Dear white boss. Do you remember that first management-team offsite

It's easy for white managers to assume that their colleagues of color face the same basic challenges they do. On one level that's true--the work itself is the same. But on another level, African-American managers often contend with an atmosphere of tension, instability, and distrust that can be so frustrating they lose the desire to contribute fully. Their white bosses and coworkers are simply unaware of the "miasma" and are often puzzled when African-Americans quit apparently for no reason or seemingly overreact to a minor incident. This portrayal of what it's like to be different in the workplace takes the form of a fictional letter from a black manager to a white boss. The letter, based on interviews and surveys the authors conducted with hundreds of mid- to senior-level African-American managers, is not about the lack of role models or mentors of color or any of the other barriers that limit opportunities for blacks in corporate America. Instead, the letter sheds light on the realities that lurk below the surface for black managers--the feeling that they leave some part of their identities at home and the sometimes subtle and often systemic racial biases that inhibit and alienate African-Americans. "Differences really do matter, although they may matter in ways you probably didn't expect. One of the big ways they matter is that race is always with us," the letter writer observes. "As a friend of mine said recently, 'I don't think a day goes by that I'm not reminded that I'm black.'" The letter may not apply to every leader, black or white, or to every organization, but the issues are more widespread than corporate America cares to acknowledge. It should be required reading for all white executives who don't want talent to slip through their fingers.     

2000年的企业战略企业的核心能力:速度与时间

<正> 决定企业胜负最重要的因素之一,是自己公司在市场上所处的位置,即所谓的“位置决定”论。企业在市场中的位置主要表现为: 是否打入了规模已经相当大,而且正在成长的市场? 是否是在价值链中产生很大附加价值的部分作战? 是否有适合其市场特性的规模及差别化的因素? 与竞争对手相比是否已经取得了充分大的市场占有率?等等。 但是,通过分析世界性企业发现,即使在完全处于相同“位置”的企业之间,其业绩也存在着很大的差别。对企业来说,仅有取决于市场和企业规模的“位置决定”战略还不够,“如何作战”的作战方式,对企业业绩也非常有影响。     

What it means to work here

What distinguishes a company that has deeply engaged and committed employees from another one that doesn't? It's not a certain compensation scheme or talent-management practice. Instead, it's the ability to express to current and potential employees what makes the organization unique. Companies with highly engaged employees articulate their values and attributes through "signature experiences"--visible, distinctive elements of the work environment that send powerful messages about the organization's aspirations and about the skills, stamina, and commitment employees will need in order to succeed there. Whole Foods Market, for example, uses a team-based hiring and orientation process to convey to new employees the company's emphasis on collaboration and decentralization. At JetBlue, the reservation system is run by agents from their homes, a signature experience that boosts employees' satisfaction and productivity. Companies that successfully create and communicate signature experiences understand that not all workers want the same things. Indeed, employee preferences are an important but often overlooked factor in the war for talent. Firms that have engendered productive and engaged workforces address those preferences by following some general principles: They target potential employees as methodically as they target potential customers; they shape their signature experiences to address business needs; they identify and preserve their histories; they share stories--not just slogans--about life in the firm; they create processes consistent with their signature experiences; and they understand that they shouldn't try to be all things to all people. The best strategy for coming out ahead in the war for talent is not to scoop up everyone in sight but to attract the right people--those who are intrigued and excited by the environment the company offers and who will reward it with their loyalty.     

What makes an effective executive

An effective executive does not need to be a leader in the typical sense of the word. Peter Drucker, the author of more than two dozen HBR articles, says some of the best business and nonprofit CEOs he has worked with over his 65-year consulting career were not stereotypical leaders. They ranged from extroverted to nearly reclusive, from easygoing to controlling, from generous to parsimonious. What made them all effective is that they followed the same eight practices: They asked, "What needs to be done?" They also asked, "What is right for the enterprise?" They developed action plans. They took responsibility for decisions. They took responsibility for communicating. They were focused on opportunities rather than problems. They ran productive meetings. And they thought and said "we" rather than "I." The first two practices provided them with the knowledge they needed. The next four helped them convert this knowledge into effective action, for knowledge is useless to executives until it has been translated into deeds. The last two ensured that the whole organization felt responsible and accountable. Effective executives know that they have authority only because they have the trust of the organization. This means they must think of the needs and opportunities of the organization before they think of their own needs and opportunities. The author also suggests a ninth practice that's so important, he elevates it to the level of a rule: Listen first, speak last. The demand for effective executives is much too great to be satisfied by those few people who are simply born to lead. Effectiveness is a discipline. And, like every discipline, it can be learned and must be earned.     

