Leading Indicator Variables, Performance Measurement, and Long-Term Versus Short-Term Contracts

In this article we develop a multiperiod agency model to study the role of leading indicator variables in managerial performance measures. In addition to the familiar moral hazard problem, the principal faces the task of motivating a manager to undertake “soft” investments. These investments are not directly contractible, but the principal can instead rely on leading indicator variables that provide a noisy forecast of the investment returns to be received in future periods. Our analysis relates the role of leading indicator variables to the duration of the manager's incentive contract. With short‐term contracts, leading indicator variables are essential in mitigating a holdup problem resulting from the fact that investments are sunk at the end of the first period. With long‐term contracts, leading indicator variables will be valuable if the manager's compensation schemes are not stationary over time. The leading indicator variables then become an instrument for matching the future investment return with the current investment expenditure. We identify conditions under which the optimal long‐term contract induces larger investments and less reliance on the leading indicator variables as compared with short‐term contracts. Under certain conditions, though, the principal does better with a sequence of one‐period contracts than with a long‐term contract.     

Overconfidence,Compensation Contracts,and Capital Budgeting

A risk‐averse manager's overconfidence makes him less conservative. As a result, it is cheaper for firms to motivate him to pursue valuable risky projects. When compensation endogenously adjusts to reflect outside opportunities, moderate levels of overconfidence lead firms to offer the manager flatter compensation contracts that make him better off. Overconfident managers are also more attractive to firms than their rational counterparts because overconfidence commits them to exert effort to learn about projects. Still, too much overconfidence is detrimental to the manager since it leads him to accept highly convex compensation contracts that expose him to excessive risk.     

Managerial Incentives and Stock Price Manipulation

We present a rational expectations model of optimal executive compensation in a setting where managers are in a position to manipulate short‐term stock prices and the manipulation propensity is uncertain. We analyze the tradeoffs involved in conditioning pay on long‐ versus short‐term performance and show how manipulation, and investors' uncertainty about it, affects the equilibrium pay contract and the informativeness of prices. Firm and manager characteristics determine the optimal compensation scheme: the strength of incentives, the pay horizon, and the use of options. We consider how corporate governance and disclosure regulations can help create an environment that enables better contracting.     

Teams,repeated tasks,and implicit incentives

In a team setting, wherein only group performance is tracked, we show that muted incentive contracts may be sufficient to motivate team members. By having the team repeat a task, explicit (contractual) incentives can be substituted by implicit incentives team members provide to each other. We also study an example in which, despite uncorrelated individual performance measures being available, it is optimal to condition each manager's pay on both managers' performance. This can be viewed as creating a group performance measure. Using a group performance measure provides each manager with incentives to monitor and a means of punishing other managers.     

Portfolio Manager Compensation in the U.S. Mutual Fund Industry

We study compensation contracts of individual portfolio managers using hand‐collected data of over 4,500 U.S. mutual funds. Variations in the compensation structures are broadly consistent with an optimal contracting equilibrium. The likelihood of explicit performance‐based incentives is positively correlated with the intensity of agency conflicts, as proxied by the advisor's clientele dispersion, its affiliations in the financial industry, and its ownership structure. Investor sophistication and the threat of dismissal in outsourced funds serve as substitutes for explicit performance‐based incentives. Finally, we find little evidence of differences in future performance associated with any particular compensation arrangement.     

The Cross‐Section of Managerial Ability,Incentives, and Risk Preferences

I estimate a dynamic investment model for mutual managers to study the cross‐sectional distribution of ability, incentives, and risk preferences. The manager's compensation depends on the size of the fund, which fluctuates due to fund returns and due to fund flows that respond to the fund's relative performance. The model provides an economic interpretation of time‐varying coefficients in performance regressions in terms of the structural parameters. I document that the estimates of fund alphas are precise and virtually unbiased. I find substantial heterogeneity in ability, risk preferences, and pay‐for‐performance sensitivities that relates to observable fund characteristics.     

Insider Trading in Financial Signaling Models

We study the impact of voluntary trade by the manager. We find that, in contrast to standard signaling models, an action is good news for some firms and bad news for others, depending on observable characteristics of the firm, its managers, and their compensation plans. Further, voluntary trade eliminates separating equilibria and thus the possibility of exactly inferring the manager's private information. This may cause the manager to take inefficient actions so as to earn trading profits. Such undesirable behavior can be more effectively constrained by compensation contracts based on phantom shares or nontradeable options instead of large stockholdings.     

