Financial distress,information asymmetry,and syndicate structure: Evidence from Japanese borrowers

This paper examines how borrower firm characteristics affect syndicate size structure in the Japanese loan market for the 1999–2003 period when the banking system is undergoing a major consolidation. We find that syndicates are smaller when borrowers have higher credit risk and when borrowers present larger information asymmetries to the lending group. Interestingly, however, these results are primarily driven by keiretsu (business group) firms. This suggests that the benefits of enhanced monitoring and superior renegotiation prospects are especially useful for banks participating in syndicated loans to Keiretsu firms in Japan rather than informationally opaque, independent firms.     

The role of culture in firm-bank matching

We assemble a unique dataset containing population-level information on loan applications in a region hosting two cultural groups to study the role of culture in firm borrowing decisions. We find that firms are more likely to apply for loans from culturally close banks. This effect is stronger for opaque firms, but not for less performing firms, indicating that firms do not expect preferential treatment from same-culture banks. Loan applications to culturally distant banks increase sharply with firms’ size and age, suggesting a role of information asymmetry in firm-bank matching. In contrast, we find no effect of cultural proximity on loan supply. Overall, our results show that demand-side factors play a key role in the formation of same-culture lending relationships.     

A darker side to decentralized banks: Market power and credit rationing in SME lending

We use loan-level data to study how the organizational structure of banks impacts small business lending. We find that decentralized banks—where branch managers have greater autonomy over lending decisions—give larger loans to small firms and those with “soft information.” However, decentralized banks are also more responsive to their own competitive environment. They are more likely to expand credit when faced with competition but also cherry pick customers and restrict credit when they have market power. This “darker side” to decentralized banks in concentrated markets highlights that the level of local banking competition is key to determining which organizational structure provides better lending terms for small businesses.     

Interbank market integration, loan rates, and firm leverage

This paper investigates the effect of interbank market integration on small firm finance in the build-up to the 2007-2008 financial crisis. We use a comprehensive data set that contains contract terms on individual loans to 6047 firms across 14 European countries between 1998:01 and 2005:12. We account for the selection that arises in the loan request and approval process. Our findings imply that integration of interbank markets resulted in less stringent borrowing constraints and in substantially lower loan rates. The decrease was strongest in markets with competitive banking sectors. We also find that in the most rapidly integrating markets, firms became substantially overleveraged during the build-up to the crisis.     

BANKING RELATIONSHIPS AND THE EFFECT OF MONITORING ON LOAN PRICING

In a sample of bank loans to small firms we find a positive relation between the bank's monitoring effort and the loan's interest rate. We also observe an inverse relation between the closeness of banking relationships and interest rates. Further, we see that banks less frequently monitor firms with whom they have closer relationships. We conclude that banking relationships are valuable because firms can significantly reduce their costs of capital by establishing and maintaining close ties to a particular bank. As firms successfully complete loan transactions with banks, banks monitor them less frequently and, ultimately, charge them lower interest rates.     

Lender Automation and Racial Disparities in Credit Access

Process automation reduces racial disparities in credit access by enabling smaller loans, broadening banks' geographic reach, and removing human biases from decision making. We document these findings in the context of the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP), where private lenders faced no credit risk but decided which firms to serve. Black-owned firms obtained PPP loans primarily from automated fintech lenders, especially in areas with high racial animus. After traditional banks automated their loan processing procedures, their PPP lending to Black-owned firms increased. Our findings cannot be fully explained by racial differences in loan application behaviors, preexisting banking relationships, firm performance, or fraud rates.     

Information Opacity,Credit Risk,and the Design of Loan Contracts for Private Firms

This paper examines the structure and cost of a large sample of bank loans to private firms. Compared to public firms, private firms are more informationally opaque and riskier. The results suggest that the design of a loan to a private firm is significantly different from that to a public firm. Bank loans to private firms are more likely to be by a sole lender, collateralized, and have sweep covenants than loans to public firms. The cost of borrowing is higher for a private firm than for a public firm, even after holding constant firm and loan characteristics.     

Corporate fraud and bank loans: Evidence from china

Receiving punishment from regulators for corporate fraud can affect financing contracts between a firm and its bank, as both the firm’s credit risk and information risk increase after punishment. By focusing on Chinese firms’ borrowing behavior after events of corporate fraud, we find that firms’ bank loans after punishment are not only significantly lower, but are also less than those for non-fraudulent firms. In addition, loan interest rates after punishment are not only higher than before, but also higher than those for their non-fraudulent counterparts. In addition, we find that corporate fraud indirectly destabilizes the “performance-bank loan” relationship. Our results suggest that corporate fraud negatively affects a firm’s ability to source debt financing, which provides new evidence about the economic consequences of fraud.     

