Market Created Risk

We develop a multiperiod rational expectations model of securities market equilibrium in which equilibrium prices may move between periods even though it is common knowledge that no new information has arrived about ultimate security payoffs. This happens because investors know they have imperfect information about the endowments of other investors and this knowledge affects their probability beliefs about the prices that will prevail at the intermediate trading date. These beliefs are reflected in the equilibrium at the initial trading date when investors focus on the probabilities of intermediate capital gains and losses, rather than ultimate payoffs.     

Divergence of Opinion in Complete Markets: A Note

We consider an Arrow-Debreu model with agents who have different subjective probabilities. In general, asset prices will depend only on aggregate consumption and the distribution of subjective probabilities in each state of nature. If all agents have identical preferences then an asset with “more dispersed” subjective probabilities will have a lower price than an asset with less dispersed subjective probabilities if risk aversion does not decline too rapidly. It seems that this condition is likely to be met in practice, so that increased dispersion of beliefs will generally be associated with reduced asset prices in a given Arrow-Debreu equilibrium.     

Market responses to qualitative information from a group polarization perspective

This study examines the predictions of group polarization in response to the receipt of qualitative information (i.e., good or bad news) in a laboratory market. Qualitative information induces varying beliefs within the market because such information is interpreted using the relevant knowledge possessed by the recipients. Findings from the group polarization literature suggest that individuals who subsequently hold the most extreme price beliefs will influence the market to a greater extent than individuals holding the most conservative beliefs. Group polarization research also suggests that participation in a market will accentuate risk preferences so that good news produces a cautious shift in prices (i.e., towards lower prices) whereas bad news produces a risky shift (i.e., towards higher prices). The results confirm the predictions of group polarization and further suggest that if extreme reactions to information reflect recency, so too may the market price.     

Futures markets and monetary policy

It has recently been argued that when differentially informed agents trade with one another monetary policy can influence the distribution of output by altering the information content of prices. This paper introduces a futures market into the Barro (1980) model and shows that under certain conditions prices may aggregate information in a manner such that differentially informed agents hold identical beliefs concerning aggregate market conditions. In such cases, monetary policy will be unable to influence the distribution of output. These results then serve as a backdrop for a more general discussion of the relationship between asset prices and the role of monetary policy.     

END‐OF‐DAY PRICING IN THE U.S. TREASURY MARKET: A COMPARISON OF GovPX AND THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK

We compare end‐of‐day indicative U.S. Treasury prices from GovPX and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY). We find that the two sources rarely quote identical prices, and differences are not simply due to noise or rounding. The average bid price differential is 2 cents for notes and bonds, but it is only ¹/₁₀ of 1 cent for bills. Bid‐ask spreads in both sources appear to be largely artificial and contain limited information. Finally, we find that the end‐of‐day indicative FRBNY bid prices are closer to true intraday GovPX market quotes than end‐of‐day indicative quotes provided by GovPX itself.     

Earnings Metrics,Information Processing,and Price Efficiency in Laboratory Markets

An enduring issue in financial reporting is whether and how salient summary measures of firm performance (“earnings metrics”) affect market price efficiency. In laboratory markets, we test the effects of salient earnings metrics, which vary in how they combine persistent and transitory elements, on investor information search, beliefs about value, offers to trade, and market price efficiency. We find that including transitory elements in salient earnings metrics causes traders to search unnecessarily for further information about these elements and to overestimate their effect on fundamental value relative to a rational benchmark. In contrast, separately displaying persistent elements in earnings increases the accuracy of traders’ value estimates. Prices generally reflect traders’ beliefs about value, and prices are most efficient when transitory elements are excluded from earnings metrics entirely. Our study contributes to research on salience effects in financial reporting by showing that including transitory elements in salient earnings metrics causes inefficient information search and biased beliefs about value that can aggregate to affect market prices. We also contribute to research in experimental markets by showing that redundant disclosure is not always beneficial; redundant disclosure of transitory earnings elements, in particular, appears to have negative consequences for investor behavior and market efficiency.     

The effect of tick size on managerial learning from stock prices

We investigate the effect of tick size, a key feature of market microstructure, on managerial learning from stock prices. Using a randomized controlled tick-size experiment, the 2016 Tick Size Pilot Program, we find that a larger tick size increases a firm's investment sensitivity to stock prices, suggesting that managers glean more new information from stock prices to guide their investment decisions as the tick size increases. Consistently, we also find that changes in managerial beliefs, as reflected in adjustments of forecasted capital expenditures, respond more strongly to market feedback under a larger tick size. Additional evidence suggests the following mechanism through which tick size affects managerial learning: a larger tick size reduces algorithmic trading, in turn encouraging fundamental information acquisition. Increased fundamental information acquisition generates incremental information about growth opportunities, macroeconomic factors, and industry factors, with respect to which the market has a comparative information advantage over management.     

