股票薪酬会计处理问题探讨——基于我国上市公司股权激励的应用分析

新会计准则《股份支付》从会计核算角度，规范了我国上市公司股权激励机制的实施。本文通过对我国2007年已施行股权激励的上市公司基本指标以及对股票薪酬会计处理方式的分析，发现股票薪酬费用化对公司业绩影响不明显，指出股份支付会计准则需要对股票来源、公允价值计量以及分摊期作出进一步规范。     

《股份支付》会计准则与上市公司股权激励——以中捷股份股权激励方案为例

股权激励是指上市公司以本公司股票为标的,对其董事、监事、高级管理人员及其他员工进行的长期性激励。股权激励方式中最传统的是股票期权激励,在股票期权方式上衍生出来的有限制性股票、股票增值权、业绩股票等长期激励方式。2006年2月,中国财政部推出了新的会计准则,其中增加了《股份支付》准则,对国内公司股权激励的相关会计处理作了明确的规定。新会计准则对股权激励会计处理主要是与国际会计准则中《国际财务报告准则第2号—以股份为基础的支付》以及美国2004年12月新修订的准则比较类似,要求对股权计算公允价值,然后以费用的形式计入到利润表中,这一会计处理原则将对上市公司的股权激励产生重要影响。     

会计变更、股权激励与上市公司绩效

2007年1月1日起,根据《企业会计准则第11号——股份支付》,我国上市公司实施股票期权计划被要求按照公允价值进行费用化处理,并在财务报表中披露。本文采用因子分析法研究此次会计变更对我国实施股权激励计划的上市公司2007年度绩效的影响,发现股权激励措施并未促进公司绩效的增长,其代理成本也没有显著降低,说明我国现行股权激励制度尚未很好解决上市公司的代理问题,股权激励制度的设计目标也未能有效实现。     

以权益结算的股份支付对上市公司投资价值的影响

现行的<企业会计准则>,为了针对日益增加的股权激励计划,规范以股权激励为基础的股份支付交易的确认、计量和披露等,在<企业会计准则第11号--股份支付>中对此进行了明确规定.该准则的实施对实行股权激励上市公司的当期利润必然产生重大影响.上市公司本着为投资者负责的态度,必须做好该项激励计划的会计处理工作.为了符合该准则规定,财务人员必须对其会计处理进行系统、全面的学习和研究.     

伊利股份股权激励的会计处理分析

《企业会计成本准则第11号——股份支付》填补了我国上市公司股权激励方面的空白,但仍有待完善之处。本文通过分析股权激励在中国的实践案例——伊利股份股权激励,着重研究伊利股权激励方案的有关会计处理、对财务报表的影响以及其中存在的问题。     

高新技术企业股权激励与业绩的相关性分析

股权激励是在所有权与经营相分离的情况下,企业为了激励经营者努力工作而采取的一种内部分配制度.我国高新技术上市公司已开始实施股权激励.文章以高新技术上市公司2010年年报为依据,通过对是否实施股权激励公司业绩以及持股比例与公司业绩的实证研究,发现实施股权激励对公司业绩是否有显著影响     

集团内股份支付涉及还款安排的会计处理探讨

<正>股权激励已经成为上市公司和IPO公司激励员工的一种重要手段。随着股权激励越来越广泛的运用,股权激励计划的设置也变得越来越多样性。一些股权激励涉及到集团内股份支付,而股份支付准则及其应用指南、相关解释等对集团内股份支付会计处理的规范较为简单,实务中对于集团内股份支付的会计处理存在一些困惑。本文以案例分析方式,梳理了集团内股份支付的会计处理,     

股权激励中股份支付的企业所得税税前扣除问题

在拟上市企业或上市公司中,采用股权激励方案,能更好地吸引人才、留住人才,但同时也会产生会计处理和企业所得税税前扣除问题.本文首先指出企业股份支付的纳税问题,然后介绍了股权激励中股份支付的会计处理,最后阐述了股份支付企业所得税的税前扣除问题,以供参考.     

上市公司应用股份支付准则的思考

上市公司施行股权激励计划,将会改变公司人力成本的支付方式,从而改变公司现金流的流转;在设计股票期权激励计划时应充分考虑不同的股票期权计划对公司业绩的不同影响;同时应注意股票期权的不确定性、股票期权的绩效依存性、不同的股份支付结算方式对上市公司利润造成不同的影响。     

我国上市公司管理层股权激励与公司业绩关系研究

上市公司管理层股权激励与公司业绩的相关性,是近几年资本市场投资人和上市公司管理层共同关注的重大问题。本文对我国管理层股权激励与公司业绩相关性进行实证研究。研究发现:我国上市公司管理层股权激励与公司业绩呈负相关关系,并对我国上市公司管理层实施股权激励提出了政策建议。     

