股权制衡对自由现金流及投资效率的影响

通过我国上证和深证上市企业披露的2006年-2012年的数据可以看出,我国上市公司普遍存在股权高度集中的现象,第一大股东处于控股地位,并存在过度投资的行为。对于自由现金流影响企业投资行为的原因存在两种不同的解释,即对应过度投资的自由现金流假说和对应投资不足的信息不对称理论。     

董事高管责任保险、自由现金流与企业过度投资

以2009—2015年沪深A股上市公司为研究样本,在考察自由现金流对企业过度投资影响作用的基础上,进一步分析了董事高管责任保险对这一关系的调节作用。研究结果表明,上市公司的自由现金流水平越高,企业过度投资现象越严重;董事高管责任保险对自由现金流与过度投资起负向调节作用,董事高管责任保险所发挥的"监督效应"可以减少自由现金流的滥用,对企业过度投资有一定的抑制作用。     

经济周期波动中企业现金持有的“对冲”效应分析

从我国经济波动的背景出发,将1999-2005年分为经济低速增长期和经济高速增长期,分析上市公司现金持有的投资-现金流敏感度。对中央国有企业、地方国有企业、民营企业的投资-现金流敏感度进行检验,分析其在经济周期波动的不同阶段的投资-现金流敏感度差异。同时分析了上市公司在经济低速增长期和经济高速增长期的现金持有量的作用。另外,检验了中央国有企业、地方国有企业、民营企业现金持有量的作用,也分析了其在经济周期波动的不同阶段现金持有量的作用。结果表明：我国上市公司大都存在融资约束,在经济低速增长期有较高的投资-现金流敏感度;民营企业的现金持有在经济周期波动的不同阶段都具有＂对冲＂效应,中央国有企业和地方国有企业现金持有的＂对冲＂效应没有显现。     

CEO过度自信对企业投资和非效率投资的影响——基于企业自由现金流调节作用的实证研究

本文研究了CEO过度自信对企业投资和非效率投资的影响,以及企业自由现金流对二者之间关系的影响。研究结果表明,CEO过度自信对企业投资和非效率投资都具有促进作用,同时,企业自由现金流也可以直接或间接促进企业投资和非效率投资。     

经济周期波动中企业现金持有的“对冲”效应分析

从我国经济波动的背景出发,将1999-2005年分为经济低速增长期和经济高速增长期,分析上市公司现金持有的投资-现金流敏感度。对中央国有企业、地方国有企业、民营企业的投资-现金流敏感度进行检验,分析其在经济周期波动的不同阶段的投资-现金流敏感度差异。同时分析了上市公司在经济低速增长期和经济高速增长期的现金持有量的作用。另外,检验了中央国有企业、地方国有企业、民营企业现金持有量的作用,也分析了其在经济周期波动的不同阶段现金持有量的作用。结果表明:我国上市公司大都存在融资约束,在经济低速增长期有较高的投资-现金流敏感度;民营企业的现金持有在经济周期波动的不同阶段都具有"对冲"效应,中央国有企业和地方国有企业现金持有的"对冲"效应没有显现。     

自由现金流量与过度投资

企业投资行为是否有效率对企业价值最大化的财务目标能否顺利实现具有重要影响。本文在充分考虑公司成长机会和自由现金流量差异的基础上来研究过度投资与自由现金流量的关系。研究结果显示,企业存在高自由现金流的情况下,中国上市公司倾向于过度投资,不过自由现金流量与过度投资的关系会因公司成长机会高低和持有自由现金流量的多少而有所不同。     

自由现金流量与过度投资

企业投资行为是否有效率对企业价值最大化的财务目标能否顺利实现具有重要影响。本文在充分考虑公司成长机会和自由现金流量差异的基础上来研究过度投资与自由现金流量的关系。研究结果显示,企业存在高自由现金流的情况下,中国上市公司倾向于过度投资,不过自由现金流量与过度投资的关系会因公司成长机会高低和持有自由现金流量的多少而有所不同。     

