Non-linear long horizon returns predictability: evidence from six south-east Asian markets

Whilst the existence of long-horizon returns predictability has been a recurrent theme in empirical finance research, extant work has focused almost exclusively on the US, and more recent work has cast doubt over the validity of such potential predictability due to non-stationarity and serial correlation in the data. The present paper examines long-horizon returns predictability in six South-East Asian markets in the context of unit root tests conducted under corrections for serial correlation and heteroscedasticity. The analysis conducted also extends the investigation of long-horizon predictability to the non-linear setting, and examines whether any detected non-linear predictability is consistent with behavioural approaches to asset pricing which emphasise the role of noise traders. The results obtained suggest the following conclusions. First, long-horizon predictability is present in each of the six South-East Asian markets considered. Second, whilst forecast power increases with horizon, for the majority of series it is maximised for forecast horizons of between 12 and 48 months. Third, non-linear predictability is reported for all series, suggesting that positive and negative values of the (demeaned) dividend yield impart different levels of predictability for returns at different forecast horizons. However, there is no consistency in the pattern of non-linearity reported, and whilst the observed patterns are consistent with noise traders models for some of the markets considered, this is not true of all the markets considered. Nevertheless, the non-linear dynamics detected are suggestive of potential market inefficiencies in all six cases.     

Neoclassical finance,behavioral finance and noise traders: A review and assessment of the literature

While mainstream neoclassical finance ignores the role played by noise traders, a significant amount of empirical evidence is available to show that noise traders are active market participants and that their participation gives rise to market anomalies. Unlike neoclassical finance, behavioral finance allows for market inefficiency on the grounds that market participants are subject to common human errors that arise from heuristics and biases. In this paper we review the literature on the behavior of noise traders and analyze the consequences of their presence in the market, starting with a distinction between neoclassical finance and behavioral finance. We identify the market anomalies that provide evidence for the tendency of markets to trade at irrational levels, demonstrate how noise trading is related to some market fundamentals, and describe the models used to quantify noise trader risk.     

Equilibrium moment restrictions on asset returns: normal and crisis periods

Empirically, the covariance between stock returns varies with their volatility. We seek a robust theoretical explanation of this. With minimal assumptions, we model stochastic properties of equilibrium returns which result from the interaction between inter-temporal traders and noisy, price-sensitive short-term traders. The inter-temporal traders can have arbitrary investment rules, preferences and information. In all cases we find a set of restrictions between second moments of equilibrium returns. With two assets there is also a bound on the correlation between asset returns. Estimation with second moments of global stock returns supports our theoretical framework. Higher volatility in at least one market can increase comovement among markets. With globalization, covariances between two stock markets can also affect covariances between two other stock markets. We also find that the changes in trader behavior between normal and crisis periods lead to changes in the moment restrictions between asset returns.     

An empirical investigation of large trader market manipulation in derivatives markets

Using account-level transaction data in options and futures markets, we investigate the existence of market manipulation, which is the ability of large traders to trade strategically, impacting prices and making abnormal profits. First, large trader’s option positions have a quantity impact on the underlying asset’s price. Second, large traders generate significantly positive alphas from trading options and futures. Among the different investor types, proprietary dealers generate the largest positive alphas. Third, these abnormal returns are consistent with strategic trading and cross-market manipulation. The evidence supports market manipulation across the options and futures markets, but not within the futures market itself.     

A Test of the Modigliani‐Miller Invariance Theorem and Arbitrage in Experimental Asset Markets

Modigliani and Miller show that the total market value of a firm is unaffected by a repackaging of asset return streams to equity and debt if pricing is arbitrage‐free. We investigate this invariance theorem in experimental asset markets, finding value‐invariance for assets of identical risks when returns are perfectly correlated. However, exploiting price discrepancies has risk when returns have the same expected value but are uncorrelated, in which case the law of one price is violated. Discrepancies shrink in consecutive markets, but persist even with experienced traders. In markets where overall trader acuity is high, assets trade closer to parity.     

Trading behavior in S&P 500 index futures

This article examines the determinants of trading decisions and the performance of trader types, in the context of the E-Mini S&;P 500 futures and S&;P 500 futures markets. Speculators and small traders tend to follow positive feedback strategies while hedgers dynamically adjust positions in response to market returns. Such strategies apparently reverse during the 2008–09 financial crisis. Investor sentiment and market volatility play an important role in determining the net trading position of traders across the sample period. While all trader types are better at foreseeing market upturns, an out-of-sample test suggests that speculators and small traders have some predictive ability for short-term market returns.     

The “make or take” decision in an electronic market: Evidence on the evolution of liquidity

This paper uses experimental asset markets to investigate the evolution of liquidity in an electronic limit order market. Our market setting includes salient features of electronic limit order markets, as well as informed traders and liquidity traders. We focus on the strategies of the traders and how these are affected by trader type, characteristics of the market, and characteristics of the asset. We find that informed traders use more limit orders than do liquidity traders. Our main result is that liquidity provision shifts as trading progresses, with informed traders increasingly providing liquidity in markets. The change in the behavior of the informed traders seems to be in response to the dynamic adjustment of prices to information; they take (provide) liquidity when the value of their information is high (low). Thus, a market-making role emerges endogenously in our electronic markets and is ultimately adopted by the traders who are least subject to adverse selection when placing limit orders.     

