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1.
在现代财务理论体系下,由于委托代理冲突和信息不对称的存在,债务融资的选择将会影响到公司的投资效率.本文分别对股东与债权人冲突、股东与经理冲突、负债期限结构、负债来源结构下,就委托代理冲突而导致的非效率投资问题进行了较系统的梳理和评论.在此基础上指出我国此类研究的不足主要在于忽视了融资的可获性与企业非效率投资行为的关系,为进一步研究提供了思路  相似文献   

2.
本文从股票融资和负债融资所引起的股东与管理者、股东与债权之间的冲突分析入手,研究了负债期限结构对企业投资行为的影响,并结合我国上市公司负债融资实践提出了深入研究的意见和建议。  相似文献   

3.
刘波 《时代金融》2015,(3):147+151
随着社会经济市场的不断进步,负债融资成为了我国各大中小企业的一种主要筹资方式。然而,由它带来的"持续增长负债"以及"股东和债权人之间的代理冲突",也给企业的投资行为造成了巨大的负面影响。因此,本文将针对负债融资,对其给企业投资行为带来的影响进行深入的分析和探究。  相似文献   

4.
随着《关于开展优先股试点的指导意见》和《优先股试点管理办法》两部法律文件的出台,作为新型融资方式的优先股逐渐成了公司竞相采纳的新方法.但优先股因其优先顺序、限制表决权等特点,使得其股东和普通股股东以公司利润为核心产生冲突.根据冲突主体地位的差异可划分为两类:股东之间的水平冲突以及股东和董事之间的垂直冲突.本文试图对以上两种冲突进行区别分析,探究其产生原因,并讨论如何缓解矛盾以维护优先股股东权益,更好的发挥优先股制度的作用.  相似文献   

5.
控股股东控制、负债融资与企业投资   总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3  
使用我国上市公司2000~2005年间非平衡面板数据,本文检验了控股股东控制下负债融资对企业投资的影响。研究表明:企业负债与投资规模显著负相关,但负债对国有控股公司投资水平抑制作用较弱;负债抑制了低成长公司的过度投资,而对于高成长公司,负债抑制了其正常投资;短期负债相比长期负债相机治理作用较强;银行借款对非国有控股企业投资支出抑制作用更强;企业投资与银行借款的负相关关系随着国有控股股东持股比例的增加而减弱,而非国有控股企业控股股东的持股比例变化不会对投资与银行借款之间的关系产生显著影响。  相似文献   

6.
本文拓展了宗教与企业决策的关系研究,实证研究了佛教对公司过度投资的影响。以2001-2012年期间12,820个公司-年的观测值为样本,本文发现佛教与公司过度投资显著负相关,表明佛教作为一种社会规范,可以缓和股东与管理者之间的代理冲突、削弱管理者的机会主义行为和过度自信,进而抑制过度投资。此外,控股股东持股比例负向调节了佛教与过度投资之间的负向关系。  相似文献   

7.
支晓强  童盼 《会计研究》2007,(10):73-81
本文考察了业绩报酬敏感度对企业内部现金流与投资行为之间关系的影响。文章发现投资现金流敏感度不仅受到内外部信息不对称导致的融资约束的影响,而且受到了股东-经理代理问题的影响,但是信息不对称理论的解释力度相对较强。另外,投资现金流敏感度和管理层业绩报酬敏感度之间的关系受到公司控股股东所有权性质的影响。  相似文献   

8.
股东的出资行为对企业融资方式的选择具有决定性作用。对于正常经营的企业,为了发挥债务资本的税蔽效应和杠杆作用,股东往往愿意企业负债经营,但是负债的对象不一定是普通债权人,很可能是股东自身;对于陷入财务危机的企业,为套牢普通债权人获得更多的企业重组收益,股东也愿意“自我负债”融资。通过债务性资本与替权益性资本的替换,股东总能够获得套利收益,但同时也损害了普通债权人和政府的收益,因而受到法律的限制。然而,在现实经济中股东的套利空间仍然存在,并对企业的融资方式选择,尤其是对债务资本产生了深远的影响。  相似文献   

