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依据中国基金激励机制经历的四个阶段,将1998年4月7日~2011年6月30日分成四个时间段。采用EGARCH-M模型并引入虚拟变量对不同时间段的激励机制进行比较研究,发现在中国基金市场中,固定比率的管理费激励机制对股市波动的影响最小。因此,从股市稳定的角度来说,中国基金市场应采取固定比率的管理费激励机制。 相似文献
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权威人士透露,证监会正在研究建立基金业绩比较基准约束机制,拟鼓励基金将基金业绩相对其业绩比较基准的波动水平与基金管理费的提取挂钩。消息一出台,立刻得到了市场各方较为强烈的反响,其中有一个对于股市较有震撼力的延伸式分析,即认为该消息将推动蓝筹股行情再起波澜。 相似文献
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本文基于向量自回归(VAR)模型,从投资收益波动性角度研究了我国股票、债券和基金市场分别在熊市、牛市、震荡市中的动态相关性,研究发现:股票市场、债券市场和基金市场的收益率在三种行情下基本都呈现双向的波动溢出效应,只是相互之间影响的程度、滞后持续时间和冲击的方向有所不同。股票市场收益率的波动主要来自本身系统性的风险,且对基金市场的影响大于基金市场对股市的影响。债券市场收益率波动主要受其自身波动影响,并在熊市中受股市波动的正影响,牛市中受基金市场负向影响,震荡市中同时受股市和基金市场的影响。而基金市场收益率在三种行情下主要受股市波动的正影响(90%以上),其次是自身市场波动的正影响(5%左右),受债券市场的影响最小。 相似文献
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本文基于向量自回归(VAR)模型,从投资收益波动性角度研究了我国股票、债券和基金市场分别在熊市、牛市、震荡市中的动态相关性,研究发现:股票市场、债券市场和基金市场的收益率在三种行情下基本都呈现双向的波动溢出效应,只是相互之间影响的程度、滞后持续时间和冲击的方向有所不同.股票市场收益率的波动主要来自本身系统性的风险,且对基金市场的影响大于基金市场对股市的影响.债券市场收益率波动主要受其自身波动影响,并在熊市中受股市波动的正影响,牛市中受基金市场负向影响,震荡市中同时受股市和基金市场的影响.而基金市场收益率在三种行情下主要受股市波动的正影响(90%以上),其次是自身市场波动的正影响(5%左右),受债券市场的影响最小. 相似文献
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本文以2004—2014年中国开放式股票型基金为研究对象,从股市周期的角度探讨投资者申购和赎回基金的影响因素和"赎回异象"。实证结果表明:在不区分市场周期的情况下,开放式股票型基金的资金流量和历史业绩总体呈正相关关系,投资者表现为追逐业绩而相对忽视风险。不同股市周期下的投资者选择呈现出不对称性,即在牛市期间基金投资者表现为追逐基金历史业绩,在熊市期间表现为对基金历史业绩不敏感。 相似文献
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合理的高管人力资本激励机制是发挥高管人力资本效用进而提高企业绩效的有效途径。本文通过实证检验管理层权力、高管人力资本激励与企业绩效的关系,结果表明:高管货币薪酬与企业绩效显著正相关,与国有企业相比,非国有企业的相关性更明显;管理层权力削弱了高管货币薪酬对企业绩效的激励作用。国有企业的在职消费与企业绩效显著负相关,但非国有企业其二者之间的相关性并不显著;管理层权力加大了在职消费对企业绩效的负向影响。高管团队内部薪酬差距与企业绩效显著正相关,且非国有企业比国有企业的相关性更明显;管理层权力削弱了高管团队内部薪酬差距对企业绩效的激励作用。 相似文献
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基于经理的努力水平和风险规避程度是基金经理费设计的关键因素,构建固定费率结构下基金经理努力及风险选择的模型,结合我国基金样本数据进行了实证研究结果表明:管理费与基金业绩无显著正相关性,且低业绩的基金体现出较高的管理费率;管理费与基金风险具有显著的正相关关系。 相似文献
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本文以2006年至2015年我国上市公司为研究对象,考察了期权激励对企业并购行为的影响。研究发现:授予高管的期权激励显著提升了企业发起并购的可能性和并购规模。缓解代理问题和提升风险承担是潜在的作用渠道。进一步研究表明,激励对象异质性会影响期权激励的效果,期权激励对企业并购倾向和并购规模的提升作用在管理者年龄较高、管理者任期较长以及管理者相对薪酬水平较低的企业中更加明显。此外,期权激励对企业并购行为的影响在非国有企业中更加突出。最后,本文还发现期权激励提升了企业并购的财务业绩。本文的研究不仅丰富了有关期权激励效果方面的文献,而且对于理解企业并购行为具有一定的参考意义。 相似文献
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基金经理更换打破了基金共同持股投资组合中股票的关联性,降低了股票收益率相关性,进而影响了股票价格。本文基于基金共同持股和基金经理更换构建了对冲投资组合,获得0.1%的日超额收益率。基金投资组合中股票收益率相关性能够解释这种超额收益率,本文发现基金更换经理后,新基金经理重建投资组合,打破了原投资组合中股票间的关联,股票收益率相关性减弱,基金共同持股程度高的股票价格受到了更大影响。基金的被动流动性冲击不能解释本文的发现。本文的研究表明基金经理变更等基金管理行为通过股票收益率相关性对股票价格产生了重要影响。 相似文献
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This paper shows that compensation incentives partly drive fund managers’ market volatility timing strategies. Larger incentive management fees lead to less counter-cyclical or more pro-cyclical volatility timing. But fund styles or aggregate fund flows could also account for this relation; therefore, we control for them and find that the relation between fees and volatility timing still holds. Results show that less aggressive fund styles are associated with pro-cyclical volatility timing, and that volatility timing and flow timing are negatively related. We also find that pro-cyclical timing mostly improves funds’ average excess returns, Sharpe ratios, and alphas. 相似文献