Stock market dynamics with rational liquidity traders

In the Kyle (1985) finite horizon model of stock market dynamics with a trader who holds long-lived information, informed trading intensities rise with time, and the slopes of the equilibrium price schedules fall. This paper shows that this result depends crucially on the irrational liquidity trader assumption. We replace the irrational noise traders with a sequence of rational, risk averse, liquidity traders who receive endowment shocks to their holdings of the risky asset. We demonstrate that unless liquidity traders are sufficiently risk averse, the slope of equilibrium price schedule rises over time, while informed trading intensities fall. In particular, Kyle's result holds only when liquidity traders are so risk averse that they ‘over-rebalance’ their portfolio's holdings of the risky asset, so that their final holdings of the risky asset have the opposite sign of their initial position.     

Investor Sentiment and REIT Returns

Recent advances in the field of behavioral finance have given a fillip to the use of behavioral factors in asset pricing models. This study adds to the understanding of the REIT return generating process by exploring the behavioral impact of investor sentiment on REIT returns. The results show that when investors are optimistic (pessimistic), REIT returns become higher (lower). These findings are robust when conventional control variables are considered. Empirical analysis indicates steady erosion in the importance of the default and term structure interest rate variables previously considered as important determinants of REIT returns. Previous noise trading papers that consider the impact of institutional traders conclude that institutional investors cannot arbitrage away noise trader risk. The results of this paper find an exception in the case of small REITs. Examination of REITs based on size reveals that the return generating process of small REITs differs from that of mid-size and large REITs. Analysis of the return generating process by performance shows high performance REITs are more sensitive to the independent variables in the model as compared to the low and mid performance REITs.     

Short-selling bans and institutional investors' herding behaviour: Evidence from the global financial crisis

The literature on short-selling restrictions focusses mainly on a ban's impact on market efficiency, liquidity and overpricing. Surprisingly, little is known about the effects of short-sale constraints on herd behaviour. Since institutional investors have come to dominate mature stock markets and rely extensively on short sales, constraining these traders may influence the asset pricing process. We investigate six stock markets that faced bans during the recent global financial crisis. Our empirical evidence shows that short-selling restrictions exhibit either no influence on herding formation or induce adverse herding. This implies a higher dispersion of returns around the market compared to rational asset pricing, which can be interpreted as an increase in uncertainty among stock market investors.     

Do market prices reveal the decision models of sophisticated investors?: Evidence from the laboratory

If security prices are fully revealing, then all public information should be reflected in prices, and unsophisticated traders may be able to learn how various types of information affect security valuation by observing prices. A series of laboratory asset markets was conducted to examine whether unsophisticated traders are able to learn to evaluate publicly released information by trading with and observing trades made by a sophisticated trader who knows the valuation implications of the information. We find that unsophisticated traders who participate in an asset market with a sophisticated trader show significant improvement in their ability to use public information on a subsequent price estimation task. Conversely, a control group consisting only of unsophisticated traders shows no improvement. We conclude that market prices convey the sophisticated trader’s private information in a manner that permits unsophisticated investors to learn the stock price implications of a public information release.     

IS NOISE TRADER RISK PRICED?

We examine the hypothesis that closed‐end fund shareholders garner greater returns than holders of the underlying assets as compensation for bearing “noise trader risk.” We demonstrate that the returns on fund shares are more volatile and exhibit greater mean reversion than the returns on the underlying assets, consistent with the hypothesis that noise traders play a more active role in closed‐end fund shares than do the underlying assets. Inconsistent with the De Long et al. (1990) noise trader model, however, we find that after accounting for fund expenses, fund shareholders do not earn returns greater than holders of the underlying assets. JEL classification: G12     

On the Out-of-Sample Importance of Skewness and Asymmetric Dependence for Asset Allocation

Recent studies in the empirical finance literature have reportedevidence of two types of asymmetries in the joint distributionof stock returns. The first is skewness in the distributionof individual stock returns. The second is an asymmetry in thedependence between stocks: stock returns appear to be more highlycorrelated during market downturns than during market upturns.In this article we examine the economic and statistical significanceof these asymmetries for asset allocation decisions in an out-of-samplesetting. We consider the problem of a constant relative riskaversion (CRRA) investor allocating wealth between the risk-freeasset, a small-cap portfolio, and a large-cap portfolio. Weuse models that can capture time-varying moments up to the fourthorder, and we use copula theory to construct models of the time-varyingdependence structure that allow for different dependence duringbear markets than bull markets. The importance of these twoasymmetries for asset allocation is assessed by comparing theperformance of a portfolio based on a normal distribution modelwith a portfolio based on a more flexible distribution model.For investors with no short-sales constraints, we find thatknowledge of higher moments and asymmetric dependence leadsto gains that are economically significant and statisticallysignificant in some cases. For short sales-constrained investorsthe gains are limited.     

