审计师选择与设立审计委员会的自选择问题——来自中国证券市场的经验证据

本文采用Heckman(1978)的二阶段回归方法,以2002-2006年我国证券市场上市公司为研究样本,在研究审计师选择的同时控制了设立审计委员会的自选择问题,并将公司设立审计委员会的实际情况与假设的相反情况进行对比,分析它们不同的审计师选择倾向,从而间接检验了审计委员会的治理效率。研究发现:自选择问题对审计师选择存在显著的影响。因此,拒绝了公司随机设立审计委员会的原假设;在控制自选择之后,回归方程中变量的斜率系数整体上存在显著差异;并且没有设立审计委员会的公司比设立审计委员会的公司更可能聘请四大会计师事务所。     

审计委员会-会计师事务所连锁关系与审计调整

本文运用我国独到的审计调整数据,研究审计委员会-会计师事务所连锁关系对审计质量的影响问题.研究发现,审计委员会-会计师事务所连锁关系能够提高审计调整的概率,这一结果在控制内生性和排除潜在替代性解释之后仍然成立,表明审计委员会-会计师事务所连锁关系能够促进审计委员会与会计师事务所之间的信息共享,从而提高审计质量.研究还发现,审计委员会-会计师事务所连锁关系对审计调整概率的提升效应,在机构投资者持股和管理层持股的公司以及国内会计师事务所中更为明显.进一步的研究发现,连锁的审计委员会成员为审计委员会主任时,上述效应更为明显;而连锁的审计委员会成员是否为独立董事对结果没有明显的影响.     

审计委员会特征与会计师事务所变更的经验研究

本文以会计师事务所变更为视角,探讨具备怎样特征的审计委员会才能有效履行其职责。研究表明:审计委员会的独立性和专业性与会计师事务所变更显著负相关;审计委员会的开会次数与会计师事务所变更没有显著关系,说明审计委员会的存在有助于减少会计师事务所变更。但在对会计师事务所变更的进一步研究中,我们并没有发现会计师事务所变是为了追求更高审计质量的进一步证据,也说明审计委员会对会计师事务所变更的影响仍然有限。这些研究结论为完善我国审计委员会制度提供了经验证据。     

审计委员会若干理论问题的探讨

我国对审计委员会的研究处于探索阶段,因此对审计委员会发展阶段的划分、审计委员会理论基础以及目的等理论问题存在诸多分歧。本文认为审计委员会发展应分为三个阶段,不同阶段有不同的标志;审计委员会不仅仅是受托责任,更主要是委托责任,其理论基础是委托代理理论;审计委员会的目的不仅仅是监督,而是制衡,是再监督。     

论审计委员会制度建设及我国现状

为进一步规范上市公司运作，中国证监会、国家经贸委联合在其发布的《上市公司治理准则》公告中建议上市公司董事会可以按照股东大会的有关决议，设立战略、审计、提名、薪酬与考核等专门委员会。专门委员会成员全部由董事组成，其中审计委员会、提名委员会、薪酬与考核委员会中独立董事应占多数并担任召集人，审计委员会     

审计委员会主席的地理位置对公司审计质量的影响

选取沪深上市公司2008—2020年的数据，采用多元线性回归和基于PSM的检验方法，验证了审计委员会主席地理位置与审计质量的关系。研究表明：审计委员会主席距离公司地理距离与审计质量显著负相关，其中，该距离与应计盈余管理水平正相关，说明审计委员会主席距离公司越远，盈余管理现象越严重；该距离与审计报告出具标准意见的报告频率正相关，说明审计委员会主席距离公司越远，公司越容易被出具标准意见的审计报告。进一步研究发现：审计委员会主席距离公司地理距离与CFO兼任审计委员会成员的现象显著正相关，说明该距离越远，CFO兼任审计委员会成员的现象越普遍。这些研究结论为上市公司遴选审计委员会主席时，对审计委员会主席客观条件的要求提供理论依据。     

网络经济环境下审计独立性的“组织独立”研究

著名审计理论家、思想家莫茨(R.K.Mautz)和夏拉夫(H.A.Sharaf)认为,审计的独立性状态应从四个方面得到反映:第一,在"财务利益"方面,审计人的活动经费应该独立;第二,在"精神状态"方面,审计人应保持精神上的独立;第三,在"组织地位"方面,审计机构必须是独立的专职机构,与被审计人没有组织上的隶属关系;第四,在"自由调查"方面,审计人的计划、检查与发表意见等各项工作均应是自由的,不受他人的控制与干涉。关于审计独立性的经济独立、精神伦理独立、工作独立等,笔者在此不再赘述,只就"组织独立"问题作一分析研究。审计独立性的"组织独立"既是一种理论升华,也是一种制度安排。最高审计机关国际组织(INTOSAI)在《利马宣言——审计规则指南》中首先提到最高审计机关只有独立于被审计单位并不受外界影响的情况下,才能客观而有效地完成其工作任务,最高审计机关必须具备完成     

