会计师事务所合并与审计定价——基于2003—2009年十起合并案面板数据的研究

会计师事务所合并究竟是会提高还是会降低审计收费,取决于合并后事务所声誉及市场势力提升所带来的审计溢价与规模效应所导致的审计成本降低两方面孰者相对占优。文章以我国2003—2009年间十起事务所合并案为对象,利用其上市公司客户在事务所合并前后各2年的面板数据,检验了事务所合并对审计定价的影响。结果发现,事务所合并后,其审计收费显著提高。对所有事务所客户审计费用的横向比较也印证了上述结论。研究还发现,事务所合并后第一年审计收费的提升较第二年更为明显;就稳定客户数据而言,本土事务所之间合并对审计定价的影响不如涉及"四大"的合并显著;此外,新设合并与吸收合并对审计定价的影响没有显著差异。     

会计师事务所合并对审计收费的影响研究

本文以2006年至2008年间我国证券审计市场中会计师事务所合并案例为研究样本,对审计收费与事务所合并行为及其带来的事务所规模扩大之间的关系进行回归分析,考察了会计师事务所合并对其审计收费的影响.研究发现,在控制了客户的规模、客户报表的复杂程度、客户的风险、审计意见类型等因素之后,事务所之间的合并行为和由此带来的事务所规模的扩大与审计收费之间存在显著的正向相关关系,这也从一个侧面提供了有关事务所合并的经济后果的经验证据.     

我国本土会计师事务所合并对审计收费的影响研究

本文以我国证券审计市场2009年的事务所合并案为例,通过合并前一年至合并后两年共四年数据之间的两两比较,考察了本土事务所合并对审计收费影响的动态变化过程。研究发现,合并后两年与合并前一年相比、合并后两年与合并当年相比,事务所的审计收费显著提高,而其他组没有显著变化。     

审计收费信息强制披露与审计环境的改善——来自中国审计市场的证据

2001年开始实施的审计收费信息强制披露规定，是改善了我国审计环境还是恶化了审计环境？本文采用三种相互补充的研究设计具体考察2001年开始实施的审计收费信息强制披露政策对我国审计环境的影响，结果发现强制披露规定颁布日国内会计师事务所主审的上市公司的累计异常回报高于中外合作会计师事务所主审的上市公司，进一步研究发现，在审计收费信息首次披露后年度（2002-2003），国内会计师事务所的审计收费与中外合作会计师事务所的审计收费的差异显著缩小、审计质量显著提高。而且上述发现在国内小会计师事务所表现更为明显。这基本上支持审计环境改善的假说。     

上市公司法律风险与审计收费——来自中国上市公司的经验证据北大核心

本文实证检验了法律风险对审计收费的影响。结果发现:上市公司的法律风险和审计收费显著正相关。进一步研究表明,国内会计师事务所审计的上市公司,法律风险和审计收费显著正相关,而由"四大"会计师事务所审计的上市公司,法律风险和审计收费相关性不显著。这可以用审计质量溢价来解释,比起国内会计师事务所,"四大"会计师事务所存在明显的审计质量溢价,在审计定价时,法律风险不是主要影响因素。     

权力的“恶之花”:IPO中的寻租、审计市场异化与资本市场惩戒

本文关注中国上市公司IPO的过程中的寻租、市场分割与市场惩戒现象,检验了失去约束的权力与权责不对称情况下滋生的"恶之花"。使用2006-2010年期间中国资本市场IPO公司的手工数据,本文研究发现:(1)证监会发行审核委员会(发审委)中的会计师关系显著提高了拟IPO公司的过会概率;(2)发审委中的会计师关系显著增加了关联事务所的审计收费以及在IPO审计中的市场份额;(3)公司IPO后的累计超额回报与发审委中的会计师关系显著负相关。上述研究发现联合支持了如下层层递进的逻辑与结论:发审委中的会计师委员使得特定的会计师事务所拥有了IPO过程中非常重要的"投票权"和权力,为此一些拟IPO公司通过将审计业务交由发审委中的会计师委员关联的会计师事务所进行审计,实现了有效率的寻租,结果是显著提高了公司IPO申请的过会概率。同时发审委中的会计师委员关联的事务所相应获得了IPO审计市场的超额审计收费、显著增加了IPO审计市场份额。但是,IPO后中国资本市场给予寻租的公司严厉的市场惩戒。上述研究发现敦促中国资本市场发审制度的改革。     

