首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
相似文献
 共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 31 毫秒
1.
There's an unsung hero in your organization. It's the person who's bringing in new ideas from the outside about how to manage better. These aren't your product and service innovators--those people are celebrated loudly and often. This is the manager who, for instance, first uttered the phrase "balance scorecard" in your hallways, or "real options," or "intellectual capital." Managerial innovation is an increasingly important source of competitive advantage--especially given the speed with which product innovations are copied--but it doesn't happen automatically. It takes a certain kind of person to welcome new management ideas and usher them into an organization. The authors recently studied 100 such people to find out how they translate new ideas into action in their organizations. They discovered that they are a distinct type of practitioner; that is to say, they resemble their counterparts in other organizations more than they resemble their own colleagues, and they share a common way of working. "Idea practitioners," as the authors call them, begin by scouting for ideas. All of them are avid readers of management literature and enthusiastic participants in business conferences; many are friendly with business gurus. Once they've identified an idea that seems to hold promise, they tailor it to fit their organizations' specific needs. Next, they actively sell the idea--to senior executives, to the rank and file, to middle managers. And finally, they get the ball rolling by participating in small-scale experiments. But when those take off, they get out of the way and let others execute. In this article, the authors identify the characteristics of idea practitioners and offer strategies for managing them wisely.  相似文献   

2.
Entrepreneurship is more popular than ever: courses are full, policymakers emphasize new ventures, managers yearn to go off on their own. Would-be founders often misplace their energies, however. Believing in a "big money" model of entrepreneurship, they spend a lot of time trying to attract investors instead of using wits and hustle to get their ideas off the ground. A study of 100 of the 1989 Inc. "500" list of fastest growing U.S. start-ups attests to the value of bootstrapping. In fact, what it takes to start a business often conflicts with what venture capitalists require. Investors prefer solid plans, well-defined markets, and track records. Entrepreneurs are heavy on energy and enthusiasm but may be short on credentials. They thrive in rapidly changing environments where uncertain prospects may scare off established companies. Rolling with the punches is often more important than formal plans. Striving to adhere to investors' criteria can diminish the flexibility--the try-it, fix-it approach--an entrepreneur needs to make a new venture work. Seven principles are basic for successful start-ups: get operational fast; look for quick break-even, cash-generating projects; offer high-value products or services that can sustain direct personal selling; don't try to hire the crack team; keep growth in check; focus on cash; and cultivate banks early. Growth and change are the start-up's natural environment. But change is also the reward for success: just as ventures grow, their founders usually have to take a fresh look at everything again: roles, organization, even the very policies that got the business up and running.  相似文献   

3.
Spinouts rarely take off; most, in fact, fall into one or more of four traps that doom them from the start. Some companies spin out ventures that are too close to the core of their businesses, in effect selling off their crown jewels. Sometimes, a parent company uses the spinout primarily to pawn off debt or expenses or to quickly raise external capital for itself. Other times, a company may try to spin out an area of its business that lacks one or more of the critical legs of a successful company--a coherent business model, say, or a solid financial base. And in many cases, parent companies can't bring themselves to sever their ownership ties and give up control of their spinouts. R.J. Reynolds, the tobacco giant, managed to avoid these traps when it successfully spun out a most unlikely venture, the pharmaceutical company Targacept. As the story illustrates, the problem with spinouts is similar to the problem of rich children. Their parents have the wherewithal to spoil them or shelter them or cling to them, but what they need is tough love and discipline--much the same discipline that characterizes successful start-ups. R.J. Reynolds recognized that it didn't know that much about the pharmaceutical business and couldn't merely try to spin out a small clone of itself. It had to treat the venture as if it were essentially starting from scratch, with a passionate entrepreneurial leader, a solid business plan, help from outside partners in the industry, and ultimately substantial venture backing. That these lessons are less obvious to executives contemplating spinning out ventures closer to their core businesses may be why so many spinouts fail.  相似文献   

