股权分置改革：分析、预期和完善

2005年5月开始的股权分置改革被视为中国证券市场最关键的基础制度改革.本文通过解读改革试点相关政策文件,分析试点上市公司股改方案和改革涉及的利益主体,包括国有资产管理部门、证券监督管理机构、上市公司非流通股东以及流通股东主张各自权利的政策条件和可利用的途径与工具,认为上市公司非流通股东具有极强的自身利益保护能力,而流通股股东自我保护能力最低.在改革过程中可能产生国有资产流失,短期看多和中长期看空的市场预期,同时形成新的股价操纵激励机制等.要使改革的代价最小化,必须从消除信息不对称、提高资金供给、活跃市场交易等方面完善相关制度安排.     

中国股市的未来是崩盘吗?

神宗迷雾:摘自SOHU股市论坛作为4家试点中的第一家,三一重工拿出了股权分置改革方案:流通股东从非流通股东手中每10股拿到3股股票和8元现金,非流通股东由此取得“上市流通权”,改革前后总股本(2．4亿股)及每股指标等均不变。读完“改革说明书”,一个强烈的感觉是,方案明显对大股东有利。判断股权分置改革方案对谁有利,只需用一个公式加以测试,即改革前非流通股的市值是多少,改革后又是多少,其中改革前用净资产计算,     

论股权分置改革中对价的公平性

股权分置改革增加的收益按持股比例在流通股东和非流通股东间进行分配，改革就是公平的。根据这一思路，公平对价率应使两类股东收益率相等，根据已完成股权分置改革上市公司的资料，对价率的不公平程度为80．6％，流通股东也没有因股改而从中受益，股权分置改革对流通股东是不公平的。改革方案的设计体现了市场经济的基本原则，方向是正确的。不公平的原因是对价谈判中双方力量的不平衡，买方处于完全垄断地位而卖方处于分散状态。     

后股权分置时期大股东行为研究

为了解决我国证券市场股权分置的沉疴,一场结构性改革于2005年春天启动.随着改革的进行,股权分置这一长期困扰我国股市的问题,将得到一次真正意义上的解决.伴随股权分置改革的完成,我国证券市场将进入后股权分置时期,这一崭新时期的到来,无论对非流通股东还是流通股股东都具有划时期的意义.后股权分置时期是一个全流通的时期,股价同样成为大股东所关心的指标,因而股权分置改革使得上市公司大股东的获利方式发生改变,其效用函数也随之改变,从而影响其最大化自身利益的行为模式.     

全流通过程中股票市场格局的变化趋势

从一个经典的动态不完全信息信号博弈模型的视角分析当前中国股票市场解禁的非流通股股东与现存普通流通股东的博弈行为,结果表明:当前针对大小非减持的信息披露机制有其积极意义;同时我国股票市场会发生一些重大变化.特别是价值发现功能和经济睛雨表的功能将逐步增强.     

机构投资者与会计信息质量之关系的实证研究

从会计信息披露的可靠性、相关性、及时性和客观性的角度入手,构建了一个会计信息质量的综合指数,采用多元回归分析的方法对我国机构投资者与上市公司会计信息质量之关系进行了实证研究,并分析了股权分置改革的实施对上述关系的影响.研究结果表明:股权分置改革前后,机构投资者的持股比例、持股的机构投资者数量、前十大流通股东中机构投资者的数量均与会计信息质量正相关;股权分置改革不会影响上述相关关系.     

资产注入对上市公司业绩和股价的影响分析

股权分置改革,迎来了中国资本市场的＂全流通＂时代。非流通股东与流通股东的利益趋于一致,控股股东具有提升上市公司业绩和股价的驱动力,政府亦以发展的眼光来鼓励上市公司通过资产注入的方式来提升业绩。本文从理论角度来解释资产注入（包含整体上市）对上市公司业绩和股价的影响,然后根据WIND资讯的整体上市板块、申万的资产注入板块进行样本分析,最后从理论和实证中得出结论：资产注入能够提升上市公司的业绩和股价,提升幅度大于市场平均水平。     

股权分置中涉及对价的账务处理探讨

当前是我国证券市场进行股权分置试点的阶段,在股权分置改革过程中,非流通股股东由于获得流通权需向流通股东支付相应的对价。已公布的试点公司支付对价方案可谓“五花八门”,支付的对价涉及股票、现金、权证等多种方式。财政部、国家税务总局于2005年6月13日下发了财税[2005]103号《关于股权分置试点改革中有关税收政策问题的通告》,在通告中明确提出:①股权分置改革过程中因非流通股东向流通股东支付对价而发生的股权转让,暂免征收印花税;②股权分置改革中非流通股股东通过对价方式向流通股股东支付的股份、现金等收入,暂免征收流通股股东…     

