Capital Structure and Debt Priority

We study a defaultable firm's debt priority structure in a simple structural model where the firm issues senior and junior bonds and is subject to both liquidity and solvency risks. Assuming that the absolute priority rule prevails and that liquidation is immediate upon default, we determine the firm's interior optimal priority structure along with its optimal capital structure. We also obtain closed‐form solutions for the market values of the firm's debt and equity. We find that the magnitude of the spread differential between junior and senior bond yields is positively, but not linearly related to the total debt level and the riskiness of assets. Finally, we provide an in‐depth analysis of probabilities of default and the term structure of credit spreads.     

Capital Structure Swaps and Shareholder Wealth

We show how capital structure swaps can increase the wealth of a firm's long‐term shareholders when a firm's debt or equity is misvalued. We review the conventional rule that a firm should issue equity and use the proceeds to retire outstanding debt (an equity‐for‐debt swap) when equity is overvalued, or repurchase equity with proceeds of new debt (a debt‐for‐equity swap) when equity is undervalued. We also analyse the more complex case where a firm's debt and equity are both undervalued, showing the optimal swap may be to issue undervalued equity, contrary to the conventional rule.     

Taxes, Leverage, and the Cost of Equity Capital

We examine the associations among leverage, corporate and investor level taxes, and the firm's implied cost of equity capital. Expanding on Modigliani and Miller [1958, 1963] , the cost of equity capital can be expressed as a function of leverage and corporate and investor level taxes. Based on this expression, we predict that the cost of equity is increasing in leverage, and that corporate taxes mitigate this leverage‐related risk premium, while the personal tax disadvantage of debt increases this premium. We empirically test these predictions using implied cost of equity estimates and proxies for the firm's corporate tax rate and the personal tax disadvantage of debt. Our results suggest that the equity risk premium associated with leverage is decreasing in the corporate tax benefit from debt. We find some evidence that the equity risk premium from leverage is increasing in the personal tax penalty associated with debt.     

Optimal Security Design and Dynamic Capital Structure in a Continuous-Time Agency Model

We derive the optimal dynamic contract in a continuous‐time principal‐agent setting, and implement it with a capital structure (credit line, long‐term debt, and equity) over which the agent controls the payout policy. While the project's volatility and liquidation cost have little impact on the firm's total debt capacity, they increase the use of credit versus debt. Leverage is nonstationary, and declines with past profitability. The firm may hold a compensating cash balance while borrowing (at a higher rate) through the credit line. Surprisingly, the usual conflicts between debt and equity (asset substitution, strategic default) need not arise.     

Required return on equity when capital structure is dynamic

We link the firm's required return on equity to its target debt ratio. We find that a firm's expected return on equity is increasing in the product of the distance between its debt ratio and its target debt ratio, its speed of adjustment, and the spread of the tax benefits of its debt over its bankruptcy costs of debt. Our empirical tests validate the testable implications of our model.     

FINANCIAL STRUCTURE AND FINANCIAL STRATEGY

Even if the value of the firm is unaffected by its capital structure, managers may have reasons to choose a particular structure. The prices of the firm's securities reflect the “market's” assessment of the value and riskiness of the firm. Should managers disagree with the market's assessment of the firm's risk or value, they will also disagree about the relative returns on the firm's securities. Concern about shareholder welfare may, therefore, lead them to prefer a specific capital structure. If managers believe the market has underestimated the firm's value, they will prefer debt financing; if the market has overestimated risk, they will prefer equity; and, if managers disagree about both risk and value, they may prefer to finance using both debt and equity.     

Value chain capability,value strategies and firm default risk

Firm stakeholders are paying more attention to the firm risks rather than merely focusing on returns. Among those risks, a firm's ability to repay its debt increasingly becomes a yardstick to evaluate a firm and predict the security level of returning its borrowings. This situation is directly related to a firm's default risk. The current article links the firm's value strategies and capabilities to firm default risk reduction. Specifically, this article conceptualizes and operationalizes a new firm capability, value chain capability, and examines how this capability and two firm value strategies, R&D and advertising, reduce the firm's default risk. Meanwhile, the authors formulate the value chain capability's moderating effects on the relationships between the two value strategies and firm default risk. The findings suggest that value chain capability and advertising help the firm reduce default risk. R&D will have the same effect only when a firm has high value chain capability.     