9.
本文在阐述债务融资方式缓解股东与经理冲突的基础上,结合企业的成长性特征具体分析了债务融资比例、债务期限结构、限制性条款、债务优先结构,以及可赎回债券与可转换债券的选择。  相似文献   

10.
投资不足给企业带来重大损失.在实践中,由于受到众多因素的影响,投资不足现象普遍存在.本文从股东—债权人冲突、信息不对称和大股东代理问题等方面,对国内外有关投资不足研究的文献进行回顾,进而就该领域未来研究的方向提出建议  相似文献   

11.
This paper offers an agency‐based explanation for the junior priority status of convertible bonds. Using a simple economic model, I show that when convertible and straight debt have equal priority, shareholders can prefer value‐decreasing projects, which results in wealth transfers from bondholders to shareholders; and I prove that this problem is solved when convertible debt is subordinated. Empirical evidence supports the theory. I find that firms with greater potential for investment‐based agency conflicts are more likely to issue subordinated convertible debt, and firms with senior convertible debt are more likely to deviate from the optimal investment policy.  相似文献   

12.
This article integrates an earnings-based capital structure model into a simple real options framework to analyze the effects of managerial optimism and overconfidence on the interaction between financing and investment decisions. Several empirical implications follow from solving the model. Notably, my analysis reveals that managerial traits can ameliorate bondholder–shareholder conflicts, such as the debt overhang problem. While debt delays investment inefficiently, mildly biased managers can overcome this problem, even though they tend to issue more debt. Similar properties and results are discussed for other real options, such as the asset stripping or risk-shifting problems.  相似文献   

13.
This paper examines the relation between corporate debt maturity dispersion and the pricing and terms of bank loans. Analyzing a sample of U.S. bank loans from 2002 to 2016, we find that firms with a dispersed debt maturity structure pay a lower interest rate. The rate-reduction effect is significant only for firms without a credit rating. For these firms, spreading debt maturity dates also results in lower commitment fees, fewer covenant restrictions, and less collateral in their loan contracts. The impact of debt maturity dispersion on the pricing and structure of bank loans is stronger when borrowers have higher rollover risk or when the need for monitoring is greater. Our results suggest that dispersion in debt maturity structure mitigates the agency problem associated with shareholder–creditor conflicts by reducing rollover risk and alleviating the need for monitoring, which results in borrowers receiving more favorable terms in loan contracts.  相似文献   

14.
This paper investigates the mediating effect of cross-acceleration provisions in bond debt on board independence and bond yield spreads. Cross-acceleration provisions cause bond debt to accelerate if other debt (mainly bank debt) is accelerated and allows bondholders to benefit from the monitoring of fellow creditors. Board independence, while generally seen as a positive governance feature, has been viewed as detrimental to bondholder interests when bondholder-shareholder conflicts are high. Cross-acceleration works to protect bondholder interests through increased likelihood of bankruptcy court supervision (or early repayment of debt). Consistent with this view, we find that when bondholder-shareholder conflict are high bonds issued without cross-acceleration provisions have yields that increase in board independence whereas bonds issued with cross-acceleration have yields that decrease in board independence. The results suggest that cross-acceleration plays a role in mitigating the tendency of more independent boards to favor shareholders when bondholder-shareholder conflicts arise.  相似文献   

15.
In this study, we examine whether the public debt market prices information on off‐balance sheet debt arising from operating leases and postretirement plans. We find that bond‐rating agencies price off‐balance sheet debt arising from operating leases and the coefficient on off‐balance sheet debt measure of operating leases is similar to that of capital leases on the balance sheet. Regarding postretirement benefit plans, we find that bond‐rating agencies do price postretirement benefit obligations that are reported in balance sheet but do not price such obligations disclosed in footnotes. We find similar results when we examine corporate bond yields on new debt issues.  相似文献   