对股权分置改革征免证券交易印花税问题的探讨

股权分置改革是针对我国证券市场在建立初期,由于改革不配套和上市公司股权被人为地割裂为非流通股和流通股两部分形成的制度性缺陷,而进行的以解决非流通股股东流通权的取得问题的试点改革.为了真正实现同股同权,非流通股东必须支付一定的"对价"(如送股或送现金),作为取得流通权的成本.在此过程中涉及到的一些备受关注的税收问题,如非流通股股东支付现金时是否征收所得税、派送股票时是否征收印花税、企业公积金转增股本是否征税等.     

二元股权结构下股权再融资的价值效应——对流通股价值的研究

本文从实证的角度研究了二元股权结构下股权再融资对流通股权价值的影响。在非流通股放弃配股权的前提下，股权再融资会给流通股同时带来“股权成本效应”和“控制权收益效应”，即股权再融资会降低公司股权融资成本，提高公司价值，对流通股价值产生正面的影响。另一方面。非流通股东在再融资过程中付出的成本，控制权没有约束的条件下，它会通过掠夺流通股价值。扩大控制权收益来补偿这一成本，即所谓“控制权收益效应”。“股权成本效应”的强弱取决干流通股东和非流通股东融资成本的差异，而“控制权收益效应”的强弱取决于非流通股东付出的成本。根据这两个效应，我们可以解释不同公司股权再融资导致的流通股价格变化的差异。本文还对非流通股东不放弃配股权的情形进行了推论。     

新企业所得税法的公平与效率

公平原则和效率原则是税法的基本原则。我国企业所得税法的统一在诸多层面体现了税法的公平和效率原则。本文通过对公平和效率原则的分析,探讨了我国企业所得税制度的历史变迁,分析了其在实现公平和效率方面的得失以及价值选择,着重研究了企业所得税法在纳税人、效率、税收优惠以及反避税等方面对公平和效率原则的回应及时代意义。     

The effect of state antitakeover laws on the firm's bondholders

We examine how state antitakeover laws affect bondholders and the cost of debt, and report four findings. First, bonds issued by firms incorporated in takeover-friendly states have significantly higher at-issue yield spreads than bonds issued by firms in states with restrictive antitakeover laws. Second, firms in takeover friendly states have significantly higher leverage than their counterparts in restrictive law states. Third, bond issues are associated with negative average stock price reactions among firms in takeover-friendly states, but positive stock price reactions among firms in restrictive law states. Fourth, existing bond values increase, on average, upon the introduction of Business Combination antitakeover law. These results indicate that state antitakeover laws tend to decrease bond yields and increase bond values, which is the opposite of their effect on equity values. This, in turn, implies that state laws help mitigate the agency cost of debt by shielding bondholders from expropriation in takeovers. Overall, the empirical evidence suggests that the effect of antitakeover provisions on firm value must take into account the impacts of both bondholders and stockholders.     

On financial contracting: An analysis of bond covenants

With risky debt outstanding, stockholder actions aimed at maximizing the value of their equity claim can result in a reduction in the value of both the firm and its outstanding bonds. We examine ways in which debt contracts are written to control the conflict between bondholders and stockholders. We find that extensive direct restrictions on production/investment policy would be expensive to employ and are not observed. However, dividend and financing policy restrictions are written to give stockholders incentives to follow a firm-value-maximizing production/investment policy. Taking into account how contracts control the bondholder- stockholder conflict leads to a number of testable propositions about the specific form of the debt contract that a firm will choose.     

资产质量影响企业权益资本成本吗?

本文基于资产负债观的会计理念,应用2003-2013年我国A股上市公司为样本,探究了资产质量对企业权益资本成本的影响.研究发现,良好的资产质量有助于企业获取更低的权益资本成本.进一步研究发现,企业与投资者之间的信息不对称程度以及管理层和股东之间的代理问题是这二者关系的中介机制,改善资产质量能够降低企业的信息不对称程度、缓解代理问题,进而降低企业权益资本成本.此外,本文发现在会计准则改革之后,企业资产质量得到了明显改善,且其对权益资本成本的影响更为显著.     

