基金家族、家族偏爱与家族竞争策略——基于中国开放式股票型基金的经验证据

实证研究了基金公司为提升家族整体绩效而采用的偏爱性竞争策略,结果显示同一家族旗下的高价值基金(高费用或高历史绩效基金)与低价值基金之间的绩效差异显著大于投资风格类似、但隶属于不同家族的高价值基金与低价值基金间的绩效差异;基金家族会通过转移旗下受托资产绩效的家族竞争策略使家族中高价值基金获取超额绩效,从而为家族吸引更多的净资金流入,最终实现提升基金家族竞争力和整体绩效的目标。     

我国基金家族风险调整行为的实证研究

本文选取我国2008年12月31日之前成立的偏股型基金,研究了2006年1月1日至2009年12月31日期间,基金家族内部基金经理根据每年前期家族内部业绩排名而对后期风险进行调整的行为,发现在基金家族内部前7个月排名靠后的基金,后期会显著增大投资组合风险,说明我国基金家族内部存在基金竞赛,即前期排名靠后的基金经理后期倾...     

基金家族“造星”:基本动因、行为评价与形成机理——一个理论研究框架的构建

本文在梳理相关文献的基础上,对基金家族"造星"策略的基本动因、行为评价和形成机理进行了深入分析,并通过明星绩效溢出效应、家族跨基金补贴行为的存在性与路径选择、家族造星主体识别和形成机理等研究模块构建了基金家族造星策略的理论研究框架,以此来探索基金市场上基金家族造星热潮的"黑箱"操作,以期为后续相关研究奠定基础。     

基金家族的产业环境研究——基于波特五力竞争模型分析视角

本文以我国54家基金管理公司为研究对象,摆脱了单纯的实证检验,通过构建基金业的波特五力竞争因子的改进模型,分析了我国基金产业潜在的进入者、替代品、与供方的博弈、与买方的博弈、行业内部基金家族的竞争,进一步揭示了我国基金家族所面临的竞争结构。此外,研究表明:在所有的作用力中,政府的作用不容忽视。     

基金家族业绩评价指标的构建与应用研究

本文选取2012—2013年度拥有2只及2只以上股票型和混合型基金的基金家族作为研究样本,构建了基金家族的整体业绩评价指标,包括加权平均业绩、加权排名百分位数、优质基金比率、业绩极差等,并从两个方面进行了相关的应用研究,其实证研究显示:明星家族的整体业绩水平显著高于非明星家族,是真正的明星家族;无论是明星家族还是非明星家族,整体业绩水平都不会长期保持,投资者不能单纯的依赖明星家族的年度业绩水平作为投资依据。     

对冲基金的双重危机与监管问题刍议

世界金融危机从爆发到现在已经一年多，回顾这次金融危机，对冲基金业的作用不可小视，而美国麦道夫诈骗案无疑是一颗重磅炮弹，使美国对冲基金业又成为最大的受害者，这对因金融危机而深受打击的对冲基金业无疑是雪上加霜。本文主要探讨对冲基金产生的双重危机及其监管的缺失，提出应对该行业监管缺失的对策，希望能对我国未来私募基金的监管有所借鉴。     

基金家族的产业环境研究——基于波特五力竞争模型分析视角

本文以我国54家基金管理公司为研究对象,摆脱了单纯的实证检验,通过构建基金业的波特五力竞争因子的改进模型,分析了我国基金产业潜在的进入者、替代品、与供方的博弈、与买方的博弈、行业内部基金家族的竞争,进一步揭示了我国基金家族所面临的竞争结构.此外,研究表明:在所有的作用力中,政府的作用不容忽视.     

投资者的选择与基金溢出效应研究

本文着重研究基金家族中明星基金对家族内部基金的溢出效应,即明星基金对基金资金流入增长率的影响。对中国证券市场54家基金家族管理的281只开放式偏股型基金的面板分析发现,拥有明星基金能够显著提高基金家族的新基金流入的增长比例,但拥有垃圾基金并不能显著地减少;明星基金比非明星基金能给自身吸引来更多的新资金,明星基金家族的非明星基金与非明星家族的基金相比没能被笼罩在这样的优质光环下。     

