An Empirical Analysis of the Effect of Financial Distress on Trade Credit

This paper studies the use of supplier's trade credit by firms in financial distress. Trade credit represents a large portion of firms’ short‐term financing and plays an important role in financial distress. We find that firms in financial distress use a significantly larger amount of trade credit to substitute for alternative sources of financing. Firms that are smaller, with less market power, and with more unique products tend to use more trade credit financing when in distress. We also find that firms that significantly increase their trade payables when in financial distress, experience an additional drop of at least 11% in sales and profitability growth over the previously documented 21% average drop for financially troubled firms.     

The Determinants of Leveraged Buyout Activity: Free Cash Flow vs. Financial Distress Costs

This paper investigates the determinants of leveraged buyout (LBO) activity by comparing firms that have implemented LBOs to those that have not. Consistent with the free cash flow theory, we find that firms that initiate LBOs can be characterized as having a combination of unfavorable investment opportunities (low Tobin's q) and relatively high cash flow. LBO firms also tend to be more diversified than firms which do not undertake LBOs. In addition, firms with high expected costs of financial distress (e.g., those with high research and development expenditures) are less likely to do LBOs.     

Why and How UK Firms Hedge

This paper attempts to differentiate among the theories of hedging by using disclosures in the annual reports of 400 UK companies and data collected via a survey. I find, unlike many previous US studies, strong evidence linking the decision to hedge and the expected costs of financial distress. The tests show that this is mainly because my definition of hedging includes all hedgers and not just derivative users. However, when the tests employ the same hedging definition as previous US studies, financial distress cost factors still appear to be more important for this sample than samples of US firms. Therefore, a secondary explanation for the strong financial distress results might be due to differences in the bankruptcy codes in the two countries, which result in higher expected costs of financial distress for UK firms. The paper also examines the determinants of the choice of hedging method distinguishing between non‐derivative and derivatives hedging. My evidence shows that larger firms, firms with more cash, firms with a greater probability of financial distress, firms with exports or imports and firms with more short‐term debt are more likely to hedge with derivatives. Thus, differences in opportunities, in incentives for reducing risk and in the types of financial price exposure play an important role in how firms hedge their risks.     

Industrial Organization of Financial Systems and Strategic Use of Relationship Banking

Using standard Industrial Organization tools, we analyze the relation between competition in arm's length financial markets and the prevalence of close bank-firms ties. We show how the degree of competition between financial intermediaries affects the intensity of relationships between banks and client firms, and explore the idea that investment in bank-firm relationships can be used strategically by incumbent multi-product (universal) banks to limit competition in arm's length markets. The analysis implies that reforms designed to facilitate entry of new intermediaries may actually induce incumbent banks to increase investment in relationship banking, so that regulatory entry barriers are replaced by entry barriers created endogenously, namely, there is ``path dependence' in the market structure of financial systems. This result suggests that increased (potential) competition in the financial services industry will not always destroy bank-firm relationships but, on the contrary, may actually strengthen them.     

An Analysis of the Underreported Magnitude of the Total Indirect Costs of Financial Distress

In this paper we examine 1,041 ongoing firms over the time period 1982–92. Using quarterly data for the detection and measurement of the magnitude of the indirect costs of financial distress, we find three important explanatory factors: (a) the distinctiveness of the pattern of increasing financial distress over time, (b) the degree of leverage in the capital structure and (c) the size of the firm. For those firms with a distinctive pattern of increasing financial distress over time, the average annual losses as a percentage of market value is –10.3%. The maximum loss is –76%. Even if the firm never fails, its market value can be severely impacted by the presence of the indirect costs of bankruptcy over time. This study finds a significantly positive relationship between Altman's Z-score and the firm capital investment growth rate. This relation holds after controlling for other variables such as leverage, firm size and market/book ratio. This implies that lost investment opportunities may be also an important part of the total indirect costs of financial distress, which appear now to be much larger than previously recorded.     

