会计师事务所任期会影响审计质量吗？——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

本文在我国会计师事务所自愿性变更的大环境下，研究事务所任期的长短是否对耳计质量造成影响，试图为会计师事务所强制轮换制度的制定提供实证证据。我们以1995年至2002年中国证券市场3466家上市公司为样本，以上市公司盈余乍理程度作为审计质量的衡量指标，研究会计师事务所任期与审计质量之间的关系。分别以主观应计利润和线下项目度量上市公司的盈余管理程度，研究结果显示：首先，对于与会计师事务所的审计业务委托关系持续时问在五年及五年以上戢上市公司，随着事务所任期的增加，上市公司利用主观应计利润进行盈余管理的程度更加严重。而这种行为主要是将利润调低的盈余管理。其次，随着会计师事务所任期的增加，上市公司利用线下项目进行盈余管理行为的程度加重了。而且，这一关系对于存在稳定的审计业务委托关系的上市公司来说更加明显。这种行为不仅包括将盈余调高的盈余管理，也包括了将盈余调低的盈余管理。以上两个结论均支持会计师事务所任期的增加加重了上市公司盈余管理程度的观点，与会计师事务所强制轮换制度暗含的假设是一致的。     

我国上市公司应计质量与审计意见之间关系的研究

由于权责发生制下的会计盈余分为有现金流支持的收现利润和没有现金流支持的应计利润两部分,所以应计质量在很大程度上决定了盈余质量。本文深入分析了我国上市公司应计质量与审计意见之间的关系,并运用回归分析法,考察了应计质量对审计意见的解释性。研究结果表明,虽然总体上来看上市公司的应计质量与审计意见之间存在正相关关系,但是这种相关性仅仅在ST类公司中表现出了显著性,而在非ST类公司中并没有表现出显著性。由此可见,我国注册会计师的审计质量仍然有待提高。     

会计师事务所人力资本特征与审计质量——来自中国资本市场的经验证据

人力资本在会计师事务所中具有十分重要的意义。本文利用2009年我国会计师事务所及其非金融类上市公司客户的数据,以操控性应计额度量审计质量,检验会计师事务所中注册会计师所占比重以及注册会计师的学历、年龄、参加行业领军人才培训情况等人力资本特征对审计质量的影响,结果发现,在我国本土事务所中,注册会计师的年龄以及入选行业领军人才培训计划的人数与正向的操控性应计额之间存在显著的负向关系,这表明,会计师事务所中注册会计师的经验丰富程度和对培训的重视程度对于抑制客户的正向盈余管理行为、提高审计质量具有积极作用。文章没有发现会计师事务所中注册会计师的比重以及注册会计师中高学历者所占比重与审计质量之间存在显著关系的证据。     

盈余管理与审计质量的关系研究——基于2008-2010年我国证券市场数据的实证分析

学术界普遍认为,审计不仅能够查出企业的错报,还能识别并遏制企业的盈余管理行为。为了检验审计质量对中国上市公司盈余管理的影响,本文利用2008-2010年中国A股上市公司的经验数据,用行业专长和事务所规模和品牌作为审计质量的代理变量,用分行业分年度修正的琼斯模型计算出的操纵性应计项目作为盈余管理的衡量指标,对审计质量和盈余管理的关系进行了实证检验,总体而言,审计质量越高,盈余管理程度越低,审计质量越低,盈余管理程度越高。特别是2008年的数据,显著的支持了研究结论。但是,2009-2010年的经验证据并不能充分支持盈余管理与审计质量的关系,这可能与我国特定的审计市场不是充分竞争的市场、我国的注册会计师不够完全独立有一定的关系。     