Expensing options solves nothing

The use of stock options for executive compensation has become a lightning rod for public anger, and it's easy to see why. Many top executives grew hugely rich on the back of the gains they made on their options, profits they've been able to keep even as the value they were supposed to create disappeared. The supposed scam works like this: Current accounting regulations let companies ignore the cost of option grants on their income statements, so they can award valuable option packages without affecting reported earnings. Not charging the cost of the grants supposedly leads to overstated earnings, which purportedly translate into unrealistically high share prices, permitting top executives to realize big gains when they exercise their options. If an accounting anomaly is the problem, then the solution seems obvious: Write off executive share options against the current year's revenues. The trouble is, Sahlman writes, expensing option grants won't give us a more accurate view of earnings, won't add any information not already included in the financial statements, and won't even lead to equal treatment of different forms of executive pay. Far worse, expensing evades the real issue, which is whether compensation (options and other-wise) does what it's supposed to do--namely, help a company recruit, retain, and provide the right people with appropriate performance incentives. Any performance-based compensation system has the potential to encourage cheating. Only ethical management, sensible governance, adequate internal control systems, and comprehensive disclosure will save the investor from disaster. If, Sahlman warns, we pass laws that require the expensing of options, thinking that's fixed the fundamental flaws in corporate America's accounting, we will have missed a golden opportunity to focus on the much more extensive defects in the present system.     

CEOs versus CFOs: Incentives and corporate policies

We undertake a broad-based study of the effect of managerial risk-taking incentives on corporate financial policies and show that the risk-taking incentives of chief executive officers (CEOs) and chief financial officers (CFOs) significantly influence their firms’ financial policies. In particular, we find that CEOs’ risk-decreasing (-increasing) incentives are associated with lower (higher) leverage and higher (lower) cash balances. CFOs’ risk-decreasing (-increasing) incentives are associated with safer (riskier) debt-maturity choices and higher (lower) earnings-smoothing through accounting accruals. We exploit the stock option expensing regulation of 2004 to establish a causal link between managerial incentives and corporate policies. Our findings have important implications for optimal corporate compensation design.     

Option Expensing and Managerial Equity Incentives

We examine the impact of mandatory option expensing on managerial equity incentives. Though effective only after June 15, 2005, there is evidence that U.S. firms begin preparing for option expensing as early as 2002 by making changes to their equity incentive plans. We find that (1) CEO option incentives exhibit a sharp reversal during the period 1993-2005, with the median CEO option incentives increasing 25% a year before 2002 but declining 17% a year after 2001; (2) the reduction in option incentives after 2001 is larger for firms that use excessive levels of equity incentives prior to 2002; (3) firms make similar reductions to options granted to CEOs, other top executives and lower-level employees; (4) CEO stock incentives increase throughout the entire 13-year period, rising at an even greater rate after 2001; and (5) the increase in stock incentives after 2001 is far from offsetting the corresponding decrease in option incentives. These findings are robust to controls for firm and CEO characteristics and for concurrent regulatory, business and market events such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the option backdating scandal, and the 2000 stock market crash. We also provide a theoretical explanation for the documented changes in option incentives.     

What drives firms' decisions to lobby and determinants of their lobbying positions: Evidence from firms' comment letter submissions during FASB's stock option expensing proposal in 2004

I examine what drives firms' decisions on whether or not to lobby and, if so, whether to oppose or support FASB's 2004 option expensing proposal. Given that the accounting treatment in place and the political climate were different in 2004 than in 1993, it becomes interesting to examine whether the incentives driving managerial lobbying process have changed. Indeed, in contrast to prior research that finds top managers' option compensation being the main incentive to oppose option expensing in 1993, firms' closeness to debt constraints is the main incentive to oppose option expensing in 2004. I also find that firms that are smaller, that are in an industry with peers who have lobbied, that have board interlocks with firms that have lobbied, and that have higher board independence are more likely to self-select to lobby. While prior accounting lobbying research has examined firms' decisions to lobby and firms' decision on their lobbying positions independently, this study improves on prior research methodology by using a two-level nested logit model and examines both decisions.     

Expensing stock options: a fair-value approach

Now that companies such as General Electric and Citigroup have accepted the premise that employee stock options are an expense, the debate is shifting from whether to report options on income statements to how to report them. The authors present a new accounting mechanism that maintains the rationale underlying stock option expensing while addressing critics' concerns about measurement error and the lack of reconciliation to actual experience. A procedure they call fair-value expensing adjusts and eventually reconciles cost estimates made at grant date with subsequent changes in the value of the options, and it does so in a way that eliminates forecasting and measurement errors over time. The method captures the chief characteristic of stock option compensation--that employees receive part of their compensation in the form of a contingent claim on the value they are helping to produce. The mechanism involves creating entries on both the asset and equity sides of the balance sheet. On the asset side, companies create a prepaid-compensation account equal to the estimated cost of the options granted; on the owners'-equity side, they create a paid-in capital stock-option account for the same amount. The prepaid-compensation account is then expensed through the income statement, and the stock option account is adjusted on the balance sheet to reflect changes in the estimated fair value of the granted options. The amortization of prepaid compensation is added to the change in the option grant's value to provide the total reported expense of the options grant for the year. At the end of the vesting period, the company uses the fair value of the vested option to make a final adjustment on the income statement to reconcile any difference between that fair value and the total of the amounts already reported.     

