Defining next-generation products: an inside look

The continued success of technology-based companies depends on their proficiency in creating next-generation products and their derivatives. So getting such products out the door on schedule must be routine for such companies, right? Not quite. The authors recently engaged in a detailed study--in which they had access to sensitive internal information and to candid interviews with people at every level--of 28 next-generation product-development projects in 14 leading high-tech companies. They found that most of the companies were unable to complete such projects on schedule. And the companies also had difficulty developing the derivative products needed to fill the gaps in the market that their next-generation products would create. The problem in every case, the authors discovered, was rooted in the product definition phase. And not coincidentally, the successful companies in the study had all learned how to handle the technical and marketplace uncertainties in their product definition processes. The authors have discerned from the actions of those companies a set of best practices that can measurably improve the definition phase of any company's product-development process. They have grouped the techniques into three categories and carefully lay out the steps that companies need to take as they work through each stage. The best practices revealed here are not a magic formula for rapid, successful new-product definition. But they can help companies capture new markets without major delays. And that is good news for any manager facing the uncertainty that goes with developing products for a global marketplace.     

Spread ladder swaps—an analysis of controversial interest rate derivatives

This article analyzes spread ladder swaps traded by Deutsche Bank to several medium-size companies and municipalities. The value of these contracts is highly sensitive to correlations between forward rates. For a contract that was challenged by the medium-size company Ille at the Federal Court of Germany, it turns out that the derivative was originated at a negative market value of −90,000 to −115,000 euros (depending on the number of factors used in the model). Moreover, the model correctly predicts the range for the terminal payment after an adverse development of the term structure of approximately 567,000 euros. We also investigate a product feature that limits the upside potential from the viewpoint of the customer and show that it has a substantial impact on market values. According to the judgment handed down by the court, the bank should have informed the customer about the market value of the product in light of special circumstances. This raises questions as to which products must meet this requirement. Moreover, especially for exotic contracts, market prices are mostly model prices: for spread ladder swaps, substantially different prices are obtained even when investors agree on the variance/covariance matrix but disagree on the number of factors to apply in an implementation of a model.     

Product market competition and the disclosure of supply chain information

We investigate how product market competition affects corporate voluntary disclosure decisions, specifically regarding supply-chain information. Our results, based on a sample of manufacturing companies listed in China from 2010 to 2016, show that companies in more competitive industries disclose less customer/supplier information. The main results stand through several robustness tests. Further analyses show that the negative relationship between product market competitiveness and supply-chain information disclosure is stronger when the disclosure contains more incremental information and when competitors are more capable of gaining competitive advantage using the disclosed information. Our study contributes to the understanding of both the relationship between product market competition and voluntary disclosure decisions and the regulation of information disclosure to build a transparent capital market.     

A Rude Awakening: Internet Shakeout in 2000

This study explores various value-drivers of business-to-consumer (B2C) Internet companies' share prices both before and after the market correction in the spring of 2000. Although many market observers had predicted that the shakeout would eventually occur (e.g., Perkins and Perkins 1999), the ultimate and previously unanswered challenge lay identifying which stocks would fall and which ones would survive the shakeout. We develop an empirical valuation model and provide evidence that the Internet stocks that this model suggests were relatively over-valued prior to the Internet stock market correction experienced relatively larger drops in their price-to-sales ratios when the shakeout occurred. This result is robust to the inclusion of competing explanatory variables suggested by the economics literature related to industry rationalizations.We examine the ability of a valuation model comprised of both financial (accounting) variables and nonfinancial web traffic metrics to explain Internet companies' market values during each of 1999 and 2000. Our findings suggest that the reach and stickiness web traffic performance measures are value-relevant to the share prices of Internet companies in each of 1999 and 2000. Our findings of significance for the year 2000 contradict the recent claims of some analysts that web traffic measures are no longer important. We also explore the valuation role of our proxy for B2C companies' current rate of cash burn and find that this proxy is a significant value-driver in each of 1999 and 2000, but with differential valuation implications for each period. Our results suggest that the market was favorably disposed towards Internet companies' aggressive cash expenditures in 1999, but appeared to adopt a more critical view of Internet companies' cash burn rates in 2000. Our results further suggest that investors adopted a more skeptical attitude towards expenditures on intangible investments as the Internet sector began to mature. We find that investors appear to implicitly capitalize product development (R&D) and advertising expenses (customer acquisition costs) during the earlier period when the market was more optimistic about the prospects of B2C companies. However, only product development costs are implicitly capitalized into value, on average, subsequent to the shakeout in the spring of 2000. Finally, we provide statistical evidence to support the conjecture that different parameter vectors characterize the estimated market valuation models for each of 1999 and 2000. Overall, our study provides a preliminary view of the shakeout and maturation of one of the most important New Economy industries to emerge to date–the Internet.     

