银行业竞争与市场风险偏好选择——竞争政策的金融风险效应分析

本文探讨银行业竞争政策与金融风险的关系。基于空间竞争模型,文章探讨银行贷款市场的竞争博弈和企业家的风险选择行为,由此分析市场均衡的贷款利率以及企业家风险偏好水平。研究表明:强化竞争政策可以降低市场整体风险,竞争上升会降低单家银行垄断势力,促使均衡贷款利率下降,减弱企业家的风险偏好行为,使得银行经营风险下降、稳健性增强;从社会福利角度分析,虽然竞争可能损害银行业的经营利润,但会通过大幅提升存款者收益以及企业家盈利使得社会总福利提高。同时,竞争对市场风险的作用受到市场结构的影响,市场集中度增强将削弱竞争政策的实施效果。文章进一步讨论银行成本不对称对均衡的影响。总之,强化竞争政策与加强竞争性金融监管可以有效降低银行经营风险,提升社会福利,实现效率和稳定的双赢。     

存款保险制度实施中商业银行市场退出机制的国际经验、存在问题及建议

我国存款保险制度的实施为商业银行市场退出奠定了基础,完善的商业银行市场退出机制有利于问题银行风险出清,进而维护银行系统稳定和有序竞争.存款保险制度在处置银行风险中具有稳定预期、防止挤兑、保护利益相关者权益等正向作用,但也存在市场约束弱化、道德风险等问题.目前,绝大多数国家已经实施了存款保险制度,积累了不少可参考借鉴的经验.结合当前我国经济发展和金融市场化实际,需要进一步完善存款保险制度,更加注重审慎监管与存款保险早纠机制的有机结合,完善存款保险制度的市场化风险处置平台作用,健全商业银行风险退出处置法律框架.     

存款保险制度对我国城市商业银行负债管理的影响——以华融湘江银行为例

存款保险制度的建立和实施,将使商业银行存款业务竞争加剧,小额存款人"存款搬家"机率提高,一旦发生金融动荡或危机,中小银行易产生存款"挤兑",但同时,存款保险制度的推行,可改善长期以来存在的商业银行"存短贷长"的不合理错配,有利于改善银行资本的流动性,降低流动性风险.再者,存款保险制度强化了银行的自控和激励机制,提高了整个金融市场的稳健性等.     

我国建立存款保险制度的意义及路径选择

存款保险制度是市场经济条件下金融领域的一项重要基础性制度安排。在我国建立存款保险制度，对于减轻纳税人负担、提高银行经济效率、保护存款人利益和创造公平竞争环境等具有重要意义。我国存款保险制度的建立，可借鉴国际上成熟经验，实行强制参保、限额赔付、风险差别费率，并赋予存款保险机构监管和早期纠正职能。不过，存款保险制度本身也有其局限性和负面影响。     

存款保险制度与存款保险定价研究

存款保险制度是保护存款人利益 ,稳定金融体系和机制的事后补救措施。美国最早引入存款保险制度。其后 ,世界上大多数国家都已采用存款保险制度以避免存款者挤提风潮带来的危害。存款保险关键在于防止存款人的挤提行为 ,有效防止银行系统风险的扩大化 ,避免由存款人行为而导致银行业经营失败。而存款保险定价问题实质上是如何协调处理银行监管工具之间搭配的问题 ,因此 ,存款保险定价就应以采取易操作、低成本的固定险费的定价策略。具体到中国存款保险制度体系的建立 ,本文提出 :我国存款保险制度也应采用固定费率 ;另外 ,在初期可采取强制投保方式 ,待条件成熟后可向自愿投保过渡。     

论存款保险制度下的风险防范

存款保险制度是一种金融保障制度。建立存款保险制度有利于降低金融风险,防止挤兑发生及危机扩散。当个别银行出现流动性风险时,存款人因为有了相关的法律制度作保证,不再产生巨大的恐惧心理,能避免发生挤兑风潮。同时,建立存款保险制度有利于保护存款人的利益。在投保银行面临支付危机时提供救助,在投保银行破产倒闭时依法清偿存款人的存款,从而保护了存款人的利益。     

