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1.
强国令 《上海金融》2012,(4):39-44,117
本文从股权分置改革的制度背景来考察国内上市公司管理层股权激励效应及其内在机理。研究结果表明,股权分置改革后,管理层股权激励显著提高了公司绩效,但在不同产权性质公司中激励效果不同:非国有控股公司表现为利益趋同效应,股权激励降低了代理成本,改善了公司绩效;而国有控股公司表现为利益壕沟效应,股权激励对代理成本和公司绩效没有显著影响。进一步研究发现,国有控股公司内部人控制、管理层权力过大是股权激励效应弱化的主要原因。  相似文献   

2.
上市公司管理层股权激励效应研究   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
侯瑜 《现代会计》2010,(1):46-49
在股权分置改革后研究管理层股权激励问题具有重大的现实意义。以往在股权分置格局下,公司的股权结构是影响公司治理的主要因素:随着股权分置改革的顺利进行,管理层股权激励在公司治理研究中的地位将日益凸现。实施管理层股权激励,在公司的所有者和公司的管理层之间建立利益共享、责任共担的利益分配机制,通过利益关系来完善公司的激励约束机制,有利于完善公司法人治理;  相似文献   

3.
针对股权分置改革这一我国资本市场影响深远的事件,基于经济后果的视角,本文利用2001~2010年上市公司数据,考察了股权分置改革前后公司股权层级的变化及对经营绩效的影响。论文研究发现,股权分置改革后随着控股股东与其他小股东间代理冲突的减轻,公司股权层级显著减少。进一步的分析显示,由于代理成本的下降及对管理层监督的加强,股权分置改革后公司业绩因股权层级的降低而上升。最后,我们的考察表明,股权分置改革对公司股权层级及经营绩效的影响在非国有公司中更显著。  相似文献   

4.
股权分置改革是中国2005年启动的资本市场重大制度变迁.本文选择12个竞争性行业的上市公司为研究样本,为剔除宏观经济周期对业绩影响,以2006年6月30目前完成股权分置改革的270家和当时未完成股权分置改革的125家公司为对比样本,运用净资产收益率、营业利润资产收益率指标分别进行横向对比与纵向比较,从上市公司绩效视角对股改的效率进行统计与计量研究.研究结果表明:第一,竞争性行业中上市公司股权分置改革呈现"靓女先嫁"特征,迄今为止股权分置改革尚没有凸现直接的公司绩效差异;二是与股权分置改革相伴生,国有上市公司的绩效显著提升,绩效的所有制差异已基本消失;此外,上市公司与行业总体的绩效差距在逐渐变小.由此可见,股权分置改革正在从总体上提升上市公司质量,推进股票市场实现资源配置的"帕累托改进".尤其对于国有上市公司成效显著,体现了股权分置改革的所有制效应.  相似文献   

5.
股权分置改革的盈余质量效应   总被引:12,自引:3,他引:9  
股权分置改革后,股价直接决定了股东的财富,持有大量非流通股的控股股东有动机操纵盈余以最大化自身的利益。国有股权转让的限制,导致国有控股股东盈余操纵动机弱于其他股东。本文研究了股权分置改革对国有控股公司和非国有控股公司盈余质量的不同影响。研究结果表明,股权分置改革后,非国有上市公司向上盈余管理程度显著提高,盈余持续性显著降低;而国有上市公司的盈余管理程度和盈余持续性都没有显著变化。本文检验了股权分置改革的成效,研究结论可为投资者的投资行为提供决策支持。  相似文献   

6.
本文以2002—2009年我国上市公司为研究对象,探讨了股权分置改革前后我国企业管理层股权激励对研发投资的影响,并在此基础上检验了管理层股权激励的内生性。研究发现,高管股权激励存在内生性,在控制了内生性之后,股改前股权激励与研发投资之间存在倒U形曲线关系;股改后股权激励对研发投资具有显著的正向影响。本文结果表明应该将研发投资作为股权激励方案的激励条件之一;此外,合理的安排股东与管理层之间的股权配置比例是保证企业有效进行研发投资、提升企业自主创新能力的必要手段。本文的结论深化了我们对股权激励内生性的理解,并为我国企业更好地实施管理层股权激励和企业自主创新战略提供了理论支持和实证证据。  相似文献   