Option Awards for Australian CEOs: The Who, What and Why

The compensation structure for Australian CEOs, and especially the extent to which they receive executive stock options, is explored. Evidence suggests that the award of executive stock options is common in Australia, but not in as systematic a manner as has been documented for US CEOs. Where ESOs are awarded, they form a significant component of total compensation, even allowing for limitations in the way we approximate their value. Modelling the use of ESOs shows relatively few empirical regularities, other than a positive association between firm size and ESO use. This is consistent with a view that ESOs are a form of "rent extraction" by CEOs, but it may also reflect a bias towards their use created by accounting rules.     

Hiring for smarts

Yes, it's nice when a leader is charismatic and confident. And a great resume can tell you a lot about a person's knowledge and experience. But such assets are no substitute for sheer business intelligence, and they reveal very little about a leader's ability to consistently reach the "right" answer. How can hiring managers flag individuals with such smarts? Historically, the only reliable measure of brainpower has been the standard IQ test, which is rarely used in business settings because of the specific subjects it tests for-math, reading, and spatial reasoning-and because of its multiple-choice format. Despite its shortcomings, the standard IQ test is still a better predictor of managerial success than any other assessment tool companies currently use, Justin Menkes argues. It's true that there isn't a version of IQ testing that applies to the corporate world, but in rejecting IQ tests altogether, hiring managers have thwarted their own attempts to identify true business stars. The author defines the specific subjects that make up "executive intelligence"-namely, accomplishing tasks, working with people, and judging oneself. He describes how to formulate questions to test job candidates for their mastery of these subjects, offering several examples based on real situations. Knowledge questions, such as those used in standard behavioral interviews, require people to recite what they have learned or experienced; intelligence questions call for individuals to demonstrate their abilities. Therefore, the questions in an executive intelligence test shouldn't require specific industry expertise or experience; any knowledge they call for must be rudimentary and common to all executives. And the questions should not be designed to ask whether the candidate has a particular skill; they should be configured so that the candidate will have to demonstrate that skill in the course of answering them.     

Selling the brand inside

When you think of marketing, chances are your mind goes right to your customers--how can you persuade more people to buy whatever it is you sell? But there's another "market" that's equally important: your employees. Author Colin Mitchell argues that executives by and large ignore this critical internal audience when developing and executing branding campaigns. As a result, employees end up undermining the expectations set by the company's advertising--either because they don't understand what the ads have promised or because they don't believe in the brand and feel disengaged or, worse, hostile toward the company. Mitchell offers three principles for executing internal branding campaigns--techniques executives can use to make sure employees understand, embrace, and "live" the brand vision companies are selling to the public. First, he says, companies need to market to employees at times when the company is experiencing a fundamental challenge or change, times when employees are seeking direction and are relatively receptive to new initiatives. Second, companies must link their internal and external marketing campaigns; employees should hear the same messages that are being sent to the market-place. And third, internal branding campaigns should bring the brand alive for employees, creating an emotional connection to the company that transcends any one experience. Internal campaigns should introduce and explain the brand messages in new and attention-grabbing ways and then reinforce those messages by weaving them into the fabric of the company. It is a fact of business, writes Mitchell, that if employees do not care about or understand their company's brands, they will ultimately weaken their organizations. It's up to top executives, he says, to give them a reason to care.     

