股权制衡对自由现金流及投资效率的影响

通过我国上证和深证上市企业披露的2006年-2012年的数据可以看出,我国上市公司普遍存在股权高度集中的现象,第一大股东处于控股地位,并存在过度投资的行为。对于自由现金流影响企业投资行为的原因存在两种不同的解释,即对应过度投资的自由现金流假说和对应投资不足的信息不对称理论。     

自由现金流量与过度投资

企业投资行为是否有效率对企业价值最大化的财务目标能否顺利实现具有重要影响。本文在充分考虑公司成长机会和自由现金流量差异的基础上来研究过度投资与自由现金流量的关系。研究结果显示，企业存在高自由现金流的情况下，中国上市公司倾向于过度投资，不过自由现金流量与过度投资的关系会因公司成长机会高低和持有自由现金流量的多少而有所不同。     

CEO过度自信对企业投资和非效率投资的影响——基于企业自由现金流调节作用的实证研究

本文研究了CEO过度自信对企业投资和非效率投资的影响,以及企业自由现金流对二者之间关系的影响。研究结果表明,CEO过度自信对企业投资和非效率投资都具有促进作用,同时,企业自由现金流也可以直接或间接促进企业投资和非效率投资。     

经济周期波动中企业现金持有的“对冲”效应分析

从我国经济波动的背景出发,将1999-2005年分为经济低速增长期和经济高速增长期,分析上市公司现金持有的投资-现金流敏感度。对中央国有企业、地方国有企业、民营企业的投资-现金流敏感度进行检验,分析其在经济周期波动的不同阶段的投资-现金流敏感度差异。同时分析了上市公司在经济低速增长期和经济高速增长期的现金持有量的作用。另外,检验了中央国有企业、地方国有企业、民营企业现金持有量的作用,也分析了其在经济周期波动的不同阶段现金持有量的作用。结果表明:我国上市公司大都存在融资约束,在经济低速增长期有较高的投资-现金流敏感度;民营企业的现金持有在经济周期波动的不同阶段都具有"对冲"效应,中央国有企业和地方国有企业现金持有的"对冲"效应没有显现。     

经济周期波动中企业现金持有的“对冲”效应分析

从我国经济波动的背景出发,将1999-2005年分为经济低速增长期和经济高速增长期,分析上市公司现金持有的投资-现金流敏感度。对中央国有企业、地方国有企业、民营企业的投资-现金流敏感度进行检验,分析其在经济周期波动的不同阶段的投资-现金流敏感度差异。同时分析了上市公司在经济低速增长期和经济高速增长期的现金持有量的作用。另外,检验了中央国有企业、地方国有企业、民营企业现金持有量的作用,也分析了其在经济周期波动的不同阶段现金持有量的作用。结果表明：我国上市公司大都存在融资约束,在经济低速增长期有较高的投资-现金流敏感度;民营企业的现金持有在经济周期波动的不同阶段都具有＂对冲＂效应,中央国有企业和地方国有企业现金持有的＂对冲＂效应没有显现。     

自由现金流量与过度投资

企业投资行为是否有效率对企业价值最大化的财务目标能否顺利实现具有重要影响。本文在充分考虑公司成长机会和自由现金流量差异的基础上来研究过度投资与自由现金流量的关系。研究结果显示,企业存在高自由现金流的情况下,中国上市公司倾向于过度投资,不过自由现金流量与过度投资的关系会因公司成长机会高低和持有自由现金流量的多少而有所不同。     

“对冲”工具抑或“壕沟”工具——中国上市企业现金持有动机的经验证据

本文通过检验现金持有量对投资——现金流敏感度的影响来考察中国上市企业持有现金的动机。结果显示,中、小规模的国有企业为了抵御外部融资约束、持有现金充当对冲工具,而大型地方国有企业所持有的现金充当扩大过度投资的壕沟工具。结果还表明,民营企业中存在过度投资问题,所持有的现金具有明显的壕沟效应、进一步助长过度投资行为。     

自由现金流过度投资文献综述

自2007年爆发的金融危机过去后，很多企业为摆脱危机的影响而进行大规模投资，造成过度投资的现象在各国普遍存在，国内外很多学者对自由现金流过度投资现象进行了理论分析和实证研究，本文从理论基础出发就相关文献进行了整理。     

