Will we outlive our money?

Fewer and fewer Americans retire with benefits in the form of life annuities. The author raises key issues regarding the increased importance that uncertainty plays in determining retirement income. The key issues include longevity risk and how savings withdrawals rates will be affected at varying rates of return.     

Should a monetary policymaker look at money?

This paper examines whether monetary indicators are useful in implementing optimal discretionary monetary policy when the policymaker has incomplete information about the environment. We find that money does not contain useful information for the policymaker, if we calibrate the model to the U.S. economy. If money demand were to be appreciably less variable, observations on money could be useful in response to productivity shocks but would be harmful in response to money-demand shocks. We provide an incomplete information example where equilibrium welfare declines when the money-demand volatility decreases.     

Do they do it for the money?

Using a sample of all top management who were indicted for illegal insider trading in the United States for trades during the period 1989-2002, we explore the economic rationality of this white-collar crime. If this crime is an economically rational activity in the sense of Becker (1968), where a crime is committed if its expected benefits exceed its expected costs, “poorer” top management should be doing the most illegal insider trading. This is because the “poor” have less to lose (present value of foregone future compensation if caught is lower for them). We find in the data, however, that indictments are concentrated in the “richer” strata after we control for firm size, industry, firm growth opportunities, executive age, the opportunity to commit illegal insider trading, and the possibility that regulators target the “richer” strata. We thus rule out the economic motive for this white-collar crime, and leave open the possibility of other motives.     

What should regulators do about consolidation and electronic money?

Shared systems in the credit card mode may offer electronic money such as stored value (“smart”) cards, e-cash, and cybermoney. In such consolidations bank partners potentially may come from far outside the customary regulated banking fraternity. While some cyberbanks have been granted official status with its responsibilities, other nonbank cyberbanks have absconded with deposits amidst fraudulent claims. Electronic money is distributed typically in complex tiers, with backup reserves often held by nonbank third parties. The regulatory rules which apply to the mixed systems are therefore uneven and unclear. Banking regulators and the Antitrust Division wrestle with the ensuing dilemmas.     

Multidimensional principal–agent value for money in healthcare project financing

Value for money (VfM) is a key parameter for the public sector in the choice between a public–private partnership (PPP) and traditional procurement, especially for healthcare infrastructure. This paper investigates the differences in what VfM means to the public and private sectors.     

Euro money market spreads during the 2007–? financial crisis

In the paper we investigate the empirical features of euro area money market turbulence during the recent financial crisis. By means of a novel Fractionally Integrated Heteroskedastic Factor Vector Autoregressive model, we find evidence of a deterministic level factor in the EURIBOR-OIS (OIS) spreads term structure, associated with the two waves of stress in the interbank market, following the BNP Paribas (9 August 2007) and Lehman Brothers (16 September 2008) “shocks”, and two additional factors, of the long memory type, bearing the interpretation of curvature and slope factors, respectively. The unfolding of the crisis yields a significant increase in their persistence and volatility. We also find evidence of a declining trend in the level and volatility of OIS spreads since December 2008, associated with ECB liquidity policies.     

Where are the smart investors? New evidence of the smart money effect

Previous research debates whether investors are smart enough to invest in funds that subsequently outperform. This paper documents a robust smart money effect among top-performing small fund investors, even after controlling for the momentum factor. I further explore the reason for the smart money effect and find that such outperformance comes from the market-timing ability of smart investors. Market-timing ability distinguishes smart investors from investors who naively chase the winners.     

Can banks individually create money out of nothing? — The theories and the empirical evidence

This paper presents the first empirical evidence in the history of banking on the question of whether banks can create money out of nothing. The banking crisis has revived interest in this issue, but it had remained unsettled. Three hypotheses are recognised in the literature. According to the financial intermediation theory of banking, banks are merely intermediaries like other non-bank financial institutions, collecting deposits that are then lent out. According to the fractional reserve theory of banking, individual banks are mere financial intermediaries that cannot create money, but collectively they end up creating money through systemic interaction. A third theory maintains that each individual bank has the power to create money ‘out of nothing’ and does so when it extends credit (the credit creation theory of banking). The question which of the theories is correct has far-reaching implications for research and policy. Surprisingly, despite the longstanding controversy, until now no empirical study has tested the theories. This is the contribution of the present paper. An empirical test is conducted, whereby money is borrowed from a cooperating bank, while its internal records are being monitored, to establish whether in the process of making the loan available to the borrower, the bank transfers these funds from other accounts within or outside the bank, or whether they are newly created. This study establishes for the first time empirically that banks individually create money out of nothing. The money supply is created as ‘fairy dust’ produced by the banks individually, "out of thin air".     

Do you really want to ask an underwriter how much money you should leave on the table?

This paper analyses whether the owners of companies seeking to list will leave less money on the table if underwriters are employed to price and market the issue. Our findings indicate that limited liability and Industrial company initial public offerings (IPOs) that have used underwriters have left more money on the table than those not employing underwriters. Not only is there a direct cost in employing an underwriter but this study suggests there might also be an indirect cost. We also find that a positive forecast earnings per share yield may be useful in reducing the amount of money left on the table.     

Can we trust the accounting discretion of firms with political money contributions? Evidence from U.S. IPOs

Using hand-collected data from the U.S., we examine the influence of political money contributions (PMC) on IPO financial reporting. Unraveling the conflicting managerial incentives, we develop and test three distinct hypotheses whereby accounting discretion is utilized to downplay, embellish, or truthfully impart the PMC firm’s prospects. Consistent with the last two hypotheses, we document income-increasing reporting. The effects are strongest for firms sensitive to policy outcomes, and least affected by contemporaneous political events. Post-issue analysis shows that at-issue discretionary accruals systematically predict future accounting performance but are unrelated to stock returns. Survival analysis indicates a lower probability of IPO failure. Robust to a battery of checks, our results support the value-relevance of financial information and a novel use of accounting discretion as a means of signaling expected political gains.