The ten deadly mistakes of wanna-dots

Increasingly, it seems, there are just two types of companies left in the world: dot-coms, born on the Internet, and "wanna-dots," established organizations that are seeking to incorporate the Internet into their businesses. Some wanna-dots manage the deep mind-shift required to cross the digital divide. These are the pacesetters--the first movers and fast followers that exhibit organizational curiosity and the desire to innovate. But most wanna-dots are laggards; they don't rise to the challenge with the same resolve. In a global research effort involving more than 800 companies, the author uncovered so many wanna-dots making the same kinds of mistakes that it almost seemed they were following a How Not to Change guide. In this article, Kanter creates just such a guide, offering ten pieces of antiadvice that expose the tendency of wanna-dots to make only cosmetic changes when deep transformation is required. Beyond delineating what not to do, Kanter serves up two examples of wanna-dots that got it right. First, Williams-Sonoma, which successfully made up for a slow start to create a strong Web presence. Second, Honeywell, a pacesetter led by e-believers from the start, which still found the road to the Web a challenging one. For companies not born digital, the fundamental problem is change. And the real place to look for change is not on the Internet but inside your company--at your own organizational culture and your attitude toward change.     

Ways women lead

Women managers are succeeding not by adopting the traditional command-and-control leadership style but by drawing on what is unique to their experience as women. According to a study the author conducted for the International Women's Forum, men and women in similar managerial jobs make the same amount of money and experience roughly the same degree of work-family conflict. But when they describe their leadership styles, vast differences arise. Men are much more likely than women to view leadership as a series of transactions with subordinates, and to use their position and control of resources to motivate their followers. Women, on the other hand, are far more likely than men to describe themselves as transforming subordinates' self-interest into concern for the whole organization and as using personal traits like charisma, work record, and interpersonal skills to motivate others. Women leaders practice what the author calls "interactive leadership"--trying to make every interaction with coworkers positive for all involved by encouraging participation, sharing power and information, making people feel important, and energizing them. In general, women have been expected to be supportive and cooperative, and they have not held long series of positions with formal authority. This may explain why women leaders today tend to be more interactive than men. But interactive leadership should not be linked directly to being female, since some men use that style and some women prefer the command-and-control style. Organizations that are open to leadership styles that play to individuals' strengths will increase their chances of surviving in a fast-changing environment.     

Why change programs don't produce change

Faced with changing markets and tougher competition, more and more companies realize that to compete effectively they must transform how they function. But while senior managers understand the necessity of change, they often misunderstand what it takes to bring it about. They assume that corporate renewal is the product of company-wide change programs and that in order to transform employee behavior, they must alter a company's formal structure and systems. Both these assumptions are wrong, say these authors. Using examples drawn from their four-year study of organizational change at six large corporations, they argue that change programs are, in fact, the greatest obstacle to successful revitalization and that formal structures and systems are the last thing a company should change, not the first. The most successful change efforts begin at the periphery of a corporation, in a single plant or division. Such efforts are led by general managers, not the CEO or corporate staff people. And these general managers concentrate not on changing formal structures and systems but on creating ad hoc organizational arrangements to solve concrete business problems. This focuses energy for change on the work itself, not on abstractions such as "participation" or "culture." Once general managers understand the importance of this grass-roots approach to change, they don't have to wait for senior management to start a process of corporate renewal. The authors describe a six-step change process they call the "critical path."     

Bottom-feeding for blockbuster businesses

Marketing experts tell companies to analyze their customer portfolios and weed out buyer segments that don't generate attractive returns. Loyalty experts stress the need to aim retention programs at "good" customers--profitable ones- and encourage the "bad" ones to buy from competitors. And customer-relationship-management software provides ever more sophisticated ways to identify and eliminate poorly performing customers. On the surface, the movement to banish unprofitable customers seems reasonable. But writing off a customer relationship simply because it is currently unprofitable is at best rash and at worst counterproductive. Executives shouldn't be asking themselves, How can we shun unprofitable customers? They need to ask, How can we make money off the customers that everyone else is shunning? When you look at apparently unattractive segments through this lens, you often see opportunities to serve those segments in ways that fundamentally change customer economics. Consider Paychex, a payroll-processing company that built a nearly billion-dollar business by serving small companies. Established players had ignored these customers on the assumption that small companies couldn't afford the service. When founder Tom Golisano couldn't convince his bosses at Electronic Accounting Systems that they were missing a major opportunity, he started a company that now serves 390,000 U.S. customers, each employing around 14 people. In this article, the authors look closely at bottom-feeders--companies that assessed the needs of supposedly unattractive customers and redesigned their business models to turn a profit by fulfilling those needs. And they offer lessons other executives can use to do the same.     

