Robust pricing with refunds

Before purchase, a buyer of an experience good learns about the product's fit using various information sources, including some of which the seller may be unaware of. The buyer, however, can conclusively learn the fit only after purchasing and trying out the product. We show that the seller can use a simple mechanism to take best advantage of the buyer's post-purchase learning to maximize his guaranteed-profit. We show that this mechanism combines a generous refund, which performs well when the buyer is relatively informed, with non-refundable random discounts, which work well when the buyer is relatively uninformed.     

Preferred suppliers in auction markets

This article examines agreements between a buyer and one of the suppliers which increase their joint surplus. The provisions of such agreements depend on the buyer's ability to design the rules of the final procurement auction. When the buyer does not have this ability, their joint surplus can be increased by an agreement which grants to the preferred supplier a right of first refusal on the lowest price from the other suppliers. When the buyer has this ability, their joint surplus can be maximized by a revelation game for the cost of the preferred supplier and a reserve price based on that cost.     

Customers and cash: How relationships affect suppliers' cash holdings

If one customer accounts for a large portion of a supplier's sales, then the loss of that one customer can cripple the supplier's financial health. As a precaution against the additional operating risk induced by being in an important relationship with a customer, I find that suppliers in such relationships hold more cash on average than suppliers that are not in important relationships. Additionally, supplier's cash holdings increase proportionately with the importance of their customer relationships. Being in an important relationship affects cash holdings and leverage differently, indicating that firms manage cash and debt for different purposes. I find that suppliers in relationships primarily accrue cash through issuance of stock as opposed to debt or retained earnings. The results highlight the importance of understanding buyer–supplier relationships when evaluating a firm's financing policy.     

Procurement when price and quality matter

A buyer seeks to procure a good characterized by its price and its quality from suppliers who have private information about their cost structure (fixed cost and marginal cost of providing quality). We characterize the buyer's optimal buying mechanism. We then use the optimal mechanism as a theoretical and numerical benchmark to study simpler buying procedures such as scoring auctions and bargaining. Scoring auctions can extract a significant proportion of the buyer's strategic surplus (the difference between the expected utility from the optimal mechanism and the efficient auction). Bargaining does less well and often does worse than the efficient auction.     

The Role of Auditing in Buyer-Supplier Relations

Supply chain management has emerged as one of the more important topics in managerial accounting. The importance of information exchange between parties involved in supply chains has also been well documented. By addressing the value of audits in this setting, this theoretical paper serves to link two strains of accounting research: the managerial topic of supply chain effectiveness and the value of the audit function, in particular audits of the suppliers conducted by the buyers. We analyze the role of supplier audits with long-term, profit sharing contracts between the buyers and suppliers. Through a stylized model, we demonstrate that when random supplier audits are conducted, the buyer can effectively leave zero informational rents to the supplier, regardless of the supplier's cost type.     

Industry structure and horizontal takeovers: Analysis of wealth effects on rivals,suppliers, and corporate customers

We examine the wealth effects of horizontal takeovers on rivals of the merging firms, and on firms in the takeover industry's supplier and customer industries. Inconsistent with the collusion and buyer power motives, we find significant positive abnormal returns to rivals, suppliers, and corporate customers for the subsample of takeovers with positive combined wealth effect to target and bidder shareholders. Overall, our findings suggest that the average takeover in our sample is driven by efficiency considerations. However, we find evidence suggesting that horizontal takeovers increase the buyer power of the merging firms if suppliers are concentrated.     

Investor valuations of suppliers' major customer disclosures

I investigate whether or not investors in suppliers to retailers find the major customer disclosure value-relevant. Major customer retailers have buyer power because the retailer represents a significant portion of a supplier's sales. Buyer power can indicate reliance on one customer where the supplier is at a disadvantage in negotiating transaction terms. Alternatively, the existence of major customers may suggest the supplier is in a mutually-benefiting partnership with the retailer. I hypothesize that investors find the major customer disclosure value-relevant; however, the direction depends on whether the investor focuses on the partnership aspect or sales concentrated with one customer. My valuation results are consistent with investors focusing on the sales concentration for larger suppliers (higher risk) and the mutually benefiting partnership for smaller suppliers (lower risk). The findings provide insight on valuation implications of having and disclosing a major customer.     