中国上市公司股权分置改革的事件研究

市场对股改这一事件的反应显著,在股改日当天出现显著为正的累积超常收益,说明了股改给流通股股东带来了超常收益;资产重组和权证方式使得流通股东获得较多的超常收益,而广为流行的送股方式以及派现方式和缩股方式都没有给流通股东带来较多收益。     

Public vs. Private Equity*

Many corporate executives view private equity as a last resort, as expensive capital that should be tapped only by companies that don't have access to presumably cheaper public equity. The reality of private equity, however, is more complex, and potentially quite rewarding, for both shareholders and management. This paper surveys some of the academic work on the costs and benefits of public vs. private equity, contrasting the private equity investment process with its public counterpart and exploring how such a process may add value. The importance of public equity, particularly for very large companies and growth companies with large capital requirements, is indisputable. But as investment bankers and other practitioners have noted, under certain circumstances the public markets effectively become “closed” to some public companies. Moreover, the cost of equity raised in public markets involves much more than the direct costs of underwriters, attorneys, and accountants. Some indication of the indirect costs is provided by the market's typically negative reaction to announcements of seasoned equity offerings. Although the negative reaction averages about 3%, in some cases stock prices drop by as much as 10%, thereby diluting the value of existing stockholders. Most academics attribute this reaction to the informational disadvantage of public stockholders. Private equity is designed in large part to overcome this information problem by replacing the monitoring performed by the typical public company board with the oversight of better informed and more highly motivated owners. A growing body of academic research suggests that private equity investors add value to the companies they invest in, and that the best investors are consistently effective in so doing. What's more, even public companies that tap private equity seem to benefit. As the author found in his own research on PIPES (Private Investment in Public Equity Securities) transactions, even though such securities are issued to private equity investors at a discount to the prevailing market price, the average market response to the announcement of such transactions is a positive 10%. In short, the participation of private equity investors is perceived to create value, and some of this value is shared with the rest of the market.     

Competition and the medium of exchange in takeovers

The role of the medium of exchange in competition among biddersand its effect on returns to stockholders in corporate takeoversare investigated. Consistent with recent empirical evidence,our model shows that stockholders of both acquiring and targetfirms obtain higher returns when a takeover is financed withcash rather than equity, and that returns to target shareholdersincrease with competition. The model predicts that the factionof synergy captured by the target decreases with the level ofsynergy. Finally, it is shown that, as competition increases,the case component of the offer as well as the proportion ofcase offered increases.     

Poison Put Bonds: An Analysis of Their Economic Role

This article examines the effect of issuing debt with and without “poison put” covenants on outstanding debt and equity claims for the period 1988 to 1989. The analysis shows that “poison put” covenants affect stockholders negatively and outstanding bondholders positively, while debt issued without such covenants has no effect. The study also finds a negative relationship between stock and bond returns for firms issuing poison put debt. These results are consistent with a “mutual interest hypothesis,” which suggests that the issuance of poison put debt protects managers and, coincidentally, bondholders, at the expense of stockholders.     

The Impact of Warrants and Convertible Securities on the Systematic Risk of Common Equity

This paper addresses the relationship between the capital structure and the systematic risk of common equity for a firm whose capital structure includes convertible securities. Adding warrants to the capital structure reduces the systematic risk of equity, which is consistent with the fact that warrants dampen the volatility of equity by reducing the upside potential gains of existing stockholders. Expressions showing the impact of conversion features in debt and preferred stock on the systematic risk of equity are derived, and contrasted with the systematic risk effects of non-convertible debt or non-convertible preferred stock financing. Failure to incorporate conversion features may lead to serious errors in assessing the impact of financing alternatives on the risk of equity.     

Stock option compensation: impact of expense recognition on performance indicators of non-domestic companies listed in the U.S.

The IFRS 2, Share-based Payment, requires that companies recognize the fair value of employee stock options as an expense. To ascertain the impact recognition will have on companies domiciled in countries subject to accounting standards issued by the IASB’s liaison standard setting partners, this research examines the pro forma stock option disclosures provided in Form 20-F by Australian, British, Canadian, French, German, Japanese, and Irish companies.The findings indicate the average impact of expense recognition on diluted EPS will be approximately 40% and will be material at a 5% level for the majority of the companies. The impact varies significantly by country. On average the annual expense recognized will be approximately 15% of beginning stockholders equity. For the majority of the companies, the charge will represent less than 1% of beginning equity. Again the impact varies significantly by country.The findings indicate that absent requirements that stock compensation expense be recognized, a material upward bias will be reflected in performance indicators of many non-U.S. companies and cross-border comparability will be impaired. Since our analysis is based solely on data for the year 2000 for companies domiciled in seven countries, future research will be needed to ascertain the impact of expense recognition on a broader range of companies reporting under IFRS 2.