Manage customer-centric innovation--systematically

No matter how hard companies try, their approaches to innovation often don't grow the top line in the sustained, profitable way investors expect. For many companies, there's a huge difference between what's in their business plans and the market's expectations for growth (as reflected in firms' share prices, market capitalizations, and P/E ratios). This growth gap springs from the fact that companies are pouring money into their insular R&D labs instead of working to understand what the customer wants and using that understanding to drive innovation. As a result, even companies that spend the most on R&D remain starved for both customer innovation and market-capitalization growth. In this article, the authors spell out a systematic approach to innovation that continuously fuels sustained, profitable growth. They call this approach customer-centric innovation, or CCI. At the heart of CCI is a rigorous customer R&D process that helps companies to continually improve their understanding of who their customers are and what they need. By so doing, they consistently create or improve their customer value proposition. Customer R&D also focuses on better ways of communicating value propositions and delivering the complete experience to real customers. Since so much of the learning about customers and so much of the experimentation with different segmentations, value propositions, and delivery mechanisms involve the people who regularly deal with customers, it is absolutely essential for frontline employees to be at the center of the CCI process. Simply put, customer R&D propels the innovation effort away from headquarters and the traditional R&D lab out to those closest to the customer. Using the example of the luggage manufacturer Tumi, the authors provide a step-by-step approach for achieving true customer-centric innovation.     

Financial service call centres: Problems encountered by the grey market

Technological advances have resulted in financial service companies being able to make use of alternative channels such as call centres and the Internet to deliver their services to their customers. At the same time, there has been a major growth throughout Europe in the grey market consisting of people who grew up in an age of face-to-face contact with service suppliers. This paper reports on a programme of qualitative research looking at the grey market's perceptions of the call centre delivery channel. It discusses the difficulties encountered by this market and the negative views that are held. It also highlights the need for further research into this area if financial service organisations are going to address the issues raised and effectively satisfy the needs of this growing market segment.     

Managing for the next big thing. Interview by Paul Hemp

In this HBR interview, CEO Michael Ruettgers speaks in detail about the managerial practices that have allowed EMC to anticipate and exploit disruptive technologies, market opportunities, and business models ahead of its competitors. He recounts how the company repeatedly ventured into untested markets, ultimately transforming itself from a struggling maker of minicomputer memory boards into a data storage powerhouse and one of the most successful companies of the past decade. The company has achieved sustained and nearly unrivaled revenue, profit, and shareprice growth through a number of means. Emphasizing timing and speed, Ruettgers says, is critical. That's meant staggering products rather than developing them sequentially and avoiding the excessive refinements that slow time to market. Indeed, a sense of urgency, Ruettgers explains, has been critical to EMC's success. Processes such as quarterly goal setting and monthly forecasting meetings help maintain a sense of urgency and allow managers to get early glimpses of changes in the market. So does an environment in which personal accountability is stressed and the corporate focus is single-minded. Perhaps most important, the company has procedures to glean insights from customers. Intensive forums involving EMC engineers and leading-edge customers, who typically push for unconventional solutions to their problems, often yield new product features. Similarly, a customer service system that includes real-time monitoring of product use enables EMC to understand customer needs firsthand.     

