Securitization,competition and monitoring

We analyze the impact of loan securitization on competition in the loan market. Using a dynamic loan market competition model where borrowers face both exogenous and endogenous costs to switch between banks, we uncover a competition softening effect of securitization that allows banks to extract rents in the primary loan market. By reducing monitoring incentives, securitization mitigates winner’s curse effects in future stages of competition thereby decreasing ex ante competition for initial market share. Due to this competition softening effect, securitization can adversely affect loan market efficiency while leading to higher equilibrium profits for banks. This effect is driven by primary loan market competition, not by the exploitation of informational asymmetries in the secondary market for loans. We also argue that banks can use securitization as a strategic response to an increase in competition, as a tool to signal a reduction in monitoring intensity for the sole purpose of softening ex ante competition. Our result suggests that securitization reforms focusing exclusively on informational asymmetries in markets for securitized products may overlook competitive conditions in the primary market.     

Can Relationship Banking Survive Competition?

How will banks evolve as competition increases from other banks and from the capital market? Will banks become more like capital market underwriters and offer passive transaction loans or return to their roots as relationship lending experts? These are the questions we address. Our key result is that as interbank competition increases, banks make more relationship loans, but each has lower added value for borrowers. Capital market competition reduces relationship lending (and bank lending shrinks), but each relationship loan has greater added value for borrowers. In both cases, welfare increases for some borrowers but not necessarily for all.     

Did quantitative easing reduce the borrowing costs of firms? The risk-taking channel

This paper examines the effect of the Federal Reserve's quantitative easing (QE) on the cost of bank loans and documents large heterogeneous effects across different firms. In QE1, the average loan spread is 22.7 percent lower compared to the non-QE period. This effect falls in QE2 and OT and then rises in QE3 and the tapering period. The rates of riskier loans are restrained more than less risky loans during QEs as banks take more risks by offering lower rates to attract risky borrowers. The Fed mortgage-backed securities purchases have a larger impact in narrowing the borrowing cost difference between riskier and safer loans than the Fed Treasury purchases. Our results are robust to borrower, year-quarter and bank fixed effects. Overall, our findings support that the risk-taking channel of QE plays a significant role in the corporate bank loan market.     

Do negative interest rates affect bank risk-taking?

We offer early evidence on the impact of negative interest rate policy (NIRP) on banks’ risk-taking. Our primary result shows banks in NIRP-adopter countries reduce holdings of risky assets by around 10 percentage points following implementation of NIRP in comparison to banks in non-adopter countries. We augment this result by identifying NIRP’s impact on other aspects of banks’ risk-taking behaviour; NIRP is associated with reductions in banks’ loan growth and average loan price (by 3.7 percentage points and 59 basis points) and a rebalancing of asset portfolios towards safer assets. Secondly, we find the NIRP-effect is heterogeneous; post-NIRP risk-taking increases at strongly capitalised banks and at banks operating in less competitive markets that exploit market power to insulate net interest margins and profitability. Our robust empirical evidence supports the “de-leverage” hypothesis which suggests that banks acquire safer, liquid assets to bolster their capital positions rather than searching for value by acquiring riskier assets. We base our evidence on a sample of 2,584 banks from 33 OECD countries across 2012 to 2016, and from models that employ a difference-in-differences framework.     

How changes in market conditions affect screening activity,credit risk,and the lending behaviour of banks

The global financial crisis dramatically transformed the market conditions in the banking industry. We construct a theoretical model of spatial competition that considers the differential information between lenders and loan applicants to explore how changes in the market structure affect the lending behaviour of banks and their incentives to invest in screening and how this, in turn, affects the level of credit risk in the economy. Our findings reveal that enhanced competition reduces lending cost thus encouraging the entry of new customers in credit markets. Also, that the transportation cost that loan applicants are required to pay to reach the bank of their interest shrinks with respect to the degree of competition. We further lend support to the view that stiffer competition has an increasing impact on the level of credit risk. Notably, we find that competition strengthens the incentives of banks to engage in screening activity and that screening serves as a protection mechanism that can provide banks with a shield against bad loans. Overall, when market conditions are substantially distorted, this has a dilutive impact on the incentives mechanism of banks to screen their applicants. We provide empirical evidence which is consistent with the conceptual underpinnings of our theoretical model and the obtained findings.     

The Effects of Banking Mergers on Loan Contracts

This paper studies the effects of banking mergers on individual business borrowers. Using information on individual loan contracts between banks and companies, I analyze the effect of banking consolidation on banks' credit policies. I find that in-market mergers benefit borrowers if these mergers involve the acquisition of banks with small market shares. Interest rates charged by the consolidated banks decrease, but as the local market share of the acquired bank increases, the efficiency effect is offset by market power. Mergers have different distributional effects across borrowers. When banks become larger, they reduce the supply of loans to small borrowers.     

