Providing liquidity in an illiquid market: Dealer behavior in US corporate bonds

We examine market making behavior of dealers for 55,988 corporate bonds, many of which trade infrequently. Dealers have a substantially higher propensity to offset trades within the same day rather than committing capital for longer periods for riskier and less actively traded bonds. Dealers’ holding periods do not decline with a bond's prior trading activity and in fact are lowest for some of the least active bonds. As a result, cross-sectional estimates of roundtrip trading costs do not increase as prior trading activity declines. Our results suggest that dealers endogenously adjust their behavior to mitigate inventory risk from trading in illiquid and higher risk securities, balancing search and inventory costs in equilibrium such that observed spreads can appear invariant to expected liquidity.     

Dealer Networks

Dealers in the over‐the‐counter municipal bond market form trading networks with other dealers to mitigate search frictions. Regulatory data show that this network has a core‐periphery structure with 10 to 30 hubs and over 2,000 peripheral broker‐dealers in which bonds flow from periphery to core and partially back. Central dealers charge investors up to double the round‐trip markups compared to peripheral dealers. In turn, central dealers provide immediacy by matching buyers with sellers more directly and prearranging fewer trades, especially during stress times. Investors thus face a trade‐off between execution cost and speed, consistent with network models of decentralized trade.     

Transparency and Liquidity: A Controlled Experiment on Corporate Bonds

This article reports the results of an experiment designed toassess the impact of last-sale trade reporting on the liquidityof BBB corporate bonds. Overall, adding transparency has eithera neutral or a positive effect on liquidity. Increased transparencyis not associated with greater trading volume. Except for verylarge trades, spreads on newly transparent bonds decline relativeto bonds that experience no transparency change. However, wefind no effect on spreads for very infrequently traded bonds.The observed decrease in transaction costs is consistent withinvestors’ ability to negotiate better terms of tradeonce they have access to broader bond-pricing data. (JEL codes:G14, G18, G23, G24, G28)     

Financial intermediation and the role of price discrimination in the foreign exchange market

Foreign exchange trading is performed in opaque and decentralized markets. The two-tier market structure consisting of a customer segment and an interdealer segment to which only market makers have access gives rise to the possibility of price discrimination. We develop a theoretical pricing model that accounts for market-power considerations and analyze a database of the trades of a foreign exchange market maker. We find that the market maker generally exerts low bargaining power vis-á-vis customers. The dealer earns lower average spreads on trades with financial customers than commercial customers, even though the former are perceived to convey exchange-rate-relevant information.     

Trade Duration: Information and Trade Disposition

We examine the relation between futures trade duration and profitability, volatility, and volume. The duration of unprofitable trades is longer than that for profitable trades across the day, which is evidence of the disposition effect. Our analysis of profitable and unprofitable trades shows strong intraday volume patterns. Greater proportions of profitable trades are offset at the open and close. During high‐volume periods dealers may use a semi‐fundamental informational advantage, based on their access to order flow signals. Dealers may be able to execute costly inventory‐reducing trades at the end of the day, when their informational advantage is perhaps greatest.     

INTRADAY STEALTH TRADING: WHICH TRADES MOVE PRICES DURING PERIODS OF HIGH VOLUME?

Research documents a U-shaped intraday pattern of returns. We examine which trade sizes drive the U-shaped pattern and find that intraday price changes from larger trades exhibit a U-shaped pattern whereas price changes from smaller trades show a reverse U-shaped pattern. We argue that price changes from smaller trades are higher during the middle of the day because informed investors break up their trades to disguise their information when intraday volume is low. Price changes from larger trades are likely higher at the beginning and end of the day because high volume allows informed investors to increase their trade size without revealing their information to the market.     

Measuring the impact of option market activity on the stock market: Bivariate point process models of stock and option transactions

I apply the bivariate Autoregressive Conditional Duration model of Engle and Lunde [2003. Trade and quotes: a bivariate point process. Journal of Financial Econometrics 1, 159–188] to stock and option market transactions. The first model uses option trades and stock trades. Shocks to option trade/option trade durations have a significant impact on option trade/stock trade durations. Higher implied volatility, larger stock and option market order imbalances, larger stock trades, larger spreads, smaller depths in the stock market and faster trading in the stock and option markets are all associated with faster trading in both markets. In the second model, option trade/option trade timing leads option trade/stock quote timing and several information-related stock and option market covariates impact the expected inter-market event durations.     

