The relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance in high R&D firms

Several studies have examined the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance/value (e.g., [Journal of Financial Economics 20 (1988) 293; Journal of Financial Economics 27 (1990) 595; Journal of Corporate Finance 5 (1999) 79]). Using different samples, these studies provide general support for the argument that increases in managerial ownership create countervailing interest alignment and entrenchment effects, leading to a nonlinear relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance. However, the actual form of this nonlinear relationship differs across the studies.The present paper examines the relationship between managerial ownership and performance for high R&D firms that are listed on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ. We find that Tobin's Q initially declines with managerial ownership, then increases, then declines again and, finally, increases again—a W-shaped relationship. The findings from our study point to the importance of industry effects in the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance.     

Determinants of Intercorporate Shareholdings

This paper examines why firms choose to spend resources on acquiring ownership rights in other firms. Based on a unique data base of every individual intercorporate shareholding on the Oslo Stock Exchange during the period 1980–1994, we find that such investments serve at least three functions. First, they play a role incorporate governance, as managers in firms withlow insider holdings, diffuse ownership structure and high free cash flow tend to mutually acquire equity stakes in each other, possibly in a collective attempt to protect their human capital in the market for corporate control. Second, interfirm equity holdings serve as financial slack for growing firms, reducing potential adverse selection costs by providing an internal funding source for new investments in long-term assets. Finally, our findings also suggest that intercorporate shareholdings are an integrated part of the investor's cash flow management system by being a liquidity buffer when cash inflows andcash outflows are non-synchronous.     

Corporate governance and firm performance

How is corporate governance measured? What is the relationship between corporate governance and performance? This paper sheds light on these questions while taking into account the endogeneity of the relationships among corporate governance, corporate performance, corporate capital structure, and corporate ownership structure. We make three additional contributions to the literature:First, we find that better governance as measured by the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick [Gompers, P.A., Ishii, J.L., and Metrick, A., 2003, Corporate governance and equity prices, Quarterly Journal of Economics 118(1), 107–155.] and Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell [Bebchuk, L., Cohen, A., and Ferrell, A., 2004, What matters in corporate governance?, Working paper, Harvard Law School] indices, stock ownership of board members, and CEO-Chair separation is significantly positively correlated with better contemporaneous and subsequent operating performance.Second, contrary to claims in GIM and BCF, none of the governance measures are correlated with future stock market performance. In several instances inferences regarding the (stock market) performance and governance relationship do depend on whether or not one takes into account the endogenous nature of the relationship between governance and (stock market) performance.Third, given poor firm performance, the probability of disciplinary management turnover is positively correlated with stock ownership of board members, and board independence. However, better governed firms as measured by the GIM and BCF indices are less likely to experience disciplinary management turnover in spite of their poor performance.     

Institutional ownership and firm performance: The case of bidder returns

We employ corporate takeover decisions to investigate the impact of institutional ownership on corporate performance. The OLS regressions of bidder gains on institutional ownership indicate a positive relation between the two. However, we find institutional ownership to be significantly determined by firm size, insider ownership and the firm's presence in the S&P 500 index. Thus, when bidder gains are regressed on the predicted values of institutional ownership in two-stage regressions, the recursive estimates do not confirm the relationship shown by the OLS regressions. Furthermore, we do not find any evidence that active institutional investors (e.g., CalPERS) as a group enhance efficiency in the market for corporate control. These findings cast doubt on the superior selection/monitoring abilities of institutional investors.     

tay's as good as cay: Reply

In a recent comment on our published work [Lettau, M., Ludvigson, S., 2001. Consumption, aggregate wealth, and expected stock returns. Journal of Finance 56, 815–850], Michael Brennan and Yihong Xia [2005. tay's as good as cay. Finance Research Letters 2, 1–14] advance the following argument: A “mechanistic” variable tay, where t is a linear time trend, forecasts stock returns. Since “t has no foresight,” the argument goes, the predictive power of this variable must be attributable to what they call “look-ahead bias.” The authors assert that cay is subject to the same look-ahead bias (generated because we use the full sample to estimate the cointegrating parameters in cay), implying that its forecasting power must be spurious. In this response, we explain why this critique is misplaced.     