4.
They make up more than half your workforce. They work longer hours than anyone else in your company. From their ranks come most of your top managers. They're your midcareer employees, the solid citizens between the ages of 35 and 55 whom you bank on for their loyalty and commitment. And they're not happy. In fact, they're burned out, bored, and bottlenecked, new research reveals. Only 33% of the 7700 workers the authors surveyed feel energized by their work; 36% say they're in dead-end jobs. One in three is not satisfied with his or her job. One in five is looking for another. Welcome to middlescence. Like adolescence, it can be a time of frustration, confusion, and alienation. But it can also be a time of self-discovery, new direction, and fresh beginnings. Today, millions of midcareer men and women are wrestling with middlescence-looking for ways to balance work, family, and leisure while hoping to find new meaning in theirjobs. The question is, Will they find it in your organization or elsewhere? Companies are ill prepared to manage middlescence because it is so pervasive, largely invisible, and culturally uncharted. That neglect is bad for business: Many companies risk losing some of their best people or-even worse-ending up with an army of disaffected people who stay. The best way to engage middlescents is to tap into their hunger for renewal and help them launch into more meaningful roles. Perhaps managers can't grant a promotion to everyone who merits one in today's flat organizations, but you may be able to offer new training, fresh assignments, mentoring opportunities, even sabbaticals or entirely new career paths within your own company. Millions of midcareer men and women would like nothing better than to convert their restlessness into fresh energy. They just need the occasion-and perhaps a little assistance-to unleash and channel all that potential.  相似文献   

5.
Uzzi B  Dunlap S 《Harvard business review》2005,83(12):53-60, 151
Many sensational ideas have faded away into obscurity because they failed to reach the right people. A strong personal network, however, can launch a burgeoning plan into the limelight by delivering private information, access to diverse skill sets, and power. Most executives know that they need to learn about the best ideas and that, in turn, their best ideas must be heard by the rest of the world. But strong personal networks don't just happen around a watercooler or at reunions with old college friends. As Brian Uzzi and Shannon Dunlap explain, networks have to be carefully constructed through relatively high-stakes activities that bring you into contact with a diverse group of people. Most personal networks are highly clustered--that is, your friends are likely to be friends with one another as well. And, if you made those friends by introducing yourself to them, the chances are high that their experiences and perspectives echo your own. Because ideas generated within this type of network circulate among the same people with shared views, though, a potential winner can wither away and die if no one in the group has what it takes to bring that idea to fruition. But what if someone within that cluster knows someone else who belongs to a whole different group? That connection, formed by an information broker, can expose your idea to a new world, filled with fresh opportunities for success. Diversity makes the difference. Uzzi and Dunlap show you how to assess what kind of network you currently have, helping you to identify your super-connectors and demonstrating how you act as an information broker for others. They then explain how to diversify your contacts through shared activities and how to manage your new, more potent, network.  相似文献   

6.
Hamel G 《Harvard business review》1999,77(5):70-84, 183
In 1998, Silicon Valley companies produced 41 IPOs, which by January 1999 had a combined market capitalization of $27 billion--that works out to $54,000 in new wealth creation per worker in a single year. Multiply the number of employees in your company by $54,000. Did your business create that much new wealth last year? Half that amount? It's not a group of geniuses generating such riches. It's a business model. In Silicon Valley, ideas, capital, and talent circulate freely, gathering into whatever combinations are most likely to generate innovation and wealth. Unlike most traditional companies, which spend their energy in resource allocation--a system designed to avoid failure--the Valley operates through resource attraction--a system that nurtures innovation. In a traditional company, people with innovative ideas must go hat in hand to the guardians of the old ideas for funding and for staff. But in Silicon Valley, a slew of venture capitalists vie to attract the best new ideas, infusing relatively small amounts of capital into a portfolio of ventures. And talent is free to go to the companies offering the most exhilarating work and the greatest potential rewards. It should actually be easier for large, traditional companies to set up similar markets for capital, ideas, and talent internally. After all, big companies often already have extensive capital, marketing, and distribution resources, and a first crack at the talent in their own ranks. And some of them are doing it. The choice is yours--you can do your best to make sure you never put a dollar of capital at risk, or you can tap into the kind of wealth that's being created every day in Silicon Valley.  相似文献   