Secondary Trading Costs in the Municipal Bond Market

Using new econometric methods, we separately estimate average transaction costs for over 167,000 bonds from a 1‐year sample of all U.S. municipal bond trades. Municipal bond transaction costs decrease with trade size and do not depend significantly on trade frequency. Also, municipal bond trades are substantially more expensive than similar‐sized equity trades. We attribute these results to the lack of bond market price transparency. Additional cross‐sectional analyses show that bond trading costs increase with credit risk, instrument complexity, time to maturity, and time since issuance. Investors, and perhaps ultimately issuers, might benefit if issuers issued simpler bonds.     

Determinants of Trading Profits: The Liquidity Provision Decision

Theories show that liquidity provision implies negative contemporaneous correlation between trades and returns. Dealers on the Taiwan Stock Exchange are granted typical dealer trading advantages without obligations to provide liquidity and, thus, are ideal to test whether these advantages lead to voluntary liquidity provision (earning bid-ask spreads) or information trading (trading in the direction of the market). We find a strong positive correlation in aggregate, implying that these unrestricted dealers prefer information trading. We also find that smaller dealers are more likely to provide liquidity and that small-cap stocks (with larger bid-ask spreads) are more profitable for liquidity provision.     

Price discovery in government bond markets

Price discovery in government bond markets is explored using Norwegian data including trades from both tiers of the market and dealer identities. The results show that while aggregate interdealer order flow explains one-fourth of daily yield changes, aggregate customer order flow has little explanatory power. Dealers are heterogeneously informed and appear to have different sources of information. While some dealers mainly rely on their customer trades, others appear to rely on skill in acquiring and interpreting other relevant information, suggesting that dealers play an independent role in the price discovery process.     

ANALYST REPUTATION,DEALER AFFILIATION,AND MARKET MAKING

We investigate the effects of analysts' affiliation and reputation on dealers' market making activities. We find that for a given stock, dealers who have affiliated analysts covering the stock quote and trade more aggressively than those who do not have any affiliated analysts. More important, the reputation of affiliated analysts plays an additional role in the affiliated dealer's quote and trade behavior. Dealers with affiliated star analysts post more aggressive quotes and have larger market shares than dealers with affiliated nonstar analysts. Although dealers who post more aggressive quotes also induce affiliated star analysts to cover the stocks, the positive effect of analyst reputation on the affiliated dealers' quote aggressiveness remains significant and robust after controlling for potential endogenous and simultaneous problems.     

Corporate Bond Trading Costs: A Peek Behind the Curtain

In this paper, I use institutional corporate bond trade data to estimate transactions costs in the over-the-counter bond market. I find average round-trip trading costs to be about $0.27 per $100 of par value. Trading costs are lower for larger trades. Small institutions pay more to trade than large institutions, all else being equal. Small bond dealers charge more than large ones. I find no evidence that trading costs more for lower-rated bonds.     

Competing for Order Flow in OTC Markets

We develop a model of a two‐sided asset market in which trades are intermediated by dealers and are bilateral. Dealers compete to attract order flow by posting the terms at which they execute trades—which can include prices, quantities, and execution speed—and investors direct their orders toward dealers who offer the most attractive terms. We characterize the equilibrium in a general setting, and we illustrate theoretically and numerically how the model can account for several important trading patterns in over‐the‐counter markets, which do not emerge from existing models.     

Insider trading patterns

We revisit the information content of stock trading by corporate insiders with an expectation that opportunistic insiders will spread their trades over longer periods of time when they have a longer-lived informational advantage, and trade in a short window of time when their advantage is fleeting. Controlling for the duration of insiders' trading strategies, we find robust new evidence that both insiders' sales and purchases predict abnormal stock returns. In addition, we provide evidence that insiders attempt to preserve their informational advantages and increase their trading profits by disclosing their trades after the market has closed. When insiders report their trades after business hours, they are more likely to engage in longer series of trades, they trade more shares overall, and their trades are associated with larger abnormal returns. Finally, we show how accounting for these trading patterns sharpens screens for corporate insiders who trade on infor- mation.     

