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Deposit insurance is widely offered in a number of countries as part of a financial system safety net to promote stability. An unintended consequence of deposit insurance is the reduction in the incentive of depositors to monitor banks which lead to excessive risk-taking. We examine the relation between deposit insurance and bank risk and systemic fragility in the years leading up to and during the recent financial crisis. We find that generous financial safety nets increase bank risk and systemic fragility in the years leading up to the global financial crisis. However, during the crisis, bank risk is lower and systemic stability is greater in countries with deposit insurance coverage. Our findings suggest that the “moral hazard effect” of deposit insurance dominates in good times while the “stabilization effect” of deposit insurance dominates in turbulent times. The overall effect of deposit insurance over the full sample we study remains negative since the destabilizing effect during normal times is greater in magnitude compared to the stabilizing effect during global turbulence. In addition, we find that good bank supervision can alleviate the unintended consequences of deposit insurance on bank systemic risk during good times, suggesting that fostering the appropriate incentive framework is very important for ensuring systemic stability. 相似文献
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We present a theory of optimal transparency when banks are exposed to rollover risk. Disclosing bank‐specific information enhances the stability of the financial system during crises, but has a destabilizing effect in normal economic times. Thus, the regulator optimally increases transparency during crises. Under this policy, however, information disclosure signals a deterioration of economic fundamentals, which gives the regulator ex post incentives to withhold information. This commitment problem precludes a disclosure policy that provides ex ante optimal insurance against aggregate shocks, and can result in excess opacity that increases the likelihood of a systemic crisis. 相似文献
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本文基于银行存款市场空间竞争模型,探讨存款保险制度的实施效果和福利效应,及其与市场竞争政策的交互作用。研究表明,政府隐性担保尽管能够保障存款人利益,但会降低存款人对银行经营稳健性的要求,使得银行追求高风险高收益资产从而降低经营稳健性;而市场化的存款保险制度通过费率与风险挂钩的激励机制,能够有效提升银行经营稳健性,同时避免过高政策成本负担,实现较高的社会福利水平。随着市场竞争强化,引入风险差别费率保险制度,在提升银行经营稳健性和增进社会福利方面的效果逐渐增强。模型分析表明,当长期允许机构自由进出市场时,政府强化竞争政策短期可能降低银行的经营稳健性,但长期内高风险银行逐渐退出市场而更有效率的低风险银行进入市场,这种柔性市场退出机制使得银行业整体经营稳健性增强。因此,在金融市场中强化竞争政策,推行并完善当前市场化的风险差别费率存款保险制度,长期内有助于在保护存款人利益的同时,提升银行稳健性和社会福利。 相似文献
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资产不透明的金融机构过度依赖批发性融资进行监管套利不利于系统性风险的防控。在此背景下,本文首先在经典银行道德风险模型的基础上引入关联性,从资产透明度和监管套利的视角分析银行系统性风险累积的内在机理。而后利用2007-2018年中国上市银行微观数据,构建资产透明度指标和系统性风险指标(SRISK、MES),对理论推论进行实证检验。主要结论有:(1)资产不透明、监管套利会提高银行的系统性风险。(2)监管套利弱化了资产透明度和资本监管机制对银行系统性风险承担的约束作用,资产透明度与资本监管机制在约束系统性风险承担中的协调作用不明显。(3)以大银行为主的债权银行受监管套利的影响相较于受资产透明度的影响更明显。在此基础上,我们对完善金融风险防范体系以及监管机制提出了若干建议。 相似文献
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本文拓展了Freixas and Rochet(2008)的理论模型,证明存款保险差别化费率机制对银行风险承担具有抑制作用,在此基础上选取我国农村银行为研究对象,运用2015—2019年某省119家法人投保机构进行实证检验。研究发现:引入差别化费率设计显著降低了农村银行的风险承担;这一作用存在异质性,对于自身风险承担水平较低、资产规模较大的农村银行来说,抑制作用更为明显。进一步研究发现,差别化费率机制在一定程度上缓和了农信社改制短期内对农商行风险可能造成的不利影响。本文结论对加强存款保险制度的早期纠正功能、防范化解金融风险以及深化农村金融机构改革具有一定的理论意义和参考价值。 相似文献
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建立商业银行信息披露制度是我国金融改革中较重要的一环,一般的认识是信息制度的建立将使金融机构运作更审慎,有利于提高整个金融系统的稳定性;但本文通过博弈模型证明:赋予我国商业银行国家信用与进行信息披露制度之间存在着一定的冲突,目前我国对金融体系的过度保护反而会降低商业银行信息披露的对银行体系稳定性的改进,合适的改革次序应是国家信用在金融机构中的先行退出也即建立一个合适的存款保险制度,其次才是规范的信息披露制度的建立. 相似文献
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We empirically investigate depositors’ response to various bank risk measures under different deposit insurance regimes. We find that depositor discipline is most significant during periods of full insurance coverage rather than during limited insurance coverage, and that deposit withdrawal induces bank managers to carry out aggressive restructuring. Our evidence suggests that the magnitude of depositor discipline is affected by both the extent of insurance coverage, and by the degree of public confidence in the stability of the financial system and the extent of regulatory forbearance. There is little evidence that higher interest rates at riskier banks promote depositor discipline. 相似文献
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Janis Sarra 《国际破产评论》2012,21(1):17-66
This article examines current initiatives in respect of bank financial distress in response to the 2008‐2009 financial crisis, suggesting that there is considerably more work to be undertaken before bank regulatory oversight, bank corporate governance, and bank resolution regimes have the appropriate preventive safeguards, governance, and timely, efficient and fair responses to bank financial distress. The corporate governance of banks and other financial institutions differs from the governance of corporations because of prudential regulation, banks' significance to the financial system, the different nature of stakeholders with investments at risk, and the existence of deposit insurance. The article offers a number of policy options in respect of how banks and other financial institutions could enhance their prudential, prescient, and pragmatic oversight and governance in a way that protects creditors, deposit holders, and other stakeholders, as well as the public interest in a healthy and sustainable financial sector. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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Analysis of the tradeoff between competition and financial stability has been at the center of academic and policy debate for over two decades and especially since the 2007–2008 global financial crises. Here we use information on 14 Asia Pacific economies from 2003 to 2010 to investigate the influence of bank competition, concentration, regulation and national institutions on individual bank fragility as measured by the probability of bankruptcy and the bank’s Z-score. The results suggest that greater concentration fosters financial fragility and that lower pricing power also induces bank risk exposure after controlling for a variety of macroeconomic, bank-specific, regulatory and institutional factors. In terms of regulations and institutions, the results show that tougher entry restrictions may benefit bank stability, whereas stronger deposit insurance schemes are associated with greater bank fragility. 相似文献