Firms’ financial and real responses to credit supply shocks: Evidence from firm-bank relationships in Germany

We investigate the importance of firm-bank relationships for the international transmission of bank distress to the real economy. Using a large panel of matched financial statements of firms of all sizes and their relationship banks in Germany, we find that banks with losses from proprietary trading activities during the 2007/8 financial crisis decreased their lending, and that their firm customers responded by reducing real investment and employment. We document how different types of firms partially offset reduced credit supply by resorting to alternative financing sources.     

Short-term debt maturity,monitoring and accruals-based earnings management

Most prior studies assume a positive relation between debt and earnings management, consistent with the financial distress theory. However, the empirical evidence for financial distress theory is mixed. Another stream of studies argues that lenders of short-term debt play a monitoring role over management, especially when the firm’s creditworthiness is not in doubt. To explore the implications of these arguments on managers’ earnings management incentives, we examine a sample of US firms over the period 2003–2006 and find that short-term debt is positively associated with accruals-based earnings management (measured by discretionary accruals), consistent with the financial distress theory. We also find that this relation is significantly weaker for firms that are of higher creditworthiness (i.e. investment grade firms), consistent with monitoring benefits outweighing financial distress reasons for managing earnings.     

Corporate hedging versus risk-shifting in financially constrained firms: The time-horizon matters!

The paper presents an intertemporal theory of the optimal risk policy in shareholder-managed firms, which face future financing constraints and act under moral hazard as well as limited liability. Our model provides an integrated framework that overcomes the dilemma of “conflicting motives” of risk-shifting (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) on the one hand and corporate hedging (Smith and Stulz, 1985) on the other hand by considering time-effects. Shareholders face a trade-off between a risk-shifting incentive if the investment horizon is short, and a hedging incentive that becomes dominant if the investment horizon is sufficiently long. Within an infinite-time investment horizon, Jensen and Meckling's risk incentive problem can be fully solved as permanent hedging is optimal except for firms in financial distress, which constantly opt for risk-shifting. We further show that the value of corporate hedging increases if financing constraints become more severe. Our results suggest that life-cycle features play a significant role in the firm's propensity to hedge. They also coincide with existing empirical evidence, which shows that only highly leveraged firms facing financial distress will primarily opt for risk-shifting.     

Convertible Securities and Bankruptcy Reforms: Addressing Too Big to Fail and Reducing the Fragility of the Financial System*

Eliminating too big to fail should be the first priority of any regulatory reform. But this is easier said than done. As the crisis has taught us, when the systemic risks are perceived to be large, regulators will be very reluctant to close down insolvent firms or impose losses on creditors. So how do we reduce these risks so that regulators can credibly commit to a policy of allowing financial companies to fail and not resort to rescues or bailouts? The author proposes two complementary approaches to this problem: The first is to design capital structures with corrective mechanisms that kick in when a financial firm displays signs of trouble, but still has positive economic capital. To this end, the author endorses the Squam Lake Report's proposal that encourages financial firms to issue convertible debt with an “automatic” provision for converting to equity. In contrast to the Squam Lake proposal, however, the author argues that the conversion to equity should not depend on regulators' decisions and should take place before individual banks and the financial system are in full crisis mode. The second approach is to design a resolution mechanism that will close failing financial firms when early intervention has not led to the firm's recovery. The author argues that the best model for this mechanism is bankruptcy, because of its resolution of claims according to predetermined rules rather than regulatory discretion. However, certain forms of early intervention can also help to lower the costs of permitting firms to fail. For example, the Squam Lake idea that financial institutions be required to develop living wills should make it easier to unwind these firms in an orderly fashion and provide regulators with insight into the degree of systemic risk that these firms impose. The author notes that the challenges associated with getting the executives of healthy banks to plan for their own bankruptcy may indicate that a better use of regulatory resources might be to view the living will as one of the tools of prompt corrective action for firms that become undercapitalized but are still solvent. Once a firm has been declared undercapitalized, regulators would have greater bargaining power to insist on a serious plan for bankruptcy.     