斟盈余管理和真实盈余管理台理手段的比较研究

盈余管理的存在性已是学术界不争的事实。过度的盈余管理却与会计信息质量相悖,影响会计信息的可靠性,误导投资者,影响证券市场的资源优化配置功能。如2011年青海华鼎通过少计提多冲回坏账准备为企业业绩铺路,ST浪莎利用债务重组操控非经常性损益调节利润实现＊ST长控的摘帽复市,2012年新大地构造关联交易虚增利润I因此,必须采取必要措施治理过度盈余管理行为。盈余管理可分为应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理,由于两者特点不同,采取的治理手段也有所差异。国内现有文献关于两种盈余管理行为治理手段的对比研究非常匮乏,本文首先比较归纳应计盈余管理与真实盈余管理的特点,总结两者的关系,并进一步分析两种盈余管理行为的治理手段,以进一步增强会计信息质量的可靠性并为监管者提供切实有用的决策依据。     

“轻信”的注册会计师影响了审计质量吗——基于中国综合社会调查(CGSS)的经验研究

本文以2008-2015年我国A股上市公司为样本,考察了签字注册会计师的社会信任程度(出生地区社会信任水平)对年报审计质量的影响。研究发现,注册会计师出生地区的社会信任程度更高,被审计上市公司的盈余管理程度更高,说明社会信任程度差异能够在一定程度上使注册会计师因"轻信"而"轻视"被审计单位的盈余管理行为,从而影响审计质量。考虑非标准审计意见类型后,发现对于存在不合规、不公允的"问题"上市公司年报,社会信任程度更高的注册会计师出具的审计意见是足够严厉的,说明社会信任程度差异造成的"轻信"影响是有限的。进一步研究发现,签字注册会计师中,项目复核人的社会信任程度对审计质量有显著影响,项目负责人则不显著;党员注册会计师和"十大"会计师事务所的注册会计师不容易受到"轻信"的影响。本文拓展了注册会计师个人特征对审计质量影响的相关文献,对监管机构加强注册会计师行业职业化建设,具有一定的启示意义。     

盈余管理方式与审计师风险感知研究

以2009~2013年沪深两市 A 股上市公司为样本,研究应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理对审计师风险感知的影响,研究结论表明,审计师既能感知到应计盈余管理行为带来的风险,同时还能感知到真实盈余管理行为的风险,并会从审计意见类型和审计费用两个方面采取风险应对措施。相较于有限责任制会计师事务所,特殊普通合伙制会计师事务所的审计师对盈余管理行为的风险感知更敏感。     

行政处罚能改进审计质量吗?——基于中国证监会处罚的证据

本文以2001-2009年被证监会处罚的会计师事务所为样本,分别从会计师事务所和CPA个人两个层面检验了行政处罚对审计质量的影响。研究发现,在被证监会行政处罚后,受罚事务所或CPA所审计的上市公司的操控性应计利润没有显著降低,会计盈余稳健性也没有显著提高,并且行政处罚力度的差异对上市公司的操控性应计利润和会计盈余稳健性也无显著影响,这些发现表明我国证监会对违规事务所和CPA的行政处罚并未显著改进上市公司的审计质量。对此现象,监管部门应当反思,并引起重视。     

审计委员会与审计质量——来自中国A股市场的经验证据

本文以中国2004年—2005年期间获得无保留审计意见的A股上市公司为研究样本,采用截面Jones模型估计出的公司操纵性应计利润(盈余管理)的绝对值作为审计质量的衡量指标,考察了审计委员会与审计质量之间的关系。研究发现,在控制了"会计师事务所规模"、"公司是否面临退市风险"、"审计意见是否带强调事项"、"公司经营活动现金流"、"公司盈余数量"、"年度"等指标后,设立审计委员会的公司的盈余管理绝对值显著比未设立审计委员会的公司小,这说明审计委员会能够显著的提高审计质量。进一步研究发现:审计委员会的成立时间越长,审计质量越高;审计委员会在2005年的作用比2004年更加显著。     

股权结构与上市公司应计和真实盈余管理行为

过高的股权集中度会导致显著更高的应计盈余操控行为,而对真实盈余管理行为的影响总体上不显著;无论对于应计盈余操控还是真实盈余操控,机构持股均具有较好的抑制作用;国有控股会导致显著更高的应计盈余操控,但在真实盈余操控方面,更多地体现在异常酌量费用方面;国有控股上市公司管理层持股越高,其应计盈余管理行为越显著,而在真实盈余管理行为方面,显著影响更多体现在异常现金流和异常生产成本方面.     

