Mandatory Pensions and the Intensity of Adverse Selection in Life Insurance Markets

This article examines the impact of varying mandatory pensions on saving, life insurance, and annuity markets in an adverse selection economy. Under reasonable restrictions, we find unambiguous effects on market size, participation rates, and equilibrium prices. The degree of adverse selection, whether a market is active or inactive, and social welfare are analyzed.     

Lifetime asset allocation with idiosyncratic and systematic mortality risks

This paper considers a lifetime asset allocation problem with both idiosyncratic and systematic mortality risks. The novelty of the paper is to integrate stochastic mortality, stochastic interest rate and stochastic income into a unified framework. An investor, who is a wage earner receiving a stochastic income, can invest in a financial market, consume part of his wealth and purchase life insurance or annuity so as to maximize the expected utility from consumption, terminal wealth and bequest. The problem is solved via the dynamic programming principle and the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation. Analytical solutions to the problem are derived, and numerical examples are provided to illustrate our results. It is shown that idiosyncratic mortality risk has significant impacts on the investor’s investment, consumption, life insurance/annuity purchase and bequest decisions regardless of the length of the decision-making horizon. The systematic mortality risk is largely alleviated by trading the longevity bond. However, its impacts on consumption, purchase of life insurance/annuity and bequest as well as the value function are still pronounced, when the decision-making horizon is sufficiently long.     

Asymmetric Information, Long-Term Care Insurance, and Annuities: The Case for Bundled Contracts

This article examines the markets for long-term care insurance and annuities when there is asymmetric information and there are costs of administering contracts. Individuals differ in terms of their risk aversion. Risk-averse individuals take more care of their health and are relatively high risk in the annuities market and relatively low risk in the long-term care insurance market. In the long-term care insurance market, both separating and partial-pooling equilibria are possible. However, in the stand-alone annuity market, only separating equilibria are possible. We show, consistent with the extant empirical research, that in the presence of administration costs the more risk-averse individuals may buy relatively more long-term care insurance and more annuity coverage. Under the same assumptions, we show that equilibria exist with bundled contracts that Pareto dominate the outcomes with stand-alone contracts and are robust to competition from stand-alone contracts. The remaining empirical puzzle is to explain why bundled contracts are such a small share of the voluntary annuity market.     

Market Discipline in the Individual Annuity Market

Theoretical expectations related to market discipline generally suggest a positive relationship between firm financial strength and price. We examine market discipline in the individual annuity market by measuring annuity contract yields during the accumulation phase and find that, among other results, firm financial strength is positively related to yield (i.e., negatively related to price). We argue that this apparent anomaly can be viewed as a form of market discipline itself, for at least four related reasons, the foremost reason being that in order to compete in the asset accumulation market, an insurer has an incentive to provide a track record of historically strong credited interest rates within the annuity. In addition, the credited interest rates within an annuity are only revealed ex post over time, thus diminishing consumer ability to impose traditional market discipline relating firm financial strength and price, and also enabling financially weaker insurers to impose higher ex post prices in the form of lower realized annuity yields.     

On the Role of Patience in an Insurance Market With Asymmetric Information

We analyze a two-period competitive insurance market that is characterized by the simultaneous presence of moral hazard and adverse selection with regard to consumer time preferences. It is shown that there exists an equilibrium in which patient consumers use high effort and buy an insurance contract with high coverage, whereas impatient consumers use low effort and buy a contract with low coverage or even remain uninsured. This finding may help to explain why the opposite of adverse selection with regard to risk types can sometimes be observed empirically.     

On the Interaction between Transfer Restrictions and Crediting Strategies in Guaranteed Funds

Guaranteed funds with crediting rates for fixed periods determined by a pension provider or insurance company are common features of accumulation annuity contracts. Policyholders can transfer money back and forth between these accounts and money market accounts that give them features similar to demand deposits, and yet they frequently credit a higher rate than the money market. Transfer restrictions are commonly employed to prevent arbitrage. In this article, we model the interaction between company and policyholder as a multiperiod game in which the company maximizes risk-neutral expected present value of profits and the policyholder maximizes his expected discounted utility. We find that the optimal strategy on the part of the company is to credit a rate higher than the money market rate in the first period to entice the policyholder to invest in the guaranteed fund. The company then credits the floor in the remaining periods as the policyholder transfers out the maximum amount. This does better for the policyholder in low interest rate environments and worse in high interest rate environments and acts as a type of “interest rate insurance” for the policyholder.     

Using price distributions to estimate search costs

We show how the equilibrium restrictions implied by standard search models can be used to estimate search‐cost distributions using price data alone. We consider both sequential and non‐sequential search strategies, and develop estimation methodologies that exploit equilibrium restrictions to recover estimates of search‐cost heterogeneity that are theoretically consistent with the search models. We illustrate the method using online prices for several economics and statistics textbooks.     