期权激励与企业并购行为

本文以2006年至2015年我国上市公司为研究对象,考察了期权激励对企业并购行为的影响。研究发现:授予高管的期权激励显著提升了企业发起并购的可能性和并购规模。缓解代理问题和提升风险承担是潜在的作用渠道。进一步研究表明,激励对象异质性会影响期权激励的效果,期权激励对企业并购倾向和并购规模的提升作用在管理者年龄较高、管理者任期较长以及管理者相对薪酬水平较低的企业中更加明显。此外,期权激励对企业并购行为的影响在非国有企业中更加突出。最后,本文还发现期权激励提升了企业并购的财务业绩。本文的研究不仅丰富了有关期权激励效果方面的文献,而且对于理解企业并购行为具有一定的参考意义。     

Finance, Politics, and the Accounting for Stock Options

The politics of option accounting crosses party lines, reflecting both the interests of the affected constituencies and the desire for power over standard setting. House Bill HR-3574, which mandates an assumption of zero stock price volatility, runs counter to the recently passed Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) rule requiring fair-value expensing of stock options. For any option issued at or out of the money, where strike prices are normally set, expense recognition is zero under this bill's mandated assumption.
Besides excessive use of stock options, the lack of a "final peace" in the option accounting war appears to have encouraged another questionable corporate practice. This article examines a sample of "six-and-one restructurings," exchanges of options in which expensing of re-priced (deep out-of-the-money) options can be avoided if employees wait at least six months and one day before receiving new options. The authors found that market-adjusted stock prices tend to decrease during the six-month period before the strike price is reset. This result provides one more reason why companies should be required to use fair-value option pricing models to expense options.     

上市公司管理层股权激励的决定因素研究

管理层股权激励决定因素的研究是我国上市公司股权激励研究的一个热点.本文以管理层股权激励水平为被解释变量,成长能力、公司规模、企业风险、自由现金流、股权制衡度、股权集中度及管理层任期为解释变量来研究上市公司管理层股权激励的决定因素.通过本文的研究发现企业风险和管理层股权激励正相关且显著,公司规模、自由现金流及股权制衡度对...     

For the last time: stock options are an expense

Should stock options be recorded as an expense on a company's income statement and balance sheet, or should they remain where they are, relegated to footnotes? The extraordinary boom in share prices during the Internet bubble made critics of option expensing look like spoilsports. But since the crash, the debate has returned with a vengeance. And no wonder: The authors believe the case for expensing options is overwhelming. In this article, Nobel Iaureate Robert Merton, one of the inventors of the Black-Scholes option-pricing model; his coauthor on the classic textbook Finance, Zvi Bodie; and Robert Kaplan, creator of the Balanced Scorecard, examine and dismiss the principal claims put forward by those who continue to oppose options expensing. They demonstrate that stock-option grants do indeed have real cash-flow implications that need to be reported. They show that effective ways certainly exist to quantify those implications. They detail the distortions that relegating stock-option accounting to footnotes creates. And they show why reporting option costs should in no way hamper young companies in their efforts to provide incentives. Options are indeed a powerful incentive, the authors agree, and failing to record a transaction that creates such powerful effects is economically indefensible. Worse, it encourages companies to favor options over alternative incentive systems. It is not the proper role of accounting standards, the authors argue, to distort executive and employee compensation by subsidizing one particular form of compensation and no other. Companies should choose compensation methods according to their economic benefits--not the way they are reported.     

The impact of the market portfolio on the valuation,incentives and optimality of executive stock options

This paper examines the effect on valuation and incentives of allowing executives receiving options to trade on the market portfolio. We propose a continuous time utility maximization model to value stock and option compensation from the executive's perspective. The executive may invest non-option wealth in the market and riskless asset but not in the company stock itself, leaving them subject to firm-specific risk for incentive?purposes. Since the executive is risk averse, this unhedgeable firm risk leads them to place less value on the options than their cost to the company.

By distinguishing between these two types of risks, we are able to examine the effect of stock volatility, firm-specific risk and market risk on the value to the executive. In particular, options do not give incentive to increase total risk, but rather to increase the proportion of market relative to firm-specific risk, so executives prefer high beta companies. The paper also examines the relationship between risk and incentives, and finds firm-specific risk decreases incentives whilst market risk may decrease incentives depending on other parameters. The model supports the use of stock rather than options if the company can adjust cash pay when granting stock-based compensation.