“对冲”工具抑或“壕沟”工具——中国上市企业现金持有动机的经验证据

本文通过检验现金持有量对投资——现金流敏感度的影响来考察中国上市企业持有现金的动机。结果显示,中、小规模的国有企业为了抵御外部融资约束、持有现金充当对冲工具,而大型地方国有企业所持有的现金充当扩大过度投资的壕沟工具。结果还表明,民营企业中存在过度投资问题,所持有的现金具有明显的壕沟效应、进一步助长过度投资行为。     

股利政策与公司过度投资行为研究

基于Richardson(2006)的过度投资测度,本文考察公司的股利支付政策是否影响了企业的过度投资。我们发现:首先,对总样本而言,我国公司普遍存在过度投资的现象;其次,现金股利的派发的确能有效制约过度投资行为;第三,经常派现公司较非经常派现公司在现金股利抑制过度投资的效果上有显著增强;最后,由于管理层存在对未来现金流的一定预期,现金股利在低自由现金流的公司中能发挥更好的抑制效果。     

环境规制、政治关联与投资效率

以"十五"到"十二五"期间的工业企业上市公司为总体研究样本,从环境规制视角,考察政治关联对企业投资效率的影响。研究表明尽管环境规制降低了企业的投资效率,而对于受环境规制越严格的企业而言,政治关联则越有助于抑制其投资过度和减少投资不足,从而提高投资效率。但政治关联的这种作用机理在环境规制较弱的"十五"期间没能发挥作用。进一步的研究发现,政治关联对受环境规制越严格的国有企业,在投资过度方面有抑制作用,而对非国有企业没有显著影响;但无论是国有还是非国有企业,政治关联均有助于减少其投资不足程度,表明政治关联对不同产权性质企业的投资影响作用机理有所不同。     

Funding Liquidity without Banks: Evidence from a Shock to the Cost of Very Short‐Term Debt

In 2011, Colombia instituted a tax on repayment of bank loans, which increased the cost of short‐term bank credit more than long‐term credit. Firms responded by cutting short‐term loans for liquidity management purposes and increasing the use of cash and trade credit. In industries in which trade credit is more accessible (based on U.S. Compustat firms), we find substitution into accounts payable and little effect on cash and investment. Where trade credit is less available, firms increase cash and cut investment. Thus, trade credit provides an alternative source of liquidity that can insulate some firms from bank liquidity shocks.     

Depoliticization and corporate cash holdings: Evidence from the mandated resignation of directors in China

The 2013 depoliticization regulation (Rule 18) in China mandates government officials to resign from board positions in public firms, terminating firms' political connections established through these directors. Exploiting this regulation as a quasi-experiment, we document that politically connected firms increase their cash holdings 12.7% more than non-connected firms because of these resignations. This pattern is more pronounced among firms that rely more heavily on the government for external resources. Among state-owned firms, the pattern is more evident in firms that are more deeply privatized. In addition, firms that lose political ties experience a significant decline in obtaining bank loans and government subsidies, and they are also slower to adjust their cash holdings toward the optimal level. These findings underscore the role of corporate political linkages in facilitating firms' access to resources that “soften” firms' budget constraints.     

Banking system reform and investment–cash flow relation: Case of a small transition economy

This research examines the effect of banking system reform which is measured by foreign bank's presence on investment–cash flow relation in a context of a small transition economy. The U-shape relation between investment and cash flow is found. We also find evidence that the presence of foreign banks in Vietnam results in decreasing in dependence on local banks and has changed corporate investment behaviors. Company investments are less reliant on internal cash flow in the post reform period. Although overinvestment of state controlled firms is not reduced but underinvestment problem of non-state-controlled listed firms is mitigated due to better accessibility to bank loans. The investigated relation between investment and leverage is robust for this conclusion.     

