零售商信息分享影响延保服务供应链产品定价及服务质量决策机理探讨

当零售商与生产商分享需求预测信息时,对延保服务供应链的产品定价、服务定价和服务质量决策均产生影响,但现有文献尚未涉及有关零售商信息分享对延保服务供应链成员企业定价及服务质量决策的影响机理。笔者依据主从博弈理论,通过建立延保服务供应链分别采用集中决策与分散决策两种模式、零售商进行信息分享或不分享情形下的决策模型,对不同决策模式下延保服务供应链成员的均衡产品价格高低、延保服务价格高低及延保服务质量优劣之对比分析,探讨零售商与生产商进行需求信息分享对延保服务供应链成员的产品价格、延保服务价格及延保服务质量决策的影响机理。研究发现：随着消费者的延保服务质量敏感性提高、价格敏感性降低及延保服务成本系数减小,集中决策模式下需求信息分享使得延保服务供应链整体利润提升的额度增大;分散决策模式下,若零售商对市场需求的预测值大于市场需求的均值,信息分享使得产品批发价及零售价、延保服务批发价及质量均提高。本研究揭示了需求信息分享对延保服务供应链成员定价及延保服务质量决策的影响机理,丰富了延保服务供应链运营决策研究的现有文献,为合理运用需求预测信息优化延保服务供应链运营决策提供了理论依据。     

滞后效应影响下绿色供应链决策机制研究

考虑产品绿色度研发的滞后效应会影响绿色供应链成员的决策,构建单个供应商和零售商的Stackelberg微分博弈模型和协同合作博弈模型,分析比较两种模型中供应商和零售商的均衡策略。研究表明,滞后效应会影响绿色供应链成员的决策选择:当产品研发滞后效应较弱时,协同合作博弈模型可以实现环境效益和经济效益双赢;当滞后效应较强时,供应链成员将选择Stackelberg微分博弈模型实现经济效益最大化。     

考虑随机市场需求和零售商风险规避的绿色供应链内部融资策略研究

在绿色供应链市场中,通过零售商向供应商提供投资或贷款,可以减少因供应商资金不足、无法正常组织生产引起的零售商以及整个供应链的损失。在随机市场需求情形下,构建供应商资金约束的供应链内部股权融资和债权融资模型,分析供应商和零售商的最优决策和对其的影响。研究发现,随着消费者绿色偏好、零售商的风险规避程度以及利润分配率的增加,产品绿色度和产品批发价格相应提高;在供应商资金约束的情况下,无论进行股权融资还是债权融资,产品绿色度都会提高;供应商和零售商为了实现自身利益最大化会选择不同的融资策略,只有当利润分配率控制在一定区间时,实行股权融资模式,才能使双方均实现利益最大化。     

制造商公平关切行为对绿色供应链生态标签策略的影响研究

考虑制造商存在公平关切行为,构建基于制造商为主导的Stackelberg绿色供应链博弈模型,研究自贴与行业认证生态标签策略下,制造商不同公平关切程度对绿色供应链各成员最优均衡决策的影响。结果表明：当制造商公平中性时,自贴和行业认证生态标签策略下,制造商利润均大于零售商。当制造商存在公平关切时,相较于自贴策略,行业认证策略下伴随制造商公平关切程度的增加,单位产品绿色度、零售商单位批零差价及绿色推广努力水平均较高,且呈现递增趋势;制造商成本与批发价的中间盈利也略高,但呈现下降趋势。同时,行业认证策略下零售商最优效用更高,制造商最优效用相对略低;但绿色供应链系统总效用均伴随制造商公平关切程度的增加而持续上升。     

基于碳税下的供应链碳减排融资决策研究

全球变暖日益加剧,为实现低碳理念,政府根据碳排放量征收碳税.为响应国家的低碳号召与节省缴税,供应商将进行碳减排投资,而我国中小企业居多的现状使得其必须进行碳减排融资.针对供应商向零售商进行内部融资的情形,在分散决策和集中决策下,运用两阶段Stackelberg博弈理论,根据供应链利润最大化条件进行优化.结果表明:分散决策下,低碳税率和供应商超额收益率的升高以及零售商净机会成本率的降低均会导致供应链总利润升高,单位碳减排量成本的升高会导致供应链总利润的降低,且集中决策的供应链总利润高于分散决策.     