The mismanagement of customer loyalty

Who wouldn't want loyal customers? Surely they should cost less to serve, they'd be willing to pay more than other customers, and they'd actively market your company by word of mouth, right? Maybe not. Careful study of the relationship between customer loyalty and profits plumbed from 16,000 customers in four companies' databases tells a different story. The authors found no evidence to support any of these claims. What they did find was that the link between customers and profitability was more complicated because customers fall into four groups, not two. Simply put: Not all loyal customers are profitable, and not all profitable customers are loyal. Traditional tools for segmenting customers do a poor job of identifying that latter group, causing companies to chase expensively after initially profitable customers who hold little promise of future profits. The authors suggest an alternative approach, based on well-established "event-history modeling" techniques, that more accurately predicts future buying probabilities. Armed with such a tool, marketers can correctly identify which customers belong in which category and market accordingly. The challenge in managing customers who are profitable but disloyal--the "butterflies"--is to milk them for as much as you can while they're buying from you. A softly-softly approach is more appropriate for the profitable customers who are likely to stay loyal--your "true friends." As for highly loyal but not very profitable customers--the "barnacles"--you need to find out if they have the potential to spend more than they currently do. And, of course, for the "strangers"--those who generate no loyalty and no profits--the answer is simple: Identify early and don't invest anything.     

Three challenges for public finance

Conclusions There is one common thread that runs through all three of these challenges. It is a plea to look beyond the standard model of taxation in which it is assumed that the taxed goods directly enter into individuals' utility functions or firms' production functions. At a very basic level this assumption is incorrect because what is taxed is what the taxpayer reports or the tax agency observes, not what the taxpayer consumes or the firm uses and produces. Thus we must analyze tax systems in which the compliance and enforcement elements are explicit.This focus is especially important for international taxation issues because of the difficulty of taxing nonresidents' income and the foreign-source income of domestic residents. It is inevitable that tax systems are designed with these practical difficulties in mind, and, in order to participate fully in the policy debates, economists ought to think carefully about these issues.The distinction may also hold the key to making sense of the empirical evidence about the impact of the U. S. tax changes of the 1980s. There are many avenues of response to tax rate changes other than changing one's consumption bundle or input mix; we need to think hard about whether these responses preclude or merely accompany the real responses that are of ultimate interest.If public finance is to decline in the 1990s, it will not be because of a lack of intellectually exciting challenges that confront us. There are many such challenges, and I am confident that they will attract the attention of both newly minted and well circulated economists.     

Accounting for Trends in Productivity and R&D: A Schumpeterian Critique of Semi-Endogenous Growth Theory

This paper argues that long-run trends in R&D and TFP are more supportive of fully endogenous "Schumpeterian" growth theory than they are of semi-endogenous growth theory. The distinctive prediction of semi-endogenous theory that sustained TFP growth requires sustained growth of R&D input is not supported by co-integration tests and forecasting exercises, as TFP growth has been stationary even though the growth rate of R&D input has fallen three-fold since the early 1950s. In contrast, the prediction of Schumpeterian theory that sustained TFP growth requires a sustained fraction of GDP to be spent on R&D is not contradicted by similar tests.     

Taste,information, and asset prices: implications for the valuation of CSR

Firms often undertake activities that do not necessarily increase cash flows (e.g., costly investments in corporate social responsibility or CSR), and some investors value these non cash activities (i.e., they have a “taste” for these activities). We develop a model to capture this phenomenon and focus on the asset-pricing implications of differences in investors’ tastes for firms’ activities and outputs. Our model shows that, first, investor taste differences provide a basis for investor clientele effects that are endogenously determined by the shares demanded by different types of investors. Second, because the market must clear at one price, investors’ demands are influenced by all dimensions of firm output even if their preferences are only over some dimensions. Third, information releases cause trading volume, even when all investors have the same information. Fourth, investor taste provides a rationale for corporate spin-offs that help firms better target their shareholder bases. Finally, individual social responsibility can lead to corporate social responsibility when managers care about stock price because price reacts to investments in CSR activities.     