The Determinants of Foreign Currency Hedging: Does Foreign Currency Debt Induce a Bias?

In this paper we use UK data to present strong empirical evidence that explains the mixed results in previous studies with respect to the effect of financial distress on the demand for corporate hedging. We build on recent studies that have identified a strong link between foreign currency (FC) debt use and leverage. Given this relationship, we show that using leverage variables as proxies for financial distress and the failure to distinguish between FC debt users and non‐users causes misleading inference. More specifically, when we partition our sample of FC hedgers into firms that use and do not use foreign debt, we show that leverage variables are significantly related to the FC hedging decision for firms that use FC debt either in isolation or in combination with FC derivatives but not for firms that only use FC derivatives. This suggests that FC debt users are influencing these results. However, we also find that other financial distress cost proxies with no obvious link to FC debt use are significant determinants in the corporate demand for FC hedging, including derivatives use.     

Switching from Single to Multiple Bank Lending Relationships: Determinants and Implications

Our data show that nearly all firms borrow for the first time in their life from a single bank, but soon afterward some of them start borrowing from additional banks. Duration analysis shows that the likelihood of a firm substituting a single relationship with multiple relationships increases with the duration of that relationship. It also shows that this substitution is more likely to occur for firms with more growth opportunities and for firms with poor performance. The analysis of the ex post effects of the initiation of multiple relationships, in turn, shows that firms with higher levels of investment prior to the initiation of multiple relationships increase their investment even further when they start to borrow from multiple banks and that firms with poor prior performance continue to perform poorly afterward. These results suggest that concerns with hold-up costs, together with an unwillingness by the incumbent bank to increase its exposure to a firm because of its past poor performance, are the key reasons for these firms to initiate an additional relationship this early in their life. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G21, G32.     

The Information Content of Short Selling Around Close Supply Chain Relationships

Close supply chain relationships are sometimes detrimental to the partnering firms, and short sellers recognize this before the rest of the market. Suppliers and customers that are in linked, close supply chain relationships have higher short interest on average. Further, higher short interest increases the likelihood of large, linked customers reporting negative earnings surprises, whereas suppliers with high short interest are more likely to report negative earnings surprises, irrespective of the supply chain structure. Short selling is informative to capital markets because these suboptimal relationships eventually lead to dependent suppliers being delisted from a stock exchange for financial distress reasons.     

Distressed acquirers and the bright side of financial distress

Extant literature states that managers who fear the consequences of financial distress may inhibit investments in profitable opportunities. Here, we posit that the career and reputational damages that distress and potential default cause are large enough to align the interests of managers and shareholders thus improving investment decisions. We find that financially distressed firms see a 3.5% higher market reaction to the announcement of acquisitions than non-distressed firms. This effect is stronger for poorly governed firms, consistent with the hypothesis that the large reputational cost of failure incentivizes managers to act in the best interest of their firm.     

Product Market Threats and the Value of Corporate Cash Holdings

We construct a model to show that predatory strategies by a financially strong rival can cause a financially weak firm to underinvest. This threat intensifies when the two firms produce similar products and share similar future investment opportunities. We show that cash holdings become more valuable by providing liquidity to fund investment opportunities as they emerge, thereby mitigating the underinvestment problem. Empirical evidence supports these model predictions. The value of cash is significantly higher for firms facing higher predatory threats. The results are robust to various controls for financial constraints, corporate governance, risk factors, and industry‐level measures of product market competition. An identification strategy that exploits exogenous variation in financial constraints further corroborates the causal effect of predatory threats on the value of cash.     

Do major customers promote firms’ innovation?