7.
When it comes to social responsibility, most companies are content to write out checks--often in large numbers--and let it go at that. General Mills is one company that likes to establish operating ventures that involve corporate officers and champion a cause. Such a venture is Altcare, a nonprofit organization designed to find more effective and less expensive ways of caring for elderly people who are getting frail but do not require acute care. In 1983, when the company chose this area as its next project, it realized it needed help from an organization with vast experience in the geriatric field. So it enlisted a nearby organization, the Wilder Foundation, and went into partnership as Altcare. The partnership has launched a service network for victims of Alzheimer's disease, a program with three other institutions to meet the myriad needs of chronically impaired people, and an unusual residence for physically impaired people, among other ventures. Altcare looks for advances and ideas that can be replicated, and the partnership often lends money to entrepreneurs who want to launch pioneering efforts or replicate Altcare initiatives. The cost to General Mills: about $80,000 a year after taxes, plus its share of any losses in project investments incurred by Altcare.  相似文献   

8.
Twenty years ago, it would have been shocking for a children's choir to sell singing telegrams or for an organization serving the homeless to dabble in property management. Today, it seems routine. Nonprofits increasingly feel compelled to launch earned-income ventures--not only to appear more disciplined and businesslike to stakeholders but also to reduce their reliance on fundraising. There's plenty of hype about the value of earned-income ventures in the nonprofit world, but such projects account for only a small share offunding in most nonprofit domains, and few of the ventures make money. Moreover, when the authors examined how nonprofits evaluate potential enterprises, they discovered a pattern of unwarranted optimism. The potential financial returns are often exaggerated, and the challenges of running a successful business are routinely discounted. But the biggest downside of such ventures is that they can distract nonprofits' managers from their core social missions and, in some cases, even subvert those missions. There are several reasons for the gap between the hype and the reality. One is that an organization's nonfinancial concerns-such as a desire to hire the disadvantaged-can hamper it in the commercial marketplace. Another is that nonprofits' executives tend to overlook the distinction between revenue and profit. For example, a youth services organization that had received funding to launch a food products enterprise hired young people and began making salad dressing. The nonprofit believed it spent $3.15 to produce each bottle of dressing that was sold for $3.50. But when expenses such as unused ingredients and managers' salaries were factored in, the cost per bottle reached a staggering $90. Earned-income ventures do have a role in the nonprofit sector, the authors say, but unrealistic expectations are distorting managers' decisions, wasting precious resources, and leaving important social needs unmet.  相似文献   

9.
How to write a great business plan   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
Every seasoned investor knows that detailed financial projections for a new company are an act of imagination. Nevertheless, most business plans pour far too much ink on the numbers - and far too little on the information that really matters. Why? William Sahlman suggests that a great business plan is one that focuses on a series of questions. These questions relate to the four factors critical to the success of every new venture: the people, the opportunity, the context, and the possibilities for both risk and reward. The questions about people revolve around three issues: What do they know? Whom do they know? and How well are they known? As for opportunity, the plan should focus on two questions: Is the market for the venture's product or service large or rapidly growing (or preferably both)? and Is the industry structurally attractive? Then, in addition to demonstrating an understanding of the context in which their venture will operate, entrepreneurs should make clear how they will respond when that context inevitably changes. Finally, the plan should look unflinchingly at the risks the new venture faces, giving would-be backers a realistic idea of what magnitude of reward they can expect and when they can expect it. A great business plan is not easy to compose, Sahlman acknowledges, largely because most entrepreneurs are wild-eyed optimists. But one that asks the right questions is a powerful tool. A better deal, not to mention a better shot at success, awaits entrepreneurs who use it.  相似文献   