A Reexamination of the Tradeoff between the Future Benefit and Riskiness of R&D Increases

Many previous studies document a positive relation between research and development (R&D) and equity value. Though R&D can increase equity value by increasing firm value, it can also increase equity value at the expense of bondholder wealth through an increase in firm risk because equity is analogous to a call option on the underlying firm value. Shi [2003] tests this hypothesis by examining the relation between a firm's R&D intensity and its bond ratings and risk premiums at issuance. His results show that the net effect of R&D is negative for bondholders. We reexamine Shi's [2003] findings and in so doing make three contributions to the literature. First, we find that Shi's [2003] results are sensitive to the method of measuring R&D intensity. When we use what we argue is a better measure of R&D intensity, we find that the net effect of R&D is positive for bondholders. Second, when we use tests that Shi [2003] recognizes are even better than the ones that he uses, we find even stronger evidence of the positive effect of R&D on bondholders. Third, we examine cross‐sectional differences in the effect of R&D on debtholders. Consistent with our main finding, we document a negative relation between R&D increases and default risk. The default risk reduction is also more pronounced for firms with higher initial default scores (where the debtholders have more to gain from an R&D increase) and for firms with more bank debt (where the debtholders have greater covenant protection from the possible detriments associated with R&D increases).     

Accounting Treatment of Inherent versus Incentive Uncertainties and the Capital Structure of the Firm

This paper studies the accounting treatment of uncertainty and how it affects a firm's capital structure. We distinguish two sources of uncertainty that raise reliability concerns: inherent uncertainty and incentive uncertainty. By inherent uncertainty, we refer to uncertainty about the quality of raw information regarding future cash flows. By incentive uncertainty, we refer to uncertainty about the quality of accounting numbers conveying the raw information. We explore features of accounting that can effectively deal with these two types of uncertainties in order to aid in the debt‐equity decision of the firm. To handle inherent uncertainty, preferable accounting involves flexible revenue/expense recognition rules that recognize more profit when the uncertainty level is low. To deal with incentive uncertainty, a stringent revenue/expense recognition rule may be desirable to fend off management's opportunistic reporting behavior. Inflexible accounting rules cause a firm's financing choices to deviate from what would hold with complete information. Given any accounting rule, an information environment with a lower (higher) uncertainty regarding future cash inflows leads to higher (lower) expected debt financing. This is because assessed default risk is increasing in the uncertainty of future cash inflows, holding the uncertainty of the outflows constant.     

Preferred stock: Some insights into capital structure

This study analyzes the reactions of equity holders and bondholders to the announcement of 427 preferred stock issues. We document an average equity announcement effect of − 0.65%. This reaction is positively influenced by a number of measures of firm creditworthiness and transparency and is higher for bank issuers. The equity market reaction is negatively influenced by convertibility (and the moneyness of the embedded option) and by the firm's accounting treatment of the issue (specifically if the issue is classified as equity). We find that average credit default swap spreads decrease by 50 basis points after the issue announcement. This decrease is also larger for more creditworthy and transparent firms. Convertibility and the moneyness of the embedded option further decrease the CDS spread. In aggregate, the decrease in equity value is much smaller than the increase in the value of the issuer's debt.     

The Cross‐Section of Credit Risk Premia and Equity Returns

We explore the link between a firm's stock returns and credit risk using a simple insight from structural models following Merton ( 1974 ): risk premia on equity and credit instruments are related because all claims on assets must earn the same compensation per unit of risk. Consistent with theory, we find that firms' stock returns increase with credit risk premia estimated from CDS spreads. Credit risk premia contain information not captured by physical or risk‐neutral default probabilities alone. This sheds new light on the “distress puzzle”—the lack of a positive relation between equity returns and default probabilities—reported in previous studies.     

New debt issues and earnings management

We empirically examine the influence and effects of real earnings management (REM) procedures on the debt market by investigating the bond rating and actual market price of a firm's new debt offerings. Extant research provides conflicting representations concerning the effects of REM techniques on equity shareholders and debt market participants. Our results indicate a negative association between all three REM manipulation methods and perceived credit risk resulting in a lower bond rating, and higher market yield of the firm's debt at issuance. Additional analyses exploring the use of REM techniques to achieve analyst's earnings forecasts indicates that this negative effect is particularly significant for firms who only achieve the earnings forecast by utilizing REM methods. Our research adds to the literature by empirically describing the effects of REM techniques on new debt issuances, and contributes to the ongoing debate regarding the efficacy of engaging in real earnings management to achieve known targets.     