The Impact of Denial-of-Service Attack Announcements on the Market Value of Firms

The increase in security breaches in the last few years and the need to insure information assets has created an intensified interest in information risk within organizations and for insurance companies. Risk assessment is an important component in the establishment of security policies. However, very little is known of the financial impact and the risk associated with security breaches. This article reports the impact of Denial‐of‐Service (DOS) attack announcements on the market over a period of 4.5 years. The study was conducted using event study methodology. The results show that in general the market does not penalize companies that experience such an attack. However, there is an indication that the market penalizes “Internet‐specific” companies more than other companies. Our results indicate that large companies who are not “Internet‐specific” might be overreacting to the media hype and may be investing resources to prevent a problem that has marginal impact on their shareholder value.     

Silo busting: how to execute on the promise of customer focus

For many senior executives, shifting from selling products to selling solutions--packages of products and services--is a priority in today's increasingly commoditized markets. Companies, however, aren't always structured to make that shift. Knowledge and expertise often reside in silos, and many companies have trouble harnessing their resources across those boundaries in a way that customers value and are willing to pay for. Some companies--like GE Healthcare, Best Buy, and commercial real estate provider Jones Lang LaSalle (JLL)--have restructured themselves around customer needs to deliver true solutions. They did so by engaging in four sets of activities: COORDINATION: To deliver customer-focused solutions, three things must occur easily across boundaries: information sharing, division of labor, and decision making. Sometimes this involves replacing traditional silos with customer-focused ones, but more often it entails transcending existing boundaries. JLL has experimented with both approaches. COOPERATION: Customer-centric companies, such as Cisco Systems, develop metrics for customer satisfaction and incentives that reward customer-focused cooperation. Most also shake up the power structure so that people who are closest to customers have the authority to act on their behalf. CAPABILITY: Delivering customer-focused solutions requires some employees to be generalists instead of specialists. They need experience with more than one product or service, a deep knowledge of customer needs, and the ability to traverse internal boundaries. CONNECTION: By combining their offerings with those of a partner, companies can cut costs even as they create higher-value solutions, as Starbucks has found through its diverse partnerships. To stand out in a commoditized market, companies must understand what customers value. Ultimately, some customers may be better off purchasing products and services piecemeal.     

Contextual marketing--the real business of the Internet

The painful truth is that the Internet has been a letdown for most companies--largely because the dominant model for Internet commerce, the destination Web site, doesn't suit the needs of those companies or their customers. Most consumer product companies don't provide enough value or dynamic information to induce customers to make the repeat visits--and disclose the detailed information--that make such sites profitable. In this article, David Kenny and John F. Marshall suggest that companies discard the notion that a Web site equals an Internet strategy. Instead of trying to create destinations that people will come to, companies need to use the power and reach of the Internet to deliver tailored messages and information to customers. Companies have to become what the authors call "contextual marketers." Delivering the most relevant information possible to consumers in the most timely manner possible will become feasible, the authors say, as access moves beyond the PC to shopping malls, retail stores, airports, bus stations, and even cars. The authors describe how the ubiquitous Internet will hasten the demise of the destination Web site--and open up scads of opportunities to reach customers through marketing "mobilemediaries," such as smart cards, e-wallets, and bar code scanners. The companies that master the complexity of the ubiquitous Internet will gain significant advantages: they'll gain greater intimacy with customers and target market segments more efficiently. The ones that don't will be dismissed as nuisances, the authors conclude. They suggest ways to become welcome additions--not unwelcome intrusions--to customers' lives.     

Interne Märkte im Versicherungsvertrieb – Konzeptionelle Überlegungen zu einem aktuellen Themenfeld

Societal and technological developments (i.e. expansion of the use of the Internet) continue to challenge insurance product distribution. These trends have lately given rise to a stronger market orientation in sales controlling and management. This paper discusses these trends and develops a conceptual framework for evaluating the advantages and disadvantages that follow from the implementation of so-called internal markets. The analysis concludes that a stronger market orientation is not only relevant for business units close to the sales force, but may also increase pressure on the insurance company as a whole to improve its customer orientation. The same holds with respect to innovative products and the efficient use of available resources.     

Is your company ready for one-to-one marketing?

