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1.
本文利用2005-2010年间开放式股票型和混合型基金的数据,研究年度基金业绩排名对基金经理冒险行为的影响。与相对业绩排名激励机制会导致基金经理过度冒险的假设相一致,本文发现,年中业绩排名靠后的基金经理(输家)在下半年提高所持有资产组合的风险的程度要大于年中业绩排名靠前的基金经理(赢家)。进一步研究发现,基金经理提高下半年所持有资产组合的风险并不能显著提高下半年基金的业绩。特别是在熊市中,提高下半年所持有资产组合的风险反而显著降低了基金下半年的业绩。  相似文献   

2.
利用中介效应分析方法检验了理论假设:股市波动对基金管理费报酬有积极的影响,基金业绩在股市波动对基金管理费报酬的影响中存在正的中介效应,即基金有能力在股市波动中发掘机会来提高业绩,从而提高管理费报酬。实证结果表明,在没有增加基金业绩情况下,股市波动对基金管理费报酬具有积极影响,此结论从股市波动的视角证明了基金管理费激励机制并不是激励相容的。根据实证结果,可以从基金类型多样化、扩大管理费率范围和加强投资者教育等三个方面完善基金管理费激励机制。  相似文献   

3.
彭文平  肖继辉 《上海金融》2012,(8):70-79,118
本文以2005年至2009年为样本期,考察了基金业绩和内部治理机制在基金经理更换中的作用,以及更换后业绩和投资行为的变化。研究发现:业绩能够较好解释基金经理降职,但对升职解释不足。基金经理升职后,继任经理会改变投资风格,从而使得业绩能够保持;而降职之后,继任经理的投资风格和资产配置都发生了显著的变化,从而使得基金业绩在不增加投资组合风险的前提下得以改善。股权较为分散、股东间有效制衡的基金公司旗下的基金经理更容易被更换,但董事会制度与基金经理更换不尽相关。同时中资基金经理更换机制不如合资基金有效。所以,基金经理更换是一种较为有效但尚不完善的激励机制。  相似文献   

4.
基金过去的业绩会影响未来的风险选择吗   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
当基金的业绩表现较差时,基金经理是否会加大基金投资组合的风险呢?本文以Hsiu—lang Chen和George G.Pennacchi的基金经理组合投资模型为基础,分析我国基金业绩对基金投资组合风险的影响。从这一模型来看,基金过去的业绩排名并不一定会影响基金未来的风险选择,过去业绩表现较差的基金也不一定会倾向干增加基金投资组合的风险。另外,本文的实证结果也支持这一结论。随后本文又采用Logit模型来分析影响基金风险选择的因素,结果发现:基金经理从业年限越长、基金申购费和赎回费越低、基金资产净值越大以及基金成立时间越短,基金经理越倾向干在基金业绩表现不好时增加基金的投资组合风险。  相似文献   

5.
本文选取2004年-2007年共201只开放式股票型基金作为样本,分析了相对业绩排序对基金经理投资组合风险选择的影响.结果表明,前期业绩排序中成为赢家的基金经理后期倾向于降低投资组合的风险,而输家凋高了投资组合的风险水平;基金规模和成立时间长短对基金经理的风险选择影响显著,新基金和小规模基金的风险调整程度大于老基金和大规模基金;同时,研究发现牛市对基金的风险激励水平明显高于熊市.  相似文献   

6.
本文选取2004年-2007年共201只开放式股票型基金作为样本,分析了相对业绩排序对基金经理投资组合风险选择的影响。结果表明,前期业绩排序中成为赢家的基金经理后期倾向于降低投资组合的风险,而输家调高了投资组合的风险水平;基金规模和成立时间长短对基金经理的风险选择影响显著,新基金和小规模基金的风险调整程度大于老基金和大规模基金;同时,研究发现牛市对基金的风险激励水平明显高于熊市。  相似文献   

7.
盛科  汤伟 《中国外资》2014,(2):220-221
自2008年肇始席卷全球的次贷危机和欧债危机至今余波未平,我国证券市场在四万亿投资这剂强心针的刺激下经历短暂繁荣之后,重新陷入持续低迷的状态,这导致大量公募基金的业绩持续惨淡,但是基金公司仍然收取着不菲的管理费,这种强烈反差招致了亏损基民们的强烈不满,从而将公募基金这种"旱涝保收"的收费模式推上风口浪尖。本文阐述了当前我国公募基金管理费制度的现状和存在的问题,通过比较固定费率和浮动费率的特征和优缺点,提出了进一步改革目前公募基金收费体制的政策建议。  相似文献   