零售商提高食品安全问题研究

近年品牌零售商食品安全在我国频发,本文尝试运用系统动力学的方法来研究面对消费者和工商部门的压力情形下,零售商提高对供应商的产品抽检率后,供应商生产工艺的变化、供应商和零售商的利润水平的变化。为研究食品供应链中的食品安全问题提供一种新的思路。     

零售商提高食品安全问题研究

近年品牌零售商食品安全在我国频发，本文尝试运用系统动力学的方法来研究面对消费者和工商部门的压力情形下，零售商提高对供应商的产品抽检率后，供应商生产工艺的变化、供应商和零售商的利润水平的变化。为研究食品供应链中的食品安全问题提供一种新的思路。     

风险喜好型零售商主导的双渠道定价策略研究(英文)

针对由一个风险喜好的零售商和一个风险规避的供应商组成的两层双渠道供应链,本文研究了当零售商在供应链中占主导地位情况下,双渠道中参与者的风险偏好程度和需求方差变化对其定价决策的影响。研究表明,随着零售商风险喜好程度的增加,零售渠道最优定价会减小;当零售商风险喜好达到一定程度时,随着需求方差的增长零售渠道最优定价才会提高。最后用一个算例验证了结论。     

突发事件风险下考虑企业社会责任的闭环供应链决策

基于突发事件风险概率小、后果大的特点,考虑企业社会责任的闭环供应链应对突发事件风险中再制造成本扰动风险的优化决策。结果表明：当再制造成本扰动较小时,不需要调整闭环供应链的生产计划,反之则需要调整生产计划;若再制造成本扰动值增大,则需提高最优零售价并减少最优产量;若再制造成本扰动量绝对值增大,则需降低最优零售价格并增加最优产量。关注CSR的水平越高,最优的批发价格和最优的零售价反而会降低。最优的回收利用率、最优的产量及整个链条的总利润与CSR水平呈正相关。若再制造成本扰动值较小,零售商回收模式更加合适,而若扰动值超过一定值则应该选择制造商回收模式。     

基于销售成本差异的制造商策略选择研究

本文以企业核心竞争能力理论和库存理论为基础,研究了由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的二级供应链中制造商的前向一体化策略与供应链策略的选择问题。假设需求不确定和供应链存在销售成本,当制造商和零售商向市场出售产品都发生销售成本且销售成本存在差异时,通过对制造商的利润比较分析发现,销售成本的差异决定了制造商供应链合作策略与前向一体化策略的选择。     

基于价格折扣和零售商服务水平的易腐产品定价研究

基于价格折扣和零售商服务水平视角,建立动态标识的食品保质期的定价模型,考量零售商易腐产品定价问题。结果表明:随着折扣时间靠近产品保质期,零售商最优利润呈现下降变化趋势,而服务水平的提升可以有效缓解这一利润的减弱。通过折扣次数的分析发现,零售商存在最优折扣次数,过多的打折次数并不能提升零售商利润。鉴此,零售商在采取价格折扣策略时,需要考虑产品打折时间和折扣次数,以在有效减少产品变质带来的损失的同时增加收益。     

Discretionary disclosure in the presence of dual distribution channels

A prevailing view in the disclosure literature is that firms who learn favorable market information are reluctant to disclose it, fearing it will attract new rivals. In this paper, we demonstrate that the presence of dual distribution arrangements, wherein consumers can purchase products either from traditional retail firms or directly from suppliers, can notably alter disclosure incentives. As under prevailing views, a retailer disclosing positive news risks entry by competitors. However, entry shifts the incumbent supplier–retailer relationship: the presence of new competitors leads the supplier to treat its retailer more as a strategic partner, translating into lower wholesale prices. This, in turn, can lead the retailer to willingly share favorable news, since such disclosure invites entry precisely when the retailer stands to benefit most from price concessions. Our results suggest that as dual distribution continues to increase in prominence, firms may be more willing to voluntarily disclose sensitive financial information particularly that which points to high demand for its products.     

Market‐share contracts as facilitating practices

This article investigates how the use of contracts that condition discounts on the share a supplier receives of a retailer's total purchases (market‐share contracts) may affect market outcomes. The case of a dominant supplier that distributes its product through retailers that also sell substitute products is considered. It is found that when the supplier's contracts can only depend on how much a retailer purchases of its product (own‐supplier contracts), intra‐ and interbrand competition cannot simultaneously be dampened. However, competition on all goods can simultaneously be dampened when market‐share contracts are feasible. Compared to own‐supplier contracts, the use of market‐share contracts increases the dominant supplier's profit and, if demand is linear, lowers consumer surplus and welfare.     

