Loan loss provisions and income smoothing – Do shareholders matter?

In this paper, we aim to analyse the role of shareholders in the creation of discretionary loan loss provisions (LLP) and the use of LLP in income smoothing. Using a sample of over 200 Central European banks, we demonstrate that LLP and income smoothing of foreign-owned banks and state-owned banks differ from those of domestic private banks. Foreign and state banks create higher discretionary LLP than private domestic banks. Foreign banks use these LLP to perform discretionary income smoothing, while state banks, in general, do not smooth income. Higher LLP of foreign banks are observed in banks with low asset quality and high profitability. Foreign banks with low profitability that operate in volatile economic environments do not create higher discretionary LLP than domestic private banks. This implies that their risk is not lower than that of locally owned banks, at least on the credit side. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, both foreign and state banks have become more prudent than domestic private banks, and their discretionary LLP are higher. Overall, we provide evidence that foreign and government ownership affect LLP policy in banks. This complements existing results on the differences in loan cyclicality and default risk between foreign, state and domestic private banks.     

金融市场现代化背景下金融发展影响文化产业的实证分析

运用中国1995-2012年的时间序列数据,实证检验金融发展对文化产业的影响。结果显示,金融发展对文化产业规模有显著的正向影响,城镇居民可支配收入对文化产业规模有显著的负向影响,农村居民家庭人均纯收入对文化产业规模有显著的正向的影响,城镇居民恩格尔系数对文化产业规模有显著的正向影响。     

Financial fragility of banks,ownership structure and income diversification: Empirical evidence from the GCC region

This paper investigates the role that ownership structure and diversification of income plays in the financial stability of banks from the GCC region. We find evidence that suggests that higher concentration of ownership in any type of shareholding is associated with higher insolvency risk. However, this higher insolvency risk is not associated with any specific type of shareholders. Higher financial fragility is also associated with the size and whether the bank is an Islamic bank. Banks engaged in substantial fee-based activities are more financially stable as compared with banks that predominantly generate their incomes from traditional intermediation activities.     

The application of a Planned Economy Country Risk Model to the assessment of market entry into the Chinese banking sector

China pledged on joining the World Trade Organisation to fully liberalise the banking sector by December 2006 and thus exposed its domestic banks to foreign competition. Global banks have since been lured by the opportunities that this sector presents in terms of its market size, buoyant saving rates, rising real per capita income, improved living standards, and an increased need for financial products and services. Nevertheless, foreign banks face a number of risks when entering markets in China where government tightly regulates industrial development. The Planned Economy Risk Model (PERM) is introduced to assess the dimensions of risk in entering such markets. To illustrate its use PERM is then applied for investments in China.     

Financial development,government ownership of banks and firm innovation

Using a newly-available World Bank survey of over 28,000 firms from 46 countries, we examine how financial development affects firm innovation around the world. We find that while stock market development significantly enhances firm innovation, banking sector development has mixed effects. We show that the latter result can be explained by different levels of government ownership of banks. Specifically, in countries with lower government ownership of banks, banking sector development significantly enhances firm innovation; while in countries with higher government ownership of banks, banking sector development has no significant or sometimes even significantly negative effects on firm innovation. Such negative effects are significantly stronger for smaller firms. The results are robust to various controls such as firms’ human capital and ownership structure, to estimations using instrumental variable techniques and alternative measures of firm innovation.     

Bank privatization and performance: Empirical evidence from Nigeria

We assess the effect of privatization on performance in a panel of Nigerian banks for the period 1990–2001. We find evidence of performance improvement in nine banks that were privatized, which is remarkable given the inhospitable environment for true financial intermediation. Our results also suggest negative effects of the continuing minority government ownership on the performance of many Nigerian banks. Finally, our results complement aggregate indications of decreasing financial intermediation over the 1990s; banks that focused on investment in government bonds and non-lending activities enjoyed a relatively better performance.     