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This paper examines the impact of mutual fund herding on the stability of China's stock market through the lens of idiosyncratic volatility. We show that mutual fund herding significantly amplifies future idiosyncratic volatility up to one-and-half years, suggesting a persistent destabilizing effect. We find that the destabilizing effect is larger for stocks with high mutual fund ownership and in high investor-sentiment periods. Furthermore, mutual fund herding destabilizes the stock market even further after China implemented the share reform in 2011. The destabilizing effect of mutual fund herding is robust to alternative measures of risk and China's institutional setting helps mitigate endogeneity concerns. 相似文献
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We find that passive intensity (PI), measured by the passive‐linked share of total stock market trading volume, is strongly related to the overall pattern of stock price movements. A one‐standard‐deviation increase in PI is associated with an 8% higher price synchronicity. We further investigate the channels through which this relation is established by separately analyzing its impact on aggregate systematic and idiosyncratic volatility of stock returns. PI has a positive effect on systematic volatility and a negative impact on firm‐specific volatility. Consistent with the effect of passive trading on price dynamics, we find evidence that PI is negatively associated with mutual funds alpha dissimilarity. After controlling for market and idiosyncratic volatility, a one‐standard‐deviation increase in PI corresponds to a 0.20% decrease in fund dissimilarity. Our findings are robust after controlling for various macro and corporate factors known to affect systematic or firm‐specific volatility. 相似文献
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We examine whether typical private equity fund compensation contracts reward excessive risk-taking rather than managerial skill. Our analysis is based on a novel model of investment value, cash flows, and fee dynamics of private equity funds. Given the embedded option-like fee components, our results demonstrate that fund managers indeed have an incentive for excessive risk-taking when only fee income from the current fund is considered. However, when managers also consider potential compensation from follow-on funds, their risk-taking incentives depend on their individual skill levels, and skilled managers will have an incentive to reduce fund risk. We also show that managers must generate substantial abnormal returns in order to compensate investors for the given fee components. 相似文献
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MYRON S. SCHOLES 《The Journal of Finance》1991,46(3):803-823
Compensation planning within firms creates important corporate financial problems. Theoretical models and empirical tests of hypotheses in this area should play a much larger role than currently in the modern theory of corporate finance. Employees fund a large proportion of their firm's activities through deferred compensation arrangements tied to the performance of their company. These arrangements are generally put in place for incentive reasons, to align the interests of employees more closely with those of shareholders. Moreover, tax rules encourage or discourage these arrangements at various times. Currently, both tax rules and incentive considerations encourage stock buyback programs to fund deferred compensation arrangements. Prior to the 1980s, however, tax rules favored funding in other than company stock, implying that employees likely held company stock for incentive and not for tax reasons during this time period. 相似文献