The impact of audit quality on real and accrual earnings management around IPOs

We examine the relation between audit quality and the earnings management activities of IPO firms. The impact of high quality auditors on real earnings management has been researched in a number of settings e.g. SEOs. However, to date, there has been no work on the effect of high quality auditors on real activities-based manipulation around IPOs. We examine UK IPOs between 1998 and 2008 and find evidence that high quality auditors constrain the use of real activities manipulation that occurs via the management of discretionary expenses. We also find evidence, consistent with prior research, that high quality auditors constrain the manipulation of discretionary accruals. Crucially, we find IPO firms audited by high quality auditors undertake sales-based manipulation in order to manage earnings upward at the end of the IPO year. The presence of high quality auditors is not, therefore, sufficient to constrain all forms of earnings management.     

How efficient ownership structure monitors income manipulation? Evidence of real earnings management among Malaysian firms

This study investigates income manipulation through real earnings management, by listed companies in Malaysia, prior to being officially designated as “financially distressed”, by this country’s stock exchange listed rules. The hypotheses relate to whether the degree of upwards real earnings management, conducted during the four-year period prior to financial distress, can be explained by ownership structure (measured with three variables: managerial ownership, institutional ownership and foreign ownership). Using a sample of 1180 firm-year observations of financially distressed companies, over the investigation period 2001–2011, the findings suggest that the degree of real earnings management is not associated with ownership by management or institutional investors. Conversely, the evidence indicates that foreign shareholders are able to constrain upwards real earnings management related to discretionary expenditure but not the operating cycle. This study contributes to the importance of diversity of ownership structures in monitoring income manipulation among firms.     

Covid-19 pandemic,a catalyst for aggressive earnings management by banks?

This paper investigates the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic on the financial reporting quality of European banks by examining the occurrence of earnings management specifically income smoothing. Using a sample of listed European banks, we employ panel estimation to compare income smoothing in the pre-pandemic period (2019Q1-2019Q4) and the pandemic period (2020Q1-2021Q4). We find that earnings management has significantly increased during the pandemic years, evidencing how the quality of financial reporting is affected during the crisis period. Our findings further suggest that amid the crisis, governance quality limits the incidence of earnings management and emphasizes how the strength of country-level governance and institutional framework affects the quality of financial reporting. Further analysis shows that though banks are inclined to manage earnings during a crisis, nevertheless, the presence of high-quality audit is a limiting factor on the incidence of earnings management in the face of crisis. Our findings which are relevant to investors, market participants, and regulators among others make a significant contribution to the accounting literature and specifically complement the strand of literature on the discretionary use of loan loss provision for earnings management during crisis.     

Asset write-offs discretion and accruals management in Taiwan: the role of corporate governance

Using a sample of Taiwan’s public firms, this paper examines whether managers use discretionary write-offs and abnormal accruals jointly to reach earnings targets and how corporate governance mechanisms react to such opportunistic behavior. We develop a set of simultaneous equations that capture executives’ incentives to manage earnings through write-offs and accrual management. These incentives include the existence and tightness of accounting-based covenants, “big bath,” income smoothing, and changes in senior management. The empirical results show that firms with larger discretionary write-offs also have lower discretionary accruals. In addition, we find that these earnings management tools are endogenous, suggesting that discretionary write-offs and discretionary accruals are partial complements for earnings manipulation and that their magnitudes are determined jointly. These findings contrast sharply with the tenor of discussion in the U.S. literature concerning the potential for using asset write-offs and discretionary accruals to manipulate earnings, which documents that managers use their discretion over accruals to signal economic realities rather than to obfuscate. Moreover, the results reveal that the empirical association between discretionary write-offs and abnormal accruals is more pronounced in weakly governed firms, suggesting that a strong governance setting is likely to constrain management’s discretionary behavior. The above implications are robust to a number of alternative specifications and variables definitions.     