宏观调控、所有权结构与商业银行信贷扩张行为

本文结合公司金融和商业银行相关理论,厘清了股权结构对商业银行信贷扩张的作用机理,重点分析政府宏观调控政策目标和意图如何通过股权结构作用于信贷行为。选用21家银行2003-2010年间的面板数据,估计得出中央政府控制、民营化程度低、大股东持股比例高的银行具有更强的信贷扩张冲动;并利用2009年宏观经济扩张政策外生冲击形成的"自然实验"环境,通过双重差分(Difference-in-Difference)估计策略发现,宏观调控对中央政府控制、民营化程度低、大股东持股比例高的银行的信贷行为影响更为显著。本文的研究从政府控制和银行内部治理的视角为信贷扩张的微观机制以及商业银行市场化改革之后政府宏观经济调控的传导渠道提供了一个新的解释。     

Financial stability reviews: A first empirical analysis

Between 1996 and 2005 the number of central banks that publish a financial stability review (FSR) increased from 1 to 40. A FSR may contribute to financial stability, increase accountability of authorities responsible for financial stability, and strengthen co-operation between the various authorities. The occurrence of a banking crisis in the past, income per capita, and European Union membership increase the likelihood that a FSR is published. The content of FSRs differs widely; on average only 33% of the indicators as suggested by the IMF is actually published. The amount of information provided seems unrelated to the health of the banking system.     

Payout policy and ownership structure: The case of Islamic and conventional banks

Using a sample of Islamic and conventional financial institutions domiciled in 16 countries for the period 2000–2015, we examine how ownership structure affects dividend policy. Our main findings indicate that ownership identity is important in explaining dividend policy in these banks, albeit in different patterns. In particular, the results suggest that government ownership seems to exert negative effects on dividend payouts in both types of banks, which is in line with the preference of governments towards bank stability. With respect to family ownership, the impact is negative for conventional banks but positive for Islamic ones, consistent with agency theory. These results are to some extent similar in the case of foreign ownership where it is associated with a higher payout policy in Islamic banks, but not significant in conventional ones. Our results are robust to an array of additional analyses including propensity score matching.     

Publicly traded versus privately held: implications for conditional conservatism in bank accounting

Compared with privately held banks, publicly traded banks face greater agency costs because of greater separation of ownership and control but enjoy greater benefits from access to the equity capital market. Differences in control and capital market access influence public versus private banks’ accounting. We predict and find that public banks exhibit greater degrees of conditional conservatism (asymmetric timeliness of the recognition of losses versus gains in accounting income) than private banks. We predict and find that public banks recognize more timely earnings declines, less timely earnings increases, and larger and more timely loan losses. Although public ownership gives managers greater ability and incentive to exercise income-increasing accounting, our findings show that the demand for conservatism dominates within public banks and that the demand for conservatism is greater among public banks than private banks. Our results provide insights for accounting and finance academics, bank managers, auditors, and regulators concerning the effects of ownership structure on conditional conservatism in banks’ financial reporting.

Post-privatization state ownership and bank risk-taking: Cross-country evidence

We examine the relation between state residual ownership and bank risk-taking for privatized banks from 45 countries. Applying propensity score matching, we find that privatized banks tend to exhibit higher levels of risk-taking post-privatization than their publicly listed non-privatized counterparts. Moreover, partially privatized banks exhibit higher levels of risk-taking than fully privatized banks. We also observe a positive and significant relation between the level of residual state ownership and risk-taking. These findings are consistent with the distorted objectives associated with government control, as suggested by the political benefits of control, and with the soft budget constraint views of state ownership. The distortion can be mitigated by the quality of a country's institutional and regulatory environments. Finally, our results show that the effect of state ownership on risk-taking is more pronounced in countries with a higher dominance of state-owned enterprises, and it was more prevalent during the global financial crisis.     

