中国上市银行特许权价值的自律效应

银行特许权价值是银行风险自我约束的重要机制。本文使用托宾Q值衡量了中国14家上市银行的特许权价值,借助面板数据回归分析对银行特许权价值的自律效应进行了实证检验。结果表明:上市银行特许权价值对反映外部评价的市场风险确实存在着自律效应,但还未对表现为内部风险控制的资本充足率产生显著作用。因国家对银行业提供了全面担保,银行所有制性质对银行风险无显著影响。随着银行业竞争日趋激烈,通过引导商业银行提升特许权价值来激励银行审慎经营并加强内部风险控制,对后金融危机时期中国银行业的健康稳定发展具有积极意义。     

特许权价值、市场结构与银行风险承担

银行业的风险程度关系到整个经济体的稳定与发展,控制风险是银行经营的重要目标之一。目前对银行风险承担的研究主要从特许权价值和市场竞争的角度分别展开分析。本文以156家中国商业银行为研究对象,同时分析了银行特许权价值、市场竞争程度对银行风险的影响。通过实证分析,我们发现目前影响我国商业银行特许权价值的因素主要来自银行因素而非市场因素;在没有控制内生性的前提下,发现银行特许权价值有效地约束了银行风险,而市场竞争的加剧增加了银行风险行为;在控制银行风险和特许权价值内生性后,发现特许权价值对中国商业银行风险的约束效应基本不存在。因此,要维持银行业的稳定,需要规范银行的竞争行为,提高特许权价值的风险约束效应。     

商业银行特许权价值风险约束效应研究

从银行特许权价值的定义入手,利用样本银行1998～2007年的年度数据,阐述和分析了银行特许权价值的风险约束效应。研究结果表明,银行特许权价值对银行的风险行为有很强的约束效应,即拥有较高特许权价值的银行不会倾向于采取过度冒险的经营行为,而那些特许权价值较低的银行会增加冒险经营的动机。     

我国上市银行特许权价值风险自律效应的研究

银行特许权价值是银行作为一个特殊行业所赋予的一种获取未来租金收益的权力价值。本文在国内12家上市银行1997-2007年面板数据的基础上,采用税前利润法计算特许权价值,构建多元线性回归方程进行实证分析,结果发现现存的隐性存款保险削弱了特许权价值对商业银行的信用风险的约束作用,也就是说以政府的信用担保的全额保险,破坏了银行特许权价值对于银行信用风险的自律机制。     

我国上市银行特许权价值风险自律效应的研究

银行特许权价值是银行作为一个特殊行业所赋予的一种获取未来租金收益的权力价值。本文在国内12家上市银行1997-2007年面板数据的基础上,采用税前利润法计算特许权价值,构建多元线性回归方程进行实证分析,结果发现现存的隐性存款保险削弱了特许权价值对商业银行的信用风险的约束作用,也就是说以政府的信用担保的全额保险,破坏了银行特许权价值对于银行信用风险的自律机制。     

我国上市银行特许权价值风险自律效应的研究

银行特许权价值是银行作为一个特殊行业被赋予的一种获取未来租金收益的权力价值.本文以国内12家上市银行1997-2007年面板数据为基础,采用税前利润法计算特许权价值,构建多元线性回归方程进行实证分析,结果发现现存的隐性存款保险削弱了特许权价值对商业银行信用风险的约束作用,也就是说以政府的信用担保的全额保险,破坏了银行特许权价值对于银行信用风险的自律机制.     

特许权价值、隐性保险与风险承担——中国银行业的经验分析

本文以特许权价值与风险承担为主要研究视角,运用面板数据模型,分析隐性存款保险制度下我国特许权价值经济效应的有效性。研究结果表明,隐性保险降低了特许权价值对银行风险承担行为的敏感性,特许权价值的自律机制不仅对国有银行几乎失效,而且对非国有银行的风险约束效应也不显著。如此说明当前中国商业银行受到隐性存款保险制度的全面保护,从而弱化了开展全面风险管理的激励机制。     

金融自由化、特许权价值与银行风险行为

随着银行业竞争的日益激烈,深入探讨金融自由化、特许权价值以及银行风险行为之间的关系显得愈来愈有必要.较多的国外文献已经证明三者之间存在着密切相关的联系.在面临全球化竞争时,通过研究三者的具体联系,更加清晰地认识特许权价值对于银行自身的风险约束作用,有效控制自身风险将会是我国银行业最基本的要求,更是非常关键的一步.     