Does shareholder coordination matter? Evidence from private placements

We propose a new role for private investments in public equity (PIPEs) as a mechanism to reduce coordination frictions among existing equity holders. We establish a causal link between the coordination ability of incumbent shareholders and PIPE issuance. This result obtains even after controlling for alternative explanations such as information asymmetry and access to public markets. Improved equity coordination following a private placement leads to favorable debt renegotiations within one year of issuance. Mitigating coordination frictions among shareholders ultimately decreases the odds of firm default in half.     

Are banks happy when managers go long? The information content of managers’ vested option holdings for loan pricing

While traditional finance theory holds that managers with option-laden incentive contracts may favor equity at the expense of debt, a risk-averse manager may be more likely to retain vested in-the-money options if the manager has private information that the firm's risk-adjusted performance will be better. It follows that vested option holdings should be positively associated with credit quality. In support of this, we find that vested option holdings have a strong negative association with loan pricing, especially for informationally sensitive loans, and also predict higher cash flows and credit ratings, a greater distance to default, and lower equity volatility.     

Leverage change,debt overhang,and stock prices

We document a significant and negative effect of the change in a firm's leverage ratio on its stock prices. We find that the negative effect is stronger for firms that have higher leverage ratios, higher likelihood of default, and face more severe financial constraints. Moreover, firms with an increase in leverage ratio tend to have less future investment. These findings are consistent with Myers' (1977) debt overhang theory that an increase in leverage may lead to future underinvestment, thus reducing a firm's value.     

Corporate Governance and the Cost of Borrowing

This paper analyzes the theoretical link between governance (defined loosely as the degree of protection offered to outside shareholders), and the cost of borrowing. We find, consistent with empirical evidence, that improvements in governance reduce the likelihood of default. Also, we find that improvements in governance will monotonically increase or reduce the cost of debt, where the sign of the relationship depends on the firm's restructuring cost in default. Finally, we find that the strength of the governance mechanism can influence the incentives to carry out risk shifting.     

The external financing of investment

This paper investigates the impact of investment characteristics on the financing choice. We investigate instances of seasoned equity, bank debt, straight non-bank debt, and convertible issues by U.S. firms where the stated use of proceeds is capital expenditure and where we are able to hand-collect and classify the characteristics of the investment. Controlling for a firm's existing assets, capital structure and valuation, we document a strong empirical link between an investment's characteristics and the choice between debt and equity financing. Factor analysis indicates that the principal determinant of the financing choice is whether an investment's payoffs can be described as a hit or miss.     

OPERATING LEVERAGE AND UNDERINVESTMENT

Using a contingent claims model, we examine the impacts of both operating leverage and financial leverage on a firm's investment decisions in the context of capacity expansion. Our model shows that quasi‐fixed operating costs could significantly mitigate the underinvestment problem for debt‐financed firms. The existing debt induces equity holders to delay equity‐financed expansion because the expanded earnings base will also benefit the debt holders by lowering the bankruptcy risk. The operating costs decrease this type of wealth transfer from equity holders to debt holders by magnifying the bankruptcy risk of the existing debt upon investment. By applying the Cox proportional hazard model on a large sample of publicly traded U.S. firms over 1966–2016, we offer empirical support for the theoretical predictions. The results are robust to various measures of operating leverage.     

Monetary policy and regional availability of debt financing

The relative availability of bond and bank financing should affect the firm's external financing and investment decisions. We define a measure that proxies for the regional borrowing inflexibility to substitute between bank and bond financing: “debt inflexibility”. Debt inflexibility tilts the firm's financial structure towards equity and reduces investment. The impact is stronger during the period of tight monetary policy, particularly for smaller firms and firms without banking relationships. Debt inflexibility increases the sensitivity of cash holdings to cash flows, reduces the likelihood of dividend payment and makes the firm more likely to pay equity in mergers and acquisitions.     

CEO inside debt and investment‐cash flow sensitivity

This paper provides a new explanation for investment‐cash flow sensitivity from the perspective of CEO inside debt holdings. We examine the effect of CEO pensions and deferred compensation (inside debt) on investment‐cash flow sensitivity for a sample of U.S. manufacturing firms from 2006 to 2012. We find that the firms with higher relative CEO leverage ratios (CEO's debt/equity ratio scaled by the firm's debt/equity ratio) generate higher investment‐cash flow sensitivity. Moreover, one standard deviation increase in the logarithm of the relative CEO leverage ratio enlarges investment‐cash flow sensitivity by 50 per cent. This positive relationship still holds even after we take account of endogeneity and financial constraints.