银行监管和股东属性对银行风险的影响——基于新兴经济体的监管数据分析

银行监管按世界银行的标准划分为总体监管和12类分项监管;银行大股东属性包括政府类、金融企业类、外资类等.总体监管可以有效地降低银行风险;大股东为工业类、金融类企业的银行能够更好地控制风险,而家族类银行的风险程度较高;通过对分项监管进行研究可以发现,加强对所有权、资本要求、经营活动限制、外部审计要求、流动性、存款保险制度、退出及监管效率八个方面的监管可降低银行总体风险,而加强准入、内部管理、资产分类配置、信息披露这四类监管反而会增加银行总体风险.     

Ownership concentration and bank risk: international study on acquisitions

This paper explores the effects of different types of bank ownership concentration on changes in bank risk during acquisition years. Using multi-country data from 2000 to 2006, during which market failures caused by various crises and government interventions are less influential to acquisition decisions, we collect 505 banking acquisition deals from 23 countries to examine which type of ownership concentration (such as financial intermediary, capital investor, non-financial, and state ownership) brings larger changes to an acquirer’s risk from pre-acquisition year to post-acquisition year (including non-performing loans, capital adequacy ratio, loan loss reserve, and credit rating). The empirical analyses show that acquirer banks with a concentration of shares owned by financial intermediaries and non-financial firms experience larger risk changes during acquisition years. In contrast, the risk changes of acquirer banks with a concentration of capital investors and state ownership are lower. Robustness checks from the random effect estimation, instrumental variables model, reverse causality, and different subsamples of (non-)U.S. or different levels of regulation enforcement confirm these results.     

The impact of state ownership on performance differences in privately-owned versus state-owned banks: An international comparison

This paper examines how government ownership and government involvement in a country’s banking system affect bank performance from 1989 through 2004. Our study uncovers an interesting pattern of changing performance differences between state-owned and privately-owned banks around the Asian financial crisis. We find that state-owned banks operated less profitably, held less core capital, and had greater credit risk than privately-owned banks prior to 2001, and the performance differences are more significant in those countries with greater government involvement and political corruption in the banking system. In addition, from 1997 to 2000, the 4-year period after the beginning of the Asian financial crisis, the deterioration in the cash flow returns, core capital, and credit quality of state-owned banks was significantly greater than that of privately-owned banks, especially for the countries that were hardest hit by the Asian crisis. However, state-owned banks closed the gap with privately-owned banks on cash flow returns, core capital, and nonperforming loans in the post-crisis period of 2001–2004. Our findings can best be explained by Shleifer and Vishny’s [Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W., 1997. A survey of corporate governance. J. Finance 52, 737–783] corporate governance theory on state ownership of firms and Kane’s [Kane, E.J., 2000. Capital movement, banking insolvency, and silent runs in the Asian financial crisis. Pacific-Basin Finance J. 8, 153–175] life-cycle model of a regulation-induced banking crisis.     

Income diversification and risk: Does ownership matter? An empirical examination of Indian banks

We examine the impact of ownership on income diversification and risk for Indian banks over the period 2001–2009. We investigate both the determinants of non-interest income and the impact of diversification on various profitability and insolvency risk measures for public sector, private domestic, and foreign banks. We document that ownership does matter in the pursuit of non-interest income. Relative to private domestic banks, public sector banks earn significantly less fee-income, while foreign banks report higher fee income. Public sector banks with higher levels of governmental ownership are significantly less likely to pursue non-interest income sources. Fee-based income significantly reduces risk, measured by profitability variables, for public sector banks. Default risk is also reduced for these banks. From a regulatory perspective, it appears that diversification benefits India’s public sector banks. Our research has implications for the changes in the risk profile for banks in emerging banking markets pursuing non-interest revenue sources.     

The Puzzle of Persistently Negative Interest‐Rate–Growth Differentials: Financial Repression or Income Catch‐Up?