Costly external financing, investment timing, and investment–cash flow sensitivity

This paper examines the effects of costly external financing on the optimal timing of a firm's investment. By altering the optimal investment timing, costly financing affects current investment and the sensitivity of investment to internal cash flow. Importantly, the relation between the cost of external funds and investment–cash flow sensitivity is non-monotonic. Investment–cash flow sensitivity is decreasing in the cost of external financing when it is relatively low and is increasing in the financing cost when it is high. Empirical tests examining investment–cash flow sensitivities within groups of firms classified by proxies for their costs of external funds provide evidence consistent with the model. The model and the empirical results complement recent studies by Cleary, Povel and Raith [Cleary, S., Povel, P. and Raith, M., 2007. The U-shaped investment curve: theory and evidence, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 42, 1–39.] and Almeida and Campello [Almeida, H. and Campello, M., in press, Financial constraints, asset tangibility and corporate investment, Review of Financial Studies.] that show a non-monotonic relation between firms' investment and the availability of internal funds.     

Asset pricing models with errors-in-variables

This paper revisits Fama and French [Fama, Eugene F., French, Kenneth R., (1993) Common risk factors in the returns on stock and bonds. Journal of Financial Economics 33 (1), 3–56] and Carhart [Carhart, Mark M., 1997. On persistence in mutual fund performance. Journal of Finance 52 (1), 57–82] multifactor model taking into account the possibility of errors-in-variables. In their well known paper, Fama and French [Fama, Eugene F., French, Kenneth R., 1997. Industry costs of equity. Journal of Financial Economic 43 (2), 153–193] concluded that estimates of the cost of equity for the three-factor model of FF (1993) were imprecise. We argue that this imprecision is even more severe because of the pervasive effects of measurement errors. We propose Dagenais and Dagenais [Dagenais, Marcel G., Dagenais, Denyse L., 1997. Higher moment estimators for linear regression models with errors in the variables. Journal of Econometrics 76 (1–2), 193–221] higher moments estimator as a solution. Our results show that estimates of the cost of equity obtained with Dagenais and Dagenais estimator differ sharply from popular OLS estimates and shed a new light on performance attribution and abnormal performance (α). Adapting the Generalized Treynor Ratio, recently developed by Hübner [Hübner, Georges, 2005. The generalized treynor ratio. Review of Finance 9 (3), 415–435], we show that the performance of managed portfolios with multi-index models should be revisited in presence of errors-in-variables.     

Hedging errors with Leland's option model in the presence of transaction costs

Nonzero transaction costs invalidate the Black–Scholes [1973. Journal of Political Economy 81, 637–654] arbitrage argument based on continuous trading. Leland [1985. Journal of Finance 40, 1283–1301] developed a hedging strategy which modifies the Black–Scholes hedging strategy with a volatility adjusted by the length of the rebalance interval and the rate of the proportional transaction cost. Kabanov and Safarian [1997. Finance and Stochastics 1, 239–250] calculated the limiting hedging error of the Leland strategy and pointed out that it is nonzero for the approximate pricing of an European call option, in contradiction to Leland's claim. As a further contribution, we first identify the mathematical flaw in the argument of Leland's claim and then quantify the expected percentage of hedging losses in terms of the hedging frequency and the level of the option strike price.     

Effect of ownership,governance, and transparency on liquidity – Chilean evidence

Companies with relatively thin trading, a high concentration of insider ownership, and a privatized pension system characterize Chile’s Santiago Stock Exchange. Within this setting, we study the relationship between ownership concentration, corporate governance, and stock market liquidity. Our results suggest that board independence, corporate disclosure and outside monitoring by institutions help moderate the effects that insiders have on trading costs and liquidity. We also find that market makers with inventory reduce the informational component of trading costs. Finally, the trades of insiders provide price guidance to market makers, while traders employ a follow-the-insider strategy when transparency is low.     

The impact of geographic diversification on firm performance

This paper empirically examines the economic effects of both corporate industrial and geographic diversifications. Using a sample of 28,050 firm-year observations from 1990 to 1998, we find that industrial and geographic diversifications are associated with firm value decrease. Consistent with Denis et al. [Denis, D. J., Denis, D. K., and Yost, K. (2002). Global diversification, industrial diversification, and firm value. Journal of Finance, 57, 1951-1979], the costs of corporate diversification may outweigh the benefits of diversification. We find that geographically diversified firms have higher R&D expenditures, advertising expenses, operating income, ROE and ROA than industrially diversified firms. In addition, higher R&D expenditures create value for multi-segment global firms, but not for single-segment global firms. This result implies that there exists an interaction effect between industrial and geographic diversification. We also examine the effects of agency cost issues, as characterized by the diversification discount, on both industrial and geographic diversification. Consistent with the agency explanation, firms with high equity-based compensation are associated with higher firm value than firms with low equity-based compensation. Also, we find that firms with a higher insider ownership percentage are associated with higher excess value.