Explaining Insurance Policy Provisions via Adverse Selection

In this article, we show that common insurance policy provisions—namely, deductibles, coinsurance, and maximum limits–can arise as a result of adverse selection in a competitive insurance market. Research on adverse selection typically builds on the assumption that different risk types suffer the same size loss and differ only in their probability of loss. In this study, we allow the severity of the insurance loss to be random and, thus, generalize the results of Rothschild and Stiglitz [1976] and Wilson [1977]. We characterize the separating equilibrium contracts in a Rothschild-Stiglitz competitive market. By further assuming a Wilson competitive market, we show that an anticipatory equilibrium might be achieved by pooling, and we characterize the optimal pooling contract.     

Trading death: The implications of annuity replication for the annuity puzzle,arbitrage, speculation and portfolios

Annuities are perceived as being illiquid financial instruments, and this has limited their attractiveness to consumers and their inclusion in financial models. However, short positions in annuities can be replicated using life insurance and debt, permitting long positions in annuities to be offset, or short annuity positions to be created. The implications of this result for the annuity puzzle, arbitrage between the annuity and life insurance markets, and speculation on expected longevity are investigated. It is argued that annuity replication could help reduce the annuity puzzle, improve the price efficiency of annuity markets and promote the inclusion of annuities in household portfolios.     

An Optimal Product Mix for Hedging Longevity Risk in Life Insurance Companies: The Immunization Theory Approach

This article investigates the natural hedging strategy to deal with longevity risks for life insurance companies. We propose an immunization model that incorporates a stochastic mortality dynamic to calculate the optimal life insurance–annuity product mix ratio to hedge against longevity risks. We model the dynamic of the changes in future mortality using the well‐known Lee–Carter model and discuss the model risk issue by comparing the results between the Lee–Carter and Cairns–Blake–Dowd models. On the basis of the mortality experience and insurance products in the United States, we demonstrate that the proposed model can lead to an optimal product mix and effectively reduce longevity risks for life insurance companies.     

Application of Relational Models in Mortality Immunization

The prediction of future mortality rates by any existing mortality models is hardly exact, which causes an exposure to mortality (longevity) risk for life insurers (annuity providers). Since a change in mortality rates has opposite impacts on the surpluses of life insurance and annuity, hedging strategies of mortality and longevity risks can be implemented by creating an insurance portfolio of both life insurance and annuity products. In this article, we apply relational models to capture the mortality movements by assuming that the realized mortality sequence is a proportional change and/or a constant shift of the expected one, and the size of the changes varies in the length of the sequences. Then we create a variety of non-size-free matching strategies to determine the weights of life insurance and annuity products in an insurance portfolio for mortality immunization, where the weights depend on the sizes of the proportional and/or constant changes. Comparing the hedging performances of four non-size-free matching strategies with corresponding size-free ones proposed by Lin and Tsai, we demonstrate with simulation illustrations that the non-size-free matching strategies can hedge against mortality and longevity risks more effectively than the size-free ones.     

Insurance Contract Design When the Insurer Has Private Information on Loss Size

This article examines the optimal indemnity contract in an insurance market, when the insurer has private information about the size of an insurable loss. Both parties know whether or not a loss occurred, but only the insurer knows the true value of the loss and/or to what extent the losses are covered under the policy. The insured may verify the insurer's loss estimate for a fixed auditing cost. The optimal contract reimburses the auditing costs in addition to full insurance for losses less than some endogenous limit. For losses exceeding this limit, the contract pays a fixed indemnity and requires no monitoring. The optimal contract is compared with the contracts obtained in cases where it is only the insured who can observe the loss size.
     

Optimal Tax Deductions for Net Losses Under Private Insurance With an Upper Limit

Kaplow (1992b) shows that governments should not provide a tax deduction for net losses when a private insurance contract is available. However, his findings rest on the assumption that the private insurance is proportional coverage. We find that Kaplow's conclusions may not hold when the private insurance contract contains an upper limit. The findings of our article show that Kaplow's conclusions are sensitive to the assumption that the insurance contract is available in the private market.     