Ex Post Moral Hazard and Bayesian Learning in Insurance

We study a dynamic insurance market with asymmetric information and ex post moral hazard. In our model, the insurance buyer's risk type is unknown to the insurer; moreover, the buyer has the option of not reporting losses. The insurer sets premia according to the buyer's experience rating, computed via Bayesian estimation based on buyer's history of reported claims. Accordingly, the buyer has strategic incentive to withhold information about losses. We construct an insurance market information equilibrium model and show that a variety of reporting strategies are possible. The results are illustrated with explicit computations in a two‐period risk‐neutral case study.     

Single sourcing versus multiple sourcing

We show that in contrast to results in the extant literature, single sourcing may not be the optimal strategy of a buyer facing suppliers with strictly convex costs. As we argue, previous findings relied crucially on the joint assumption that, first, there is only a single buyer and that, second, procurement takes place in an auction organized by the buyer. Relaxing these restrictions, we obtain a richer set of results. In particular, we show that even in the original setting, where suppliers bid, committing to single sourcing is only optimal if the respective buyer controls a sufficiently large fraction of the whole procurement market.     

Corporate suppliers and customers and accounting conservatism

We argue that a firm's suppliers and customers prefer it to account more conservatively due to information asymmetry and these stakeholders' asymmetric payoffs with respect to the firm's performance. We predict that a firm meets this demand for accounting conservatism when suppliers or customers have bargaining advantages over it that enable them to dictate terms of trade or whether trade occurs at all. We show that when a firm's suppliers or customers have greater bargaining power, the firm recognizes losses more quickly. Our findings provide insights into how a firm's powerful suppliers and customers are associated with its accounting practices and also support the contracting explanation for accounting conservatism.     

Interorganizational cost management in the exchange process

This paper explores interorganizational cost management (IOCM) practices in the exchange process. IOCM can be defined as buyers’ and suppliers’ coordinated efforts to reduce costs. Past research has primarily argued that such practices depend on component characteristics, relationship characteristics, and characteristics of the transaction. Based on a study of three buyer–supplier relationships, this article also finds variations in IOCM practices between six main activities in the exchange process. In this process, the supplier's management accounting is found to be more important than recognized by prior research. The deepest collaboration around IOCM issues and the greatest joint use of suppliers’ management accounting in the three cases typically occurs in earlier activities in the exchange process, including supplier selection, joint product design and joint manufacturing process development. In later activities in the process, during full-speed production as well as in product and manufacturing process redesign, suppliers’ managerial accounting plays a lesser role in our study.     

Do firms' relationships with principal customers/suppliers affect shareholders' income?

In this paper, we examine whether a firm's relationship with its principal customers/suppliers affects its payout policies. A firm has customer–supplier relationships when its business depends on a small number of major customers/suppliers. The extant literature indicates two channels through which customer–supplier relationships might negatively affect a firm's dividend payments: 1) the high financial distress costs associated with relationship-specific investments and 2) the information certification effect of the principle customer. Consistent with expectations, our study reveals a negative relationship between a firm's dependence on customer–supplier relationships and its dividend payments. This result is robust to various model specifications and consistent with evidence regarding the time-series properties of dividends. Moreover, we find that high financial distress costs associated with relationship-specific investments are the key channel through which a firm's customer–supplier relationship affects its dividend payments. Overall, our results suggest that a firm's relationship with its non-financial stakeholders, such as principal customers/suppliers, is an important determinant of its shareholders' income.     

论背俗一物二卖中的回复原状救济

一物二卖中第二次买卖违背善良风俗时，如何救济第一买受人对于取得实物的期待利益，是民法学中的经典疑难问题，也是实践中经常发生的代表性案型。就此存在“处分背俗无效”与“处分有效+背俗侵权”两种救济进路，无效进路下可进一步分为“绝对无效”与“相对无效”方案，侵权进路下可分为“标的物返还出卖人”“标的物直接让与第一买受人”等侵权责任承担方式。救济第一买受人的目标是使其法律地位回复到应有状态，影响回复原状方式选择的实质因素包括出卖人原本另行处分之可能性、出卖人原本破产和被执行的风险大小。根据这一分析框架，第二买受人单方背俗时，所有权变动并不无效，只能采侵权进路，第二买受人应将标的物直接让与第一买受人；出卖人与第二买受人双方背俗时，应采相对无效方案，所有权变动相对于第一买受人无效。     

