母子公司交叉持股问题的综述及思考

母子公司之间相互持股在世界各国中比较普遍，有的国家允许这种现象存在，有的禁止这种情况，这些不同的规定与其本国的经济理念有很大的关系。目前我国对此的规定不尽完善，仍需不断改进。     

交叉持股最终收益确认的解决方案

企业集团内部各企业相互持股是一种特殊的持股关系，分析了建立相互数学模型利用严格的数学计算消除交叉持股的相互影响因素，为会计核算和财务管理提供可以参考的数据资料。     

浅析公司间相互持股及其相关会计问题

公司间相互持股又称为交叉持股,是指两个或两个以上的公司基于特定的目的,相互持有对方股份而形成的企业法人间相互持股的现象。公司间相互持股一般是基于彼此结成战略联盟提升竞争力的一种长期投资行为。根据公司间是否具有母子关系,可将相互持股分为垂直式的相互持股和水平式的相互持股,垂直式的相互持股是指相互持股公司间存在母子关系;而水平式的相互持股公司间不存在母子关系。公司间相互持股的利弊分析(一)益处1.结成战略联盟形成强强联合。相互持股企业之间相互依存、相互渗透,彼此间在一定程度上结成了命运共同体。具体又可以分为横…     

论权益法下相互持股公司投资损益的确定

自我国企业实行公司化改造以来，公司出于种种战略性考虑，对外投资活动越来越多，并出现了公司间相互持股或投资情况。现实经济生活中，相互持股作为公司间一种合法经济关系，将随着公司对资本营运的重视得到进一步发展。由于我国现行会计准则（制度）并未规定相互持股公司在权益法下确认投资损益的具体方法，为此，本文拟以直接分配法、交互分配法解决这一现实问题。一、投资损益确定的依据相互持股是指两个或两个以上公司相互进行直接或间接股权投资而形成的经济关系。直接相互持股是两个公司间以资产相互投资或交换股权等方式而形成的互…     

国有企业相互持股的负效应探析

我国国有企业问相互持股现象越来越普遍，其产生根源与国有企业改革有关。相互持股会导致资本虚增，造成公司内部分权制衡机制的失效，阻碍有效竞争，不利于资本市场的健康发展。有必要借鉴其他国家和地区的法律规制，对相互持股的数额和表决权两个方面进行约束，以减轻相互持股的负效应。     

国有企业相互持股的负效应探析

我国国有企业间相互持股现象越来越普遍，其产生根源与国有企业改革有关。相互持股会导致资本虚增，造成公司内部分权制衡机制的失效，阻碍有效竞争，不利于资本市场的健康发展。有必要借鉴其他国家和地区的法律规制，对相互持股的数额和表决权两个方面进行约束，以减轻相互持股的负效应。     

国有企业相互持股的负效应探析

我国国有企业间相互持股现象越来越普遍，其产生根源与国有企业改革有关。相互持股会导致资本虚增，造成公司内部分权制衡机制的失效，阻碍有效竞争，不利于资本市场的健康发展。本文认为，有必要借鉴其他国家和地区的法律规制，对相互持股的数额和表决权两个方面进行约束，以减轻相互持股的负效应。     

母子公司交叉持股的会计处理

一、交叉持股的概述 交叉持股是资本市场中较为常见的经济现象，是指两个公司直接或者变相直接相互持有对方的股权，继而相互成为对方股东的情形。     

国有企业相互持股的负效应探析

国有企业之间的相互持股现象最早源于政府和理论界的推动和倡导，目的在于深化国有企业改革，并将相互持股视为一种加强企业之间联合和协作关系的手段，以克服我国经济中存在的“小而全”、“大而全”、重复建设、缺乏协作和规模效应等问题。为了积极推行企业股份制改造，政府对企业间相互持股也持支持态度。国务院早在1990年5月批转的《关于在治理整顿中深化企业改革强化企业管理的意见》中就明确提出：“企业间相互参股、持股的股份制，要积极试行。”     

上市公司交叉持股对经济安全的隐患——从非传统安全视角出发

交叉持股,是指两家或两家以上公司相互持有对方的股权,即上市公司间接参股其他上市公司法人股。不仅包括需编制合并会计报表的集团内部各公司之间的相互持股,如母子公司相互持股、子公司之间相互     

Does cross-ownership affect competition?: Evidence from the Italian banking industry

The purpose of this paper is to empirically investigate the effects of cross-ownership among Italian banks on competition in the national banking sector. This aim is pursued by measuring and comparing the degree of competition between banks involved in the web of cross-ownership and banks that are not involved. The bank's degree of competition is measured by applying the methodology developed by [Panzar, J.C., Rosse, J.N., 1987. Testing for monopoly equilibrium. Journal of Industrial Economics 35, 443–456.] The econometric results provide empirical evidence that, in the period 1996–2000, Italian banks involved in cross-ownership were less competitive than the other national credit firms, thus supporting the view that cross-ownership may represent an obstacle to industrial competition.     

The Impact of Institutional Cross-ownership on Corporate Tax Avoidance: Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms

This study investigates the relationship between institutional cross-ownership and corporate tax avoidance in Chinese listed firms. Our findings indicate that the tax avoidance aggressiveness of Chinese listed firms could be significantly motivated by institutional cross-ownership. This finding is robust to endogeneity tests, namely, propensity score matching estimation, two-stage least squares regression, generalised method of moments test, and a falsification concern. Further, this positive relationship between institutional cross-ownership and tax avoidance is more pronounced for listed firms with greater managerial ability and those with higher auditor industry expertise. Finally, such a relationship is more obvious for cross-owners within the same industry, but only significant for independent cross-owners, non-state-owned enterprises and firms within a less competitive industry. All main findings are robust to various robustness tests.     

