Downward Nominal Wage Rigidities Bend the Phillips Curve

We introduce a model of monetary policy with downward nominal wage rigidities and show that both the slope and curvature of the Phillips curve depend on the level of inflation and the extent of downward nominal wage rigidities. This is true for the both the long‐run and the short‐run Phillips curve. Comparing simulation results from the model with data on U.S. wage patterns, we show that downward nominal wage rigidities likely have played a role in shaping the dynamics of unemployment and wage growth during the last three recessions and subsequent recoveries.     

Robustness and real consequences of nominal wage rigidity

Nominal wage rigidity has been shown to exist in periods of high inflation, while reduction in nominal pay has been hypothesized to occur in times of low inflation. Nominal wage rigidity would therefore become irrelevant because there is little need to cut nominal pay under high inflation, while the necessary cuts would occur under low inflation. We test this hypothesis by examining Swiss data in the 1990s, where wage inflation was low. Nominal wage rigidity proves robust in a low inflation environment, constituting a considerable obstacle to real wage adjustments. Real wages would indeed respond to unemployment without downward nominal rigidity. Moreover, wage sweep-ups caused by nominal rigidity correlate strongly to unemployment, suggesting downward nominal wage rigidity fuels unemployment.     

The Passthrough of Labor Costs to Price Inflation

We use a time‐varying parameter/stochastic volatility VAR framework to assess how the passthrough of labor costs to price inflation has evolved over time in U.S. data. We find little evidence that independent movements in labor costs have had a material effect on price inflation in recent years, even for compensation measures where some degree of passthrough to prices still appears to be present. Our results cast doubt on explanations of recent inflation behavior that appeal to such mechanisms as downward nominal wage rigidity or a differential contribution of long‐term and short‐term unemployed workers to wage and price pressures.     

Inflation Expectations and Risk Premiums in an Arbitrage‐Free Model of Nominal and Real Bond Yields

Differences between yields on comparable‐maturity U.S. Treasury nominal and real debt, the so‐called breakeven inflation (BEI) rates, are widely used indicators of inflation expectations. However, better measures of inflation expectations could be obtained by subtracting inflation risk premiums (IRP) from the BEI rates. We provide such decompositions using an affine arbitrage‐free model of the term structure that captures the pricing of both nominal and real Treasury securities. Our empirical results suggest that long‐term inflation expectations have been well anchored over the past few years, and IRP, although volatile, have been close to zero on average.     

Evaluating the economic significance of downward nominal wage rigidity

The existence of downward nominal wage rigidity has been abundantly documented, but what are its economic implications? This paper demonstrates that, even when wages are allocative, downward wage rigidity can be consistent with weak macroeconomic effects. Firms have an incentive to compress wage increases as well as wage cuts when downward wage rigidity binds. By neglecting compression of wage increases, previous literature may have overstated the costs of downward wage rigidity to firms. Using micro-data from the US and Great Britain, I find that the evidence for the compression of wage increases when downward wage rigidity binds. Accounting for this reduces the estimated increase in aggregate wage growth due to wage rigidity to be much closer to zero. These results suggest that downward wage rigidity may not provide a strong argument against the targeting of low inflation rates.     

Effective Use of Survey Information in Estimating the Evolution of Expected Inflation

The evolution of the term structure of expected U.S. inflation is modeled using survey data to provide timely information on structural change not contained in lagged inflation data. To capture shifts in subjective perceptions, the model is adaptive to long‐horizon survey expectations. However, even short‐horizon survey expectations inform shifting‐endpoint estimates that capture the lag between inflation and the perceived inflation target, which anchors inflation expectations. Results show movements of the perceived target are an important source of inflation persistence and suggest historical U.S. monetary policy was not fully credible for much of the postwar sample.     