中国银行特许权价值的风险自律效应研究

将银行破产风险分解为经营不确定性与风险覆盖能力、杠杆风险与资产组合风险,建立动态面板模型并采用2003~2013年中国上市银行的数据和系统广义矩估计方法,分析特许权价值激励银行降低风险承担的途径和方式。研究发现：我国银行特许权价值具有抑制银行风险的自律效应,银行为避免过高风险而遭受监管惩罚或丧失市场资源,保持特许经营条件和优势,将进行积极的风险管理;特许权价值的风险自律效应主要通过促使银行提升风险覆盖能力、降低资产组合风险和杠杆风险来实现。     

商业银行特许权价值的自律效应研究

特许权价值是商业银行具有的从受保护市场获取未来租金的牌照价值,通常情况下,具有相对较高特许权价值的银行为了避免破产,更有动力倾向于采取谨慎策略,因而其发挥着银行风险自律器的作用。通过银行风险行为的静态选择和动态选择视角,考证特许权价值的自律效应,对于后过渡时期的银行监管政策具有启发意义。     

Bank regulation and risk-taking incentives: An international comparison of bank risk

This paper uses a panel database of 251 banks in 36 countries to analyze the impact of bank regulation on bank charter value and risk-taking. After controlling for deposit insurance and for the quality of a country's contracting environment, the results indicate that regulatory restrictions increase banks' risk-taking incentives by reducing their charter value. Banks in countries with stricter regulation have a lower charter value, which increases their incentives to follow risky policies. These results corroborate a negative relation between regulatory restrictions and the stability of a banking system. Deposit insurance has a positive influence on bank charter value, mitigating the risk-shifting incentives it creates. This positive influence disappears when we control for the possible endogeneity of deposit insurance.     

An Analysis of Bank Charter Value and Its Risk-Constraining Incentives

Valuable bank charters have been hypothesized to provide bank managers self-regulatory incentives to constrain their risk taking. However, this paper presents evidence that charter value itself may derive from high-risk activities, indicating that minimizing risk taking also would limit the value of the charter. During economic expansions, bank charter values increase to reflect growth opportunities. In turn, high-charter-value banks gain easier access to equity capital sources for expansion. The result is a positive relationship between charter value and capital ratios during expansions. However, this relationship may invert during economic contractions. Panel regressions demonstrate that the charter value and bank leverage relationship is sensitive to market conditions.     

Credit information sharing in the nexus between charter value and systemic risk in Asian banking

In this paper, we assess whether the link between charter value and systemic risk in banking is affected by credit information sharing at the country level. Using a sample of Asian listed banks, we document that banks with higher charter value exhibit lower systemic risk because these banks hold more capital. Nevertheless, we find that the self-disciplining role of charter value in banking is more pronounced for countries with lower depth of credit information sharing. Specifically, our findings also reveal that higher charter value alleviates systemic risk and increases capitalization, particularly in countries with lower quality of private credit bureaus. These findings suggest that higher charter value can be detrimental for financial stability due to an increase in bank systemic risk, particularly when private credit bureaus are of better quality. In order to overcome bank systemic risk, this paper advocates the importance of strengthening bank competition to limit charter value, in addition to promoting the development of private credit bureaus.     

Does market discipline impact bank charter value? The case for Australia and Canada

This study analyses the relation between market discipline and bank charter value using a panel data set of publicly listed domestic banks in Australia and Canada over the period of 1995–2011, with a focus on the 2007–2008 global financial crisis (GFC). Overall, the results show a positive relation between market discipline and bank charter value, but this relation is weaker in the post‐GFC period. Our findings reveal that in the presence of market discipline, bank capital, contingent liabilities and non‐interest income are important sources of charter value. These findings have important policy implications related to bank stability. The results are robust to several model specifications.     