A Synthesis of Equity Valuation Techniques and the Terminal Value Calculation for the Dividend Discount Model

This paper lays out alternative equity valuation models that involve forecasting for finite periods and shows how they are related to each other. It contrasts dividend discounting models, discounted cash flow models, and residual income models based on accrual accounting. It shows that some models that are apparently different yield the same valuation. It gives the general form of the terminal value calculation in these models and shows how this calculation serves to correct errors in the model. It also shows that all models can be interpreted as providing a particular specification of the terminal value for the dividend discount model. In so doing it shows how one calculates the terminal value for the dividend discount formula. The calculation involves weighting forecasted stocks and flows of value with weights determined by a parameter that can be discovered from pro forma analysis.     

The quest for resilience

In less turbulent times, executives had the luxury of assuming that business models were more or less immortal. Companies always had to work to get better, but they seldom had to get different--not at their core, not in their essence. Today, getting different is the imperative. It's the challenge facing Coca-Cola as it struggles to raise its "share of throat" in noncarbonated beverages. It's the task that bedevils McDonald's as it tries to restart its growth in a burger-weary world. It's the hurdle for Sun Microsystems as it searches for ways to protect its high-margin server business from the Linux onslaught. Continued success no longer hinges on momentum. Rather, it rides on resilience-on the ability to dynamically reinvent business models and strategies as circumstances change. Strategic resilience is not about responding to a onetime crisis or rebounding from a setback. It's about continually anticipating and adjusting to deep, secular trends that can permanently impair the earning power of a core business. It's about having the capacity to change even before the case for change becomes obvious. To thrive in turbulent times, companies must become as efficient at renewal as they are at producing today's products and services. To achieve strategic resilience, companies will have to overcome the cognitive challenge of eliminating denial, nostalgia, and arrogance; the strategic challenge of learning how to create a wealth of small tactical experiments; the political challenge of reallocating financial and human resources to where they can earn the best returns; and the ideological challenge of learning that strategic renewal is as important as optimization.     

Why should anyone be led by you?

We all know that leaders need vision and energy, but after an exhaustive review of the most influential theories on leadership--as well as workshops with thousands of leaders and aspiring leaders--the authors learned that great leaders also share four unexpected qualities. The first quality of exceptional leaders is that they selectively reveal their weaknesses (weaknesses, not fatal flaws). Doing so lets employees see that they are approachable. It builds an atmosphere of trust and helps galvanize commitment. The second quality of inspirational leaders is their heavy reliance on intuition to gauge the appropriate timing and course of their actions. Such leaders are good "situation sensors"--they can sense what's going on without having things spelled out for them. Managing employees with "tough empathy" is the third quality of exceptional leadership. Tough empathy means giving people what they need, not what they want. Leaders must empathize passionately and realistically with employees, care intensely about the work they do, and be straightforward with them. The fourth quality of top-notch leaders is that they capitalize on their differences. They use what's unique about themselves to create a social distance and to signal separateness, which in turn motivates employees to perform better. All four qualities are necessary for inspirational leadership, but they cannot be used mechanically; they must be mixed and matched to meet the demands of particular situations. Most important, however, is that the qualities encourage authenticity among leaders. To be a true leader, the authors advise, "Be yourself--more--with skill."     

Communicating total rewards to the generations

This is the first time in American history that four distinct generations have been in the workforce at the same time. Because employers have finite resources with which to compete for talent, they must understand the generations, what matters most to them and what they can do to motivate different generations of workers. Perhaps surprisingly, the author argues that the generations share in most valuing "soft cost" rewards over "hard dollar cost" items. This article advises employers on how to make their company a great place to work for all generations.