Credit unions vs. commercial banks,who takes more risk?

A unique feature of the financial services industry is that both shareholder-owned banks and member-owned credit unions coexist and compete against each other. In this study, we investigate two research questions. First, we compare risk-taking by banks and credit unions, with an additional consideration as to how regulatory oversight (state or federal) relates to such risk-taking. Second, we examine how competition affects the difference in risk-taking between these two types of financial institutions. To answer both questions, we rely on a matched sample (by loan type, size, and county) of commercial banks and credit unions, covering the period between 2010 and 2017. We use three empirical proxies for risk-taking, the Z-score, measuring an institution’s insolvency risk, as well as the ratios of non-performing loans to total loans and loan charge-offs to total loans, measuring the credit risk. Our results suggest that banks tend to engage in more risk-taking than credit unions; however, state regulatory oversight reduces the risk-taking gap, especially in terms of the Z-score. We further find that competition induces different risk-taking behaviors in banks and credit unions. Our results are robust to several alternative specifications.     

Alternative Information Sources and the Information Content of Bank Loans

This paper examines the information content of bank loan agreements. We differentiate borrowers according to financial analysts' percentage earnings forecast errors and most recent forecast revisions. The empirical results suggest that banks rely on other indicators as initial screening devices to determine where to best deploy their evaluation and monitoring efforts. If these other indicators are reliable and signal-improving prospects, banks do little further investigation. However, if the indicators are noisy and signal-declining prospects, banks have incentives to expend resources to investigate the borrowers, resulting in the production of valuable information.     

Countercyclical prudential buffers and bank risk-taking

We investigate the effects of countercyclical prudential buffers on bank risk-taking. We exploit the introduction of dynamic loan loss provisioning in Spain, mandating that banks use historical average loss rates in their estimation of loan loss provisions. We find that dynamic loan loss provisioning is associated with reductions in timely loan loss provisioning. Banks that previously recognized loan losses in a timely fashion exhibit the greatest reductions in timeliness and consequently extend loans to riskier borrowers with lower accounting quality. Our results have policy implications for the debate on the use of financial reporting requirements in mitigating capital pro-cyclicality.     

Bank Mergers and Diversification: Implications for Competition Policy

This paper analyses competition and mergers among risk averse banks. We show that the correlation between the shocks to the demand for loans and the shocks to the supply of deposits induces a strategic interdependence between the two sides of the market. We characterise the role of diversification as a motive for bank mergers and analyse the consequences of mergers on loan and deposit rates. When the value of diversification is sufficiently strong, bank mergers generate an increase in the welfare of borrowers and depositors. If depositors have more correlated shocks than borrowers, bank mergers are relatively worse for depositors than for borrowers.     

Learning by lending

This paper studies bank learning through repeated interactions with borrowers from a new perspective. To understand learning by lending, we adapt a methodology from labor economics to analyze how loan contract terms evolve as banks acquire new information about borrowers. We construct “proxy” variables for this information using data from borrowers’ out-of-sample, future credit performance. Due to the timing of their construction, banks could not have used these variables directly to price loans. We nonetheless find that these proxies increasingly predict loan prices as relationships progress, even after controlling for possible omitted variable bias. Our methodology provides strong evidence that: (a) bank learning affects loan prices, and (b) relationship benefits are heterogeneous. In particular, higher quality borrowers face differentially lower spreads as their relationship with lenders develop – and banks learn about their quality – while lower quality borrowers see loan prices increase and their loan amounts fall. We further find suggestive evidence that banks incorporate CEO-specific information into loan prices.     

Deposit competition and loan markets

Less-intense competition for deposits, by mitigating banks’ incentive to take excessive risks, is traditionally believed to lead to lower non-performing loan (NPL) ratios and more-stable banks. This paper revisits this proposition in a model with borrower moral hazard in which banks’ NPL ratios depend endogenously on their loan pricing. In relatively uncompetitive loan markets, less-fierce competition for deposits (i.e., lower deposit rates) leads to lower loan rates and, thus, safer loans. In more-competitive markets, the opposite can occur: As banks’ deposit-repayment burdens decline, they become less eager to risk-shift; this softens competition for risky loans, leading to higher loan rates and, ultimately, riskier loans. Overall, the model predicts a hump-shaped relationship between banks’ pricing power in deposit markets and their NPL ratios.     

Role of Collateral and Personal Guarantees in Relationship Lending: Evidence from Japan's SME Loan Market

This paper investigates the determinants of the use of collateral and personal guarantees in Japan's SME loan market. We find that firms' riskiness does not have a significant effect on the likelihood that collateral is used. We find, however, that main banks whose claims are collateralized monitor borrowers more intensively and that borrowers who have a long-term relationship with their main banks are more likely to pledge collateral. These findings are consistent with the theory that the use of collateral is effective in raising the bank's seniority and enhances its screening and monitoring. This incentive effect for the bank becomes tenuous for personal guarantees.     

