Estimating monetary policy effects when interest rates are close to zero

Using a nonlinear structural VAR approach, we estimate the effects of exogenous monetary policy shocks in the presence of a zero lower bound constraint on nominal interest rates and examine the impact of such a constraint on the effectiveness of counter-cyclical monetary policies based on the data from Japan. We find that when interest rates are at zero, the output effect of exogenous shocks to monetary policy is cut in half if the central bank continues to target the interest rate. The conditional impulse response functions allow us to isolate the effect of monetary policy shocks operating through the interest rate channel when other possible channels of monetary transmission are present.     

Credit crunch in a small open economy

We construct an open-economy DSGE model with a banking sector to analyze the impact of the recent credit crunch on a small open economy. In our model the banking sector operates under monopolistic competition, collects deposits and grants collateralized loans. Collateral effects amplify monetary policy actions, interest rate stickiness dampens the transmission of interest rates, and financial shocks generate non-negligible real and nominal effects. As an application we estimate the model for Poland-a typical small open economy. According to the results, financial shocks had a substantial, though not overwhelming, impact on the Polish economy during the 2008/09 crisis, lowering GDP by approximately 1.5 percent.     

Monetary Policy Expectations at the Zero Lower Bound

We show that conventional dynamic term structure models (DTSMs) estimated on recent U.S. data severely violate the zero lower bound (ZLB) on nominal interest rates and deliver poor forecasts of future short rates. In contrast, shadow‐rate DTSMs account for the ZLB by construction, capture the resulting distributional asymmetry of future short rates, and achieve good forecast performance. These models provide more accurate estimates of the most likely path for future monetary policy—including the timing of policy liftoff from the ZLB and the pace of subsequent policy tightening. We also demonstrate the benefits of including macroeconomic factors in a shadow‐rate DTSM when yields are constrained near the ZLB.     

Quasi-monetary and quasi-fiscal policy rules at the zero-lower bound

This paper assesses adjustments at the zero lower bound (ZLB) in an economy incorporating financial frictions and nominal price stickiness. We examine the dynamic paths of key variables under recurring real (productivity) and financial (net worth) shocks under three alternative policy scenarios: removal of the zero lower bound (to allow for negative rates), quantitative easing policies at the ZLB, and the use of endogenous tax-rates rules for consumption and labor income at the ZLB. The results show that the fiscal tax-rate rules (acting like a quasi-monetary policy with direct effects on consumption) can be as effective as quantitative easing (a quasi-fiscal policy with indirect effects on investment) in times of prolonged crises due to recurring negative shocks.     

House Prices and Government Spending Shocks

We show that dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models with housing and collateralized borrowing predict a fall in house prices following positive government spending shocks. By contrast, we show that house prices in the United States rise persistently after identified positive government spending shocks. We clarify that the incorrect house price response is due to a general property of DSGE models—approximately constant shadow value of housing—and that modifying preferences and production structure cannot help in obtaining the correct house price response. Properly accounting for the empirical evidence on government spending shocks and house prices using a DSGE model therefore remains a significant challenge.     

Discretionary monetary policy and the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates

Ignoring the existence of the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates one considerably understates the value of monetary commitment in New Keynesian models. A stochastic forward-looking model with an occasionally binding lower bound, calibrated to the U.S. economy, suggests that low values for the natural rate of interest lead to sizeable output losses and deflation under discretionary monetary policy. The fall in output and deflation are much larger than in the case with policy commitment and do not show up at all if the model abstracts from the existence of the lower bound. The welfare losses of discretionary policy increase even further when inflation is partly determined by lagged inflation in the Phillips curve. These results emerge because private sector expectations and the discretionary policy response to these expectations reinforce each other and cause the lower bound to be reached much earlier than under commitment.     

Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy with a Zero Bound on Nominal Interest Rates

I characterize optimal monetary and fiscal policy in a stochastic New Keynesian model when nominal interest rates may occasionally hit the zero lower bound. The benevolent policymaker controls the short‐term nominal interest rate and the level of government spending. Under discretionary policy, accounting for fiscal stabilization policy eliminates to a large extent the welfare losses associated with the presence of the zero bound. Under commitment, the gains associated with the use of the fiscal policy tool remain modest, even though fiscal stabilization policy is part of the optimal policy mix.     

