特许权价值、市场结构与银行风险承担

银行业的风险程度关系到整个经济体的稳定与发展,控制风险是银行经营的重要目标之一。目前对银行风险承担的研究主要从特许权价值和市场竞争的角度分别展开分析。本文以156家中国商业银行为研究对象,同时分析了银行特许权价值、市场竞争程度对银行风险的影响。通过实证分析,我们发现目前影响我国商业银行特许权价值的因素主要来自银行因素而非市场因素;在没有控制内生性的前提下,发现银行特许权价值有效地约束了银行风险,而市场竞争的加剧增加了银行风险行为;在控制银行风险和特许权价值内生性后,发现特许权价值对中国商业银行风险的约束效应基本不存在。因此,要维持银行业的稳定,需要规范银行的竞争行为,提高特许权价值的风险约束效应。     

银行特许权价值的内生风险约束效应——基于中国上市银行的实证研究

本文采用托宾Q值来衡量上市银行的特许权价值,基于分阶段动态回归模型,对银行特许权价值的影响因素及其风险约束效应进行研究。实证结果显示,外生性和内生性的银行特许权价值都有显著的风险约束效应;回归结果可以通过稳健性检验。     

中国上市银行特许权价值的自律效应

银行特许权价值是银行风险自我约束的重要机制。本文使用托宾Q值衡量了中国14家上市银行的特许权价值,借助面板数据回归分析对银行特许权价值的自律效应进行了实证检验。结果表明:上市银行特许权价值对反映外部评价的市场风险确实存在着自律效应,但还未对表现为内部风险控制的资本充足率产生显著作用。因国家对银行业提供了全面担保,银行所有制性质对银行风险无显著影响。随着银行业竞争日趋激烈,通过引导商业银行提升特许权价值来激励银行审慎经营并加强内部风险控制,对后金融危机时期中国银行业的健康稳定发展具有积极意义。     

特许权价值、隐性保险与风险承担——中国银行业的经验分析

本文以特许权价值与风险承担为主要研究视角,运用面板数据模型,分析隐性存款保险制度下我国特许权价值经济效应的有效性。研究结果表明,隐性保险降低了特许权价值对银行风险承担行为的敏感性,特许权价值的自律机制不仅对国有银行几乎失效,而且对非国有银行的风险约束效应也不显著。如此说明当前中国商业银行受到隐性存款保险制度的全面保护,从而弱化了开展全面风险管理的激励机制。     

影响银行冒险行为的因素——来自我国银行业的实证检验

本文以15家全国性商业银行的数据为研究样本,采用面板数据二阶段可行广义最小二乘方法检验了影响银行冒险行为的因素.研究发现,银行资本对冒险行为具有显著的负效应,银行规模对冒险行为具有显著的负效应,特许权价值对冒险行为的影响不显著,稳定股东所有权对冒险行为具有显著的负效应,监管压力对冒险行为具有显著的正效应,但对上市银行的冒险行为却具有显著的负效应.     

外资银行进入对我国商业银行特许权价值的影响

本文通过托宾Q法度量了我国上市银行的特许权价值,并利用计量模型检验了外资银行进入的资产份额和数量份额与上市银行特许权价值之间的关系。实证结果表明,外资银行进入的数量份额与上市银行特许权价值显著负相关,而资产份额与特许权价值却是显著正相关,且对特许权价值影响更大,特许权价值的提高可以促使银行冒险动机减弱,降低银行的风险。     

中国银行特许权价值的风险自律效应研究

将银行破产风险分解为经营不确定性与风险覆盖能力、杠杆风险与资产组合风险,建立动态面板模型并采用2003~2013年中国上市银行的数据和系统广义矩估计方法,分析特许权价值激励银行降低风险承担的途径和方式。研究发现：我国银行特许权价值具有抑制银行风险的自律效应,银行为避免过高风险而遭受监管惩罚或丧失市场资源,保持特许经营条件和优势,将进行积极的风险管理;特许权价值的风险自律效应主要通过促使银行提升风险覆盖能力、降低资产组合风险和杠杆风险来实现。     

商业银行特许权价值的自律效应研究

特许权价值是商业银行具有的从受保护市场获取未来租金的牌照价值,通常情况下,具有相对较高特许权价值的银行为了避免破产,更有动力倾向于采取谨慎策略,因而其发挥着银行风险自律器的作用。通过银行风险行为的静态选择和动态选择视角,考证特许权价值的自律效应,对于后过渡时期的银行监管政策具有启发意义。     