Electricity markets and oligopolistic behaviors: The impact of a multimarket structure

The article analyses the development of retail competition in electricity markets, compares market structures and performance in Great Britain and Norway, and concludes that there is no satisfactory outcome in a multimarket setting like Great Britain. We study differences in retail profits between Norway and Great Britain, both considered as benchmarks for competitive markets. We highlight the price parallelism of British suppliers whatever the trend of wholesale prices. These behaviors contrast with the small and stable retail mark-ups in each group of suppliers in Norway. The main explanation comes from the combination of vertical integration and multimarket setting, which allows parallel pricing behaviors in the British retail market. We also evaluate the impact of other factors that influence the dynamic of retail competition: national fuel mixes and institutional design of retail and wholesale markets. However, we demonstrate that a multimarket setting, which is a major feature of most retail markets, remains the main determinant of oligopolistic profit. Remedies must be implemented to correct these market imperfections.     

The effect of suppliers' corporate social responsibility concerns on customers' stock price crash risk

We investigate the spillover effect of corporate social responsibility (CSR) concerns along the supply chain. We propose an information incorporation effect for whether suppliers' CSR concerns affect customers' stock price crash risk. Customers' investors can incorporate information about suppliers' CSR into stock price valuations, lowering the probability of abrupt stock price crashes. Our findings support the information incorporation effect. Suppliers' CSR concerns are negatively associated with customers' stock price crash risk. The negative relationship is more pronounced for firms with high media coverage, negative media sentiment, high investor attention, negative investor sentiment, low trade policy uncertainty, and low political uncertainty. Moreover, we rule out the alternative explanation that suppliers' CSR strengths dominate the effect. Our main finding is supported by change analysis and robustness tests, including an alternative measure test.     

Disclosure standards for vertical contracts

In this article, we investigate the welfare consequences of disclosure of vertical contracts. When much of retail competition is among products provided by a dominant supplier, disclosure provides a means through which the supplier can use its prices to coordinate the retail behavior of its wholesale customers. From the retail consumers' perspective, such coordination is unwanted, leading them to favor opacity of contracts. When retail competition is across brands made by different suppliers, disclosure becomes a conduit through which suppliers compete indirectly via their retail surrogates. Consumers welcome the increased competition accompanying such disclosures. In short, the efficacy of disclosure standards depends critically on the suppliers’ market reach and the relative intensity of intrabrand versus interbrand retail competition.     

The welfare effects of third‐degree price discrimination in intermediate good markets: the case of bargaining

This article examines the welfare effects of third‐degree price discrimination by a monopolist selling to downstream firms with bargaining power. One of the downstream firms (the “chain store”) can integrate backward at lower cost than rivals. Bargaining powers also depend on disagreement profits, bargaining weights, and concession costs. If the chain's integration threat is not credible, price discrimination reduces the input price charged symmetric downstream firms and often reduces the average input price charged asymmetric downstream firms.     

Properties of scoring auctions

This article studies scoring auctions, a procedure commonly used to buy differentiated products: suppliers submit offers on all dimensions of the good (price, level of nonmonetary attributes), and these are evaluated using a scoring rule. We provide a systematic analysis of equilibrium behavior in scoring auctions when suppliers' private information is multidimensional (characterization of equilibrium behavior and expected utility equivalence). In addition, we show that scoring auctions dominate several other commonly used procedures for buying differentiated products, including menu auctions, beauty contests, and price‐only auctions with minimum quality thresholds.     

两阶段闭环供应链制造商直销渠道入侵策略研究

运用博弈方法构建由单个制造商和单个零售商组成的两阶段供应链模型,研究有无再制造情形下制造商直销渠道的入侵策略和入侵时机问题。结果表明：无再制造情形下,在渠道竞争较弱且入侵将平分市场时,制造商不会开通直销渠道,否则会选择在第一阶段开通直销渠道;再制造情形下,在渠道竞争较弱且入侵将平分市场时制造商同样不会开通直销渠道,但竞争较弱且零售渠道占比较大时会选择在第二阶段开通直销渠道,否则其会在第一阶段开通直销渠道;无论是否进行再制造,制造商的渠道入侵都可能会损害零售商的利润,但是在竞争较强且零售渠道占比较大时渠道入侵却能使制造商和零售商均获益,且再制造情形下实现共赢的可能性更大。