政府干预、政治关联与企业非效率投资——基于中国上市公司面板数据的实证研究

以2004~2009年间701家上市公司为样本,研究政府干预、政治关联对企业非效率投资行为的影响。研究发现:政府干预一方面会加剧有自由现金流量公司的过度投资,对国有企业过度投资的影响更为严重;另一方面可以有效地缓解融资约束企业的投资不足,尤其是国有企业的投资不足。这说明,出于自身的政策性负担或政治晋升目标,政府会损害或支持所控制的企业,这为政府"掠夺之手理论"和"支持之手理论"提供了实证支持。研究还发现,政治关联与过度投资和投资不足均负相关,这表明,政治关联可以作为法律保护的替代机制来保护企业产权免受政府损害,并为企业谋取利益。     

Inside the black box: Bank credit allocation in China’s private sector

This study examines how the Chinese state-owned banks allocate loans to private firms. We find that the banks extend loans to financially healthier and better-governed firms, which implies that the banks use commercial judgments in this segment of the market. We also find that having the state as a minority owner helps firms obtain bank loans and this suggests that political connections play a role in gaining access to bank finance. In addition, we find that commercial judgments are important determinants of the lending decisions for manufacturing firms, large firms, and firms located in regions with a more developed banking sector; political connections are important for firms in service industries, large firms, and firms located in areas with a less developed banking sector.     

The Relevance of a Segment Cash Flow Statement in Lending Decisions: An Empirical Study

The purpose of this study is to examine the relevance of a segment cash flow statement in the lending decisions of commercial bank loan officers. 117 loan officers made short term, intermediate term, and long term lending decisions using case materials prepared for a company that operates in two industries—soft drinks and farm machinery/equipment. Results indicate that segment cash flow statements are relevant in lending decisions under certain circumstances. When given the ‘good news’ that a stable industry was the cash source, loan officers in the soft drinks group granted more long term loans than those in the control group. When given the ‘bad news’ that a troubled industry was the cash source, loan officers in the farm group made smaller short term loans than those in the control group.     

Local corruption and corporate cash holdings: Sheltering assets or agency conflict?

This study investigates the impact of corruption on corporate cash holdings in China. The political extraction argument predicts that firms might shelter liquid assets to avoid extraction by corrupt officials. Using data on A-shared listed firms between 2007 and 2012, we find that firms located in more corrupt regions hold less cash, supporting this hypothesis. Political resources help to diminish the risk of exploitation, reducing the extent to which liquid assets are sheltered. We find that the negative association between corruption and cash holding is more significant for non-state-owned enterprises (Non-SOEs) than for state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Moreover, the cash holdings of Non-SOEs without political connections are more sensitive to corruption than those of Non-SOEs with political connections. These findings demonstrate that expropriation by corrupt officials is an important factor driving firms to manage liquidity.     

Bank connections,corporate investment and crisis

Against the backdrop of a severe financial crisis and extensive restructuring of the financial sector, we investigate the evolution and determinants of connections between firms and banks, and the impact of bank connections on corporate investment. Our study examines Thai non-financial companies during 1995–2000, a period straddling the East Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–1998. Before the crisis, bank-connections are common and associated with significantly lower sensitivity of corporate investment to internal cash flow. After the crisis, and following substantial changes in bank ownership and governance due to financial-sector reforms and restructuring, far fewer firms are bank-connected and connections no longer affect investment–cash flow sensitivity.     

Bank Concentration and Firm Investment: Empirical Evidence from India

This paper investigates the impact of bank concentration on firm-level investment across firm groups classified according to size, investment destination, and debt maturity structure. Using data of 302 manufacturing firms for the period 2000-2009, we show that elevated financial constraints are associated with small and medium-size enterprises and firms that are dependent on short-term debt and exhibit high levels of sensitivity of investment to cash flow. Our empirical finding confirms that bank concentration exerts a positive impact on firms' financial constraints on investment. This effect is more pronounced for small firms and firms dependent on short-term debt. However, our results are indifferent to domestic versus foreign investing firm groups.     

Relationship-based debt financing of Chinese private sector firms: The role of social connections to banks versus political connections

We study whether a firm's social connections to banks can augment its political connections to help it obtain loans. In China, Regulation No. 18 (announced in 2013) prohibits all high-level government officials from being independent directors of firms. As a result, many firms lost their political connections. We find that after firms lose their politically connected independent directors, firms having no social connections to banks experience, on average, a 12% decrease in the bank loan ratio relative to the median ratio; but those whose board chairs or CEOs are socially connected to local bank branch heads experience a 22% increase in the loan ratio relative to the median. However, this positive effect is short lived and thus not a new equilibrium. Overall, our findings support the hypothesis that a firm's social connections to banks can augment its political connections to help it get bank financing.