CAP Forum on Enron: Former Audit Firm Personnel as CFOs: Effect on Earnings Management*

Corporate hiring of former audit personnel to fill key financial positions is a practice that has attracted attention from the media, the accounting profession, and regulators. The concern is that the former external auditor who now holds a key position with the client may be able to circumvent the audit or exert pressure on the audit team and adversely influence audit quality. We compare a sample of 172 test companies that appointed to the position of chief financial officer (CFO) personnel who are former employees of the companies' auditors, with a control sample of companies that appointed new CFOs who were not affiliated with their auditors. We investigate whether the level of discretionary accruals is greater for the test sample compared with the control sample during the two years following appointment of the CFO. Both univariate and multivariate results for signed discretionary accruals suggest some support for the hypothesis that firms with affiliated CFOs are associated with greater earnings management than firms with unaffiliated CFOs. Furthermore, the results for signed discretionary accruals suggest that the association is stronger for nonpartners who moved from the audit firm to the client with little or no time gap. On average, the results for absolute discretionary accruals do not suggest differences in earnings management between affiliated and unaffiliated CFOs. However, they do indicate some earnings management relative to unaffiliated CFOs by CFOs who had little or no time gap between leaving the audit firm and joining the client firm, although at a weaker level of significance.     

会计估计与独立审计质量——来自中国A股上市公司的证据

本文以2001—2004年间上市公司会计估计变更过程中暴露出的失当会计估计为研究对象,检验注册会计师的独立审计质量。在控制了重大未决诉讼、债务水平、重大会计差错调整等因素后,研究发现：1．在会计估计变更前一年,注册会计师对公司的失当会计估计已有觉察并在审计意见中反映。会计估计涉及的项目个数、线上会计估计变更金额占全部会计估计变更金额的比例、客户规模以及会计师事务所规模等因素对非标意见的出具具有显著的解释力。2．在会计估计变更当年,注册会计师非标意见的出具与会计估计变更涉及的项目个数、线上会计估寸变更金额占全部会计估计变更金额的比例以及客户规模显著相关。3．注册会计师的审计质量明显受到客户规模的影响。上市公司的规模与注册会计师的审计质量负相关。     

Product market power,industry structure,and corporate earnings management

This is the first study to establish a link between product market power of firms and the degree of earnings management. We hypothesize and document a significant and robust association between (a) a firm’s product market pricing power and its degree of earnings management, and (b) industry competitiveness and the degree of earnings management in the industry. Our study reveals that firms with inferior product market pricing power engage in greater discretionary earnings accruals, adding a new dimension to our understanding of the transparency and informativeness of firms’ financial statements. These findings are mirrored at the industry level where we document that more competitive industries are associated with greater earnings manipulation. The empirical evidence has direct implication on the informativeness and earnings quality of firms based on their product market power and competitiveness.     

Internal governance structures and earnings management

This paper investigates the role of a firm's internal governance structure in constraining earnings management. It is hypothesized that the practice of earnings management is systematically related to the strength of internal corporate governance mechanisms, including the board of directors, the audit committee, the internal audit function and the choice of external auditor. Based on a broad cross‐sectional sample of 434 listed Australian firms, for the financial year ending in 2000, a majority of non‐executive directors on the board and on the audit committee are found to be significantly associated with a lower likelihood of earnings management, as measured by the absolute level of discretionary accruals. The voluntary establishment of an internal audit function and the choice of auditor are not significantly related to a reduction in the level of discretionary accruals. Our additional analysis, using small increases in earnings as a measure of earnings management, also found a negative association between this measure and the existence of an audit committee.     

R&D capitalization and audit fees: Evidence from China

Our study investigates the association between capitalized R&D costs and audit fees and whether this association reflects the effect of earnings management. By exploring Chinese listed firms, we find that capitalized R&D costs are positively associated with audit fees, where such positive association holds for both the discretionary and nondiscretionary portions of capitalized R&D costs. Moreover, the positive association between the discretionary portion of capitalized R&D costs and audit fees is more pronounced for firms with stronger incentives to manipulate earnings. Overall, our findings imply that firms' reporting incentives affect how auditors react to clients' accounting choices. This in turn suggests that auditors believe some firms capitalize R&D to manipulate earnings, and the resulting earnings-management concerns lead them to charge higher fees.