The Quantitative Importance of News Shocks in Estimated DSGE Models

We estimate a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with several frictions and both unanticipated and news shocks, using quarterly U.S. data from 1954 to 2004 and Bayesian methods. We find that unanticipated shocks dominate news shocks in accounting for the unconditional variance of output, consumption, and investment growth, interest rate, and the relative price of investment. The unanticipated shock to the marginal efficiency of investment is the dominant shock, accounting for over 45% of the variance in output growth. News shocks account for less than 15% of the variance in output growth. Within the set of news shocks, nontechnology sources of news dominate technology news, with wage markup news shocks accounting for about 60% of the variance share of both hours and inflation. We find that in the estimated DSGE model (i) the presence of endogenous countercyclical price and wage markups due to nominal frictions substantially diminishes the importance of news shocks relative to a model without these frictions, and (ii) while there is little change in the estimated contributions of technology news when we restrict wealth effects on labor supply, the contributions of nontechnology news shocks are relatively more sensitive.     

Estimating DSGE models with zero interest rate policy

We propose estimating DSGE models in which the central bank fixes the policy rate for an extended period of time and apply our approach to estimate expected durations of the Federal Reserve’s zero interest rate policy since 2009. We find a large increase in expected duration in 2011 with the move to calendar-based guidance and a decrease in 2013 with the ‘Taper tantrum’. These changes are identified by the influence of expected duration on output, inflation and interest rates at longer maturities. The structural model measures the severity of the zero lower bound constraint and the effects of unconventional policy.     

Economic determinants of the nominal treasury yield curve

Macroeconomic shocks account for most of the variability of nominal Treasury yields, inducing parallel shifts in the level of the yield curve. We develop a new approach to identifying macroeconomic shocks that exploits model-based empirical shock measures. Technology shocks shift yields through their effect on expected inflation and the term premium. Shocks to preferences for current consumption affect yields through their impact on real rates and expected inflation. For both shocks, the systematic reaction of monetary policy is an important transmission pathway. We find little evidence that fiscal policy shocks are an important source of interest rate variability.     

The Credit Channel at the Zero Lower Bound through the Lens of Equity Prices

This study examines the impact of unconventional monetary policies on the stock market when the short‐term nominal interest rate is stuck at the zero lower bound (ZLB). Unconventional monetary policies appear to have significant effects on stock prices and the effects differ across stocks. In agreement with existing credit channel theories, I find that firms subject to financial constraints react more strongly to unconventional monetary policy shocks [especially large‐scale asset purchases (LSAPs)] than do less constrained firms. These results imply that the credit channel is as important as the interest rate channel in the transmission of unconventional monetary policies at the ZLB.     

What does a technology shock do? A VAR analysis with model-based sign restrictions

This paper estimates the effects of technology shocks in VAR models of the U.S., identified by imposing restrictions on the sign of impulse responses. These restrictions are consistent with the implications of a popular class of DSGE models, with both real and nominal frictions, and with sufficiently wide ranges for their parameters. This identification strategy thus substitutes theoretically motivated restrictions for the atheoretical assumptions on the time-series properties of the data that are key to long-run restrictions. Stochastic technology improvements persistently increase real wages, consumption, investment and output in the data; hours worked are very likely to increase, displaying a hump-shaped pattern. Contrary to most of the related VAR evidence, results are not sensitive to a number of specification assumptions, including those on the stationarity properties of variables.     

Oil shocks and the zero bound on nominal interest rates

Beginning in 2008, in many advanced economies, policy rates reached their zero lower bound (ZLB) and almost at the same time, oil prices started rising again. We analyze how the ZLB affects the propagation of oil shocks. As these shocks move inflation and output in opposite directions, their effects on economic activity are cushioned when monetary policy is constrained. The burst of inflation from an oil price increase lowers real interest rates at the ZLB and stimulates the interest-sensitive component of GDP, offsetting the usual contractionary effects. We show that the mitigation of the output decline from the zero lower bound depends on the source of the shock and on the persistence that alternative shocks induce in the price of oil.     