The Impact of Capital Requirements and Managerial Compensation on Bank Charter Value

This paper examines the joint impact of capital requirements and managerial incentive compensation on bank charter value and bank risk. Most of the previous literature in the area of banking and agency theory has focused on asymmetric information between either banks and regulators, (and therefore on the role of bank capital), or between bank shareholders and bank managers, (and therefore on the role of managerial ownership). In this paper we unify these issues and present empirical results from the regression of capital requirements jointly with measures of incentive compensation on Tobin's Q, our proxy for bank charter value, and on the standard deviation of total return, our proxy for bank risk. In a sample of 102 bank holding companies we find that capital levels are consistently a significant positive factor in determining bank charter value and a significant negative factor in determining risk. On the other hand, we find our six measures of incentive compensation to be generally insignificant relative to charter value but do provide some evidence consistent with a theory relating types of incentive compensation with risk.     

Moral Hazard,Dividends, and Risk in Banks

In non‐financial firms, higher risk taking results in lower dividend payout ratios. In banking, public guarantees may result in a positive relationship between dividend payout ratios and risk taking. I investigate the interplay between dividend payout ratios and bank risk‐taking allowing for the effect of charter values and capital adequacy regulation. I find a positive relationship between bank risk‐taking and dividend payout ratios. Proximity to the required capital ratio and a high charter value reduce the impact of bank risk‐taking on the dividend payout ratio. My results are robust to different proxies for the dividend payout ratio and bank risk‐taking.     

Are bank shareholders enemies of regulators or a potential source of market discipline?

In moral hazard models, bank shareholders have incentives to transfer wealth from the deposit insurer – that is, maximize put option value – by pursuing riskier strategies. For safe banks with large charter value, however, the risk-taking incentive is outweighed by the possibility of losing charter value. Focusing on the relationship between Tobin’s q and an ex ante measure of the failure probability, this paper develops a semi-parametric model for estimating the critical level of bank risk at which put option value starts outweighing charter value. From these estimates, we infer the prevalence of moral hazard. Examining publicly held bank holding companies (BHC) during the tumultuous 1986–1992 period, we find that shareholders’ risk-taking incentives were confined to a small fraction of highly risky institutions. Furthermore, our analysis shows that the inflection point at which banks begin to tilt in favor of moral hazard increased substantially in 1993–2005. These findings are encouraging to bank regulators and legislators because they indicate that tighter capital rules and more rigorous supervision introduced by several legislative initiatives in the 1990s have helped squeeze a lot of the moral hazard incentives out of the banking system.     

Effects of Deposit Insurance Reform on Moral Hazard in US Banking

In cross sections of US banks before the deposit-insurance system was reformed in the early 1990s, bank risk-taking was positively associated with bank size and negatively associated with the value of bank charters and bank capital. These empirical associations have an easy theoretical interpretation. Bank size is positively related, while charter value and capital are negatively related, to the moral hazard associated with flat insurance premiums and other aspects of a laxly administered system. Hence the observed associations of risk-taking with size, charter value, and capital reflected the expected positive relation between moral hazard and risk-taking. We test the hypothesis that the three associations became weaker after reform. In the case of unsystematic risk, we find no evidence of significant changes for any of the three. In the case of systematic risk, we find that risk-taking associated with lower charter values and larger size is indeed significantly weaker after reform. Risk-taking associated with capital ratios is also weaker after reform, though not significantly so. Since systematic risk is undoubtedly the more appropriate measure, reform seems to have reduced moral hazard.     

Financial guarantors’ executive compensation,charter value and risk-taking

Financial guarantees have been extensively used recently as part of rescue packages to bail out troubled institutions and governments around the world. We propose a new incentive compensation model for studying agency conflict between the shareholders and the manager of a typical financial guarantor. In our model, the manager chooses the guarantor's risk level, with disutility to reduce risk (i.e., reducing the risk of the guarantor incurs a direct cost to the manager). Moral hazard causes the manager to select a level of risk that is higher than the level chosen in an otherwise first-best environment with no conflict of interest between the shareholders and the manager. However, in our proposed framework, charter value plays a self-disciplining role on the manager's appetite for risk, therefore it helps mitigate the extent of the deviation from first best with agency conflict found previously (e.g., 0055, 0015 and 0020). This suggests that researchers should study charter value, managerial compensation and risk decisions within a unified framework and not separately, as all studies have done in the past.