One-to-one marketing, also known as relationship marketing, promises to increase the value of your customer base by establishing a learning relationship with each customer. The customer tells you of some need, and you customize your product or service to meet it. Every interaction and modification improves your ability to fit your product to the particular customer. Eventually, even if a competitor offers the same type of service, your customer won't be able to enjoy the same level of convenience without taking the time to teach your competitor the lessons your company has already learned. Although the theory behind one-to-one marketing is simple, implementation is complex. Too many companies have jumped on the one-to-one band-wagon without proper preparation--mistakenly understanding it as an excuse to badger customers with excessive telemarketing and direct mail campaigns. The authors offer practical advice for implementing a one-to-one marketing program correctly. They describe four key steps: identifying your customers, differentiating among them, interacting with them, and customizing your product or service to meet each customer's needs. And they provide activities and exercises, to be administered to employees and customers, that will help you identify your company's readiness to launch a one-to-one initiative. Although some managers dismiss the possibility of one-to-one marketing as an unattainable goal, even a modest program can produce substantial benefits. This tool kit will help you determine what type of program your company can implement now, what you need to do to position your company for a large-scale initiative, and how to set priorities.     

Marketing is everything

Technology is creating customer choice, and choice is altering the marketplace. Gone are the days of the marketer as salesperson. Gone as well is marketing that tries to trick the customer into buying whatever the company makes. There is a new paradigm for marketing, a model that depends on the marketer's knowledge, experience, and ability to integrate the customer and the company. Six principles are at the heart of the new marketing. The first, "Marketing is everything and everything is marketing," suggests that marketing is like quality. It is not a function but an all-pervasive way of doing business. The second, "The goal of marketing is to own the market, not just to sell the product," is a remedy for companies that adopt a limiting "market-share mentality." When you own a market, you lead the market. The third principle says that "marketing evolves as technology evolves." Programmable technology means that companies can promise customers "any thing, any way, any time." Now marketing is evolving to deliver on that promise. The fourth principle, "Marketing moves from monologue to dialogue," argues that advertising is obsolete. Talking at customers is no longer useful. The new marketing requires a feedback loop--a dialogue between company and customer. The fifth principle says that "marketing a product is marketing a service is marketing a product." The line between the categories is fast eroding: the best manufacturing companies provide great service, the best service companies think of themselves as offering high-quality products. The sixth principle, "Technology markets technology," points out the inevitable marriage of marketing and technology and predicts the emergence of marketing workstations, a marketing counterpart to engineers' CAD/CAM systems.     

客户型文化促进了企业创新吗?——来自中国制造业上市公司的经验证据

客户型文化是市场经济环境下企业重要的文化维度,是企业内部控制环境的组成部分,促使企业和客户之间的隐性契约得到较好地履行,有利于合作创新的开展.文章对客户型文化促进企业创新进行理论分析,并以2010-2017年A股制造业上市公司作为样本,实证检验了企业客户型文化对创新绩效的影响以及其中的中介路径.研究结果表明:(1)企业客户型文化对企业专利申请数有明显的促进作用;(2)降低大客户的波动性、增加客户的异质性和缓解企业的融资约束是客户型文化促进企业创新的中介路径.     

The stages of financial services product elimination

This paper examines product elimination in the UK's financial services industry. The literature review establishes that physical goods elimination theory has only limited application to the financial services sector. Specifically, it fails to take account of constraints that prevent the removal of a product to a state of nonexistence. To overcome this, the sector uses two forms of removal — full and partial elimination. A three-stage methodology is used to find out how products are eliminated in retail banks, building societies and insurance organisations. A model is developed which explains that companies within the sector proceed through four stages during the elimination process — identification, decision, implementation and post elimination evaluation. At the end of this process, a product will have been either partially or fully eliminated. The preference of the industry is to use partial elimination. It can be concluded that the customer relationship is a key determinate factor in the choice of elimination process.     