Pay-performance sensitivity and firm size: Insights from the mutual fund industry

I examine the ex ante decision to make an agent's pay-performance sensitivity an inverse function of organization size. I focus on mutual funds and their decision to use compensation contracts that reduce the advisor's marginal compensation as the fund grows (a declining-rate contract) over the dominant contract type, where marginal compensation is unrelated to fund size (a single-rate contract). I find evidence consistent with the view that declining-rate contracts are a mechanism to keep marginal compensation in line with the advisor's declining marginal product. Specifically, I find that funds with greater exposure to diseconomies of scale are more likely to use a declining-rate contract and to specify a greater amount of compensation decline in their contracts. Consistent with optimal contracting, I find no evidence of a performance difference between funds with declining-rate contracts and funds with single-rate contracts.     

Investment timing,agency, and information

This paper provides a model of investment timing by managers in a decentralized firm in the presence of agency conflicts and information asymmetries. When investment decisions are delegated to managers, contracts must be designed to provide incentives for managers to both extend effort and truthfully reveal private information. Using a real options approach, we show that an underlying option to invest can be decomposed into two components: a manager's option and an owner's option. The implied investment behavior differs significantly from that of the first-best no-agency solution. In particular, greater inertia occurs in investment, as the model predicts that the manager will have a more valuable option to wait than the owner.     

Earnings Manipulation and the Cost of Capital

The widespread use of accounting information by investors and financial analysts to help value stocks creates an incentive for managers to manipulate earnings in an attempt to influence short‐term stock price performance. This paper examines the role of earnings management in affecting a firm's cost of capital. Using an agency model with multiple firms whose cash flows are correlated, we demonstrate that the extent of earnings manipulation varies across the business cycle. Depending on a firm's earnings profile, it can have stronger incentives to overstate its performance in good times or in bad times. Because of this dependence on the state of the economy, earnings manipulation can influence a firm's cost of capital despite the forces of diversification.     

Optimal compensation contracts when managers can hedge

This paper examines optimal compensation contracts when executives can hedge their personal portfolios. In a simple principal-agent framework, I predict that the Chief Executive Officer's (CEO's) pay-performance sensitivity decreases with the executive-hedging cost. Empirically, I find evidence supporting the model's prediction. Providing further support for the theory, I show that shareholders also impose a high sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock volatility and increase financial leverage to resolve the executive-hedging problem. Moreover, executives with lower hedging costs hold more exercisable in-the-money options, have weaker incentives to cut dividends, and pursue fewer corporate diversification initiatives. Overall, the manager's ability to hedge the firm's risk affects governance mechanisms and managerial actions.     

Managerial hedging,equity ownership,and firm value

Suppose risk‐averse managers can hedge the aggregate component of their exposure to firm's cash‐flow risk by trading in financial markets but cannot hedge their firm‐specific exposure. This gives them incentives to pass up firm‐specific projects in favor of standard projects that contain greater aggregate risk. Such forms of moral hazard give rise to excessive aggregate risk in stock markets. In this context, optimal managerial contracts induce a relationship between managerial ownership and (i) aggregate risk in the firm's cash flows, as well as (ii) firm value. We show that this can help explain the shape of the empirically documented relationship between ownership and firm performance.     

Optimal Contracts with Performance Manipulation

We study optimal compensation contracts that (1) are designed to address a joint moral hazard and adverse selection problem and that (2) are based on performance measures, which may be manipulated by the agent at a cost. In the model, a manager is privately informed about his productivity prior to being hired by a firm. In order to incentivize the manager to exert productive effort, the firm designs a compensation contract that is based on reported earnings, which can be manipulated by the manager. Our model predicts that (1) the optimal compensation contract is convex in reported earnings; (2) the optimal contract is less sensitive to reported earnings than it would be absent the manager's ability to manipulate earnings; and (3) higher costs of manipulating reported earnings (e.g., due to higher governance quality) are associated with higher firm value, lower expected level of earnings management, and higher output.     

Risk aversion,prudence, and compensation

In a standard principal-agent setting, we use a comparative approach to study the incentives provided by different types of compensation contracts, and their valuation by managers with utility function u who are risk averse (u″<0) and prudent (u″′>0). We show that concave contracts tend to provide more incentives to risk averse managers, while convex contracts tend to be more valued by prudent managers. This is because concave contracts concentrate incentives where the marginal utility of risk averse managers is highest, while convex contracts protect against downside risk. Thus, managerial prudence can contribute to explain the prevalence of stock-options in executive compensation. However, convex contracts are not optimal when the principal is sufficiently prudent relative to the manager.     