10.
Why business models matter   总被引:45,自引:0,他引:45  
"Business model" was one of the great buzz-words of the Internet boom. A company didn't need a strategy, a special competence, or even any customers--all it needed was a Web-based business model that promised wild profits in some distant, ill-defined future. Many people--investors, entrepreneurs, and executives alike--fell for the fantasy and got burned. And as the inevitable counterreaction played out, the concept of the business model fell out of fashion nearly as quickly as the .com appendage itself. That's a shame. As Joan Magretta explains, a good business model remains essential to every successful organization, whether it's a new venture or an established player. To help managers apply the concept successfully, she defines what a business model is and how it complements a smart competitive strategy. Business models are, at heart, stories that explain how enterprises work. Like a good story, a robust business model contains precisely delineated characters, plausible motivations, and a plot that turns on an insight about value. It answers certain questions: Who is the customer? How do we make money? What underlying economic logic explains how we can deliver value to customers at an appropriate cost? Every viable organization is built on a sound business model, but a business model isn't a strategy, even though many people use the terms interchangeably. Business models describe, as a system, how the pieces of a business fit together. But they don't factor in one critical dimension of performance: competition. That's the job of strategy. Illustrated with examples from companies like American Express, EuroDisney, WalMart, and Dell Computer, this article clarifies the concepts of business models and strategy, which are fundamental to every company's performance.  相似文献   

11.
"The fastest way to succeed," IBM's Thomas Watson, Sr., once said, "is to double your failure rate." In recent years, more and more executives have embraced Watson's point of view, coming to understand what innovators have always known: Failure is a prerequisite to invention. But while companies may grasp the value of making mistakes at the level of corporate practices, they have a harder time accepting the idea at the personal level. People are afraid to fail, and corporate culture reinforces that fear. In this article, psychologist and former Harvard Business School professor Richard Farson and coauthor Ralph Keyes discuss how companies can reduce the fear of miscues. What's crucial is the presence of failure-tolerant leaders--executives who, through their words and actions, help employees overcome their anxieties about making mistakes and, in the process, create a culture of intelligent risk-taking that leads to sustained innovation. Such leaders don't just accept productive failure, they promote it. Drawing from their research in business, politics, sports, and science, the authors identify common practices among failure-tolerant leaders. These leaders break down the social and bureaucratic barriers that separate them from their followers. They engage at a personal level with the people they lead. They avoid giving either praise or criticism, preferring to take a nonjudgmental, analytical posture as they interact with staff. They openly admit their own mistakes rather than trying to cover them up or shifting the blame. And they try to root out the destructive competitiveness built into most organizations. Above all else, failure-tolerant leaders push people to see beyond traditional definitions of success and failure. They know that as long as a person views failure as the opposite of success, rather than its complement, he or she will never be able to take the risks necessary for innovation.  相似文献   

12.
We extend Lee and Lim (Rev Quant Financ Account 27:111–123, 2006) who provide empirical evidence on the impact of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and joint ventures on the value of information technology (IT) and non-IT firms. Using technology-motivated transactions, we examine whether there are differences in market response to the announcement of M&As and joint ventures, and we consider the long-term performance of such firms. We find the market provides no (positive) reaction to joint ventures (M&As) at the announcement. We also present new evidence suggesting the market reacts more favorably to the announcement of technology M&As relative to joint ventures for our full sample, IT sample and non-IT sample. However, our examination of these firms’ long-term performance suggests the initial reaction is not fully supported. The findings suggest improved (declining) operating performance for joint venture (M&A) firms, and evidence to conclude joint venture firms achieve superior long-term performance changes for both accrual- and cash-based measures. To explain these inconsistencies, we employ a set of control variables previously documented as determinants of the innovation ownership decision. For joint venture firms, we find that, while the market fails to consider the importance of the firms’ R&D intensity and growth prospects in its initial reaction, these are ultimately key indicators of their future performance. The evidence also suggests the market overreacts to M&A announcements because it over-weights the impact of R&D intensity on the firms’ future performance in its initial response.  相似文献   

13.
Hamm J 《Harvard business review》2002,80(12):110-5, 134
It's well known that many executives who excel at starting businesses or projects fizzle out--in other words, they fail to "scale"--as their ventures grow. But the reasons have remained fuzzy. In this article, leadership coach John Hamm identifies four management tendencies that work for small-company or business-unit leaders but become Achilles' heels as those individuals try to run larger organizations. The first tendency is loyalty to comrades. In entrepreneurial mode, you need to lead as though you're in charge of a combat unit on the wrong side of enemy lines. But blind loyalty can become a liability in managing a complex organization. The second tendency, task orientation, is critical in driving toward a big product launch, but excessive attention to detail can cause a large organization to lose sight of its long-term goals. The third tendency, single-mindedness, is important in a visionary unleashing a revolutionary product or service on the world but can limit the company's potential as it grows. And the fourth tendency, working in isolation, is fine for the brilliant scientist focused on an ingenious idea. But it's disastrous for a leader whose expanding organization increasingly relies on many other people. Leaders who scale deal honestly with problems and quickly weed out nonperformers. They see past distractions and establish strategic priorities. They learn how to deal effectively with diverse employees, customers, and external constituencies. And, most important, they make the company's continuing health and welfare their top concern.  相似文献   