Unstable Inflation Targets

This paper studies long‐run inflation targets and stability in an imperfect information environment. When central banks set an inflation target that is not fully communicated, agents draw inferences about inflation from recent data and remain alert to structural change by forming expectations from a forecasting model that is estimated via discounted least squares. Inflation targets can lead agents' beliefs to depart from rational expectations through two channels. First, implementing a higher inflation target can lead to overshooting. Second, there can be nearly self‐fulfilling inflation, disinflation, or deflation that arises as an endogenous response to shocks. Policy implications for implementing a higher target without deanchoring expectations are discussed.     

Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity and Inflation Dynamics during and after the Great Recession

In this paper, I develop a New Keynesian model that embeds heterogeneous workers with asymmetric wage adjustment costs to address two inflation puzzles: missing deflation during the Great Recession and the subsequent missing inflation. When the wage adjustment costs are estimated according to U.S. microwage data, downward nominal wage rigidity emerges, which flattens the observed price Phillips curve during and after recessions. Endogenous evolution of the cross-sectional wage distribution generates nonlinear dynamics including the sign, size, and state dependence. These nonlinearities enable the model to address the inflation puzzles as well as matching microevidence on wage adjustments.     

Heterogeneous Inflation Expectations and Learning

Using the panel component of the Michigan Survey of Consumers, we estimate a learning model of inflation expectations, allowing for heterogeneous use of private information and lifetime inflation experience. Life experience inflation has a significant impact on individual expectations, but only for 1‐year‐ahead inflation. Public information is substantially more relevant for longer horizon expectations. Even controlling for life experience inflation and public information, idiosyncratic information explains a nontrivial proportion of the inflation forecasts of agents. Women, ethnic minorities, and less educated agents have a higher degree of heterogeneity in their idiosyncratic information, and give less importance to recent movements in inflation.     

Measuring Inflation Expectations Uncertainty Using High‐Frequency Data

Inflation expectations play a key role in determining future economic outcomes. The associated uncertainty provides a direct gauge of how well‐anchored the inflation expectations are. We construct a model‐based measure of inflation expectations uncertainty by augmenting a standard unobserved components model of inflation with information from noisy and possibly biased measures of inflation expectations obtained from financial markets. This new model‐based measure of inflation expectations uncertainty is more accurately estimated and can provide valuable information for policymakers. Using U.S. data, we find significant changes in inflation expectations uncertainty during the Great Recession.     

A New Model of Inflation,Trend Inflation,and Long‐Run Inflation Expectations

This paper develops a bivariate model of inflation and a survey‐based long‐run forecast of inflation that allows for the estimation of the link between trend inflation and the long‐run forecast. Thus, our model allows for the possibilities that long‐run forecasts taken from surveys can be equated with trend inflation, that the two are completely unrelated, or anything in between. Using a variety of inflation measures and survey‐based forecasts for several countries, we find that long‐run forecasts can provide substantial help in refining estimates and fitting and forecasting inflation. It is less helpful to simply equate trend inflation with the long‐run forecasts.     

The Role of Real Wage Rigidity and Labor Market Frictions for Inflation Persistence

We analyze the transmission mechanism of wages to inflation within a New Keynesian business cycle model with wage rigidities and labor market frictions. Our main focus is on the channel of real wage rigidities on inflation persistence for which we find the specification of the wage bargaining process to be of crucial importance. Under the standard efficient Nash bargaining, the feedback of wage rigidities on inflation is ambiguous and depends on other labor market variables. However, under the alternative right‐to‐manage bargaining we find that more rigid wages translate directly into more persistent movements of aggregate inflation.     

Measuring Inflation Anchoring and Uncertainty: A U.S. and Euro Area Comparison

We use several U.S. and euro‐area surveys of professional forecasters to estimate a dynamic factor model of inflation featuring time‐varying uncertainty. We obtain survey‐consistent distributions of future inflation at any horizon, both in the U.S. and the euro area. Equipped with this model, we propose a novel measure of the anchoring of inflation expectations that accounts for inflation uncertainty. Our results suggest that following the Great Recession, inflation anchoring improved in the United States, while mild de‐anchoring occurred in the euro area. As of our sample end, both areas appear to be almost equally anchored.     

How Robust Are Popular Models of Nominal Frictions?

