Non-GAAP earnings reporting following going-concern opinions

We examine non-GAAP earnings reporting following a going-concern audit opinion (GCO). Using a propensity score-matched sample, matching first-time going-concern issuing companies with firms in financial distress that did not receive a going-concern report, we find that the likelihood and frequency of non-GAAP earnings reporting are lower following GCOs. In additional analyses, we find the negative association between the announcement of GCOs and the likelihood and frequency of non-GAAP earnings reporting stronger when GCOs are issued by industry-specialist auditors and when GCOs are unexpected, but do not find litigation risk or managers' ability to affect the association. These results are consistent with a decrease in investor demand for non-GAAP earnings disclosures following GCOs.     

Disclosure strategies among S&P 500 firms: Evidence on the disclosure of non-GAAP financial measures and financial statements in earnings press releases

This paper examines the prominence of non-GAAP financial measures in press releases, testing whether managers emphasize these adjusted performance measures relative to GAAP numbers in four different settings where their disclosure helps managers reach strategic earnings benchmarks on a pro forma basis when they would otherwise fall short using GAAP numbers. Moreover, this research investigates the information content of disclosures reconciling non-GAAP to GAAP earnings (and other financial statements). The data is hand collected from quarterly earnings press releases of a sample of S&P 500 firms during the 2001–2003 period. In this particular sample, the disclosure of non-GAAP financial measures is frequent. The results suggest that managers strategically give more prominence to non-GAAP measures than to GAAP figures when the GAAP earnings number falls short of a benchmark but the non-GAAP earnings number does not. This disclosure strategy may influence the perception of the firm's financial results. Furthermore, the results suggest that both the reconciliation and the non-GAAP income statement contain information useful for users.     

Non-GAAP earnings and board independence

We examine the association between board independence and the characteristics of non-GAAP earnings. Our results suggest that companies with less independent boards are more likely to opportunistically exclude recurring items from non-GAAP earnings. Specifically, we find that exclusions from non-GAAP earnings have a greater association with future GAAP earnings and operating earnings when boards contain proportionally fewer independent directors. Consistent with the association between board independence and the permanence of non-GAAP exclusions reflecting opportunism rather than the economics of the firm, we find that the association declines following Regulation G and that managers appear to use exclusions to meet earnings targets prior to selling their shares more often in firms with fewer independent board members. Overall, our results suggest that board independence is positively associated with the quality of non-GAAP earnings.     

Do more able managers provide better non-GAAP earnings?

This paper investigates whether managerial ability is associated with non-GAAP earnings quality. I find that the quality of non-GAAP earnings is greater for high-ability managers than low-ability managers. I also find that investors consider non-GAAP earnings released by high-ability management to be informative. Additional tests show that the positive association between managerial ability and the quality of non-GAAP earnings is stronger when return volatility or managerial stock ownership is greater. The results are robust to alternative measures of managerial ability and non-GAAP earnings quality and to controlling for endogeneity bias. Overall, this paper provides evidence that managers of high ability use non-GAAP reporting as a signalling tool to reduce information asymmetry.     

How efficient is the market for Australian firms’ earnings information?

We construct a measure of the speed with which forecasts issued by sell-side analysts accurately forecast future annual earnings. Following Marshall, we label this measure earnings information flow timeliness (EIFT). This measure avoids the aggregation problem inherent in price-based measures of information efficiency. We document large variation in EIFT across firm-years, and show that EIFT is positively associated with the extent of analyst following, consistent with increased analyst coverage improving the speed with which earnings-related information is recognised. We also find that EIFT is higher for firm-years classified as ‘bad news’ (i.e., where analysts’ forecasts at the start of the financial period exceed the reported outcome). However, when we separately consider instances where analysts appear to forecast non-GAAP (or ‘street’) earnings rather than GAAP earnings, we find that the greater timeliness of bad news is concentrated among observations where analysts forecast non-GAAP earnings, where unusual items are typically excluded. We conclude that the market for accounting information is more efficient for negative operating outcomes than for negative outcomes reflecting unusual items.     