The interest‐rate–growth differential (IRGD) plays a critical role in determining the sustainability of government debt. Yet it is striking that IRGDs are correlated with income levels, and are generally negative in emerging and developing economies, which contradicts standard economic theory. Negative IRGDs constitute a powerful debt‐stabilising force, driving down debt ratios or keeping them stable even in the presence of persistent primary deficits. Motivated by the puzzling facts, this paper examines the IRGDs for a large panel of advanced and non‐advanced economies by utilising a newly assembled data set. The evidence shows that large negative IRGDs in emerging and developing economies are largely due to real interest rates well below market equilibrium – stemming from financial repression and captive and distorted markets – whereas the income catch‐up process plays a relatively modest role. Therefore, the IRGD in non‐advanced economies is likely to rise with financial market development and financial global integration, perhaps even before their GDP per capita converges to advanced‐economy levels.     

Foreign Banks: Trends and Impact

Over the past two decades, foreign banks have become much more important in domestic financial intermediation, heightening the need to understand their behavior. We introduce a new, comprehensive database, made publicly available, on bank ownership (including the home country of foreign banks) for 5,324 banks in 137 countries over the period 1995–2009. We document large increases in foreign bank presence in many countries, but with substantial heterogeneity in terms of host and banks’ home countries, bilateral investment patterns, and bank characteristics. In terms of impact, we document that the relation between private credit and foreign bank presence importantly depends on host country and banks’ characteristics. Specifically, foreign banks only seem to have a negative impact on credit in low‐income countries, in countries where they have a limited market share, where enforcing contracts is costly and where credit information is limited available, and when they come from distant home countries. This shows that accounting for heterogeneity, including bilateral ownership, is crucial to better understand the implications of foreign bank ownership.     

The Puzzle Between Banking Competition and Profitability can be Solved: International Evidence from Bank-Level Data

This article applies the GMM techniques for dynamic panels using bank-level data for 61 countries over the period 1992 to 2006 to re-investigate the impact of banking competition on profitability. The extant literature, which ignores influence factors, presents ambiguity towards the impact of banking competition on profitability. However, when the effects of a broad range of factors are taken into consideration, five conclusions are reached. First, along with the change in market structure, a higher degree of activity restriction enhances banks’ profits. Second, restrictions on the rights of commercial banks to engage in securities, insurance, and other non-banking-related business, along with restrictions on the entry of foreign banks into these markets, weaken the positive relationship between banking competition and profits. Third, a higher degree of efficiency within the judicial system and the added protection afforded to investors may weaken or else have no impact on the positive relationship. Fourth, the positive relationship may weaken in countries having a sound financial system or high income per capita. Finally, greater competitive pressure facing banks may weaken or eliminate the impact of banking competition on profit.     

Bank discrimination, holding bank ownership, and economic consequences: Evidence from China

This paper finds that compared with Chinese state-owned firms, non-state-owned firms have a greater propensity to hold significant ownership in commercial banks. These results are consistent with the notion that because non-state-owned firms are more likely to suffer bank discrimination for political reasons, they tend to address their financing disadvantages by building economic bonds with banks. We also find that among non-state-owned firms, those that hold significant bank ownership have lower interest expenses, and are less likely to increase cash holdings but more likely to obtain short-term loans when the government monetary policy is tight. These results suggest that the firms building economic bonds with banks can enjoy benefits such as lower financial expenses and better lending terms during difficult times. Finally, we find that non-state-owned firms with significant bank ownership have better operating performance. Overall, we find that firms can reduce discrimination through holding bank ownership.     

社区银行发展的经济学分析与路径选择

社区银行是一种充满生命力的经营模式.从发达国家的实践来看,社区银行的蓬勃发展得益于正确的市场定位、明晰的产权结构、强力的政策扶持以及有序的金融监管.从经济学上看,这一模式的存在是源于金融专业化分工的客观要求、在特定的领域拥有信息和交易成本的比较优势.建立一个覆盖城乡的社区银行体系能够弱化我国经济发展中典型的二元经济结构.结合我国国情,社区银行的发展路径包括:改造现存的部分地方中小银行,由民营资本组建新的社区银行,将民间金融组织引导规范成社区银行.此外,社区银行的有效运行还需要建立健全法律体系、建立存款保险制度等配套措施.