Contagion as a Wealth Effect

Financial contagion is described as a wealth effect in a continuous-time model with two risky assets and three types of traders. Noise traders trade randomly in one market. Long-term investors provide liquidity using a linear rule based on fundamentals. Convergence traders with logarithmic utility trade optimally in both markets. Asset price dynamics are endogenously determined (numerically) as functions of endogenous wealth and exogenous noise. When convergence traders lose money, they liquidate positions in both markets. This creates contagion, in that returns become more volatile and more correlated. Contagion reduces benefits from portfolio diversification and raises issues for risk management.     

Glued to the TV: Distracted Noise Traders and Stock Market Liquidity

In this paper, we study the impact of noise traders’ limited attention on financial markets. Specifically, we exploit episodes of sensational news (exogenous to the market) that distract noise traders. We find that on “distraction days,” trading activity, liquidity, and volatility decrease, and prices reverse less among stocks owned predominantly by noise traders. These outcomes contrast sharply with those due to the inattention of informed speculators and market makers, and are consistent with noise traders mitigating adverse selection risk. We discuss the evolution of these outcomes over time and the role of technological changes.     

Are REITs real estate? Evidence from international sector level data

The aim of this study is to examine whether securitized real estate returns reflect direct real estate returns or general stock market returns using international data for the U.S., U.K., and Australia. In contrast to previous research, which has generally relied on overall real estate market indices and neglected the potential long-term dynamics, our econometric evaluation is based on sector level data and caters for both the short-term and long-term dynamics of the assets as well as for the lack of leverage in the direct real estate indices. In addition to the real estate and stock market indices, the analysis includes a number of fundamental variables that are expected to influence real estate and stock returns significantly. We estimate vector error-correction models and investigate the forecast error variance decompositions and impulse responses of the assets. Both the variance decompositions and impulse responses suggest that the long-run REIT market performance is much more closely related to the direct real estate market than to the general stock market. Consequently, REITs and direct real estate should be relatively good substitutes in a long-horizon investment portfolio. The results are of relevance regarding the relationship between public and private markets in general, as the ‘duality’ of the real estate markets offers an opportunity to test whether and how closely securitized asset returns reflect the performance of underlying private assets. The study also includes implications concerning the recent financial crisis.     

上市公司综合盈利水平与股票收益

本文基于2000-2017年上市公司的财务及股票交易数据,研究了上市公司综合盈利水平与股票收益之间的关系。我们使用目前资产定价文献中较新的偏最小二乘法和组合预测法,从12个衡量公司盈利能力的指标中提取了一个测度上市公司综合盈利水平的指标。研究结果显示,上市公司综合盈利水平能够显著预测未来股票收益。使用单因子偏最小二乘法、取12个月斜率的平均值构造的综合盈利水平最有效,以其构建的多空对冲投资组合能产生15%的年平均收益,夏普比率达到0.75。与此对应,组合预测法提取的上市公司综合盈利水平的预测能力稍低,但依然显著。在控制了其他公司特征变量后,综合盈利水平对于股票收益的解释能力依然稳健。本文还从经济机制的角度出发,探讨了综合盈利水平对收益的预测来源。我们发现,上市公司综合盈利水平与股票预期回报的正向关系在投资摩擦更低的组中更高,而在错误定价程度更高的组通常更低。这些结果支持了基于投资摩擦的Q理论,而与行为金融的错误定价理论相悖。     

The Limits of Investor Behavior

Many models use noise trader risk and corresponding violations of the Law of One Price to explain pricing anomalies, but include a storage technology in perfectly elastic supply or unlimited asset liability. Storage allows aggregate consumption risk to differ from exogenous fundamental risk, but using aggregate consumption as a factor for asset returns can make noise trader risk superfluous. Using (i) limited asset liability and limited storage withdrawals, or (ii) an endogenous locally riskless interest rate eliminates violations of the Law of One Price. Our main results use only budget equations and market clearing, and require virtually no assumptions about behavior.     

Financial Markets Where Traders Neglect the Informational Content of Prices

We model a financial market where some traders of a risky asset do not fully appreciate what prices convey about others' private information. Markets comprising solely such “cursed” traders generate more trade than those comprising solely rationals. Because rationals arbitrage away distortions caused by cursed traders, mixed markets can generate even more trade. Per‐trader volume in cursed markets increases with market size; volume may instead disappear when traders infer others' information from prices, even when they dismiss it as noisier than their own. Making private information public raises rational and “dismissive” volume, but reduces cursed volume given moderate noninformational trading motives.     

Predatory Trading

This paper studies predatory trading, trading that induces and/or exploits the need of other investors to reduce their positions. We show that if one trader needs to sell, others also sell and subsequently buy back the asset. This leads to price overshooting and a reduced liquidation value for the distressed trader. Hence, the market is illiquid when liquidity is most needed. Further, a trader profits from triggering another trader's crisis, and the crisis can spill over across traders and across markets.