Managerial risk-taking incentives and non-GAAP earnings disclosures

We investigate the association between risk-taking incentives provided by stock-based compensation arrangements and non-GAAP financial disclosures. Controlling for compensation to stock price sensitivity, we find that managers with higher compensation to stock volatility sensitivity (vega) are more likely to be associated with voluntary non-GAAP earnings information disclosures. In addition, higher-vega managers are found to be associated with more frequent and less opportunistic non-GAAP earnings information disclosures. Robust to alternative specifications and estimations, our findings suggest that compensation arrangements can encourage managers to make more, higher-quality voluntary non-GAAP disclosures.     

Analyst reputation and management earnings forecasts

Prior studies show that analysts with high reputation are influential in the market. This paper examines whether managers consider analyst reputation in shaping their voluntary disclosure strategy. Using Institutional Investor magazine’s All-American (AA) rankings as a proxy for analyst reputation, we find that the coverage of AA analysts is positively associated with the likelihood of quarterly management earnings forecasts (MEFs). We also find that AA analysts’ forecast optimism is more positively associated with the likelihood of MEFs than non-AA analysts’ forecast optimism when the firm is covered by AA analysts. Analyses based on AA analyst coverage changes and AA status changes confirm the relation between analyst reputation and MEFs. We further find that analyst reputation influences other MEF properties, such as forecast news, bias, and revisions, and that our results are robust to alternative measures of analyst reputation. Further analyses show that market reactions at quarterly earnings announcements are more positive (negative) when firms meet/beat (miss) AA analysts’ forecasts than when firms meet/beat (miss) non-AA analysts’ forecasts. Collectively, our findings suggest that managers strategically provide voluntary forecasts by taking into account the reputation of individual analysts following their firms.     

Non-GAAP earnings disclosures around regulation G – The case of “implicit non-GAAP reporting”

We identify a phenomenon related to non-GAAP earnings disclosure and examine its prevalence around Regulation G (RegG). Specifically, we analyze to what extent firms only disclose adjustments to GAAP earnings instead of entire adjusted earnings figures thereby not providing the ideal non-GAAP to GAAP reconciliation promoted by RegG. We refer to this reporting behavior as “implicit non-GAAP reporting” and ask three different questions: How is “implicit non-GAAP reporting” related with the adoption of RegG? What type of firm reports implicit non-GAAP measures? What are the motives for “implicit non-GAAP reporting” post-RegG? Our analyses yield three key findings. First, the frequency of “implicit non-GAAP reporting” spikes after the regulatory intervention but to a lesser degree also existed before. Second, during the post-RegG time period, the prevalence of “implicit non-GAAP reporting” is much higher among firms who only started to report non-GAAP earnings after RegG was enacted (starters) than among those, which continued to disclose non-GAAP earnings across the regulatory intervention (continuers). Third, we show that only for starters, “implicit non-GAAP reporting” is associated with motives of beating analyst earnings forecasts as well as experiencing GAAP losses. Our study provides important insights for regulators, firms and academics into "implicit non-GAAP reporting" by examining properties and determinants of implicit vs. explicit non-GAAP earnings for different types of firms around RegG.     

A discussion of “Do managers use earnings guidance to influence street earnings exclusions?”

It is well known that both managers and analysts frequently define earnings by excluding various amounts from GAAP earnings. Christensen et al. (Rev Account Stud, 2011) make a prediction of causality whereby managers actively influence how analysts define earnings. They argue that the mechanism through which managers accomplish this is guidance of analysts’ earnings forecasts within a fiscal period. Using a large sample of firms actively followed by analysts, the authors examine whether the existence of earnings guidance is associated with higher levels of total exclusions in analysts’ definition of earnings. The study provides suggestive evidence that managers actively influence analysts’ definition of earnings that they forecast. However, the indirect nature of the research design calls for additional work to specifically link directed guidance of GAAP earnings exclusions to amounts actually excluded by analysts.     