How much should inflation targeters care about the exchange rate?

A DSGE model is used to examine whether including the exchange rate in the central bank’s policy rule can improve economic performance. Smoothing the exchange rate helps both financially-robust economies and financially-vulnerable emerging economies in handling risk premium shocks and, given a small weight placed on the exchange rate, the effects on inflation and output volatility are minimal with demand and cost-push shocks. Financially-vulnerable economies are especially likely to benefit from exchange rate smoothing due to perverse movements of the exchange rate they experience when hit by demand shocks and being more prone to risk premium shocks.     

A New Keynesian Perspective on the Great Recession

With an estimated New Keynesian model, this paper compares the “Great Recession” of 2007–09 to its two immediate predecessors in 1990–91 and 2001. The model attributes all three downturns to a similar mix of aggregate demand and supply disturbances. The most recent series of adverse shocks lasted longer and became more severe, however, prolonging and deepening the Great Recession. In addition, the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate prevented monetary policy from stabilizing the U.S. economy as it had previously; counterfactual simulations suggest that without this constraint, output would have recovered sooner and more quickly in 2009.     

Countercyclical Bank Capital Requirement and Optimized Monetary Policy Rules

Using BoC-GEM-Fin, a large-scale dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with real, nominal, and financial frictions featuring a banking sector, we explore the macroeconomic implications of various types of countercyclical bank capital regulations. Results suggest that countercyclical capital requirements have a significant stabilizing effect on key macroeconomic variables, but mostly after financial shocks. Moreover, the bank capital regulatory policy and monetary policy interact, and this interaction is contingent on the type of shocks that drive the economic cycle. Finally, we analyze loss functions based on macroeconomic and financial variables to arrive at an optimal countercyclical regulatory policy in a class of simple implementable Taylor-type rules. Compared to bank capital regulatory policy, monetary policy is able to stabilize the economy more efficiently after real shocks. On the other hand, financial shocks require the regulator to be more aggressive in loosening/tightening capital requirements for banks, even as monetary policy works to counter the deviations of inflation from the target.     

Capital controls and optimal Chinese monetary policy

China׳s external policies, including capital controls, managed exchange rates, and sterilized interventions, constrain its monetary policy options for maintaining macroeconomic stability following external shocks. We study optimal monetary policy in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model that incorporates these “Chinese characteristics”. The model highlights a monetary policy tradeoff between domestic price stability and costly sterilization. The same DSGE framework allows us to evaluate the welfare implications of alternative liberalization policies. Capital account and exchange rate liberalization would have allowed the Chinese central bank to better stabilize the external shocks experienced during the global financial crisis.     

Macroeconomic Effects of Government Spending: The Great Recession was (Really) Different

We estimate the effect of government spending shocks on the U.S. economy with a time‐varying parameter vector autoregression. The recent Great Recession period appears to be characterized by uniquely large impulse responses of output to fiscal shocks. Moreover, the particularity of this period is underlined by highly unusual responses of several other variables. The pattern of fiscal shock responses neither completely fits the predictions of the New Keynesian model of an economy subject to the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates, nor does it suggest regular variation of fiscal policy effects depending on the state of the business cycle. Rather, the Great Recession period seems special in that government spending shocks had a strongly negative effect on the spread between corporate and government bond yields and a strongly positive effect on consumer confidence and private consumption spending.     

Inflation targeting: What inflation rate to target?

In an economy with nominal rigidities in both an intermediate good sector and a finished good sector, and thus with a natural distinction between CPI and PPI inflation rates, a benevolent central bank faces a tradeoff between stabilizing the two measures of inflation, a final output gap and, unique to our model, a real marginal cost gap in the intermediate sector, so that optimal monetary policy is second-best. We discuss how to implement the optimal policy with minimal information requirement and evaluate the robustness of these simple rules when the central bank may not know the exact sources of shocks or nominal rigidities. A main finding is that a simple hybrid rule under which the short-term interest rate responds to CPI inflation and PPI inflation results in a welfare level close to the optimum, whereas policy rules that ignore PPI inflation or PPI sector shocks can result in significant welfare losses.