Adverse selection in the annuity market with sequential and simultaneous insurance demand

This paper investigates the effect of adverse selection on the private annuity market in a model with two periods of retirement and two types of individuals, who differ in their life expectancy. In order to introduce the existence of time-limited pension insurance, we consider a model where for each period of retirement separate contracts can be purchased. Demand for the two periods can be decided sequentially or simultaneously. We show that only a situation where all risk types choose sequential contracts is an equilibrium and that this outcome is favourable for the long-living, but is unfavourable for the short-living individuals. JEL Classification D82 · D91 · G22     

Stochastic mortality under measure changes

We provide a self-contained analysis of a class of continuous-time stochastic mortality models that have gained popularity in the last few years. We describe some of their advantages and limitations, examining whether their features survive equivalent changes of measures. This is important when using the same model for both market-consistent valuation and risk management of life insurance liabilities. We provide a numerical example based on the calibration to the French annuity market of a risk-neutral version of the model proposed by Lee & Carter (1992).     

Information Aggregation via Contracting

When a group of investors with dispersed private information jointly invest in a risky project, how should they divide the project's profit? We show that a simple contract dividing profits in proportion to investors' risk tolerances may facilitate information aggregation by altering investors' risk-taking incentives when they decide on how investment strategies respond to private information. Our results provide a contracting-based approach for information aggregation, which is an alternative to learning from endogenous market variables (e.g., prices) via contingent schedules as seen in well-known rational expectations equilibrium models.     

To Hedge or Not to Hedge: Managing Demographic Risk in Life Insurance Companies

Demographic risk, i.e., the risk that life tables change in a nondeterministic way, is a serious threat to the financial stability of an insurance company having underwritten life insurance and annuity business. The inverse influence of changes in mortality laws on the market value of life insurance and annuity liabilities creates natural hedging opportunities. Within a realistically calibrated shareholder value (SHV) maximization framework, we analyze the implications of demographic risk on the optimal risk management mix (equity capital, asset allocation, and product policy) for a limited liability insurance company operating in a market with insolvency‐averse insurance buyers. Our results show that the utilization of natural hedging is optimal only if equity is scarce. Otherwise, hedging can even destroy SHV. A sensitivity analysis shows that a misspecification of demographic risk has severe consequences for both the insurer and the insured. This result highlights the importance of further research in the field of demographic risk.     

Effects of Competition on Insurance Contract Formation

For an insurance transaction between a single risk-averse buyer and single risk-neutral seller with positive transaction costs, it is well known that the buyer will prefer a policy contract with an ordinary deductible. More detailed results demonstrate the Pareto optimality of an insurance contract characterized by a deductible (followed by coinsurance) for a single risk-averse buyer and single risk-averse seller. In the present work, we employ a market-game model to solve for the equilibrium insurance contract. This formulation, which approximates the behavior of excess property insurance and property catastrophe reinsurance markets, reveals that the equilibrium policy is described by full insurance up to a given policy limit, with no deductible or coinsurance. Our analysis shows further that this solution persists regardless of the numbers of buyers and sellers in the market, and in particular that the market-game equilibrium does not converge to a Pareto-optimal result because of boundary constraints on the number of sellers. Finally, we test our price-formation mechanism against an important generalization, and find that the policy-limit contract persists.     

Creating Customer Value in Participating Life Insurance

The value of a life insurance contract may differ depending on whether it is looked at from the customer's point of view or that of the insurance company. We assume that the insurer is able to replicate the life insurance contract's cash flows via assets traded on the capital market and can hence apply risk‐neutral valuation techniques. The policyholder, on the other hand, will take risk preferences and diversification opportunities into account when placing a value on that same contract. Customer value is represented by policyholder willingness to pay and depends on the contract parameters, that is, the guaranteed interest rate and the annual and terminal surplus participation rate. The aim of this article is to analyze and compare these two perspectives. In particular, we identify contract parameter combinations that—while keeping the contract value fixed for the insurer—maximize customer value. In addition, we derive explicit expressions for a selection of specific cases. Our results suggest that a customer segmentation in this sense, that is, based on the different ways customers evaluate life insurance contracts and embedded investment guarantees while ensuring fair values, is worthwhile for insurance companies as doing so can result in substantial increases in policyholder willingness to pay.     

Risk Mutualization and Competition in Insurance Markets

The aim of this paper is to analyze the impact of mutual firms on competition in the insurance market. We distinguish two actors in this market: mutual firms, which belong to their pooled members, and traditional companies, which belong to their shareholders. Our approach differs from the literature by one crucial assumption: the expected utility of the consumers depends on the size of their insurance firm, which generates network externalities in this market. Thus, the choice of a contract results in a trade-off between the premium level and the probability of that premium being ex-post adjusted. The optimal contract offered by a mutual firm involves a systematic ex-post adjustment (negative or positive), while the contracts a company offers imply a fixed premium that is possibly negatively adjusted at the end of the contractual period. In an oligopoly game, we show that three types of configurations are possible at equilibrium: either one mutual firm or insurance company is active, or a mixed structure emerges in which two or more companies share the market with or without a mutual firm.