Banks without parachutes: Competitive effects of government bail-out policies

We analyze the competitive effects of government bail-out policies in two models with different degrees of transparency in the banking sector. Our main result is that bail-outs lead to higher risk-taking among the protected bank’s competitors, independently of transparency. The reason is that the prospect of a bail-out induces the protected bank to expand, which intensifies competition in the deposit market, depresses other banks’ margins, and thereby increases risk-taking incentives. Contrary to conventional wisdom, protected banks may take lower risks when transparency in the banking sector is low and the deposit supply is sufficiently elastic.     

Is there a tradeoff between bank competition and financial fragility?

We use a model of mean-shifting investment technologies to study the relationship between market structure, risk taking and social welfare in lending markets. Introduction of loan market competition is shown to reduce lending rates and to generate higher investments without increasing the equilibrium bankruptcy risk of borrowers. Hence, there need not be a tradeoff between lending market competition and financial fragility. Such a tradeoff may not emerge either when banks compete by conditioning interest rates on investment volumes irrespectively of whether credit rationing takes place or not.     

Political institutions and bank risk-taking behavior

This paper examines the impact of political institutions on bank risk-taking behavior. Using an international sample of banks from 98 countries over the period 1998–2007, I document that sound political institutions stimulate higher bank risk-taking. This is consistent with the hypotheses that better political institutions increase banks’ risk by boosting the credit market competition from alternative sources of finance and generating the moral hazard problems due to the expectation of government bailouts in worst economic conditions. While it is contrary to the hypotheses that better political institutions decrease banks’ risk by lowering the government expropriation risk and the information asymmetries between banks and borrowers. The results are robust to a number of sensitivity tests, including alternative proxies of bank risk-taking and political institutions, cross-sectional bank- and country-level regressions, endogeneity concerns of political institutions, country income levels, explicit deposit insurance schemes and sample extension from 1998 to 2014. I also examine the interdependence between political and legal institutions and find that political and legal institutions complement each other to influence bank risk-taking behavior.     

Moral hazard and adverse selection in the originate-to-distribute model of bank credit

Bank credit has evolved from the traditional relationship banking model to an originate-to-distribute model. We show that the borrowers whose loans are sold in the secondary market underperform their peers by about 9% per year (risk-adjusted) over the three-year period following the initial sale of their loans. Therefore, either banks are originating and selling loans of lower quality borrowers based on unobservable private information (adverse selection), and/or loan sales lead to diminished bank monitoring that affects borrowers negatively (moral hazard). We propose regulatory restrictions on loan sales, increased disclosure, and a loan trading exchange/clearinghouse as mechanisms to alleviate these problems.     

Information Losses in a Dynamic Model of Credit

This paper examines dynamic information losses associated with loan terminations. We assume that the aggregated returns of current borrowers contain information about the mean returns to future borrowers. In a competitive loan market, the value of this information is not fully internalized by individual borrowers and lenders, and loan decisions fail to be first best. Introducing heterogeneous borrowers, who know their own risk characteristics better than lenders, safer borrowers are less willing to borrow when risk premia rise. As they cease borrowing, the information generated in credit markets becomes noisier and this tends to increase risk premia. The model produces alternating and persistent periods of “tight” and “loose” credit.     

What does peer-to-peer lending evidence say about the Risk-Taking Channel of monetary policy?

This paper uses loan application-level data from a peer-to-peer lending platform to study the risk-taking channel of monetary policy. By employing a direct ex-ante measure of risk-taking and estimating the simultaneous equations of loan approval and loan amount, we provide evidence of monetary policy's impact on a nonbank financial institution's risk-taking. We find that the search-for-yield is the main driving force of the risk-taking effect, while we do not observe consistent findings of risk-shifting from the liquidity change. Monetary policy easing is associated with a higher probability of granting loans to risky borrowers and greater riskiness of credit allocation. However, these changes do not necessarily relate to a larger loan amount on average.     

Are all types of real transaction management equal in the eyes of bank lenders?

This study examines whether bank lenders react differently to various types of real transaction management (RTM) by borrowing firms. Drawing upon the differential cash and cash flow effects of alternative forms of RTM, we predict and find that banks provide more favorable loan terms, that is, lower interest spread and reduced likelihood of required collateral, for firms reporting more discretionary reductions in research and development (R&D) expenditures. In contrast, lending banks respond unfavorably to borrowers’ engagement in RTM through aggressive sales discounts and overproduction of inventories. Additional analysis reveals that the favorable effect of discretionary R&D reductions on loan pricing is greater (smaller) for borrowing firms with a prior relationship with the bank or with a lower level of cash holdings (loans with longer maturity). Overall, our findings suggest that banks, with their unique payoff functions and monitoring incentives, do not view all forms of RTM negatively.