This study examines whether and how a concentrated supply chain relationship affects a firm’s innovation decisions. Using data from Chinese listed firms in the manufacturing industry, we find that a concentrated customer base constrains a firm’s R&D investment, where a 1% increase in customer concentration is associated with a 0.011% decrease in R&D investment. To establish causality, we use the instrumental variable method, the reverse causality model, and the Granger causality test to re-examine the relationship and arrive at a consistent conclusion. Results from mechanism analysis suggest that a concentrated customer base constrains the internal fund availability and that the negative relationship between customer concentration and firms’ innovation is less pronounced for firms with more external financial support. Additional analysis reveals that the negative effect of customer concentration mainly affects R&D investment expenditure and that customer concentration also constrains innovation output in China. Overall, our paper reveals the dark side of close customer-supplier relationships and provides new insights into how supply chain relationships affect firms’ innovation decisions.     

The influence of governance on investment: Evidence from a hazard model

Does corporate governance affect the timing of large investment projects? Hazard model estimates suggest strong shareholder governance may deter managers from pursuing large investments. Controlling for investment opportunities, firms with good governance experience longer spells between large investments. However, in the presence of financial constraints or strong CEO incentives (high delta (δ)), we find no such timing differences. Finally, these higher investment hazard firms exhibit significantly negative long-run operating and stock performance. Overall, our findings are consistent with the notion that poor governance associates with overinvestment.     

Corporate investment during the financial crisis: Evidence from China

China's growth model suggests that the 2008 financial crisis may have affected the Chinese economy differently from what one observes in mature market economies. In this paper, we examine how Chinese corporate investment responded to the financial crisis by using 1689 listed nonfinancial firms during Q12006–Q32010. We document that (1) the overall impact of the financial crisis on Chinese corporate investment is negative; (2) among three channels conveying the effect of the financial crisis, namely, the demand channel, the financial constraints channel, and the uncertainty channel, the demand channel dominates; (3) financial assets held by a nonfinancial firm are important in explaining the firm's fixed investment behaviour; (4) as compared to non-state firms, state-controlled firms are less affected by the financial crisis and more active in engaging in financial assets investment; and (5) foreign ownership can be seen as a buffer against the negative effect of the financial crisis and foreign-involved Chinese firms are less active in financial assets investment as compared to domestic firms.     

Can local policy uncertainty curtail corporate speculation on financial assets?

Using a hand-collected data set of city-level local official's turnover in China, we find that the average financial investments of listed non-financial firms decrease significantly in the spike of local political uncertainty, i.e., when upon the turnover of city head occurs. The decrease in financial investment still occurs upon the predicted timing of city heads' turnover. The effect is more prominent for firms with high financial distress risk and weaker corporate governance, i.e., those with higher speculative motives. Overall, this paper reveals that local political uncertainty discourages firms' speculative motives of investing in financial securities.     

Corporate Governance and Corporate Financing and Investment during the 2007‐2008 Financial Crisis

We examine the impact of the 2007‐2008 financial crisis on nonfinancial firms’ financing and investment activities and the role of corporate governance in alleviating the adverse consequences of the external capital supply shock. Employing a difference‐in‐differences research design, we find that better governance mitigates the disruption caused by the bank credit supply shock to firms’ financing and investment activities. A variety of robustness tests suggest that our findings are unlikely to be driven by an endogeneity problem. We obtain similar results when we extend the sample period to include the delayed spillover from the banking sector to other capital market sectors.     

Is Investment‐Cash Flow Sensitivity Caused by Agency Costs or Asymmetric Information? Evidence from the UK

We investigate the investment‐cash flow sensitivity of a large sample of the UK listed firms and confirm that investment is strongly cash flow‐sensitive. Is this sensitivity a result of agency problems when managers with high discretion overinvest, or of asymmetric information when managers owning equity are underinvesting if the market (erroneously) demands too high a risk premium? We find that investment‐cash flow sensitivity results mainly from the agency costs of free cash flow. The magnitude of the relationship depends on insider ownership in a non‐monotonic way. Furthermore, we obtain that outside blockholders, such as financial institutions, the government, and industrial firms (only at high control levels), reduce the cash flow sensitivity of investment via effective monitoring. Finally, financial institutions appear to play a role in mitigating informational asymmetries between firms and capital markets. We corroborate our findings by performing additional tests based on the stochastic efficient frontier approach and power indices.