Taxes on Tax‐Exempt Bonds

Implicit tax rates priced in the cross section of municipal bonds are approximately two to three times as high as statutory income tax rates, with implicit tax rates close to 100% using retail trades and above 70% for interdealer trades. These implied tax rates can be identified because a portion of secondary market municipal bond trades involves income taxes. After valuing the tax payments, market discount bonds, which carry income tax liabilities, trade at yields around 25 basis points higher than comparable municipal bonds not subject to any taxes. The high sensitivities of municipal bond prices to tax rates can be traced to individual retail traders dominating dealers and other institutions.     

Imperfect Competition, Information Heterogeneity, and Financial Contagion

This study examines how heterogeneity of private informationmay induce financial contagion. Using a model of multi-assettrading in which the three main channels of contagion throughfinancial linkages in the literature (correlated information,correlated liquidity, and portfolio rebalancing) are ruled outby construction, I show that financial contagion can still bean equilibrium outcome when speculators receive heterogeneousfundamental information. Risk-neutral speculators trade strategicallyacross many assets to mask their information advantage aboutone asset. Asymmetric sharing of information among them preventsrational market makers from learning about their individualsignals and trades with sufficient accuracy. Incorrect cross-inferenceabout terminal payoffs and contagion ensue. When used to analyzethe transmission of shocks across countries, my model suggeststhat the process of generation and disclosure of informationin emerging markets may explain their vulnerability to financialcontagion (JEL D82, G14, G15).     

Transaction costs in an illiquid order‐driven market

Transaction costs in many international equity markets are much larger than those in the USA. This raises questions such as what trade size these reported trading costs relate to and whether investors can reduce trading costs by timing their trades. We show, using data from the order‐driven New Zealand market, that transaction costs are frequently lower for larger trades, particularly in small stocks, and investors are able to reduce costs by timing their transactions. While investors who require immediate execution incur transaction costs that are much higher than reported average costs, patient investors can trade at much better rates.     

Permanent trading impacts and bond yields

We analyse four years of transaction data for euro-area sovereign bonds traded on the MTS electronic platforms. In order to measure the informational content of trading activity, we estimate the permanent price response to trades. We not only find strong evidence of information asymmetry in sovereign bond markets, but also show the relevance of information asymmetry in explaining the cross-sectional variations of bond yields across a wide range of bond maturities and countries. Our results confirm that trades of more recently issued bonds and longer maturity bonds have a greater permanent effect on prices. We compare the price impact of trades for bonds across different maturity categories and find that trades of French and German bonds have the highest long-term price impact in the short maturity class, whereas trades of German bonds have the highest permanent price impact in the long maturity class. More importantly, we study the cross-section of bond yields and find that after controlling for conventional factors, investors demand higher yields for bonds with larger permanent trading impact. Interestingly, when investors face increased market uncertainty, they require even higher compensation for information asymmetry.     

Do Investment Newsletters Move Markets?

We analyze the market impact of stock recommendations made by a single investment newsletter that focuses on instances of heavy insider trading. The market reacts positively to the actual insider trades and the associated Form 4 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings that attracted the newsletter's interest. The subsequent recommendations, which occur within a delay of several days, are associated with an even larger announcement period return and higher trade volume. Thus, despite the fact that recommendations are largely based on publicly available information on insider trades and the reach of the newsletter is limited, the newsletter has a significant impact on the market.     

Quote-based competition and trade execution costs in NYSE-listed stocks

This study examines quotations, order routing, and trade execution costs for seven markets that compete for orders in large-capitalization NYSE-listed stocks. The competitiveness of quote updates from each market varies with measures of the profitability of attracting additional order and with volatility and inventory measures. The probability of a trade executing on each market increases when the market posts competitive quotes. Execution costs for non-NYSE trades when the local market posts competitive (non-competitive) quotes are virtually the same (substantially exceed) costs for matched NYSE trades. Collectively, these results imply a significant degree of quote-based competition for order flow and are consistent with off-NYSE liquidity providers using competitive quotations to signal when they are prepared to give better-than-normal trade executions.