7.
以中国上市公司2006~2012年公告的股权激励计划为研究对象,运用主成分分析法合成管理层权力的综合变量,研究管理层权力对股权激励契约设计的影响,结果发现:管理层权力越大,股权激励强度越高,激励契约中设定较长有效期的概率越低;相比非国有公司,国有公司的管理层权力对股权激励契约设计的影响力显著更强。  相似文献   

8.
股权分置下公司治理存在着"一股独大",缺乏共同的利益基础,组织机构不健全,缺乏有效外部治理等问题.随着股权分置改革的进行,将从制度上促进我国金融市场的全方位改革,对我国上市公司的治理结构产生深远的影响,这主要体现在股权结构的合理化,管理层激励机制的逐步完善,职业经理人市场的形成等.  相似文献   

9.
股权分置下公司治理存在着“一股独大“,缺乏共同的利益基础,组织机构不健全,缺乏有效外部治理等问题。随着股权分置改革的进行,将从制度上促进我国金融市场的全方位改革,对我国上市公司的治理结构产生深远的影响,这主要体现在股权结构的合理化,管理层激励机制的逐步完善,职业经理人市场的形成等。  相似文献   

10.
股权分置改革是我国资本市场的一次根本性改革,它使以往不能上市流通的股票获得可流通性,重建公司治理的共同利益基础,更好地实现国有资本的保值增值以及包括中小投资者在内的各方利益的共赢。本文通过对2006~2008年期间进行股权分置改革的部分上市公司进行统计,试图分析股权分置改革的市场效应以及次贷危机对改革的影响。得出如下结论:(1)股权分置改革的市场效果是积极的,能带给投资者显著的超额收益;(2)股改对价支付率和股东对方案的支持率与上市公司股票的市场效应呈显著正相关;(3)次贷危机严重影响了股权分置改革的市场效应。  相似文献   

11.
This paper investigates the relationship among a firm's managerial incentive scheme, the informativeness of its stock price, and its investment policy. It shows that the shareholders' concerns about the effectiveness of stock-based compensation can lead to overinvestment. However, unlike other explanations in the literature, our results are neither caused by suboptimal incentive contracts nor do they rely on the assumption that managers are “empire builders.” Rather, overinvestment serves to induce information production by outside investors. By accepting positive and negative NPV projects, a firm effectively increases the market's uncertainty about its cash flow, thereby giving traders more incentives to become informed.  相似文献   

12.
高管薪酬:激励还是自利?——来自中国上市公司的证据   总被引:13,自引:0,他引:13  
近年来中国上市公司的高管薪酬增长迅速并引起社会的广泛关注。本文收集了2004-2008年中国上市公司前三名高管的薪酬水平,考察高管薪酬与公司绩效、高管控制权、政府管制及代理成本之间的关系。研究发现:(1)高管薪酬仅与ROA显著正相关,但与资产获现率(经营净现金/总资产)及股票收益率没有显著的正相关关系。(2)高管的薪酬水平随着其控制权的增加而显著提高。(3)对比国有公司,非国有公司的高管更容易利用其控制权来提高自身的薪酬水平。(4)高管高薪并未有效降低公司的代理成本,反而提高了代理成本。本文的研究结果证实了我国上市公司的高管在其薪酬制定中存在明显的自利行为,且这种自利行为降低或者消除了薪酬的激励作用。  相似文献   

13.
We examine the relationship between economic policy uncertainty (EPU) and stock price crash risk via the corporate investment in Chinese listed firms. Results show that higher EPU is associated with lower crash risk. Firms increase financial asset holdings and reduce overinvestment when EPU rises, leading to lower future crash risk. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) and firms with lower management incentives tend to reduce overinvestment, whereas non-SOEs tend to increase financial asset holdings. Thus, firms tend to be cautious in their investments when EPU is high, which reduces crash risk. Our study provides new insights into the validity of the Lucas critique in China.  相似文献   