论会计师事务所合并对审计质量的影响

会计师事务所在我国快速增长的经济中发挥着越来越大的作用,虽然本土会计师事务所在规模上不断扩大,但却存在着大而不强的局面。在并购浪潮越来越热的情况下,会计师事务所也希望通过并购寻求增长。本文以此为研究目的,研究不同的会计师事务所合并后出现的情况对审计质量带来的影响,根据相关的调查研究可以发现,虽然合并之后规模有所扩大,但是,审计质量并没有显著的提升,反而出现下降。本文就会计师事务所、行业协会和政府三个不同的方面对会计师事务所合并后如何更好的提升审计质量提出合理化的建议。     

事务所所有权规模对审计收费的影响及检验

根据中国2007~2011年全部A股上市公司的年报数据,从理论上分析了会计师事务所所有权规模对审计收费的影响并进行了实证检验。研究发现有限责任会计师事务所所有权规模与审计收费显著正相关,即随着事务所所有权规模的增大,审计收费也增大。研究同时发现,相对于私有产权上市公司,事务所对国有产权上市公司的盈余管理收取了更高的审计费用。     

会计师事务所合并的经济后果文献综述

合并是会计师事务所实现规模扩张的重要途径。目前,国内外学者对于会计师事务所合并经济后果的研究较为广泛,包括合并对审计收费的影响研究,对审计质量的影响研究以及对审计师行业专长的研究。以往对于会计师事务所合并经济后果的理论和案例研究较多,近几年实证研究逐渐增多,但各方学者所得结论随研究角度和样本的不同而不同。因此,会计师事务所合并经济后果产生的内在机理有待进一步研究。     

会计师事务所的属性重要性与审计收费——基于中国会计师事务所综合评价前百家信息的证据

审计收费是对事务所的审计师团队努力的回报,而审计师团队有多种不同重要程度的属性,因此有必要把会计事务所作为一个拥有多个属性重要性的系统,具体考察其对于审计收费的影响。本文根据中国注册会计师协会年度会计师事务所综合评价前百家信息,具体考察了会计事务所的属性重要性对审计收费的影响。研究表明,事务所中的CPA的教育结构、CPA的经验(年龄)结构和事务所综合规模对审计收费具有显著正向影响。事务所其他属性与审计收费未发现存在显著相关性。     

Audit firm merger and the strategic response by large audit firms

We examine the impact of a change in the audit industry structure in China as a result of two recent mergers involving large non-Big 4 audit firms. The ‘New Big’ audit firms, Ruihua and BDO Lixin, became the third and fourth largest audit firms in China following audit firm mergers, outranking both EY and KPMG in terms of total audit revenues in 2013. We find a significant audit fee and audit quality increase for the New Big audit firms relative to the Big 4 audit firms following the mergers. While this finding could be interpreted as an increase in quality as a result of audit firm consolidation, we find that this net effect is due to a decrease in audit fees and audit quality for the Big 4 following the mergers, rather than an increase in audit fees and audit quality by the New Big audit firms. We discuss the implications of our findings for various regulators.     

Local Gambling Attitudes and Audit Quality: Evidence from Audit Adjustments

This study examines the influence of local gambling attitudes on audit quality. As a preference for gambling correlates to a greater tendency to take risks, we hypothesize that auditors make a greater magnitude of audit adjustments for clients headquartered in gambling-prone areas to reduce heightened audit risk. Consistent with our hypothesis, the empirical results show a positive relation between local gambling attitudes and the magnitude of audit adjustments. Further analyses show that this association is more pronounced when the regulatory cost is higher, and when the board chair or CEO comes from a gambling-prone area. We also find evidence that gambling culture results in greater magnitudes of both upward and downward audit adjustments, audit firms appoint more experienced audit partners to gambling-prone clients, and there is a fee premium for gambling-prone clients.     