We consider alternative combinations of nominal price and wage frictions in dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models fit to U.S. data. Since inflation was unanchored in the 1970s, we divide the data into early, middle, and late samples (1955–68, 1969–79, and 1983–2007, respectively). We find that prices are reoptimized more frequently and exhibit greater indexation to past inflation in the middle sample than in the other two samples, while wages are reoptimized with increasing frequency and display less evidence of indexation over time. Differences in price and wage setting across samples have important implications for the economy's response to key shocks.     

Inflation and Welfare in Long‐Run Equilibrium with Firm Dynamics

We analyze the welfare cost of inflation in a model with a cash‐in‐advance constraint and an endogenous distribution of establishments' productivities. Inflation distorts aggregate productivity through firm entry dynamics. The model is calibrated to the U.S. economy and the long‐run equilibrium properties are compared at low and high inflation. When the period over which the cash‐in‐advance constraint is binding is one quarter, an annual inflation rate of 10% leads to a decrease in average productivity of roughly 0.5% compared to the optimum. This decrease is not innocuous: it leads to a doubling of the welfare cost of inflation.     

How much inflation is necessary to grease the wheels?

Tobin's proposition that inflation “greases” the wheels of the labor market is studied using a simple dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with asymmetric wage adjustment costs. The simulated method of moments is used to estimate the nonlinear model based on its second-order approximation. Optimal inflation is determined by a benevolent government that maximizes the households’ welfare. Econometric results indicate that nominal wages are downwardly rigid and that the optimal level of grease inflation for the U.S. economy is about 0.35% per year, with a 95% confidence interval ranging from 0.04% to 0.87%.     

The Most Beautiful Variations on Fair Wages and the Phillips Curve

This paper explores the connection between inflation and unemployment in two different models with fair wages in both the short and the long runs. Under customary assumptions regarding the sign of the parameters of the effort function, more inflation lowers the unemployment rate, albeit to a declining extent. This is because firms respond to inflation—which spurs effort by decreasing the reference wage—by increasing employment, thus maintaining the effort level constant as implied by the Solow condition. A stronger short‐run effect of inflation on unemployment is produced under varying as opposed to fixed capital, given that in the former case the boom produced by a monetary expansion is reinforced by an increase in investment. Therefore, I provide a new theoretical foundation for recent empirical contributions that find negative long‐ and short‐run effects of inflation on unemployment.     

Monetary Policy,Trend Inflation,and Unemployment Volatility

The literature has long agreed that the DMP model (after Diamond 1982, Mortensen 1982, Pissarides 1985) with search and matching frictions in the labor market can deliver large volatilities in labor market quantities, consistent with empirical data, only if there is at least some wage stickiness. I show, however, that the model can deliver nontrivial volatilities without wage stickiness, as long as it has price dispersion and nonzero long‐run inflation rates. I find that by keeping inflation at a positive rate, monetary policy may be accountable for the large standard deviations observed on labor market variables. In addition, the Shimer (2005) puzzle disappears under monetary policy shocks.     

Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity Meets the Zero Lower Bound

We add downward nominal wage rigidity to a standard New Keynesian model where the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates is allowed to bind. Wage rigidity reduces the frequency of zero bound episodes but also mitigates the severity of corresponding recessions. As a result, previous studies abstracting from the presence of wage rigidity may have overemphasized the need for increasing the inflation target to offset the costs associated with hitting the zero bound. Moreover, our findings add to the recent debate on the presumed benefits of wage flexibility that has arisen in the aftermath of the Great Recession.     

How strong is the macroeconomic case for downward real wage rigidity?

We explore the existence of downward real wage rigidity (DRWR) at the industry level, based on data from 19 OECD countries for the period 1973-1999. The results show that DRWR compresses the distributions of industry wage changes overall, as well as for specific geographical regions and time periods, but there are not many real wage cuts that are prevented. More important, however, DRWR attenuates larger real wage cuts, thus leading to higher real wages. There is stronger evidence for downward nominal wage rigidity than for DRWR. Real wage cuts are less prevalent in countries with strict employment protection legislation and high union density.