Corporate managerial ability,earnings smoothing,and acquisitions

This paper examines whether high-ability managers’ earnings smoothing is motivated by the need to mitigate the adverse effects of heightened information asymmetry triggered by mergers and acquisitions (M&As) on managers’ reputation capital (job loss) and firm value. We document that acquirers led by high-ability managers engage in more pre-acquisition earnings smoothing and experience more significant announcement abnormal returns and operating performance in post-M&A periods than their low-ability counterparts. This result is consistent with the theory of managerial response to asymmetric information, amplified by M&As, where high-ability managers use earnings smoothing as a signaling device to ensure that the market quickly discovers their superior abilities, to increase acquirers’ future growth prospects and avoid the adverse effects of information asymmetry on managers’ job security and career prospects in a competitive executive labor market.     

Analyst coverage and earnings management

What is the role of information intermediaries in corporate governance? This paper examines equity analysts’ influence on managers’ earnings management decisions. Do analysts serve as external monitors to managers, or do they put excessive pressure on managers? Using multiple measures of earnings management, I find that firms followed by more analysts manage their earnings less. To address the potential endogeneity problem of analyst coverage, I use two instrumental variables based on change in broker size and on firm's inclusion in the Standard & Poor's 500 index, and I find that the results are robust. Finally, given the number of covering analysts, analysts from top brokers and more experienced analysts have stronger effects against earnings management.     

Local political corruption and Firm's non-GAAP reporting

We examine whether local political corruption affects managers' discretionary disclosures of non-GAAP earnings. Using United States Department of Justice data on the number of corruption convictions of government officials, we find that firms headquartered in more corrupt districts (1) are less likely to report non-GAAP earnings, (2) have less aggressive non-GAAP earnings disclosures, and (3) experience a significant decline in the exclusion magnitudes of non-GAAP earnings. These results are more pronounced for firms with concentrated operations in their headquarter states and are robust to controlling for demographic characteristics, employing alternative corruption and non-GAAP measures, using the instrumental variable approach, and conducting a difference-in-difference analysis based on firms' relocation. Finally, we show that as local political corruption increases, managers exclude lower levels of both recurring and non-recurring items when calculating non-GAAP earnings. Overall, the results suggest that managing non-GAAP reporting is one channel through which firms could deter rent-seeking by corrupt officials.     

Sources of earnings variability and their effect on earnings forecasts

Previous research shows that analysts’ forecasts of earnings do not fully incorporate information contained in reported earnings variability. This study investigates whether the inefficient forecast is because of a failure to incorporate observable information on two components of earnings variability: variability in operating performance and income smoothing. Our results show that analysts’ forecasts fully incorporate information contained in earnings variability for firms with high income smoothing and for firms with low operating variability. A smaller serial correlation of forecast errors is observed for firms with low operating variability, which suggests that analysts recognize the permanence in earnings for such firms.     

When does the tone of earnings press releases matter?

The tone of a firm's financial disclosure is increasingly used as a variable in panel data regressions to predict future performance and explain investors' reaction at earnings announcement. We investigate when tone is informative, and argue that the informativeness of tone increases with the information asymmetry between firms and investors. Using a sample of over 50,000 earnings press releases of about 1800 U.S. public firms between 2004 and 2015, we find that firm growth, size, age, complexity and forecast inaccuracy are key drivers of tone informativeness. The effect is economically significant, since, compared to the reference case of a transparent firm, we find that the slope coefficient of tone doubles or even quadruples in panel data regressions when the firm operates in an environment with high information asymmetry.     

On-market share buybacks, exercisable share options and earnings management

Chan et al. (2006b ) suggest that managers might announce a share buyback to manipulate investors’ perceptions and capitalize on the positive price reaction usually associated with the announcement. The incentive to do so is greater when managers have exercisable options. Prior studies document that managers engage in upwards earnings management for opportunistic reasons related to option holdings (Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006). We examine the association between earnings management and exercisable option holdings for buyback firms to investigate if earnings management in the pre‐buyback period is greater for firms with equity incentives to increase share price. Our results, using 138 buybacks over the period 1996–2003, support our prediction. We find that buyback firms with both exercisable options that are in‐the‐money prior to the buyback announcement as well as options that are exercised in the buyback period have higher discretionary current accruals than buyback firms with no exercisable options, unexercised options or with out‐of‐the‐money options. Overall, our results are consistent with buyback firms with exercisable options using earnings management and buyback announcements to maximize option payoffs, and buyback firms without exercisable options signalling undervaluation.     