投资者异质后验信念对股票价格影响的实证研究

过度自信程度不同的投资者因消息确认精度差异引起意见分歧,产生异质后验信念,导致投资者对股价高估或者低估。在此基础上,以盈余公告信息作为利好或利空消息,研究不同环境下异质后验信念对我国股票价格的影响。实证结果表明:不管在牛市还是在熊市环境下,异质后验信念均会对股价产生影响,当盈余公告为利好消息时,异质后验信念程度越高,当期股价被高估的程度越显著;当盈余公告为利空消息时,异质后验信念程度越高,当期股价被低估的程度越显著。此外,在盈余公告前投资者就对盈余消息作出了反映,但对好消息与坏消息的反映程度不同。     

List Price Information in the Negotiation of Commercial Real Estate Transactions: Is Silence Golden?

We examine the use (and non-use) of list price information in the process of marketing commercial real estate. While housing market research suggests that list prices can serve as a strong anchor and/or signal, list price information is included in less than one-third of the commercial property sales and is less likely to be included as part of the sellers’ offering information for larger and more complex properties. Given the potentially powerful effect of list prices (first offers) on outcomes, the non-use of list price information is a puzzle. We speculate that the limited use of list prices may be due to the sellers’ interests in both maintaining their informational advantage and not truncating higher than expected offers, especially during periods of economic growth or with more complex properties. Using a two-stage selection correction model, we find that office properties which provide list price information are, on average, associated with lower price outcomes (ceteris paribus) and that these outcomes vary by price cohort and economic condition. It is important to note, however, that while these findings identify a correlation, they do not necessarily imply causation. Our results support the notion that asymmetric information and information signaling play a dominant role in explaining the sellers’ strategic non-use of list price information in the commercial real estate market and that the signaling effect is more pronounced in higher priced properties and during periods of strong economic growth.     

An Empirical Analysis of Analysts' Target Prices: Short-term Informativeness and Long-term Dynamics

Using a large database of analysts' target prices issued over the period 1997–1999, we examine short‐term market reactions to target price revisions and long‐term comovement of target and stock prices. We find a significant market reaction to the information contained in analysts' target prices, both unconditionally and conditional on contemporaneously issued stock recommendation and earnings forecast revisions. Using a cointegration approach, we analyze the long‐term behavior of market and target prices. We find that, on average, the one‐year‐ahead target price is 28 percent higher than the current market price.     

Disagreement and asset prices

How do differences of opinion affect asset prices? Do investors earn a risk premium when disagreement arises in the market? Despite their fundamental importance, these questions are among the most controversial issues in finance. In this paper, we use a novel data set that allows us to directly measure the level of disagreement among Wall Street mortgage dealers about prepayment speeds. We examine how disagreement evolves over time and study its effects on expected returns, return volatility, and trading volume in the mortgage-backed security market. We find that increased disagreement is associated with higher expected returns, higher return volatility, and larger trading volume. These results imply that there is a positive risk premium for disagreement in asset prices. We also show that volatility in and of itself does not lead to higher trading volume. Instead, only when disagreement arises in the market is higher uncertainty associated with more trading. Finally, we are able to distinguish empirically between two competing hypotheses regarding how information in markets gets incorporated into asset prices. We find that sophisticated investors appear to update their beliefs through a rational expectations mechanism when disagreement arises.     

Causality-in-mean and causality-in-variance among electricity prices,crude oil prices,and yen–US dollar exchange rates in Japan

In this study, we test the Granger-causality-in-mean and Granger-causality-in-variance among electricity prices, crude oil prices, and yen-to-US-dollar exchange rates in Japan using a cross-correlation function approach. We find Granger-causality-in-mean from neither the exchange market nor the oil market to the power market; the same was true of Granger-causality-in-variance, although both the exchange rates and oil prices greatly influence power generation costs in Japan. We suspect the efficiency of this market is at play.     

Evaluation Periods and Asset Prices in a Market Experiment

We test whether the frequency of feedback information about the performance of an investment portfolio and the flexibility with which the investor can change the portfolio influence her risk attitude in markets. In line with the prediction of myopic loss aversion (Benartzi and Thaler (1995)), we find that more information and more flexibility result in less risk taking. Market prices of risky assets are significantly higher if feedback frequency and decision flexibility are reduced. This result supports the findings from individual decision making, and shows that market interactions do not eliminate such behavior or its consequences for prices.     