Dupes or Incompetents? An Examination of Management's Impact on Firm Distress

This article examines whether managers impact firm performance. We conservatively define managerial ability as the manager's capacity to deploy the firm's resources. We verify the validity of our metric using a manager–firm matched panel data set that allows us to track managers (CEOs) across different firms over time. We find managerial ability is inversely related to the amount of time a firm spends in distress, the likelihood of a firm's failure, and the cost of failure. These results suggest that the managers of failed firms are less skilled than their counterparts. But even within failed firms there is heterogeneity in the talents of managers.     

Information Production, Insider Trading, and the Role of Managerial Compensation

We analyze the information production decision of a manager who can trade on this information and whose compensation is increasing in the stock price. The amount of information produced increases with the stock's volatility and liquidity and decreases with the manager's pay-performance sensitivity. Insider trading regulations that symmetrically inhibit the manager's ability to buy and sell stock cause her to produce less information. But asymmetric insider trading regulations like the short sales prohibition have an ambiguous effect inducing her to produce more or less information depending on her pay-performance sensitivity. This contradicts the standard argument made by opponents of insider trading regulations that such regulations always reduce information production.     

The Effect of Personnel Characteristics in the Internal Accounting Control System on Discretionary Tax Accruals: Evidence from Korea

This study examines whether the characteristics of personnel in a firm's internal accounting control system (IACS) and auditor characteristics control managers’ discretionary behaviour for tax planning. The study uses a sample of 4210 firm‐year observations from 2006 to 2014. The results show that managers’ discretionary tax planning cannot be controlled when the personnel in charge of internal accounting control are at an optimum level or higher. On the other hand, when a CPA is included among the personnel, the manager's discretionary behaviour is somewhat controlled. Moreover, the results show that firms audited by a large accounting firm also control the manager's discretionary tax planning to some extent. Unlike previous studies that examine the effects of IACS on discretionary accruals mostly in terms of book income, this study's contribution is an examination of the effects of the characteristics of personnel in IACS on the relationship between discretionary book‐tax conformity accruals and discretionary book‐only accruals that can be used when the manager establishes a tax plan. Additionally, this study also provides indirect evidence that the characteristics of auditors and personnel in charge of internal accounting perform a monitoring role that controls the manager's opportunistic behaviour.     

The Agency Effect of Repurchases on Closed‐End Funds

Share prices rise after companies announce repurchases, but there are differing views as to why this happens. Repurchases are announced by closed‐end funds when their discounts are widening (market‐to‐book is falling). The immediate post‐announcement effect is a small jump in a fund's share price, but the main effect occurs over the next four years during which time there is significant outperformance both of the fund's price and of its investment portfolio. Liquidity of the shares does not change. Repurchases, if executed, reduce the size of a fund and therefore the manager's fees. Our findings are consistent with directors using the threat of repurchases to discipline managers whose investment performance has been poor, leading to a closer alignment of pay and performance.     

Managers, Workers, and Corporate Control

If management has high private benefits and a small equity stake, managers and workers are natural allies against takeover threats. Two forces are at play. First, managers can transform employees into a “shark repellent” through long‐term labor contracts and thereby reduce the firm's attractiveness to raiders. Second, employees can act as “white squires” for the incumbent managers. To protect their high wages, they resist hostile takeovers by refusing to sell their shares to the raider or by lobbying against the takeover. The model predicts that wages are inversely correlated with the managerial equity stake, and decline after takeovers.     

Corporate Governance When Managers Set Their Own Pay

This paper presents a model of the firm in which the manager has discretion over his own compensation, constrained only by the threat of shareholder intervention. The model addresses two main questions. How does shareholder power affect managers' compensation and their incentives to maximise firm value? And what is the optimal level of shareholder power? Expectedly, the model shows that increasing shareholder power leads to lower managerial pay. Greater shareholder power, however, also weakens the manager's incentives to maximise value and may even lead to lower profits for shareholders. There might, thus, be too much, as well as too little, shareholder power. The model characterises the optimal level of shareholder power and yields predictions about the relation between shareholder power, managerial pay, performance and firm characteristics.