存款保险制度与存款保险定价研究

存款保险制度是保护存款人利益，稳定金融体系和机制的事后补救措施。美国最早引入存款保险制度。其后，世界上大多数国家都已采用存款保险制度以避免存款者挤提风潮带来的危害。存款保险关键在于防止存款人的挤提行为，有效防止银行系统风险的扩大化，避免由存款人行为而导致银行业经营失败。而存款保险定价问题实质上是如何协调处理银行监管工具之间搭配的问题，因此，存款保险定价就应以采取易操作、低成本的固定险费的定价策略。具体到中国存款保险制度体系的建立，本文提出：我国存款保险制度也应采用固定费率；另外，在初期可采取强制投保方式，待条件成熟后可向自愿投保过渡。     

存款保险制度对金融机构经营行为的影响

存款保险制度的推出,将改变金融机构的经营环境,改变存款人乃至金融消费者的心理预期,中小银行将得到更大的发展空间。同时,存款保险制度的建立有利于银行,扩大财务杠杆和存贷款利差,提升银行的经营效率,而保费支出也不会对银行成本形成压力,而个别金融机构也有可能经营失败退出市场。     

存款保险制度的有效性与银行道德风险分析

存款保险制度诱发银行道德的风险是不可回避的问题。文章即从存款保险制度即能保证存款人利益,维护银行体系的稳定,又不至于加大银行经营的道德风险的角度引出问题,并通过对国外存款保险制度与银行道德风险关系理论实践分析综述基础上,总结分析了我国显性存款保险制度即将推出前已经存在的及预期出现的银行道德风险,对建立我国有效的存款保险制度,降低银行道德风险提出相应建议。     

关于我国银行业建立存款保险制度的探讨

我国商业银行建立存款保险制度势在必行.实施存款保险制度,宜制定相关法律,正确确立存款保险制度的目标和组织形式,从严规定存款保险资格的标准,保险费率应遵循与商业保险费率相同的原则.存款保险制度的标的范围和保险限额,应分阶段确定.存款保险制度的资金来源宜多渠道筹集,资金运用应类似于一般商业保险公司.对问题存款保险机构的处理,应在保护存款人利益,进而保持市场稳定的前提下,防止风险进一步传导和扩散.同时,在我国建立存款保险制度还需要解决金融机构市场运行机制、金融机构经营状况、存款保险机构与中央银行的关系,以及实行差别费率所带来的实际困难等众多现实问题.     

Banks without parachutes: Competitive effects of government bail-out policies

We analyze the competitive effects of government bail-out policies in two models with different degrees of transparency in the banking sector. Our main result is that bail-outs lead to higher risk-taking among the protected bank’s competitors, independently of transparency. The reason is that the prospect of a bail-out induces the protected bank to expand, which intensifies competition in the deposit market, depresses other banks’ margins, and thereby increases risk-taking incentives. Contrary to conventional wisdom, protected banks may take lower risks when transparency in the banking sector is low and the deposit supply is sufficiently elastic.     

Internet finance development and banking market discipline: Evidence from China

Depositor discipline is the only viable and universal source of banking market discipline in China. This paper investigates whether the depositor discipline of banking works in the context of an emerging economy under financial repression and implicit government guarantee, such as the Chinese economy; how banking market discipline is affected by Internet finance development; and whether the impact of Internet finance development on market discipline changes across heterogeneous banks. The results suggest that, in general, measures of bank risk are negatively associated with the growth of deposit volumes. Internet finance development alters the sensitivity of deposit growth ratios to some bank risk measures. For non-state-owned banks, fewer measures of bank risk are significantly negatively associated with the growth of deposit volumes, and the attenuation impact of Internet finance development on market discipline for bank capitalization instead relatively increases. For large banks, market discipline works significantly, except in the case of the bank capitalization variable; moreover, these significant market disciplines are strengthened with the development of Internet finance.     

Competition and financial stability in European cooperative banks

Cooperative banks are a driving force for socially committed business at the local level, accounting for around one fifth of the European Union (EU) bank deposits and loans. Despite their importance, little is known about the relationship between bank stability and competition for these small credit institutions. Does competition affect the stability of cooperative banks? Does the financial stability of banks increase/decrease when competition is higher? We assess the dynamic relationship between competition and bank soundness (both in the short and long run) among European cooperative banks between 1998 and 2009. We obtain three main results. First, we provide evidence in line with the competition-stability view proposed by Boyd and De Nicolò (2005). Bank market power negatively “Granger-causes” banks' soundness, meaning that there is a positive relationship between competition and stability. Second, we find that this fundamental relationship does not change during the 2007–2009 financial crisis. Third, we show that increased homogeneity in the cooperative banking sector positively affects bank soundness. Our findings have important policy implications for designing and implementing regulations that enhance the overall stability of the financial system and in particular of the cooperative banking sector.     