Causality-in-mean and causality-in-variance among electricity prices,crude oil prices,and yen–US dollar exchange rates in Japan

In this study, we test the Granger-causality-in-mean and Granger-causality-in-variance among electricity prices, crude oil prices, and yen-to-US-dollar exchange rates in Japan using a cross-correlation function approach. We find Granger-causality-in-mean from neither the exchange market nor the oil market to the power market; the same was true of Granger-causality-in-variance, although both the exchange rates and oil prices greatly influence power generation costs in Japan. We suspect the efficiency of this market is at play.     

What do professional forecasters' stock market expectations tell us about herding,information extraction and beauty contests?

We study how professional forecasters form equity market expectations based on a new micro-level dataset which includes rich cross-sectional information about individual characteristics. We focus on testing whether agents rely on the beliefs of others, i.e., consensus expectations, when forming their own forecast. We find strong evidence that the average of all forecasters' beliefs influences an individual's own forecast. This effect is stronger for young and less experienced forecasters as well as forecasters whose pay depends more on performance relative to a benchmark. Further tests indicate that neither information extraction to incorporate dispersed private information, nor herding for reputational reasons can fully explain these results, leaving Keynes' beauty contest argument as a potential candidate for explaining forecaster behavior.     

Discriminating between wealth and information effects in event studies in accounting and finance research

This article examines the power of tests of given size to detect and distinguish between wealth (i.e., mean) and information (i.e., variance) effects in event studies. We find that an Estimated Generalized Least Squares (EGLS) mean-effects test is consistently more powerful than the test based upon the average standardized residual and is as powerful as a nonparametric rank test. Unlike the test based upon the average standardized residual and the rank test, the EGLS test is well specified even when the event affects the variances of the prediction errors. We also find that conventional parametric tests to detect changes in the variance of the event-day average abnormal return are misspecified when the null of no change is true. We analyze the reasons this occurs and suggest a rank procedure that produces tests of the correct size under the null. Our evidence suggests that the critical factors allowing researchers to distinguish between wealth and information effects are an estimation procedure incorporating the heteroskedasticity inherent in market model prediction errors and an explicit test for event-day variance changes.     

Dealer behavior in the specials market for US Treasury securities

We assess dealer behavior in the specials market for US Treasury securities by comparing dealer participation in the Federal Reserve's securities loan auctions with prices in the private market. Dealer behavior is generally consistent with the law of one price and apparent violations can largely be explained by institutional differences between the private market and the Fed's program. However, for auctions that are effectively noncompetitive, dealers regularly pass up true arbitrage opportunities and frequently overpay to borrow securities. Dealers apparently do not realize that certain auctions are noncompetitive, even though the information needed to discern this fact is publicly available in advance.     

Trade size clustering and the cost of trading at the London Stock Exchange

For the London Stock Exchange, this paper investigates differences in trading costs between market maker (off-book) and order book trades, in the context of clustering in trade sizes and prices. We report several substantial findings. Even after controlling for differences in trade size, the realised spread measure is lower for off-book trades. For the order book, trade size clustering is not associated with differences in transaction costs nor with differences in the information content of trades. For the off-book market, trades in clustered (popular) sizes carry significantly more information than non-clustered trades. Despite the significant differences in the price impact estimates between the order book and off-book, we show that traders placing large orders off-book are still better off than trading via the order book as they benefit from a large discount from the current midpoint price. Additionally, we highlight that price and size clustering tend to occur simultaneously rather than being substitutes in this market setting.     

The Timing of Opening Trades and Pricing Errors

After demonstrating that a zero investment trading strategy that buys stocks with overnight returns below the market average and sells stocks with overnight returns above the market average earns more than 1% monthly profit, I demonstrate that this profit is greater for stocks that start trading more quickly than for other stocks. These results control for trading costs. The resulting pricing errors are a material portion of stock price volatility and suggest that a quick response to overnight information adds non‐information‐based stock volatility to stock prices.     

Corporate Governance,Companies’ Disclosure Practices and Market Transparency: A Cross Country Study

We examine the link between corporate governance, companies’ disclosure practices and their equity market transparency in a study of more than 5,000 listed companies in 23 countries covering the period 1 January 2003 to 31 December 2008. Our results confirm the belief that better‐governed firms make more frequent disclosures to the market. We also find greater disclosure in common law relative to code law countries. However firms with better governance in both code and common law countries make more frequent disclosures. We measure market transparency by the timeliness of prices. In contrast to single country studies, results show, for the 23 countries collectively, better corporate governance is associated with less timely share prices. This would suggest that a firm substitutes better corporate governance for transparency. We are thus led to the conclusion that even if information is disclosed more frequently by better‐governed firms, it does not necessarily follow that information is reflected in share prices on a timelier basis.