我国开放式和封闭式基金绩效比较的实证研究

近年来我国新设立的开放式基金远远多于封闭式基金。在数量迅速增长的情况下，开放式基金能否取得优于封闭式基金的绩效受到市场的普遍关注。本文选取了10家基金管理公司，每家公司各选一只开放式基金和一只封闭式基金，从收益率、风险调整后的绩效和择时能力三个方面比较了2004年1月至2005年4月期间开放式基金与封闭式基金的绩效。实证结果显示，在我国目前情况下，开放式基金的绩效略高于封闭式基金，但并不存在显著的差异．     

基于DEA的我国主动型股票基金绩效及其影响因素分析

伴随着我国股票市场不断地丰富和完善,我国基金业迎来了新的发展时机。主动型股票基金以战胜市场为目标,受到追求更高收益的投资者的广泛关注。本文运用传统DEA模型计算出我国主动型股票基金2012到2014年的效率值,并进一步利用Tobit模型对我国主动型股票基金绩效的微观影响因素进行回归分析,最后得出了基金成本利润率、选股能力和选时能力同主动型股票基金绩效呈显著正相关,而基金资产总值和持股集中度对主动型股票基金绩效具有显著的负影响的结论。     

全球基础设施投资基金研究：投资者偏好和委托代理问题

基于2005年1月至2019年6月间公开发售的2246支来自全球的基建基金数据,本文研究基建基金投资者偏好和委托代理问题。研究结果表明:投资者偏好客户忠诚度较高、投资于国际市场、团队管理型的基建基金;在基建基金公司层面,投资者存在跟风投资行为,且随着信息不透明度和收益不确定性加剧;投资者与基金管理人存在委托代理问题,体现为基金费率与预期业绩不匹配。该现象源于基金管理人利用投资者较高的预期收益设置费率,可以由基金特征因素和年份效应解释,尤其是投资于国际市场、收益分配或非团队管理等特征。本文结论对创新基础设施融资模式、稳定资金来源和微观审慎监管具有重要借鉴意义。     

固定费用结构下基金经理管理费激励研究

基于经理的努力水平和风险规避程度是基金经理费设计的关键因素,构建固定费率结构下基金经理努力及风险选择的模型,结合我国基金样本数据进行了实证研究结果表明:管理费与基金业绩无显著正相关性,且低业绩的基金体现出较高的管理费率;管理费与基金风险具有显著的正相关关系。     

Performance Chasing,Fund Flows and Fund Size in Real Estate Mutual Funds

Real estate mutual funds have grown dramatically in number, size, scope and assets under management over the last 15 years, but little assessment is evident. The present study addresses this limitation. Better prior period performance is associated with greater shares of fund inflows for a period. Returns, however, are negatively associated with increased fund flows and fund size. Investors chase past performance limiting fund managers’ ability to optimize investments. Under normal market conditions, but departing from typical mutual fund performance, real estate mutual fund returns generally exceed relevant benchmarks on a before expenses basis and match benchmark returns after expenses. The ability to meet and exceed benchmark returns, however, does not hold during the financial crisis period. Overall, more established funds are shown to have higher returns while fund turnover is not a determinant of returns.     

Stronger Risk Controls,Lower Risk: Evidence from U.S. Bank Holding Companies

We construct a risk management index (RMI) to measure the strength and independence of the risk management function at bank holding companies (BHCs). The U.S. BHCs with higher RMI before the onset of the financial crisis have lower tail risk, lower nonperforming loans, and better operating and stock return performance during the financial crisis years. Over the period 1995 to 2010, BHCs with a higher lagged RMI have lower tail risk and higher return on assets, all else equal. Overall, these results suggest that a strong and independent risk management function can curtail tail risk exposures at banks.     

基金业绩归因与投资者行为

本文以2006年1月至2016年12月中国64家股票型主动管理基金为样本,从基金净资金流变化的角度,检验了投资者决策与基金业绩结构的关系,以期更好地理解投资者行为。本文结论有:(1)整体上,投资者在衡量基金经理能力时,更关注原始超额收益率或只基于市场风险调整风险敞口,这可能与中国市场投资工具仍然不够充分、风险难以有效对冲有关;(2)机构投资者相比个人投资者对风险敞口的识别更严格;(3)简单模型的优势集中在市场波动低、投资者情绪高的时期;(4)除基金经理能力外,净资金流变化对市场风险报酬也很敏感;(5)从alpha的角度,我国基金市场仍存在“赎回异象”,可能与“处置效应”有关,仍需提升投资者对风险的认知,引导市场形成更加科学的投资观念。     