企业家政治关联、所有制与企业债务期限结构——基于转型经济制度背景的实证研究

本文结合中国转型经济时期的制度背景,在区分政治关联层级差异的基础上研究了企业家政治关联与企业债务期限结构的关系,并进一步讨论了所有制对两者关系的情境效应。以上市公司为对象的面板数据实证结果表明:企业家政治关联对企业债务期限结构具有显著正向影响,但细分政治关联层级之后发现,企业家地方政治关联对企业债务期限结构的正向影响要显著强于中央政治关联。同时相对于非民营企业,民营企业中企业家政治关联与企业债务期限结构关系更强,并且所有制的情境效应同样存在着层级差异。本文在提供非正式制度影响企业债务期限结构证据的同时,也为我国现阶段经济体制改革提供了参考。     

过度投资、债务结构与治理效应——来自中国房地产上市公司的经验证据

近年来房地产市场过热问题引发广泛关注,那么房地产企业是否存在过度投资开发行为,政府紧缩信贷的调控政策又如何能更好地发挥作用?本文以2006～2010年房地产上市公司为研究样本,借鉴Richardson投资模型对我国房地产上市公司的过度投资行为进行度量,发现房地产开发企业存在用自由现金流进行过度投资的行为.进一步通过债务融资与过度投资之间的关系进行实证分析,发现债务融资总体上对房地产企业过度投资行为具有抑制作用,其中银行借款不能抑制其过度投资行为,反而与过度投资呈正向关系；商业信用能有效抑制其过度投资行为.     

Funding Liquidity without Banks: Evidence from a Shock to the Cost of Very Short‐Term Debt

In 2011, Colombia instituted a tax on repayment of bank loans, which increased the cost of short‐term bank credit more than long‐term credit. Firms responded by cutting short‐term loans for liquidity management purposes and increasing the use of cash and trade credit. In industries in which trade credit is more accessible (based on U.S. Compustat firms), we find substitution into accounts payable and little effect on cash and investment. Where trade credit is less available, firms increase cash and cut investment. Thus, trade credit provides an alternative source of liquidity that can insulate some firms from bank liquidity shocks.     

政府干预、政治关联与企业非效率投资——基于中国上市公司面板数据的实证研究

以2004~2009年间701家上市公司为样本,研究政府干预、政治关联对企业非效率投资行为的影响。研究发现:政府干预一方面会加剧有自由现金流量公司的过度投资,对国有企业过度投资的影响更为严重;另一方面可以有效地缓解融资约束企业的投资不足,尤其是国有企业的投资不足。这说明,出于自身的政策性负担或政治晋升目标,政府会损害或支持所控制的企业,这为政府"掠夺之手理论"和"支持之手理论"提供了实证支持。研究还发现,政治关联与过度投资和投资不足均负相关,这表明,政治关联可以作为法律保护的替代机制来保护企业产权免受政府损害,并为企业谋取利益。     

Inside the black box: Bank credit allocation in China’s private sector

This study examines how the Chinese state-owned banks allocate loans to private firms. We find that the banks extend loans to financially healthier and better-governed firms, which implies that the banks use commercial judgments in this segment of the market. We also find that having the state as a minority owner helps firms obtain bank loans and this suggests that political connections play a role in gaining access to bank finance. In addition, we find that commercial judgments are important determinants of the lending decisions for manufacturing firms, large firms, and firms located in regions with a more developed banking sector; political connections are important for firms in service industries, large firms, and firms located in areas with a less developed banking sector.     

Local corruption and corporate cash holdings: Sheltering assets or agency conflict?

This study investigates the impact of corruption on corporate cash holdings in China. The political extraction argument predicts that firms might shelter liquid assets to avoid extraction by corrupt officials. Using data on A-shared listed firms between 2007 and 2012, we find that firms located in more corrupt regions hold less cash, supporting this hypothesis. Political resources help to diminish the risk of exploitation, reducing the extent to which liquid assets are sheltered. We find that the negative association between corruption and cash holding is more significant for non-state-owned enterprises (Non-SOEs) than for state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Moreover, the cash holdings of Non-SOEs without political connections are more sensitive to corruption than those of Non-SOEs with political connections. These findings demonstrate that expropriation by corrupt officials is an important factor driving firms to manage liquidity.     