特许权价值与商业银行风险行为

特许权价值是商业银行风险行为的重要影响因素。本文以2008—2011年14家上市银行为样本,实证表明:特许权价值与商业银行风险行为显著负相关,说明商业银行为了保障特许权价值的长期持续性,会降低自身的风险承担。     

金融自由化、特许权价值与银行风险行为

随着银行业竞争的日益激烈,深入探讨金融自由化、特许权价值以及银行风险行为之间的关系显得愈来愈有必要.较多的国外文献已经证明三者之间存在着密切相关的联系.在面临全球化竞争时,通过研究三者的具体联系,更加清晰地认识特许权价值对于银行自身的风险约束作用,有效控制自身风险将会是我国银行业最基本的要求,更是非常关键的一步.     

Market Structure, Capital Regulation and Bank Risk Taking

This paper discusses the effect of capital regulation on the risk taking behavior of commercial banks. We first theoretically show that capital regulation works differently in different market structures of banking sectors. In lowly concentrated markets, capital regulation is effective in mitigating risk taking behavior because banks’ franchise values are low and banks have incentives to pursue risky strategies in order to increase their franchise values. If franchise values are high, on the other hand, the effect of capital regulation on bank risk taking is ambiguous. We then test the model predictions on a cross-country sample including 421 commercial banks from 61 countries. We find that capital regulation is effective in mitigating risk taking only in markets with a low degree of concentration. The results remain robust after accounting for financial sector development, legal system efficiency, and for other country and bank-specific characteristics.     

Does the stock market value bank diversification?

This paper investigates whether or not functionally diversified banks have a comparative advantage in terms of long-term performance/risk profile compared to their specialized competitors. To that end, this study uses market-based measures of return potential and bank risk. We calculate the franchise value over time of European banks as a measure of their long-run performance potential. In addition, we measure risk as both the systematic and the idiosyncratic risk components derived from a bank stock return model. Finally, we analyze the return/risk trade-off implied in different functional diversification strategies using a panel data analysis over the period 1989–2004. A higher share of non-interest income in total income affects banks’ franchise values positively. Diversification of revenue streams from distinct financial activities increases the systematic risk of banks while the effect on the idiosyncratic risk component is non-linear and predominantly downward-sloping. These findings have conflicting implications for different stakeholders, such as investors, bank shareholders, bank managers and bank supervisors.     

Bank Capital Requirements, Capital Structure and Regulation

This paper studies the impact of capital requirements, deposit insurance and franchise value on a bank’s capital structure. We find that properly regulated banks voluntarily choose to maintain capital in excess of the minimum required. Central to this decision is both firm franchise value and the ability of regulators to place banks in receivership stripping equity holders of firm value. These features of our model help explain both the capital structure of the large mortgage Government Sponsored Enterprises and the recent increase in risk taking through leverage by financial institutions. The insights gained from the model are useful in guiding the discussion of financial regulatory reforms.     

Bank profitability,leverage constraints,and risk-taking

Traditional theory suggests that higher bank profitability (or franchise value) dissuades bank risk-taking. We highlight an opposite effect: higher profitability loosens bank borrowing constraints. This enables profitable banks to take risk on a larger scale, inducing risk-taking. This effect is more pronounced when bank leverage constraints are looser, or when new investments can be financed with senior funding (such as repos). The model’s predictions are consistent with some notable cross-sectional patterns of bank risk-taking in the run-up to the 2008 crisis.     

Loan Market Competition and Bank Risk-Taking

Recent literature (Boyd and De Nicoló, J Finance 60:1329–1343, 2005) has argued that competition in the loan market lowers bank risk by reducing the risk-taking incentives of borrowers. Using a model where competition arises from falling switching costs for entrepreneurs, we show that the impact of loan market competition on banks is reversed if banks can adjust their loan portfolios. The reason is that when borrowers become safer, banks want to offset the effect on their balance sheet and switch to higher-risk lending. They even overcompensate the effect of safer borrowers because loan market competition erodes their franchise values and thus increases their risk-taking incentives.     

对我国商业银行特许权价值形成要素的实证分析

特许权价值是银行具有的从受保护市场获取未来租金的牌照价值,由市场相关因素和银行相关因素决定.本文在5家上市银行1999-2006年的面板数据基础上,利用托宾Q的方法度量特许权价值,并构建多元线性回归模型,得知随着市场优势因素的弱化,特许权价值整体呈现下降的趋势,而银行内在效率是其稳定的关键,对于银行业的稳健经营具有重要意义.