把握好效益审计的四个特点

一是立项选择十分重要。一个好的效益审计项目，要同时具备重要性、时效性、增值性和可行性。重要性是指所选择的项目应该是放大群众最关心的、党委和政府高度关注的事项；时效性是指选择项目的时机应该是合适的；增值性是指所选择的项目应该具备可改进的空间；而可行性，则是指被审计单位的配合程度及审计力量应该能够达到审计要求。[第一段]     

审计质量与银行贷款

本文以我国上市公司的2003年至2008年的数据为样本,研究了审计费用、审计高见、审计委员会三个因素对公司短期贷款和长期贷款的影响.研究发现: (1)审计费用越高,公司更客易获得较多的短期贷款和长期贷款;(2)出具标准审计意见的公司更容易获得银行的长期贷款;(3)成立审计委员会的公司对获得更多的短期借款起积极作用.     

论注册会计师环境审计的主导地位——基于独立性要求的视角

<正>一、引言审计主体研究对于审计实务和理论的发展具有重要意义,而对于环境审计这样一个审计的新兴分支学科,明确和规范环境审计主体的相关问题尤为必要。环境审计主体相关问题的研究主要涉及两个方面,一是环境审计主体的构成内容,二是哪一类环境审计主体占据主导地位。陈思维(1998)首次提出了环境审计主体的构成内容,从审计关系的角度将其划分为审计机关环境审计(或称政府环境审计)、社会环境审计(或称注册会计师环境审计)和内部环境审计,并为学术界广泛接受。但是,有关哪一类环境审计主体占据主导地位的争论却一直未曾止息。如果不能及早地在这一问题上达成共识,不仅会严重阻碍环境审计理论的深入发展和进一步完善,还会严重影响环境审计实务的顺利开展,造成不分主次、群龙治水的混乱局面。     

Audit Committee Members’ Reputation Incentives and Their Effectiveness in Monitoring the Financial Reporting Process

We examine whether the reputation incentives of audit committee members are associated with their effectiveness in monitoring the financial reporting process. Prior research assumes that audit committee members allocate their effort proportionately across all memberships on which they serve. However, our findings suggest that audit committee members with multiple audit committee memberships tend to focus their attention on the memberships that provide them with the greatest reputation incentives. Specifically, firms with a larger proportion of audit committee members where the membership is the most prominent are associated with higher financial reporting quality and more effective monitoring of internal control. Additional tests reveal that audit committee members’ reputation incentives are driving our results rather than independent non-audit committee members’ reputation incentives. We conclude that reputation is a strong incentive for audit committee members, such that it influences their monitoring effectiveness over the financial reporting process.     

Earnings management and corporate governance: the role of the board and the audit committee

We examine the role of the board of directors, the audit committee, and the executive committee in preventing earnings management. Supporting an SEC Panel Report's conclusion that audit committee members need financial sophistication, we show that the composition of a board in general and of an audit committee more specifically, is related to the likelihood that a firm will engage in earnings management. Board and audit committee members with corporate or financial backgrounds are associated with firms that have smaller discretionary current accruals. Board and audit committee meeting frequency is also associated with reduced levels of discretionary current accruals. We conclude that board and audit committee activity and their members' financial sophistication may be important factors in constraining the propensity of managers to engage in earnings management.     

Shareholder election of CSR committee members and its effects on CSR performance

We examine the election of directors to corporate social responsibility (CSR) committees and whether shareholder votes influence CSR committee effectiveness. Our study is motivated by the importance that shareholders place on CSR and the responsibilities of the board in overseeing a firm's CSR practices. We find that CSR committee members receive greater shareholder support than other directors. We further find that among CSR committee members, those who are more experienced and skilled receive greater shareholder support. Furthermore, when a firm's CSR performance is poorer (better), CSR committee members receive lower (greater) shareholder support compared with other directors. Finally, we find that through voting, shareholders can increase the efficacy of the CSR committee, leading to improvements in CSR committee structure and performance. Overall, our results suggest that shareholders value the services and expertise of CSR committee members and hold them accountable for CSR performance. Shareholder votes are also effective in enhancing CSR performance.     

Independent audit committee members’ board tenure and audit fees

An independent audit committee is an audit committee on which all members are independent directors. This study examines whether independent audit committee members’ board tenure affects audit fees. On the basis of the prior literature, we formulate an unsigned hypothesis. This is because on the one hand, long board tenure audit committee members (defined as members with board tenure of 10 or more years) have greater incentives to protect their reputational capitals by purchasing increased audit effort, which positively affects audit fees. On the other hand, audit pricing reflects audit committee quality. Long board tenure audit committee members may have less need for increased audit effort because they can effectively oversee the financial reporting process themselves, which negatively affects audit fees. We find that audit fees are negatively associated with the proportion of long board tenure directors on the independent audit committee, consistent with the notion that audit committee members’ long board tenure results in lower audit effort.     