16.
本文从地方政府多种关系冲突和商业银行对地方政府贷款风险认识不足入手,揭示地方政府借款存在的潜在风险,并力图通过对地方政府借款主体的合法性、借款用途的合理性、借款资金贷后划转规范性、第一和第二还款来源的稳定性和可靠性、担保措施的可信性和长效性等风险的剖析,呼吁地方政府和商业银行在刺激内需热潮中,保持清醒头脑,控制住地方政府的借款额度,防止还款来源资金的断裂。  相似文献   

17.
This paper analyzes the impact of shareholder-creditor conflicts on corporate risk-taking. Specifically, I examine the role played by institutional dual-holders (i.e., those simultaneously holding the same firm's debt and equity) in corporate innovation. Baseline results show that firms held by dual-holders generate fewer but more valuable patents. To alleviate endogeneity concerns, I use a difference-in-differences approach based on financial institution mergers. Further analysis suggests that decreased sensitivity of managerial compensation to firm risk might be a possible channel. Overall, I provide new evidence that shareholder-creditor conflicts indeed exist and lead to risk-shifting, and that dual ownership can partially mitigate this problem.  相似文献   

18.
Prior studies demonstrate that high CEO compensation risk encourages managers to engage in risk‐seeking behavior, thus intensifying agency conflicts between creditors and borrowers. We argue and document that accounting conservatism plays an important role in mitigating debt holder and shareholder conflicts over asset substitution arising from high CEO compensation risk. Our empirical results show that firms with high CEO compensation risk tend to use more timely loss recognition and this positive relationship is more pronounced for firms with high leverage. Additional results show that the positive relationship between CEO compensation risk and borrowing costs is reduced for firms using timely loss recognition, suggesting that creditors perceive timely loss recognition as a risk‐reducing mechanism. Using the passage of FAS 123R as a quasi‐natural experiment on managerial compensation risk, we find a significant reduction in the use of timely loss recognition for firms experiencing a decrease in CEO compensation risk after the passage of FAS 123R. Lastly, we show that timely loss recognition is positively associated only with the compensation risk of the firm's primary decision maker (i.e., its CEO) and not with the compensation risk of subordinates.  相似文献   

19.
Considerable research has documented the role of debt covenants and conservative financial accounting in addressing agency conflicts between lenders and borrowers. Beatty, A., Weber, J., and Yu, J. [2008. Conservatism and debt. Journal of Accounting and Economics, forthcoming] document interesting, but mixed, findings on the relation between debt covenants and conservative accounting, and the extent to which the two contracting mechanisms act as substitutes or complements. In this paper, I discuss the economic roles of financial reporting, debt covenants, and conservatism within the debt contracting environment, and attempt to fit BWY's findings within this context.  相似文献   

20.
This paper examines the issues relating to the most appropriate form of corporation ownership including organizational and cultural systems that will maximize the firm's value to society whilst maintaining a more sustainable market value. The paper argues that the maximization of firm value to society may be more readily achieved through a closed corporation type formation with better rights protection for all internal stakeholders, such as an employee-owned corporation or a limited liability partnership similar to Scott Bader Commonwealth and John Lewis Partnership, rather than a publicly-owned open corporation with large ‘moral debt’ claims, conflicts of interest, and agency costs. The four main perceived theoretical arguments against a closed corporation are: The horizon problem; the common-property problem; the non-transferability problem; and the control problem. Our analysis demonstrates how the Scott Bader Commonwealth and the John Lewis Partnership with support from the capital markets evolved successful solutions to the above theoretical issues. In other words, closed corporations such as Scott Bader Commonwealth and John Lewis Partnership with their better organizational and cultural systems can be considered to be more just at distributing residual and ‘moral debt’ claims than open corporations and thus are better at maximizing their value to society.  相似文献   

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