8.
白俊岭 《时代金融》2013,(14):31-32
近几年在股市低迷背景下,公募基金管理费收取模式屡屡被公众质疑,本文通过对公募金管理费现状和存在问题的剖析,结合其他理财产品管理费提取模式,提出了公募基金管理费费率模式改进以及相关管理措施调整的建议。  相似文献   

9.
近几年在股市低迷背景下,公募基金管理费收取模式屡屡被公众质疑,本文通过对公募金管理费现状和存在问题的剖析,结合其他理财产品管理费提取模式,提出了公募基金管理费费率模式改进以及相关管理措施调整的建议。  相似文献   

10.
本文选取我国2008年12月31日之前成立的偏股型基金,研究了2006年1月1日至2009年12月31日期间,基金家族内部基金经理根据每年前期家族内部业绩排名而对后期风险进行调整的行为,发现在基金家族内部前7个月排名靠后的基金,后期会显著增大投资组合风险,说明我国基金家族内部存在基金竞赛,即前期排名靠后的基金经理后期倾...  相似文献   

11.
The present paper examines the often-overlooked managed fund fee that is incurred when investors enter and exit managed fund products. The present paper documents that transaction costs for investors, measured by the application-redemption spread, are above stock market brokerage rates although they have declined since 1995. The study analyses the relationship between this transaction fee and several variables. In summary, retail fund transaction costs are positively related to retail funds’ assets under management, whilst this relationship is negative for larger wholesale funds, consistent with economies of scale. Direct entry and exit fees and initial commissions are positively related to transaction costs which raises the possibility that the commissions are used to levy soft-dollar payments. The paper also documents a relationship between transaction costs and fund flows which differs between retail and wholesale funds. Overall, the findings are consistent with the proposition that the various fees are used by managers as interchangeable and the different fee regimes reflect different products and markets.  相似文献   

12.
以中国基金市场32家基金管理公司旗下的103只开放式偏股型基金作为样本,选择恰当的面板数据模型形式,分别建立金融危机之前、危机期间和危机之后三个时期基金家族绩效与风险关系模型,以剖析不同经济形势下两者之间的关系。结果表明,金融危机之前和危机期间基金家族绩效与风险显著负相关,而危机之后两者关系不显著,在金融危机期间和危机之后基金业绩效状况持续恶化,危机之后基金业整体风险水平降低;金融危机后,为弥补金融危机中造成的损失,各基金家族倾向于采取"打造明星基金"的投资策略以充分利用有限资源、提升家族整体绩效。  相似文献   

13.
Since the late 1990s, a performance fee arrangement has been approved as a managerial incentive in direction contribution (DC) pension plan management to motivate managers. However, the fact that managers may take undue risk for the larger performance fees and thus reduce members’ utility has been a subject of debate. As such, this study investigates the optimal risk-taking policies of DC pension fund managers under both the single management fee scheme and a mixed scheme with a lower management fee, as well as an additional performance fee. The analytical solutions are derived by using the duality method and concavification techniques in a singular optimization problem. The results show the complex risk-taking structures of fund managers and recognize the win-win situation of implementing performance-based incentives in DC pension plan management. Under the setting of geometric Brownian motion asset price dynamics and constant relative risk aversion utility, the optimal risk investment proportion shows a peak-valley pattern under the mixed scheme. Further, the manager gambles for gain when fund wealth is low and time to maturity is short. As opposed to the existing literature, this study found that the risk-taking policy is more conservative when fund wealth is relatively large. Furthermore, the utilities of the manager and members could both be improved by appropriately choosing the performance fee rate.  相似文献   

14.
陈胜蓝  李璟 《金融研究》2021,492(6):170-188
基金网络在金融市场的信息流动中发挥着重要作用。本文利用基金共同持股关系构建了一个有效的基金网络数据集,以中国资本市场股票型基金2005-2018年季度数据为研究样本,考察基金网络是否以及如何影响投资绩效。结果表明,基金在基金网络中越处于网络中心地位,基金的投资绩效越高。使用基金家族网络作为工具变量缓解内生性偏误后,基金网络仍然对投资绩效具有显著的正向影响。进一步地,本文考察了基金网络影响投资绩效的渠道,结果表明,基金网络主要通过提高基金的选股技能、资产配置技能和管理技能影响投资绩效。最后,本文考察了基金网络对基金市场份额的影响,研究发现基金网络会显著提高基金的市场份额,对基金在市场上的占有率有积极的正向影响。  相似文献   