14.
Semler R 《Harvard business review》2000,78(5):51-3, 56-8, 198
Once you say what business you're in, you put your employees into a mental straitjacket and hand them a ready-made excuse for ignoring new opportunities. So rather than dictate his company's identity, Ricardo Semler--the majority owner of Semco in S?o Paulo, Brazil--lets his employees shape it through their individual efforts and interests. "I don't know what Semco is," he writes in this first-person account of his company's expansion from manufacturing to Internet services. "Nor do I want to know." Ten years ago, Semco employees who were selling cooling towers to owners of large commercial buildings heard customers complain about the high cost of maintaining the towers. The salespeople proposed a new business in cooling-tower maintenance, and the venture is now a $30 million property-management business. That initiative led to the creation, with Semco's support, of an on-line exchange to facilitate the management of commercial construction projects. The exchange is revolutionizing the construction process in Brazil and has become a springboard for further Web initiatives such as virtual trade shows. The author shares some of the lessons he has learned along the way: Forget about the top line. Never stop being a start-up. Don't be a nanny (treat your employees like adults). Let talent find its place. Make decisions quickly and openly when it comes to reviewing proposals for new businesses. And partner promiscuously: "Our partners," Semler says, "are as much a part of our company as our employees."  相似文献   

15.
We examine the potential expropriation of a firm's intellectual capital that results from joint venture agreements when a firm's joint venture partner becomes the target of an acquisition attempt. We find that: (1) non-targeted joint venture partners often suffer losses in value upon the announcement of the acquisition; (2) the magnitude of the loss increases with the R&D intensity of the non-targeted joint venture partner; and (3) average bidder returns are less negative for acquirers if the affected joint venture partners report R&D spending and are in the same line of business as the acquirer. Our estimate of the average loss is $843 million per firm, roughly 3% of the non-targeted firm's pre-announcement equity value. Our evidence suggests a previously unrecognized merger motive in that joint ventures expose a firm's intellectual capital to the risk of expropriation.  相似文献   

16.
A buyer's guide to the innovation bazaar   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
Nambisan S  Sawhney M 《Harvard business review》2007,85(6):109-16, 118, 142
Companies seeking new ideas or product concepts from outside sources may find the "innovation bazaar," with its wide array of choices and methods of acquiring them, a confusing, chaotic place. Nambisan and Sawhney have crafted a conceptual guide for managers who understand the importance of going outside their firms for innovation but are uncertain about how to do it. The authors' "external sourcing continuum" shows at a glance how shopping for, say, raw ideas compares with shopping for market-ready products in terms of cost, risk, multiplicity of options, and speed of commercialization. Raw ideas, whether acquired directly from the inventor or through a patent broker, licensing agent, or some other intermediary, tend to be low cost but high risk and take a long time to bring to market. Market-ready products, often acquired as stand-alone businesses through a venture capitalist or business incubator, are more expensive and narrow one's choices, but they can be launched quickly and with less risk. Between these two approaches lies a third, facilitated by the "innovation capitalist." This new kind of intermediary provides client companies with access to a broad range of innovative product or technology ideas that are nearly market ready, thereby mitigating early-stage risks and lowering the time to market without significantly increasing acquisition costs. The authors compare the advantages and disadvantages of using intermediaries associated with the three approaches and provide a checklist of factors to consider when placing your company on the external sourcing continuum. If you've been oriented toward one end of the continuum or the other, you can increase your options and your flexibility by expanding into the middle.  相似文献   