One size does not fit all: Selling firms to private equity versus strategic acquirers

This paper investigates the selling process of firms acquired by private equity versus strategic buyers. In a single regression setup we show that selling firms choose between formal auctions, controlled sales and private negotiations to fit their firm and deal characteristics including profitability, R&D, deal initiation and type of the eventual acquirer (private equity or strategic buyer). At the same time, a regression model determining the buyer type shows that private equity buyers pursue targets that have more tangible assets, lower market-to-book ratios and lower research and development expenses relative to targets bought by strategic buyers. To reflect possible interdependencies between these two choices and their impact on takeover premium, as a last step, we estimate a simultaneous model that includes the selling mechanism choice, buyer type and premium equations. Our results show that the primary decision within the whole selling process is the target firm's decision concerning whether to sell the firm in an auction, controlled sale or negotiation which then affects the buyer type. These two decisions seem to be optimal as then they do not impact premium.     

Auctions versus negotiations: the effects of inefficient renegotiation

For the procurement of complex goods, the early exchange of information is important to avoid costly renegotiation. If the buyer can specify the main characteristics of possible design improvements in a complete contingent contract, scoring auctions implement the efficient allocation. If this is not feasible, the buyer must choose between a price‐only auction (discouraging early information exchange) and bilateral negotiations with a preselected seller (reducing competition). Bilateral negotiations are superior if potential design improvements are important, if renegotiation is very costly, and if the buyer's bargaining position is strong. Moreover, negotiations provide stronger incentives for sellers to investigate design improvements.     

Information and the hold‐up problem

We examine situations in which a party must make a sunk investment prior to contracting with a second party to purchase an essential complementary input. We study how the resulting hold‐up problem is affected by the seller's information about the investing party's likely returns from its investment. Our principal focus is on the effects of the investment's being observable by the noninvesting party. We establish conditions under which the seller's ability to observe the buyer's investment harms the seller, benefits the buyer, and reduces equilibrium investment and total surplus. We also note conditions under which investment and welfare rise when investment is observable.     

Best foot forward or best for last in a sequential auction?

Should a seller with private information sell the best or worst goods first? Considering the sequential auction of two stochastically equivalent goods, we find that the seller has an incentive to impress buyers by selling the better good first because the seller's sequencing strategy endogenously generates correlation in the values of the goods across periods. When this impression effect is strong enough, selling the better good first is the unique pure‐strategy equilibrium. By credibly revealing to all buyers the seller's ranking of the goods, an equilibrium strategy of sequencing the goods reduces buyer information rents and increases expected revenues in accordance with the linkage principle.     

Procurement under public scrutiny: auctions versus negotiations

We compare two commonly used mechanisms in public procurement: auctions and negotiations. The execution of the procurement mechanism is delegated to an agent of the buyer. The agent has private information about the buyer's preferences and may collude with one of the sellers. We provide a general characterization of both mechanisms based on public scrutiny requirements and show—contrary to conventional wisdom—that an intransparent negotiation always yields higher social surplus than a transparent auction. Moreover, there exists a lower bound on the number of sellers such that the negotiation also generates a higher buyer surplus.     

Buyer Search Intensity and the Role of the Residential Real Estate Broker

This study examines the impact of the real estate broker on the effectiveness of buyer search by focusing on the linkages between search intensity and the duration of search. How long a buyer searches depends on how sensitive the buyer is to within-period search costs and across-period, sequential search costs. High-income individuals and other homebuyers with high within-period search costs tend to search longer and less intensively. Buyers with high across-period search costs, such as out-of-town buyers, tend to search more intensively. Brokers, by reducing the opportunity costs of within-period search, increase buyer search intensity, which in turn reduces actual search time.     

Strategic ex ante contracts: rent extraction and opportunity costs

This article cosiders the possibility that a seller can contract with one uninformed buyer prior to an auction involving two potential buyers. The seller's optimal strategic ex ante contract more accurately reflects joint opportunity costs of the seller and the contracted buyer, and therefore extracts more rent from the entrant. Moreover, this ex ante contract mitigates the seller's ex post rent seeking vis‐à‐vis the contracted buyer. Accordingly, it may create more social welfare than the absence of ex ante contracts, depending upon the contracted buyer's financial constraint and the distributions of trade surplus. Implementation of the optimal strategic ex ante contract and policy implications are discussed.