新理念 新方式--客户关系管理(CRM)的营销审视与运用

从营销角度看 ,CRM是一种新的营销理念 ,它强调以客户为中心 ,并将其当作一种企业资源来管理 ;CRM是一种新的营销方式 ,它强调企业要由重视产品营销转变为重视全方位的服务、由重视需求差异化转变为重视需求个性化、由重视顾客满意转变为重视顾客愉悦、由重视市场的外部调研转变为重视建立和运用客户数据库。中国企业要全面实施CRM ,必须解决信息流、货币流、物流、服务、产品和组织等方面的诸多问题     

Growth outside the core

Growth in an adjacent market is tougher than it looks; three-quarters of the time, the effort fails. But companies can change those odds dramatically. Results from a five-year study of corporate growth conducted by Bain & Company reveal that adjacency expansion succeeds only when built around strong core businesses that have the potential to become market leaders. And the best place to look for adjacency opportunities is inside a company's strongest customers. The study also found that the most successful companies were able to consistently, profitably outgrow their rivals by developing a formula for pushing out the boundaries of their core businesses in predictable, repeatable ways. Companies use their repeatability formulas to expand into any number of adjacencies. Some companies make repeated geographic moves, as Vodafone has done in expanding from one geographic market to another over the past 13 years, building revenues from $1 billion in 1990 to $48 billion in 2003. Others apply a superior business model to new segments. Dell, for example, has repeatedly adapted its direct-to-customer model to new customer segments and new product categories. In other cases, companies develop hybrid approaches. Nike executed a series of different types of adjacency moves: it expanded into adjacent customer segments, introduced new products, developed new distribution channels, and then moved into adjacent geographic markets. The successful repeaters in the study had two common characteristics. First, they were extraordinarily disciplined, applying rigorous screens before they made an adjacency move. This discipline paid off in the form of learning curve benefits, increased speed, and lower complexity. And second, in almost all cases, they developed their repeatable formulas by studying their customers and their customers' economics very, very carefully.     

The customer has escaped

Every company makes choices about the channels it will use to go to market. Traditionally, the decision to sell through a discount superstore or a pricey boutique, for instance, was guided by customer demographics. A company would identify a target segment of buyers and go with the channel that could deliver them. It was a fair assumption that certain customer types were held captive by certain channels--if not from cradle to grave, then at least from initial consideration to purchase. The problem, the authors say, is that today's customers have become unfettered. As their channel options have proliferated, they've come to recognize that different channels serve their needs better at different points in the buying process. The result is "value poaching." For example, certain channels hope to use higher margin sales to cover the cost of providing expensive high-touch services. Potential customers use these channels to do research, then leap to a cheaper channel when it's time to buy. Customers now hunt for bargains more aggressively; they've become more sophisticated about how companies market to them; and they are better equipped with information and technology to make advantageous decisions. What does this mean for your go-to-market strategy? The authors urge companies to make a fundamental shift in mind-set toward designing for buyer behaviors, not customer segments. A company should design pathways across channels to help its customers get what they need at each stage of the buying process--through one channel or another. Customers are not mindful of channel boundaries--and you shouldn't be either. Instead, they are mindful of the value of individual components in your channels--and you should be, too.     

CRM done right

Disappointed by the high costs and elusive benefits, early adopters of customer relationship management systems came, in the post dot-com era, to view the technology as just another overhyped IT investment whose initial promise would never be fulfilled. But this year, something unexpected is happening. System sales are rising, and executives are reporting satisfaction with their CRM investments. What's changed? A wide range of companies are successfully taking a pragmatic, disciplined approach to CRM. Rather than use it to transform entire businesses, they've directed their investments toward solving clearly defined problems within their customer relationship cycle. The authors have distilled the experiences of these CRM leaders into four questions that all companies should ask themselves as they launch their own CRM initiatives: Is the problem strategic? Is the system focused on the pain point? Do we need perfect data? What's the right way to expand an initial implementation? The questions reflect a new realism about when and how to deploy CRM to best advantage. Understanding that highly accurate and timely data are not required everywhere in their businesses, CRM leaders have tailored their real-time initiatives to those customer relationships that can be significantly enhanced by "perfect" information. Once they've succeeded with their first targeted CRM project, they can use it as a springboard for solving additional problems. CRM, in other words, is coming to resemble any other valuable management tool, and the keys to successful implementation are also becoming familiar: strong executive and business-unit leadership, careful strategic planning, clear performance measures, and a coordinated program that combines organizational and process changes with the application of new technology.