17.
Coming up with creative ideas is easy; selling them to strangers is hard. Entrepreneurs, sales executives, and marketing managers often go to great lengths to demonstrate how their new concepts are practical and profitable--only to be rejected by corporate decision makers who don't seem to understand the value of the ideas. Why does this happen? Having studied Hollywood executives who assess screenplay pitches, the author says the person on the receiving end--the "catcher"--tends to gauge the pitcher's creativity as well as the proposal itself. An impression of the pitcher's ability to come up with workable ideas can quickly and permanently overshadow the catcher's feelings about an idea's worth. To determine whether these observations apply to business settings beyond Hollywood, the author attended product design, marketing, and venture-capital pitch sessions and conducted interviews with executives responsible for judging new ideas. The results in those environments were similar to her observations in Hollywood, she says. Catchers subconsciously categorize successful pitchers as showrunners (smooth and professional), artists (quirky and unpolished), or neophytes (inexperienced and naive). The research also reveals that catchers tend to respond well when they believe they are participating in an idea's development. As Oscar-winning writer, director, and producer Oliver Stone puts it, screen-writers pitching an idea should "pull back and project what he needs onto your idea in order to make the story whole for him." To become a successful pitcher, portray yourself as one of the three creative types and engage your catchers in the creative process. By finding ways to give your catchers a chance to shine, you sell yourself as a likable collaborator.  相似文献   

18.
The surprising economics of a "people business"   总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2  
When people are your most important asset, some standard performance measures and management practices become misleading or irrelevant. This is a danger for any business whose people costs are greater than its capital costs-that is, businesses in most industries. But it is particularly true for what the authors call "people businesses": operations with high employee costs, low capital investment, and limited spending on activities, such as R&D, that are aimed at generating future revenue. If you run a people business-or a company that includes one or more of them how do you measure its true performance? Avoid the trap of relying on capital-oriented metrics, such as return on assets and return on equity. They won't help much, as they'll tend to mask weak performance or indicate volatility where it doesn't exist. Replace them with financially rigorous people-oriented metrics-for example, a reformulation of a conventional calculation of economic profit, such as EVA, so that you gauge people, rather than capital, productivity. Once you have assessed the business's true performance, you need to enhance it operationally (be aware that relatively small changes in productivity can have a major impact on shareholder returns); reward it appropriately (push performance-related variable compensation schemes down into the organization); and price it advantageously (because economies of scale and experience tend to be less significant in people businesses, price products or services in ways that capture a share of the additional value created for customers).  相似文献   

19.
To the manager of the not-for-profit organization, the idea of entering into a business venture might seem heretical. The precedent has been set, however, and numbers of not-for-profits are currently earning substantial amounts of income through long-term for profit enterprises that have continuity with the organization's prime mission. The author of this article cautions managers of not-for-profits that an earned-income venture can be a miserable failure unless the organization meets certain conditions: a product to sell, managerial talent, trustee support, an entrepreneurial spirit, and money or the ability to get it. He then describes nine issues managers should consider before undertaking earned-income projects.  相似文献   

20.
The peak year for joint venture formation was 1995, which saw almost 5,700 new ventures. Since then, however, JV activity has gone into a sharp decline, with 2004 setting a new 10‐year low of just over 700 new deals, and many executives have completely dismissed joint ventures as a vehicle for growth. But is this the right conclusion? Perhaps for some companies. But for most, the answer may be to use the lessons from past failures to improve their ability to negotiate and manage joint ventures. This article offers five main pieces of advice: ? Don't rely too much on experience from negotiating acquisitions. JVs require a more balanced, less competitive negotiating style that can help set the tone for a good relationship. ? Don't allow the contract to dominate the relationship. If JV agreements are crafted more with the aim of building trust and achieving a shared understanding than designing explicit provisions for all contingencies, the parties will have stronger incentives to seek business solutions instead of legal remedies. ? Weigh carefully the value of commitment versus the value of flexibility. Although the ability to exit a bad deal clearly has option value, there may be greater value from the stability achieved by locking oneself into a relationship. ? Resist the urge for certainty in termination clauses. A “process‐oriented” approach will typically be more fair, resulting in smoother negotiations and a better working relationship, than an “outcome‐oriented” approach. ? Recognize when a JV has outlived its useful life, and do something about it before value is destroyed.  相似文献   

设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号