Who controls Allianz?

With cross-ownership among firms a separation between dividend rights on common stocks and voting rights may occur. This paper proposes a method to trace control rights in a company that is based purely upon accounting identities and the underlying data on cross-ownership relations among firms and privately held shares. Examples show that under cross-ownership, control and ownership of dividend rights may be entirely separated, and multiple equilibria may exist in such economies. The proposed methodology is then applied to the conglomerate around the German ‘Allianz’ group.     

机构交叉持股对企业价值的影响

基于2007-2018年中国A股上市公司数据,本文考察了机构交叉持股对企业价值的影响及其作用机制。研究发现,机构交叉持股显著提高了企业价值,在考虑内生性问题和替换主要变量后结论依然较为稳健。交叉持股机构投资者能够成为更加积极的监督者,主动参与公司治理,缓解代理问题,同时促进同行业企业间产品市场协作,改善企业的产品市场表现,进而提升企业价值。此外,相比其他类型的投资者,长期、独立以及稳定型的交叉持股机构投资者对企业价值的促进作用更显著,进一步印证了监督治理渠道的作用。机构交叉持股推动产品市场协作,主要是通过提高企业创新能力和营业利润率。本文结论证实了机构交叉持股的正向协同效应,对完善中国资本市场制度体系和促进企业可持续发展具有重要意义。     

Cross-ownership as a structural explanation for over- and underestimation of default probability

Based on the work of Suzuki, we consider a generalization of Merton’s asset valuation approach in which two firms are linked by cross-ownership of equity and liabilities. Suzuki’s results then provide no arbitrage prices of firm values, which are derivatives of exogenous asset values. In contrast to the Merton model, the assumption of lognormally distributed assets does not result in lognormally distributed firm values, which also affects the corresponding probabilities of default. In a simulation study we see that, depending on the type of cross-ownership, the lognormal model can lead to both over- and underestimation of the actual probability of default of a firm under cross-ownership. In the limit, i.e. if the levels of cross-ownership tend to their maximum possible value, these findings can be shown theoretically as well. Furthermore, we consider the default probability of a firm in general, i.e. without a distributional assumption, and show that the lognormal model is often able to yield only a limited range of probabilities of default, while the actual probabilities may take any value between 0 and 1.     

Institutional cross-ownership and stock price crash risk

Using manually collected data of Chinese listed firms during the period 2007–2018, we provide strong and robust evidence that institutional cross-ownership is negatively associated with firm-specific stock price crash risk. Building on China’s institutional settings, we document that the negative relation is more pronounced for firms located in provinces with higher political uncertainty, or state-owned enterprises. This paper also conducts several mechanisms analyses and has confirmed three potential influencing mechanisms, such as information advantage, governance improvement and anticompetitive incentives, in explaining the effect of institutional cross-ownership on stock price crash risk. Overall, this paper develops a new perspective to investigate the ways to alleviate stock price crash risk in emerging markets.     

Cross-ownership and collateral in lending

Information asymmetry is a major obstacle in both formal and informal loan markets. However, when a borrower and a lender are connected via cross-ownership, this obstacle can be significantly reduced. Cross-ownership enables lenders to collect more concrete and precise information about borrowers, and this lowered information asymmetry reduces the likelihood that the lender will require the borrower to provide collateral. Using a data set of 1091 intercorporate loans from China, we find strong support for the prediction that cross-ownership between lenders and borrowers lowers the collateral requirements by more than 50%. This relation is more pronounced for informationally opaque borrowers and for lending firms with a controlling stake in the borrowing firms.     

对公司治理结构与资本市场关系的思考

公司治理结构与企业的绩效是密不可分的。由于我国国有企业的产权结构畸形问题始终没有彻底得到解决,导致公司治理结构存在很大缺陷。根据我国的实际情况,完善公司治理结构的路径是多方面的,其中之一就是要充分协调与资本市场的关系。     

大股东资金占用和公司绩效：来自其他应收款的证据

在具体考察大股东资金占用的经济后果和制度成因时,首先发现其他应收款比重不仅对公司经营绩效（EPS和ROE）具有显著且较强的负面影响,还对公司盈利能力（盈利概率）具有显著且较强的负面影响。结果表明,大股东通过其他应收款账户对上市公司的占款行为会对上市公司的经营绩效和盈利能力造成不利影响,并会损害其他中小股东的利益以及公司长远发展的后劲。另外还发现,第一大股东持股对其他应收款比重具有显著较强的非线性影响：当第一大股东的控股地位较弱时,第一大股东具有较强的激励效应去改善公司绩效,并减少对上市公司资金的无效占用;当第一大股东的控股地位较强时,第一大股东具有较强的动机和能力去攫取私人利益,并增加对上市公司的资金占用。     

内含价值评价方法研究

寿险公司的经营主旨在于为股东和保户创造持久的价值。单纯依靠保费收入等传统财务报表数据无法反映公司的真实价值。以价值评估为基础的价值管理模式,是寿险公司提高管理水平、促进公司发展的重要管理方式。我国有不少寿险公司已经或正准备上市,为保护广大股东的权益,需要更为科学合理的财务指标来有效反映各公司的业务状况及其各险种业务的经营绩效。内含价值评估应按照保单分类、建立模型、搜集和整理数据、确定精算假设、对未来利润进行预测并贴现以及敏感性分析等步骤进行。