The impact of strategic interaction on earnings expectations associated with corporate product strategies

We examine how strategic interaction in an industry influences the earnings expectations of financial analysts with regard to new product strategies. We find that following announcement of new products, analysts revise earnings forecasts upward more for announcing firms competing in low-strategic interaction industries than for firms competing in high-strategic interaction industries. For value-enhancing (value-reducing) product strategies, earnings forecast revisions are more favorable for rivals competing under a high (low) degree of strategic interaction than for rivals competing under a low (high) degree of strategic interaction. Overall empirical evidence indicates that the nature of strategic competition within the industry is important in assessing the market expectations of earnings for new product announcers and their rivals.     

Inflation,earnings forecasts,and post-earnings announcement drift

We examine whether financial analysts fully incorporate expected inflation in their earnings forecasts for individual stocks. We find that expected inflation proxies, such as lagged inflation and inflation forecasts from the Michigan Survey of Consumers, predict the future earnings change of a portfolio long in high inflation exposure firms and short in low or negative inflation exposure firms, but analysts do not fully adjust for this relation. Analysts’ earnings forecast errors can be predicted using expected inflation proxies, and these systematic forecast errors are related to future stock returns. Overall, our evidence is consistent with the Chordia and Shivakumar (J Account Res 43(4):521–556, 2005) hypothesis that the post-earnings announcement drift is related to investor underestimation of the impact of expected inflation on future earnings change.     

Discussion of “Why do pro forma and street earnings not reflect changes in GAAP? Evidence from SFAS 123R”

Barth et al. (Review of Accounting Studies, this issue, 2012) identify the perfect natural laboratory setting in which they explore important questions related to non-GAAP earnings disclosures. By focusing on a single income statement line item, stock compensation expense, they can directly compare the behavior of managers and analysts in excluding that item from GAAP earnings. Their empirical analyses indicate that managers exclude the expense for opportunistic reasons. They also conclude that analysts are more likely to exclude the expense in order to increase the predictability of current-period earnings for future earnings. I believe their evidence provides a solid contribution to the literature on non-GAAP reporting. Moreover, it provides important evidence regarding the effectiveness of SFAS 123R??s requirement for the recognition of stock compensation expense in providing relevant earnings information to stakeholders. I provide a few comments regarding aspects of the paper that require clarification or that may influence the design of future studies. Overall, I believe this research provides an important contribution to the non-GAAP literature and that it will have a significant influence on the design of future studies.     

The effect of earnings surprises on information asymmetry

We examine the effect of earnings surprises on changes in information asymmetry. We hypothesize and find that asymmetry is lower (higher) in the quarter following positive (negative) earnings surprises compared to firms that meet the consensus analyst earnings forecast. The relations between earnings surprises and information asymmetry are stronger when the surprises are more likely to capture investors’ attention. Examining the source of these changes, we show that decreased information search activities is the most important factor for asymmetry declining after positive surprises; for negative surprises, decreased uninformed trading plays a dominant role increasing asymmetry.     

Analysts' Reactions to Earnings Preannouncement Strategies

Preannouncements of earnings tend to overstate negative or understate positive news, which decreases the chance of a negative surprise when actual earnings is announced. We conduct an experiment to investigate how experienced sell-side analysts' earnings forecasts are affected by preannouncements that either understate, accurately state, or overstate the magnitude of positive or negative total earnings news, holding total earnings news constant. We find that firms with negative (positive) total news receive the highest post-earnings announcement forecasts of future earnings when the earlier preannouncement overstates (understates) the magnitude of the news. These forecasts are consistent with the analysts' perceptions about the firms' future prospects, but not their perceptions of management. While analysts expect preannouncements to be lower than actual earnings, they do not adjust their forecasts for these beliefs. These insights into analysts' responses have implications both for managers and analysts.