银行对企业经营的监督效应研究——基于控股股东掏空行为的视角

从控股股东掏空行为的视角,采用中国上市公司的贷款数据分析中国的商业银行对企业的监督作用。研究发现,银行对控股股东的掏空行为具有一定的监督作用,在银行贷款数量多、贷款期限长的公司中,控股股东的掏空行为明显减少。对不同所有制的企业,银行的监督作用存在异质性。目前,银行的监督作用主要体现在国有银行中,而国有银行能有效监督的对象仅限于地方政府和私人控制的企业,国有银行对中央企业的监督能力较弱。从事后监督来看,银行会对控股股东的掏空行为做出贷款政策的调整,对于控股股东掏空严重的企业,续新贷款的银行数量、续新贷款比例显著下降,而且贷款利率显著提高。     

Firm age and the evolution of borrowing costs: Evidence from Japanese small firms

This paper investigates how firms’ borrowing costs evolve as they age. Using a new panel data set of about 100,000 bank-dependent small firms for 1997–2002 and focusing on the channel of “adaptation” (i.e., surviving firms’ borrowing costs decline as they age) and that of “selection” (i.e., total borrowing costs decline as defaulting firms exit), we find that the reputation hypothesis suggested by Diamond (1989) provides a more plausible explanation of the downward sloping age profile of borrowing costs than the firm dynamics (Cooley and Quadrini, 2001) or the relationship banking (Boot and Thakor, 1994) hypothesis. In addition, we examine whether the firm selection process in Japan has been natural or unnatural. Our findings suggest that it has been natural in that firms with lower quality are separated, face higher borrowing costs, and are eventually forced to exit, which contrasts with the results of previous studies on credit allocations in Japan, including Peek and Rosengren (2005). Further, we find that the evolution of borrowing costs is partially due to selection but is mainly attributable to adaptation.     

Offshore operations and bank loan contracting: Evidence from firms that set up subsidiaries in offshore financial centers

We examine the effects of a multinational firm's subsidiary operations in offshore financial centers (OFCs) on bank loan contracting terms. Using a propensity score matched cross-country sample of firms with and without OFC subsidiaries, we find that firms with OFC subsidiaries receive less favorable loan terms than firms without OFC subsidiaries. The results from a difference-in-differences analysis and an analysis of a firm's mutation from a non-OFC firm to an OFC firm support the causal effect of offshore operations on the unfavorable loan terms. Furthermore, focusing on firms with OFC subsidiaries, we find that the intensity of offshore operations affects loan terms unfavorably. We also find that the unfavorable effect is more pronounced for more opaque firms and for firms that are headquartered in countries or jurisdictions with weaker legal enforcement. Our findings indicate that banks view offshore operations of borrowers as a credit risk-increasing factor.     

Bank size, lending technologies, and small business finance

Under the current paradigm in small business lending research, large banks tend to specialize in lending to relatively large, informationally transparent firms using “hard” information, while small banks have advantages in lending to smaller, less transparent firms using “soft” information. We go beyond this paradigm to analyze the comparative advantages of large and small banks in specific lending technologies. Our analysis begins with the identification of fixed-asset lending technologies used to make small business loans. Our results suggest that large banks do not have equal advantages in all of these hard lending technologies and these advantages are not all increasing monotonically in firm size, contrary to the predictions of the current paradigm. We also analyze lines of credit without fixed-asset collateral to focus on relationship lending. We confirm that small banks have a comparative advantage in relationship lending, but this appears to be strongest for lending to the largest firms.     

Bank audit practices and loan loss provisioning

I empirically examine the evolution of loan loss accounting across banks that differ categorically by external auditing practice. Using a partial adjustment model, and a sample of 75,505 observations on affiliated banks, 1995–2009, I find evidence of convergence across audit categories in target ratios of provisions for loan losses to nonaccrual loans. This is consistent with a standardized method of accounting for “impaired” loans. I observe less convergence, on the other hand, in target ratios of provisions for loan losses to loans, which appears to accommodate a role for managerial discretion.     

Small Firm Capital Structure and the Syndicated Loan Market

We show that small firms using syndicated loans for their mid- and long-term financial needs have significantly higher leverage than firms that do not borrow in this market. This difference cannot be attributed to firm characteristics like the availability of growth opportunities, asset tangibility, R&D spending, profitability and net sales that are known to influence capital structure. We also find that the capital structure of other firms that borrow in the syndicated loan market is not different from those that do not. We show that already highly leveraged small firms are more likely to borrow in the syndicated loan market than other firms. The higher debt in the capital structure of small firms that rely on syndicated loans consequently can be attributed to the availability of capital rather than demand for capital, as shown more generally by Faulkender and Petersen (Rev Financ Stud 19(1):45?C79, 2006).     