14.
We examine the effect of government ownership and its associated institutional incentives on firms’ earnings quality using a sample of Chinese firms during the transitional economy between 1998 and 2005 when state-owned and non-state-owned firms were traded in the stock exchanges. We find that, in China, state-owned firms exhibit a lower earnings quality property than non-state-owned firms. Particularly, state-owned firms have more earnings smoothing, more frequently managed earnings toward target, less frequent timely recognition of losses, and less value relevance, relative to non-state-owned firms. We also find that state-owned firms have significantly higher discretionary current accruals than non-state-owned firms. We conclude that the Chinese government, through its controlling ownership of state-owned firms, creates incentives and regulatory backing for self-serving purposes that negatively influence these listed firms’ financial reporting.  相似文献   

15.
In this study we use estimates of the sensitivities of managers' portfolios to stock return volatility and stock price to directly test the relationship between managerial incentives to bear risk and two important corporate decisions. We find that as the sensitivity of managers' stock option portfolios to stock return volatility increases firms tend to choose higher debt ratios and make higher levels of R&D investment. These results are even stronger in a subsample of firms with relatively low outside monitoring. For these firms, managerial incentives to bear risk play a particularly pivotal role in determining leverage and R&D investment.  相似文献   

16.
We exploit the staggered initiation of merger and acquisition (M&A) laws across countries as a plausibly exogenous shock to the threat of takeover to examine whether the market for corporate control has a real effect on firm-level stock price crash risk. Using a difference-in-differences regression on a large sample of firms from 32 countries, we find that stock price crash risk significantly decreases following the passage of M&A laws. This effect is stronger for firms domiciled in countries with poorer investor protection and information environments and for firms with weaker firm-level governance. Further, financial reporting opacity and overinvestment significantly decrease in the post-M&A law periods. Our study suggests that an active takeover market has a disciplining effect on managerial bad news hoarding and leads to lower future crash risk.  相似文献   

17.
We examine the effect of managerial characteristics on investment in the stock market by listed firms in China. Our empirical findings suggest that higher levels of cash‐based compensation may increase both the propensity of investing in the stock market and the total amount of investment. On the other hand, managerial holdings discourage managers from investing in stock markets and also lead to a decrease in the amount of investment. This study sheds light on managerial risk‐taking incentives. Moreover, this study fills the gap in the literature by providing evidence for the determinants of listed firms’ stock market investment.  相似文献   

18.
I examine the relation between managerial incentives from holdings of company stock and options and stock option repricing. Because options provide incentives to increase both risk and stock price, firms must realize that as options go underwater, executives might face incentives to invest in risky, negative NPV projects. Repricing may alleviate such incentives. I examine repricing activity by firms in the US gaming industry and find that risk-taking incentives from options are positively related to the incidence of executive option repricing. The results support the hypothesis that repricing assists firms in alleviating excessive risk-taking incentives of senior management.  相似文献   

19.
Equity-based compensation affects managers’ risk-taking behavior, which in turn has an impact on shareholder wealth. In response to an exogenous increase in takeover protection in Delaware during the mid-1990s, managers lower firm risk by 6%. This risk reduction is concentrated among firms with low managerial equity-based incentives, in particular firms with low chief executive officer portfolio sensitivity to stock return volatility. Furthermore, the risk reduction is value-destroying. Finally, firms respond to the increased protection accorded by the regime shift by providing managers with greater incentives for risk-taking.  相似文献   

20.
Using manually collected data of Chinese listed firms during the period 2007–2018, we provide strong and robust evidence that institutional cross-ownership is negatively associated with firm-specific stock price crash risk. Building on China’s institutional settings, we document that the negative relation is more pronounced for firms located in provinces with higher political uncertainty, or state-owned enterprises. This paper also conducts several mechanisms analyses and has confirmed three potential influencing mechanisms, such as information advantage, governance improvement and anticompetitive incentives, in explaining the effect of institutional cross-ownership on stock price crash risk. Overall, this paper develops a new perspective to investigate the ways to alleviate stock price crash risk in emerging markets.  相似文献   

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