Voting Transparency in a Monetary Union

We examine whether the monetary policy committee of a monetary union should publish its voting records when members are appointed by national politicians. We show that the publication of voting records lowers overall welfare. This finding also holds for arbitrary levels of private benefits from holding office and if governments incur costs when replacing committee members. High private benefits of committee members always lower overall welfare, as they induce nonpartisan members to care more about being reappointed than about beneficial policy outcomes. Nonrenewable but long terms for national committee members and delegating the appointment of all committee members to a union-wide authority would be desirable.     

Audit Committee Members: What Goes on Behind Closed Doors?

Using a qualitative research paradigm, this study examines audit committee effectiveness from the perspective of audit committee members of New Zealand listed companies. The findings reveal that audit committee members perform a range of overlapping tasks and justify their existence in their audit committees by fulfilling the ‘expectations’ that are placed on them. Many quantitative research studies have examined the association between different dimensions of audit committee inputs and financial reporting outputs. The empirical evidence, however, is mixed and remains far from conclusive (Bédard and Gendron 2010). One of the primary reasons for the inconsistent findings is the lack of understanding of the actual process by which audit committees perform their responsibilities. Using a qualitative research paradigm, this study examines audit committee activities, processes and effectiveness from the perspective of audit committee members of New Zealand listed companies. The study argues that performing audit committee duties is an intended process, whereby audit committee members justify their actions and the effectiveness of their audit committees. The paper contributes to the limited literature on how audit committees operate and, by doing so, provides possible explanations for the inconsistent findings of the quantitative audit committee research. In particular, the paper invites further discussion on whether audit committee members can be (or should be assumed to be) independent when discharging their role of overseeing auditing and financial reporting‐related matters.     

A study of the relationship between corporate governance structures and the extent of voluntary disclosure

The primary objective of this study is to test a theoretical framework relating four major corporate governance attributes with the extent of voluntary disclosure provided by listed firms in Hong Kong. These corporate governance attributes are the proportion of independent directors to total number of directors on the board, the existence of a voluntary audit committee, the existence of dominant personalities (CEO/Chairman duality), and the percentage of family members on the board. Using a weighted relative disclosure index for measuring voluntary disclosure, the results indicate that the existence of an audit committee is significantly and positively related to the extent of voluntary disclosure, while the percentage of family members on the board is negatively related to the extent of voluntary disclosure. The study provides empirical evidence to policy makers and regulators in East Asia for implementing the two new board governance requirements on audit committee and family control.     

How does the type of equity compensation of audit committee affect audit fees?

Based on agency theory, if equity compensation aligns audit committee members' interests with those of shareholders, the audit committee will provide effective oversight and demand more thorough audit coverage and scope. This will result in higher audit fees paid to the external auditor. This study specifically examines the associations between the types of equity compensation of audit committee members and audit fees. Our findings show differential impacts of equity compensation of audit committee in the forms of option grants and stock awards on audit fees. Specifically, equity compensation using stock awards is more effective than using option grants in aligning the interests of audit committee members with the interests of shareholders to provide better oversight of financial reporting.     

An Investigation of Audit Committees' Oversight Responsibilities

Audit committee performance has come under close scrutiny in recent years from a variety of policy-makers, interest groups and researchers. In particular, the adequacy of audit committee oversight has been challenged. At the same time, audit committees are under pressure to increase the scope of their oversight work. This study examines audit committee oversight from the internal perspective of active U.S. audit committee members. A two-part survey used Wolnizer's (1995) list of seventeen prescribed audit committee objectives related to accounting and reporting, auditors and auditing, and corporate governance in general as a basis to assess audit committee members' abilities to recognize their assigned objectives and explore their perceptions of the key tasks and issues currently addressed by audit committees. The results indicate that audit committee members appreciate the importance of all audit committee members having sufficient expertise in oversight areas related to accounting, auditing and the law. However, some respondents agreed they lacked sufficient expertise in many or all of these areas. In addition, the findings indicate that audit committee members tend not to recognize their assigned responsibilities, but agree with the proposed expansion of committee responsibilities. Using a multimethod approach, internal control evaluation was consistently listed and ranked as the most important oversight responsibility. These findings provide insight into the priority perceived by audit committee members as to their oversight responsibilities, and the adequacy of U.S. reporting disclosures as signals of audit committee work.     

Preferences or private assessments on a monetary policy committee?

Using Bank of England voting data, we show empirically that members’ votes are driven by heterogeneous individual assessments of the economy as well as their individual policy preferences. Estimates indicate that internal committee members form more precise assessments than externals and are also more hawkish. The estimates allow the first quantification of the gain due to information aggregation on monetary policy committees. The marginal gain from additional committee members tapers quickly after five members. There is no evidence of gains through externals’ moderating internals’ preferences. A relatively small committee of highly informed internal members emerges as a desirable committee structure.