15.
The fee structure used to compensate investment advisers iscentral to the study of fund design, and affects investor welfarein at least three ways: (i) by influencing the portfolio-selectionincentives of the adviser, (ii) by affecting risk-sharing betweenadviser and investor, and (iii) through its use as a signalof quality by superior investment advisers. In this paper, wedescribe a model in which all of these features are present,and use it to compare two popular and contrasting forms of feecontracts, the "fulcrum " and the "incentive " types, from thestandpoint of investor welfare. While the former has some undeniablyattractive features (that have, in particular, been used byregulators to justify its mandatory use in a mutual fund context),we find surprisingly that it is the latter that is often moreattractive from the standpoint of investor welfare. Our modelis a flexible one; our conclusions are shown to be robust tomany extensions of interest. The results are also extended toconsider unrestricted fee structures and competitive marketsfor fund managers.  相似文献   

16.
In this article I explain why asset‐based fees are common for mutual fund management companies and why the average fee has increased recently. I argue that Securities and Exchange Commission fee regulations make alternative fee types illegal or unattractive. Management companies can maintain higher fees because regulations and brand‐name capital partly insulate them from competition and because investors cannot easily distinguish between performance‐oriented and marketing‐oriented fund companies. Index funds and unit investment trusts may offer competition to mutual funds in the future because they are designed to minimize management fees.  相似文献   

17.
李志冰  刘晓宇 《金融研究》2019,464(2):188-205
本文以2006年1月至2016年12月中国64家股票型主动管理基金为样本,从基金净资金流变化的角度,检验了投资者决策与基金业绩结构的关系,以期更好地理解投资者行为。本文结论有:(1)整体上,投资者在衡量基金经理能力时,更关注原始超额收益率或只基于市场风险调整风险敞口,这可能与中国市场投资工具仍然不够充分、风险难以有效对冲有关;(2)机构投资者相比个人投资者对风险敞口的识别更严格;(3)简单模型的优势集中在市场波动低、投资者情绪高的时期;(4)除基金经理能力外,净资金流变化对市场风险报酬也很敏感;(5)从alpha的角度,我国基金市场仍存在“赎回异象”,可能与“处置效应”有关,仍需提升投资者对风险的认知,引导市场形成更加科学的投资观念。  相似文献   

18.
张琳琳  沈红波  范剑青 《金融研究》2022,501(3):189-206
随着社保、养老金等中长期资金的大规模入市,中国公募基金规模面临更快扩张,那么基金规模究竟是可以无限扩张还是存在制约?本文研究发现,基金规模扩张会受到基金经理与投资者之间的委托代理冲突、边际规模报酬递减、投资者大规模赎回的制约。基于此,本文提出了基金管理规模适度区间的概念及其相应计量模型,并借此对2011—2019年间中国公募基金市场规模的适度性进行实证判断和检验,结果显示:(1)中国公募基金的平均管理规模在2015年之前过大,2016年之后趋向适度,而在2019年出现偏小现象。(2)中国基金市场规模适度区间的上、下限呈现逐年减小趋势,但二者的差值,即适度性区间的宽度却逐年增加。(3)规模适度基金的业绩表现远好于规模不足和规模过大两类基金,但市场上的规模适度基金占比则小于另外两类基金。最后,本文就如何提升公募基金,尤其是对安全性和盈利性要求更高的养老保险基金的规模适度性提出了相应对策建议。  相似文献   

19.
Explicit mutual fund fees are typically less than 1% of the assets under management. By comparison, the typical hedge fund charges a base fee of 2% plus a performance fee equal to 20% of net profits. Thus, hedge funds appear to charge far more for even comparable performance—unless one takes account of the following:
  • ? For most mutual funds, a very high percentage of performance is driven by its passive exposure to the market, even though the fee is applied to the total fund.
  • ? Many hedge funds are designed to provide returns that are completely independent of market performance.
Using these two assumptions, the author provides a simple example that shows that a representative mutual fund's performance can be replicated by combining an index fund, which represents the mutual fund's passive component, with a hedge fund, representing the mutual fund's active component. When analyzed in this way, the fee of the combined fund turns out to be remarkably close to the actual fee of the mutual fund. This in turn suggests that the implicit fee for the mutual fund's small active component is comparable to the fees of the hedge fund.  相似文献   

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