Implicit deposit insurance and deposit guarantees: Characteristics of Australian bank risk premia

This paper examines the hypothesis that CD issue yields of Australian banks incorporate a premium that reflects bank risk. Our empirical analysis of Australian banks' CD premiums suggests the data is consistent with this hypothesis and hence supports the view that CD holders do not perceive their deposits as being risk-free. Nor do we find any statistically significant difference between the premiums paid by private banks with implicit deposit insurance vis-a-vis those paid by government-owned banks with explicit government guarantees.     

Deposit insurance and subsidized recapitalizations

The 2007–2009 financial crisis saw a vast expansion in deposit insurance guarantees around the world and yet our understanding of the design and consequences of deposit insurance schemes is in its infancy. We provide a new rationale for the provision of deposit insurance. In our model the banking sector exhibits both adverse selection and moral hazard, which implies that the social benefits of bank monitoring must for incentive reasons be shared between depositors and banks. Consequently, socially too few deposits are made in equilibrium. Deposit insurance – or, equivalently, bank recapitalization – corrects this market failure. We find that deposit insurance should be funded not by banks or depositors but out of general taxation. The optimal level of deposit insurance varies inversely with the quality of the banking system. Hence, when the soundness of the financial sector is uncertain, governments should consider supporting deposit insurance schemes and undertaking subsidized recapitalizations.     

Competition,Financial Intermediation,and Riskiness of Banks: Evidence from the Asia-Pacific Region

From a sample of commercial banks in the Asia-Pacific region over the 1994–2009 period, this study highlights that banks in less competitive markets exhibit lower loan growth and higher instability. Such instability is further followed by a decline in deposit growth, suggesting that Asian banks are also subject to indirect market discipline mechanisms through bank competition. This study therefore sheds light on the importance of enhancing bank competition to overcome bank risk and strengthen financial intermediation. Likewise, this study advocates the importance of strengthening market discipline to reduce bank riskiness regardless of the degree of competition in the banking industry.     

Bank runs, welfare and policy implications

This paper studies the welfare implications of various government policies that have been used to prevent bank runs. The benchmark model suggests that a bank run is a business-cycle-state-related phenomenon and it leads to the failure of the risk-sharing mechanism provided by the banking sector. Extensions of the model show that a number of policy instruments, including the suspension of convertibility of deposits, the taxation on short-term deposits, reserve requirement and blanket guarantee, turn out to be inefficient. Instead, I propose that a limited-coverage deposit insurance scheme or capital requirements can be welfare-improving.     

我国商业银行市场结构分析

本文采用季度数据分析我国银行业市场结构,发现自2013年民营银行获得市场准入资格以来,我国银行业的市场结构竞争程度并未发生明显变化,仍然处于较低水平。建议通过增量改革,继续降低我国银行业市场集中度,促进银行业的竞争;完善相关法律和监管制度,规范银行市场退出机制;建立和发展存款保险制度。     

Aggregate uncertainty, money and banking

This paper addresses the problem of monitoring the monitor in a model of money and banking with private information and aggregate uncertainty. There is no need to monitor a bank if it requires loans to be repaid partly with money. A market arises at the repayment stage and generates information-revealing prices that perfectly discipline the bank. This mechanism also applies when there exist multiple banks. With multiple banks, competition of private monies improves welfare. A prohibition on private money issue not only eliminates money competition but also triggers free-rider problems among banks, which is detrimental to welfare.     

竞争与效率——基于我国区域性商业银行的实证研究

针对文献中有关银行业竞争与效率之间关系的争论,本文采用我国区域性城市商业银行和农村商业银行的数据做了进一步的探索。文章采用随机前沿分析法计算银行效率水平,并利用银保监会发布的银行分支许可证信息构建区域竞争指数,从而考察区域银行业竞争程度对银行经营效率的影响。研究印证了竞争程度的增加可以提高区域性商业银行的效率,但竞争度对农村商业银行效率的影响更大。结果表明,我国区域性商业银行中的竞争与效率之间存在非线性关系,过度的竞争会对区域性商业银行的效率造成负面影响。通过对区域性银行跨区经营行为的进一步分析,发现竞争会影响区域性银行跨区经营决策,进而改变其经营效率。具体来讲,当区域性商业银行在银行竞争程度更高的地区设立异地分支机构时,银行效率提高的更多。本文结果对相关文献提供了重要的补充,并为我国区域银行业的发展规划提供了实证依据。