Japan’s banking crisis: An event-study perspective

We calculate abnormal stock returns for Japanese non-financial companies around major events associated with the banking crisis (1995–2000), and find that not all companies were equally sensitive to the malaise of the banking sector: the most affected were small, leveraged, low-tech companies with low credit ratings and low market to book ratios. This is consistent with “credit crunch” theories (companies with limited access to financial markets are sensitive to changes in bank lending) and with claims that innovation is rarely financed by bank debt. We do not find much evidence on the alleged misallocation of loans to support ailing bank clients.     

Further Evidence on the Determinants of Secured versus Unsecured Loans

Using a unique data set collected from financial statements of all Singapore listed firms from 1983 to 1991, we provide international evidence on the determinants of the amount of secured loans as a fraction of total secured and unsecured loans. This data set comprises a much wider range of firms than most previous studies. We show that consistent with the agency-cost hypothesis, firms with more growth opportunities use more secured loans. This is in contrast to the opposite result reported in Barclay and Smith (1995b) who measure secured debt as a fraction of total long-term fixed claims. We also find strong support for the hypothesis that smaller firms use more secured loans. In contrast, Leeth and Scott (1989), using survey data on small firms, find an insignificant firm size effect. Finally, we show that the use of secured loans is positively related to asset riskiness and loan size, and is negatively related to asset specificity. Firm quality has no explanatory power.     

The performance of banks around the receipt and repayment of TARP funds: Over-achievers versus under-achievers

In this paper, we look at how the pre-crisis health of banks is related to the probability of receiving and repaying TARP capital. We find that financial performance characteristics that are related to the probability of receiving TARP funds differ for the healthiest (“over-achiever”) versus the least healthy (“under-achiever”) banks. We find that TARP under-achievers have some, but not consistent, weaknesses in income production. These banks also are experiencing liquidity issues as customers, shut out of public debt markets, get bank loans through drawdowns of loan commitments. Unlike TARP under-achievers, TARP over-achievers’ loans are performing well. Yet, liquidity issues (from low levels of liquid assets and core deposits and drawdowns of loan commitments) hurt the abilities of these banks to continue their lending. Differences between under-achiever and over-achiever banks are also found for repayment and deadbeat TARP banks.     

Are lending relationships beneficial or harmful for public credit guarantees? Evidence from Japan's Emergency Credit Guarantee Program

This paper examines the effectiveness of Japan's Emergency Credit Guarantee (ECG) Program set up during the financial turmoil following the failure of Lehman Brothers, in increasing credit availability and improving the ex-post performance of small businesses. In particular, using a unique firm–bank matched dataset, the paper examines whether lending relationships enhanced or dampened the effects of the ECG program. It is found that the ECG program significantly improved credit availability for firms using the program. However, when it was a relationship lender (main bank) that extended an ECG loan, the increased availability was partially, if not completely, offset by a decrease in non-ECG loans by the same bank. Further, propensity score matching estimations show that the ex-post performance of firms that received ECG loans from the main bank deteriorated more than that of firms that received non-ECG loans. We do not find such loan “substitution” or performance “deterioration” effects when a non-main bank extended ECG loans. Our findings suggest that close firm–bank relationships may have perverse effects on the efficacy of public credit guarantees.     

When does relationship lending start to pay?

This paper empirically characterizes relationship lending using data from more than 20,000 loans of a Spanish bank to small and medium enterprises (SMEs). The study analyzes the pricing determinants of loans to firms based on the entire previous bank–firm relationship, allowing for the identification of nonlinear pricing patterns in the bank–firm relationship. We show that firms only start capitalizing the gains of relationship lending when the relationship extends beyond two years. This reduction in the loan rate spread charged is driven by the opaque firms, for which the acquisition of “soft” information is especially relevant. Finally, we find that relationship lending significantly mitigates the increased costs of refinancing loans along two dimensions: relationship duration and having additional contracts—other than loans—with the bank.     

Banking Relationships and Syndicated Loans during the 2008 Financial Crisis

The research shows that banking relationships are important to lending. However, few studies focus on the banking relationships in syndicated loans, although these loans have became a major source of financing. The last financial crisis clearly shows the impacts of credit rationing and tightening credit conditions, even in the syndicated loans market. We investigate whether banking relationships help firms to benefit from better terms for syndicated loans in a chaotic financial environment. Using a sample of syndicated loans arranged from 2003 to 2008 in North America and Europe, we find that firms with a previously developed relationship with a lead bank obtained a lower spread and a longer maturity during the financial crisis but did not benefit from larger loan facilities.