

证券化就是实现金融权益可交易的过程.从广义上讲,资产证券化包括一级证券化(初级证券化)和二级证券化(高级证券化).在证券化过程的初级阶段,资产证券化主要是指资金短缺者在资本市场和货币市场上通过发行证券来融资,所使用的融资工具包括商业票据、企业债券和股票,因此,又被称之为融资证券化.     

中国金融业资产的规模与效率

通过在金融资产结构与经济增长模型中引入能够综合反映制度变迁的制度变量,证明国家制度变迁对一国金融资产结构与经济增长会起到促进或制约的作用.当制度供给与金融资产结构和经济增长对制度的需求达到均衡时,国家制度安排会优化金融资产结构、促进经济增长,否则便会出现规模与效率的"反比"现象,从而回答了我国金融资产规模与效率之间为什么出现悖论的问题.我国应积极发展非银行金融机构,实现金融体系多元化,对内开放,满足我国经济对多层次、多样化金融的需求,完善金融市场准入制度,优化市场参与主体结构,促进股票市场和银行协调发展.     

中国金融业资产的规模与效率

通过在金融资产结构与经济增长模型中引入能够综合反映制度变迁的制度变量，证明国家制度变迁对一国金融资产结构与经济增长会起到促进或制约的作用。当制度供给与金融资产结构和经济增长对制度的需求达到均衡时，国家制度安排会优化金融资产结构、促进经济增长，否则便会出现规模与效率的“反比”现象，从而回答了我国金融资产规模与效率之间为什么出现悖论的问题。我国应积极发展非银行金融机构，实现金融体系多元化，对内开放，满足我国经济对多层次、多样化金融的需求，完善金融市场准入制度，优化市场参与主体结构，促进股票市场和银行协调发展。     

Real Options, Product Market Competition, and Asset Returns

We study how competition in the product market affects the link between firms' real investment decisions and their asset return dynamics. In our model, assets in place and growth options have different sensitivities to market wide uncertainty. The strategic behavior of market participants influences the relative importance of these components of firm value. We show that the relationship between the degree of competition and assets' expected rates of return varies with product market demand. When demand is low, firms in more competitive industries earn higher returns, whereas when demand is high firms in more concentrated industries earn higher returns.     

Product market competition in accounting,finance, and corporate governance: A review of the literature

Product market competition has been identified as one of the most powerful corporate governance tools for motivating managers to maximize firm value. Consistent with this view, a large body of theoretical and empirical research over the years has investigated the implications of product market competition. This paper synthesizes and critically evaluates the empirical literature on the consequences of product market competition in the accounting, finance, and corporate governance domains. Our review focuses on issues like financial reporting quality, analyst forecasting activities, asset pricing, investment, and financing decisions, and the substitutive versus complementary relationships between product market competition and other corporate governance tools. Our review suggests that, although market competition has profound implications for these issues, the empirical findings often provide conflicting results. We highlight such contradictory findings and offer suggestions for future research. Our review will help researchers intending to further investigate the implications of product market competition, both in the US and internationally.     

ETF Competition and Market Quality

This paper examines competition between exchange traded funds (ETFs) that hold nearly identical portfolios of securities. We provide evidence that incumbent‐fund liquidity is negatively affected when a new ETF is added to an asset class. The degradation in liquidity is even more severe whenever both funds follow the same benchmark. We also document a decline in primary‐market activity for the incumbent ETFs after the arrival of new competitors. Furthermore, increasing the number of funds in an asset class does not put downward pressure on fund management fees. Thus, the deterioration in market quality may not be offset by decreasing costs of fund ownership.     

Are Judgment Errors Reflected in Market Prices and Allocations? Experimental Evidence Based on the Monty Hall Problem

The question of whether individual judgment errors survive in market equilibrium is an issue that naturally lends itself to experimental analysis. Here, the Monty Hall problem is used to detect probability judgment errors both in a cohort of individuals and in a market setting. When all subjects in a cohort made probability judgment errors, market prices also reflected the error. However, competition among two bias-free subjects was sufficient to drive prices to error-free levels. Thus, heterogeneity in behavior can be an important factor in asset pricing, and further, it may take few bias-free traders to make asset prices bias-free.     

ISLAMIC BANKING,COSTLY RELIGIOSITY,AND COMPETITION

In this article we explain how Islamic banks (IBs) maximize profitability in the presence of costly religiosity. Because of strong competition between IBs and conventional banks (CBs), a unique equilibrium emerges that affects the IB pricing structure. We propose a new model that identifies the optimal rate on the asset and liability sides of IBs. It shows that the financial products offered by IBs are not an exogenous function of religiosity; instead, they are endogenously determined by the nature of market forces in which IBs are operating. We show that in the presence of costly religiosity and competition, the rates of both converge. Moreover, the competitive pricing mechanism induces IBs to structure their asset- and liability-side financial products (particularly Murabaha) with a risk profile similar to that of the CB loan system. This article empirically supports the theoretical propositions by using data from 17 Muslim majority countries where both IBs and CBs coexist from 2000 to 2015. We find that, holding other factors of bank returns constant, competition significantly affects IB asset- and liability-side returns. The analysis also reveals that because of increasing competition between IBs and CBs, the market power of IBs has significantly declined over time.     

CEO Ownership,Stock Market Performance,and Managerial Discretion

We examine the relationship between CEO ownership and stock market performance. A strategy based on public information about managerial ownership delivers annual abnormal returns of 4% to 10%. The effect is strongest among firms with weak external governance, weak product market competition, and large managerial discretion, suggesting that CEO ownership can reverse the negative impact of weak governance. Furthermore, owner‐CEOs are value increasing: they reduce empire building and run their firms more efficiently. Overall, our findings indicate that the market does not correctly price the incentive effects of managerial ownership, suggesting interesting feedback effects between corporate finance and asset pricing.     

A Model of the Commercial Loan Rate

This paper explores the theoretical and empirical determinants of the commercial loan rate charged by commercial banks based on a model of financial intermediary behavior which assumes monopolistic competition in asset and liability markets. The model incorporates the constraint that banks must maintain at least a minimum quantity of bonds in asset portfolios. Equations are estimated on a time series basis to explain the behavior of commercial loan rates over the period 1953 to 1980. The evidence appears consistent with the hypothesis that commercial banks operate in a market characterized by imperfect competition and that they explicitly set loan rates.     

The Effect of the Transparency of Order Flows in a Dealer Market with Several Securities

This paper compares two trading mechanisms in a dealer market with several securities exhibiting asymmetric information and imperfect competition. These two market structures differ in the information received by market-makers. While in the first of them when setting the price of an asset, they observe the order flows of all assets, in the second one they only observe the order flow corresponding to this asset. In order to make this comparison, we analyze several market indicators such as the informed expected traded volume, the market depth, the volatility and the informativeness of equilibrium prices, and the informed traders' ex-ante expected profits. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G10.