Public Disclosure of Audit Fees and Bargaining Power between the Client and Auditor: Evidence from China

Before the public disclosure of audit fees was mandated, it was unlikely for an audit client to have accurate information about how much other companies were charged by their auditors. Public fee disclosure decreases the cost of auditees' access to audit fee information for the auditor's portfolio of clients and is thus likely to increase the relative bargaining power of auditees over auditors when they negotiate audit fees. Using both proprietary and public audit fee data before and after public fee disclosure was mandated in China, we provide evidence consistent with the preceding conjecture. We find that public fee disclosure reinforces the magnitude of audit fee decreases for overcharged clients and weakens auditors' ability to raise audit fees for undercharged clients. These findings suggest the existence of unintended consequences of public fee disclosure regulation, the original rationale of which was a concern about audit pricing practices that could undermine auditor independence.     

对我国审计收费制度及收费现状的理性思考

结合我国特殊的制度背景研究审计收费问题已逐渐成为审计理论研究的热门话题。本在相关课题调研的基础上，对我国审计收费现状进行了分析，并结合中西方审计收费制度的理论和实践。提出了改进我国审计收费制度的建议。     

Audit Firm Ranking,Audit Quality and Audit Fees: Examining Conflicting Price Discrimination Views

In this study, we examine whether highly ranked audit firms in Iran, as determined by the Securities and Exchange Organization (SEO), earn a fee premium, firstly, by providing superior quality audit services or, secondly, due to reputation created by the ranking system implemented by the SEO. We employ price discrimination theory, and we test quality discrimination versus brand reputation explanations in the context of a unique institutional setting (where international audit firms are not allowed to operate). The data are derived from firms listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) for the period 2006 to 2015. Our results show that the quality of audit services (using all of our measures) provided by the highest ranked audit firms is not superior to that of the non-highest ranked firms. In addition, the audit fee models suggest that the highest ranked firms charge significantly more audit fees compared to lower ranked firms. We employ several sensitivity tests and the results do not change materially. Such findings go against the “quality-based price discrimination” view but support the reputation-based view, and make a significant contribution towards understanding the economic consequences of state-determined ranking of audit firms rather than allowing the market to determine quality differentiation.     

Note on audit fee premiums to client size and industry specialization

This research note examines the impact of client size on the estimation of audit fee premiums in the Australian market for audit services. Previous research suggests that higher audit fees are expected for both larger clients and for industry specialization. We find that in the Australian market for audit services, the fee premium attributed to industry specialist audit firms is concentrated in the audit fees paid by the largest clients in each industry. One reason for higher fees paid by larger clients is the demand for additional audit services. We find higher fees for companies cross‐listed on US exchanges. We also find that fee premiums to auditors that are city‐industry leaders are strongly related to client size.     

Effects of SOX 404(b) implementation on audit fees by SEC filer size category

This study provides novel information about the consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) by documenting differential audit fee shocks accompanying implementation of SOX 404(b) internal control tests and reports for clients in three size categories: large accelerated filers (LAFs), small accelerated filers (SAFs), and non-accelerated filers (NAFs). First, we find that although both LAFs and SAFs experience audit fee shocks attributable to 404(b), SAFs on average experience relatively greater fee shocks than LAFs (107.8% versus 84.6%; Table 6). Second, even though NAFs are not subject to 404(b) procedures, we document a 42.7% fee shock for NAFs. Our interpretation is that 404(b) generated an immediate increase in demand for audit services with no corresponding sudden increase in supply of experienced audit personnel, enabling audit firms to charge higher prices for all filers including NAFs. We find that audit fee shocks attributable to 404(b) are positively associated with audit offices’ bargaining power relative to clients, and that the effect of offices’ bargaining power is strongest for SAFs and weakest for NAFs. Although higher audit fees (with client characteristics held constant) are often considered an indicator of better audit quality, we find virtually no evidence that the massive fee increases in 2004 are accompanied by improvements in same-year or next-year audit quality, measured as decreases in discretionary accruals and a lower likelihood of subsequent restatements of audited financial reports.