我国开放式基金绩效及选股和择时能力研究

近年来,开放式基金逐渐成为我国基金市场的绝对主体。开放式基金能否取得较好的绩效受到市场的普遍关注。本文选取了资金管理规模前20位的公司,并从中随机挑选1只基金,运用詹森指数、特雷诺比率、夏普指数和信息比率等单因素模型和Fama-French三因素模型对开放式基金的绩效进行分析,并使用T-M模型、H-M模型、C-L模型对基金经理人股票选股与择时能力进行分析。结果发现:第一,我国开放式基金经理的选股能力存在时变性,在上升期具备选股能力,在下跌期不具备选股能力,而无论是在上升期还是下跌期,基金经理普遍不具备择时能力。第二,在市场上升期基金经理比较注意对风险的把控,系统性风险较小,而在下跌期基金投资组合的系统性风险明显上升,基金经理冒险意愿上升,当市场出现大幅度下跌时,其不理性行为会加剧市场的波动。本文的研究结论有利于提升投资者的风险意识和理性意识、促进外部监管部门的精准监管审查,并能够激励基金经理人提高自身风险管控的能力。     

Social Capital,Trust, and Corporate Performance: How CSR Helped Companies During the Financial Crisis (and Why It Can Keep Helping Them)

The authors summarize the findings of their study, published recently in the Journal of Finance, that shows that CSR investments can help companies when they perhaps need it most—that is, during sharp downturns when overall trust in companies and markets declines. Companies with high‐CSR rankings experienced stock returns that were five to seven percentage points higher than their low‐CSR counterparts during the 2008–2009 financial crisis, and even larger excess returns during the Enron crisis of 2001–2003. High‐CSR companies during the crisis also reported better operating performance, higher growth, higher employee productivity, and greater access to debt markets—while continuing to generate higher shareholder returns as late as the end of 2013. Many of these operating improvements continued well into the post‐crisis period, though at more modest levels. As the authors view their findings, the ‘social capital’ built up by corporate CSR programs complements effective financial capital management in increasing shareholder wealth mainly by limiting companies' downside risk. CSR is seen as not only reducing systematic as well as firm‐specific risk, but as also providing protection against overall ‘loss of trust.’ The social capital created by CSR programs is said to provide a kind of insurance policy that pays off when investors and the overall economy face a severe crisis of confidence.     

Risk-taking and performance of government bond mutual funds

This paper investigates the risk exposures of government bond mutual funds and how risk-taking behavior affects fund performance. Government bond mutual funds often outperform their respective benchmark bond indexes before but not after adjusting for bond market risk factors. We show that the risk-taking behavior of fund managers helps to explain the different performances of government bond funds with and without controlling for the risk factors. Our results suggest that risk-taking leads to higher returns relative to benchmarks in normal risk periods but lower returns in high risk periods, suggesting that fund managers consistently take risky bets in fund management. We further show that the risk-taking of government bond funds is persistent and that investors typically have no ability to differentiate between the skill and risk components of fund performance. These findings suggest why fund managers have incentives to take consistently risky positions.     

Risk Management: History,Definition, and Critique

The study of risk management began after World War II. Risk management has long been associated with the use of market insurance to protect individuals and companies from various losses associated with accidents. Other forms of risk management, alternatives to market insurance, surfaced during the 1950s when market insurance was perceived as very costly and incomplete for protection against pure risk. The use of derivatives as risk management instruments arose during the 1970s, and expanded rapidly during the 1980s, as companies intensified their financial risk management. International risk regulation began in the 1980s, and financial firms developed internal risk management models and capital calculation formulas to hedge against unanticipated risks and reduce regulatory capital. Concomitantly, governance of risk management became essential, integrated risk management was introduced, and the chief risk officer positions were created. Nonetheless, these regulations, governance rules, and risk management methods failed to prevent the financial crisis that began in 2007.     

Does concurrent management of mutual and hedge funds create conflicts of interest?

This paper shows that conflicts of interest may exist in cases where a hedge fund manager starts a mutual fund but not in the opposite case. We compare performance, asset flows, and risk incentives to establish several key differences between these two scenarios: First, prior to concurrent management, hedge fund managers experience worse performance while mutual fund managers achieve better performance relative to their full-time peers. Second, hedge fund managers who choose concurrent management are disproportionately the ones with less experience. Their hedge funds tend to suffer a decline in performance after the event. By contrast, mutual fund managers who choose concurrent management tend to outperform their full-time peers. Based on our findings, we make important recommendations for policy makers and companies. The relevance of our recommendations extends beyond the small share of companies presently engaged in concurrent management.