The Relevance of a Segment Cash Flow Statement in Lending Decisions: An Empirical Study

The purpose of this study is to examine the relevance of a segment cash flow statement in the lending decisions of commercial bank loan officers. 117 loan officers made short term, intermediate term, and long term lending decisions using case materials prepared for a company that operates in two industries—soft drinks and farm machinery/equipment. Results indicate that segment cash flow statements are relevant in lending decisions under certain circumstances. When given the ‘good news’ that a stable industry was the cash source, loan officers in the soft drinks group granted more long term loans than those in the control group. When given the ‘bad news’ that a troubled industry was the cash source, loan officers in the farm group made smaller short term loans than those in the control group.     

Bank Concentration and Firm Investment: Empirical Evidence from India

This paper investigates the impact of bank concentration on firm-level investment across firm groups classified according to size, investment destination, and debt maturity structure. Using data of 302 manufacturing firms for the period 2000-2009, we show that elevated financial constraints are associated with small and medium-size enterprises and firms that are dependent on short-term debt and exhibit high levels of sensitivity of investment to cash flow. Our empirical finding confirms that bank concentration exerts a positive impact on firms' financial constraints on investment. This effect is more pronounced for small firms and firms dependent on short-term debt. However, our results are indifferent to domestic versus foreign investing firm groups.     

Bank connections,corporate investment and crisis

Against the backdrop of a severe financial crisis and extensive restructuring of the financial sector, we investigate the evolution and determinants of connections between firms and banks, and the impact of bank connections on corporate investment. Our study examines Thai non-financial companies during 1995–2000, a period straddling the East Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–1998. Before the crisis, bank-connections are common and associated with significantly lower sensitivity of corporate investment to internal cash flow. After the crisis, and following substantial changes in bank ownership and governance due to financial-sector reforms and restructuring, far fewer firms are bank-connected and connections no longer affect investment–cash flow sensitivity.     

疫情背景下的中小微企业金融纾困模式

针对新冠病毒肺炎疫情,本课题组对中小微企业的生存压力进行调研,发现85%中小微企业现金流不足支持3个月;各级政府、金融机构的救助政策反应迅速、积极,但惠及效率有待提高;企业现金流救助需要发挥政府平台和产业链群形成的产业平台的作用,助推金融精准纾困中小微企业。建议政府部门短期积极利用两大平台资源,优化中央、地方政府专项纾困基金和支持性贷款、金融扶持资金和优惠贷款的管理模式;中期建立专项中小微企业发展的扶持基金和就业援助计划,推动中小微企业转型升级。     

The Benefits of Political Connection: Evidence from Individual Bank-Loan Contracts

This paper investigates whether political connections improve the access of firms to financing. We propose three hypotheses to prove that political benefits exist. First, do politically connected firms obtain preferential treatment for bank loans? Second, if these firms do obtain preferential treatment, do they benefit from government-owned banks (GOBs) more than from privately owned banks? Third, is the preferential treatment from GOBs enhanced during presidential election years? We examine these three questions by using detailed data on political connections and 69,332 individual bank-loan contracts for listed firms in Taiwan from 1991 to 2008. The empirical results generally support our hypotheses.     

Bank discrimination, holding bank ownership, and economic consequences: Evidence from China

This paper finds that compared with Chinese state-owned firms, non-state-owned firms have a greater propensity to hold significant ownership in commercial banks. These results are consistent with the notion that because non-state-owned firms are more likely to suffer bank discrimination for political reasons, they tend to address their financing disadvantages by building economic bonds with banks. We also find that among non-state-owned firms, those that hold significant bank ownership have lower interest expenses, and are less likely to increase cash holdings but more likely to obtain short-term loans when the government monetary policy is tight. These results suggest that the firms building economic bonds with banks can enjoy benefits such as lower financial expenses and better lending terms during difficult times. Finally, we find that non-state-owned firms with significant bank ownership have better operating performance. Overall, we find that firms can reduce discrimination through holding bank ownership.